- Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Umbra Technologies Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 11, 2025 · IPR2024-00344 · APJ St John Courtenay III · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–7 unpatentable under § 103 over Agarwala, finding Petitioner proved unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“2. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the asserted grounds of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 23
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notTerm construed petitioner constructionPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner
“[t]he prosecution history is consistent with the specification’s focus on the data beacons recited in the preamble as being the disclosed invention.” PO Resp. 24. Accordingly, we find the prosecution history also favors Petitioner regarding whether “[t]he term ‘data beacons’ recited in the preamble is an intended use and not limiting.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Accordingly, based on the complete record, we agree with Petitioner” slip op. at 47
Patent outcomesUS 11,146,632 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,146,632 - Qualcomm Incorporated v. Network System Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2024-00343 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as obvious over Rădulescu2004 and OCP; the Board did not reach the Weber-based grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“include (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) the type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior-art solutions to those problems; (4) the rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) the sophistication of the technology; and (6) the educational level of workers active in the field. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696–97 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Not all factors may exist in every case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case. Id. These factors are not exhaustive, but merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Moreover, the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 (2006). “[T]he use of the word ‘means’ in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112, para. 6 applies.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part); Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 703–04 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “[This] presumption may be rebutted if the properly construed claim limitation itself recites sufficiently definite structure to perform the claimed function.” Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Ex. 1001, 4:46–50. This passage indicates that the interconnect can be a network on a chip and the network on a chip can include wires and buses. That does not necessarily mean that the interconnect can be just wires or buses; rather, it discloses that the interconnect can include wires and buses. In context, the disclosure regarding wires and buses does not support construing the corresponding structure broadly enough to encompass just wires and buses. The networks that constitute the corresponding structure, however, could include networks with wires and buses. Therefore, we agree with Patent Owner that the corresponding structure for the interconnect means should not include a mere bus, switch, and point-to-point wire and instead find that the corresponding structure under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 is a network, which the ’052 patent describes as a multi-hop interconnection between modules separated by one or more network nodes. See Ex. 1001, 2:33–37. Because this structure corresponds to the construction of “interconnect means” proposed by Patent Owner and adopted by the district courts in the TI and Qualcomm litigations (see supra Section III.C.3.b), and we do not rely in our analysis below on a recourse to “equivalents thereto” as permitted by § 112 ¶ 6, we note that our ultimate conclusions on the unpatentability of the challenged claims would be the same if § 112 ¶ 6 did not apply. iii. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, we construe “interconnect means” to cover the structure described in the Specification corresponding to the specified functions of “coupling said plurality of processing modules (M, S)” in the context of claim 6 and “coupling said plurality of processing modules (M, S)” and “enabling a connection-based communication having a set of connection properties” in the context of claims 1 and 7—i.e., a “multi-hop interconnection between modules separated by one or more network nodes”—and equivalents thereof.” slip op. at 28
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“standard as would be used by a district court to construe a claim in a civil action involving the validity or infringement of a patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. Id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 7,594,052 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,594,052 - Qualcomm Incorporated v. Network System Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01081 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2, 6, and 9–16 are unpatentable as obvious over Goossens2003 and Drake; the Board did not reach the Goossens2002 and Drake challenge.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“3. WHETHER AN ORDINARILY SKILLED ARTISAN WOULD HAVE BEEN MOTIVATED TO COMBINE THE TEACHINGS OF” slip op. at 54
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Qualcomm”) filed a petition in IPR2024-01081 challenging claims 2, 6, and 9–16 in the ’449 patent on substantively identical grounds to those asserted in Samsung’s Petition. Qualcomm Incorporated v. Network System Technologies, LLC, IPR2024-01081, Paper 1 (“Pet.”).2 Concurrently with filing the petition in IPR2024-01081, Petitioner filed a motion for joinder, seeking joinder as a party in this proceeding under 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). IPR2024-01081, Paper 3. slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“IV. JOINDER AND THE ONE-YEAR TIME BAR IN § 315(b) Regarding joinder, § 315(c) permits joinder as a party and states:” slip op. at 157
