• DISH Network LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 22, 2025 · IPR2024-00373 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17 are unpatentable as obvious, principally over Amit and Jacobsen and, for additional claims, Amit, Jacobsen, and DSL-Book; the Board did not reach grounds 1 and 2.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Considering the parties’ proposals and the record evidence, we adopt the following level of ordinary skill in the art, which we apply in this Decision: A POSITA would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, and two to three years of experience with broadband communication networks. Additional professional experience could substitute for education, and additional education could substitute for professional experience. We find Patent Owner’s proposal to limit a POSITA’s education and experience to “broadband networks over coaxial cables” too narrow. Although Patent Owner points to various parts of the ’249 patent as supporting its restrictive proposal, other parts of the patent are not so limited. For example, the patent’s technical field and summary are not limited to coaxial cable, and the patent discusses LAN wiring, twisted pair, and satellite as communications media that can be used. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:11–16, 2:65–66, 3:9–37, 3:58–61, 7:4–5. In addition, while Patent Owner indicates that the ’249 patent addresses “the problem of tap port-to-port isolation and providing a suitable signal path for terminal-to-terminal communication in a coaxial cable wired building” (id. at 3:4–7), we see no reason why this problem and the solutions proposed in the ’249 patent (using frequency bins to bit load or equalization) would not be equally applicable to other kinds of communication media. Therefore, we find our adopted skill level to be consistent with the problems and solutions identified in the ’