- ExcludeOther
“In our analyses above, we do not rely on any of the evidence that Petitioner seeks to exclude. See, e.g., supra §§ III.C–III.E. Hence, we dismiss Petitioner’s motion to exclude evidence as moot. See, e.g., Netflix, Inc. v. GoTV Streaming, LLC, IPR2023-00757, Paper 39 at 135 (PTAB Nov. 5, 2024) (dismissing motion to exclude evidence as moot); Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc. v. Spero, IPR2023-00335, Paper 40 at 24 (PTAB July 15, 2024) (dismissing motion to exclude evidence as moot).” slip op. at 159
Patent outcomesUS 7,373,449 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,373,449 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Qualcomm Incorporated v. Network System Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2024-00338 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2, 6, and 9–16 are unpatentable under § 103(a) as obvious over Goossens2003 and Drake.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“Accordingly, “the teachings of Drake apply directly to systems on” slip op. at 82
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“In October 2024, the Board (1) instituted an inter partes review in IPR2024-01081, (2) granted Petitioner’s motion for joinder in IPR2024- 01081, and (3) joined Petitioner as a party in this proceeding. Paper 16 (“Qualcomm Inst. Dec.”), 50–51; IPR2024-01081, Paper 14 at 50–51. The next day, based on a settlement between Samsung and Patent Owner, the Board granted in part a joint motion to terminate filed by Samsung and Patent Owner and terminated Samsung as a petitioner in this proceeding. See Paper 14 (Joint Motion); Paper 17 (Order).” slip op. at 3
- ExcludeOther
“In our analyses above, we do not rely on any of the evidence that Petitioner seeks to exclude. See, e.g., supra §§ III.C–III.E. Hence, we dismiss Petitioner’s motion to exclude evidence as moot. See, e.g., Netflix, Inc. v. GoTV Streaming, LLC, IPR2023-00757, Paper 39 at 135 (PTAB Nov. 5, 2024) (dismissing motion to exclude evidence as moot); Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc. v. Spero, IPR2023-00335, Paper 40 at 24 (PTAB July 15, 2024) (dismissing motion to exclude evidence as moot).” slip op. at 159
Patent outcomesUS 7,373,449 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,373,449 - Nuvei Technologies, Inc. v. Autoscribe CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2025-00089 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Nuvei did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–27 would have been obvious over either asserted combination.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“providing” negative limitation of independent claim 1, and the similar negative limitations of independent claims 8, 15, 23, and 25. Accordingly, Nuvei has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on its assertions that the subject matter of independent claims 1, 8, 15, 23, and 25 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Stringfellow and Kloster.” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“the art “would have had at least (1) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or comparable field of study, and (2) at least two years’ experience working with and programming networked computer systems.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 36). Nuvei also argues that “[a]dditional education might substitute for some experience, and vice versa.” Id. In the Preliminary Response, Autoscribe does not address the level of skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Nuvei’s proposed assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with both the ’621 patent and the asserted prior art, and it is supported by the testimony of Dr. Almeroth.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“The supporting testimony from Nuvei’s declarant, Dr. Almeroth, on these issues fare no better. Dr. Almeroth provides no additional explanation beyond the arguments and evidence presented in the Petition to support Nuvei’s assertion that Kloster does not provide the payment data token to the payer during its token retrieval functions. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 100.” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“argument that Kloster does not teach the “without providing” negative limitation required by each independent claim. Nuvei appears to contend that Kloster teaches this limitation in two different ways—namely, through either a “call back URL” or “API calls by the merchant.” Pet. 50–51 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 15, 23) (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 24). We address Nuvei’s contentions in turn.” slip op. at 21
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,620,621 - Intel Corporation / Lenovo (United States) Inc. et al. v. Collision Communications, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 28, 2025 · IPR2025-00301 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review for claims 1–11, 16, and 21 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored discretionary denial, and denied joinder.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“2026. This date is nearly five months prior to the date on which the final written decision would be due if trial were instituted in this proceeding. And, even if we assume Petitioner’s alleged February–March 2026 trial date, this date too is several months prior to the projected final written decision deadline. As such, it is unlikely that a final written decision in this proceeding would issue before trial in the district court, unless the trial was delayed or rescheduled for a later time. Thus, we find this factor weighs in favor of exercising our discretion to deny institution. See ARM Ltd. v. Daedalus Prime LLC, IPR2025-00207, Paper 10 at 2 (May 16, 2025) (Before the Office of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office) (exercising discretion to deny institution with the same relative timing between district court trial and final written decision deadline).” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsNot reached
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Institution of inter partes review, however, is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). For the reasons discussed below, we exercise discretion pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) not to institute inter partes review. Additionally, for the same reasons and because institution was denied in IPR2024-01248, we deny Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (“[T]he Director . . . may join as a party . . . any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director . . . determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314.”).” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,814,071 - Xu Peicheng (Hong Kong) Optoelectronic Technology Co., Limited v. Semisilicon Technology Corp.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · May 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00156 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 and 8 are unpatentable over the stated obviousness grounds; claims 4–6 were not shown unpatentable because Hiroyuki does not teach the claimed terminal pins.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Relying on the Schubert Declaration, Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, materials science, or a related discipline, and 6 years of 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (Sept. 16, 2011), includes amendments to Section 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the challenged claims issued from an application filed before March 16, 2013, we apply pre-AIA law. See Pet. 2; Ex. 1001, codes (22), (30). 2 US 2009/0021955 A1, published January 22, 2009 (Ex. 1004, codes (10), (43)) (“Kuang”). Petitioner contends that Kuang is prior art to the ’546 patent at least under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 2. 3 US 2012/0050606 A1, published March 1, 2012 (Ex. 1005, codes (10), (43)) (“Debevec”). Petitioner asserts that “[b]ecause Debevec was filed prior to the priority date of the ’546 patent, it qualifies as prior art at least under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).” Pet. 2. 4 US 6,774,584 B2, issued August 10, 2004 (Ex. 1008, codes (10), (45)) (“Lys”). Petitioner contends that Lys is prior art to the ’546 patent at least under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 2–3. 5 JP2006-228529, published August 31, 2006 (Ex. 1006, code (43)) (“Hiroyuki”). We refer herein to the certified English translation filed as Exhibit 1007. Petitioner contends that Hiroyuki is prior art to the ’546 patent at least under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 2. practical experience in designing or fabricating LED lighting systems, including controlling and driving LEDs,” or “[a]lternatively . . . would have had a master’s degree and four years of experience, or a Ph.D. degree and two years of experience.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 31). Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 7–8. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner as it is consistent with the ’546 patent and the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“The parties also dispute the interpretation of the term “synchronous signals” recited in claim 1, with the parties proposing these respective constructions: Petitioner’s Proposed Patent Owner’s Proposed Construction Construction “signals that are sent to the slave “signals related to activities governed by synchronized timing” nodes to control their corresponding LED strings at the same time.”” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“The “context” is typically evaluated by reviewing the intrinsic record. See e.g., Regeneron, 130 F.4th at 1380–84. Here, as discussed above, the ’546 patent has multiple disclosures where a curtain lamp has a single light-emitting diode in one light-emitting diode string. See Ex. 1001, 1:33–36, 6:15–20, 6:27–40, 8:25–45. In particular, the ’546 patent similarly discloses a first curtain lamp with one LED in one light string, as well as a second curtain lamp, which provides further support for Petitioner’s proposed interpretation. Id. at 8:25–45. Although Patent Owner argues that Figures 7 and 8 disclose multiple LEDs and light strings in curtain lamps, other embodiments and claims explicitly indicate single components in a “curtain lamp.” “[T]here is a strong presumption against a claim construction that excludes a disclosed embodiment.” See In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Given that certain embodiments and claim 8 disclose a curtain lamp with one light string with one LED, we decline to interpret the claim to prohibit Petitioner’s interpretation. Additionally, we do not find that Petitioner’s claim interpretation renders the claim terms nonsensical or illogical. See Becton, 616 F.3d at 1255. Patent Owner asserts otherwise, arguing that Petitioner’s interpretation is based upon a “nonsensical” or “absurd[]” argument, there is no reason to have both a master and slave control unit to operate a single LED, and the interpretation renders most of the components superfluous. See PO Sur-reply 12; PO Resp. Supp. Br. 5. As discussed above, however, although the ’546 patent does not appear to provide any explanation for why there are master and slave control units to operate a single LED, the patent nevertheless discloses that in embodiments. This situation is also distinguishable from Becton, where “unequivocal language” of the claim recited “spring means ‘connected to’ the hinged arm,” such that interpreting the spring means and the hinged arm as the same structure would have rendered the claim nonsensical. Becton, 616 F.3d at 1254–55. Becton further found that interpreting the spring means and hinged arm as the same structure would be inconsistent with descriptions of the elements in the specification. Id. Here, in contrast, the ’546 patent Specification is replete with disclosures of a curtain lamp having one light string with one LED, and claim 8 is directed to the same. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s interpretation of these claim elements.” slip op. at 36
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“Although Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s arguments in the Reply on “light strings” and “curtain lamp” as they relate to a single LED are improper, we do not agree. As Patent Owner acknowledges, the Petition and Dr. Schubert’s original declaration stated that a “curtain lamp” is “commonly understood to be one or more light strings.” See PO Sur-reply 12; see also Pet. 8; Ex. 1003 ¶ 37. Patent Owner did not contest Petitioner’s interpretation in its Response. See PO Resp. 15. Patent Owner did, however, argue that Kuang did not teach or suggest “light strings” in any form and therefore did not teach a “curtain lamp” under Petitioner’s definition of the same. PO Resp. 15–17. A petitioner reply may respond to arguments raised in a patent owner’s response under 35 U.S.C. § 42.23(b), and here Petitioner’s argument that a light string may have a single LED is properly presented in its Reply in response to Patent Owner’s arguments. Further, Patent Owner was not only aware that Petitioner had taken the position that a “curtain lamp” could be a single “light string,” but Patent Owner also did not dispute Petitioner’s interpretation.8 Our view, therefore, is that Petitioner’s argument that a curtain lamp may be a single LED is proper because it is corollary to Petitioner’s reply arguments on light strings. That is, Petitioner’s assertion follows from the reply arguments on light strings and the unopposed interpretation of curtain lamp as a single light string. Additionally, to the extent there could be any prejudice to Patent Owner by these light string and curtain lamp arguments, Patent Owner has had opportunities to address them by supplemental briefing.” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 8,884,546 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,884,546 - LG Electronics, Inc. / LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. v. Multimedia Technologies Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · May 12, 2025 · IPR2024-00353 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 6, 8–10, 12–17, and 19 are unpatentable as obvious over Kim, WD-Manual, and Bae, with Coburn added for claims 6, 12, and 19.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“See Pet. 123 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 267, 269). LG argues—and we agree—that, because Kim already provides functionality that updates the EPG information when the user performs a search, it would not require a leap of logic to incorporate Bae’s channel number selection window 330 that contains numbers 0 to 9, together with Coburn’s technique that predictably narrows the channel identifiers displayed based on the user selecting numbers sequentially, into Kim. See id. at 123–126. LG merely reiterates this position in the Reply and, therefore, does not shift its obviousness theory with respect to dependent claim 6. See Pet. Reply 38–41. c. Summary In summary, LG has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of dependent claims 6, 12, and 19 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Kim, WD-Manual, Bae, and Coburn.” slip op. at 85
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“2. Level of Skill in the Art In determining whether an invention would have been obvious at the” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 9,055,254 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,055,254 - Wiz, Inc. v. Orca Security Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · May 5, 2025 · IPR2025-00095 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Orca disclaimed all challenged claims 1–18, so no trial could be instituted on them.
RulingsInstitution decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“Based on our review of Exhibit 2002 and the USPTO’s public records, we conclude that a disclaimer of claims 1–18 of the ’855 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) has been recorded in the Office as of April 24, 2025. Ex. 2002. Because we cannot institute an IPR based on disclaimed claims and all of the challenged claims of the ’855 patent have been disclaimed, no trial will be instituted. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (Decision” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 11,637,855 - Wiz, Inc. v. Orca Security Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · May 5, 2025 · IPR2025-00093 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Orca disclaimed all challenged claims 1–20, leaving no claims on which to institute IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“Based on our review of Exhibit 2002 and the USPTO’s public records, we conclude that a disclaimer of claims 1–20 of the ’257 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) has been recorded in the Office as of April 24, 2025. Ex. 2002. Because we cannot institute an IPR based on disclaimed claims and all of the challenged claims of the ’257 patent have been disclaimed, no trial will be instituted. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (Decision” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 11,582,257
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.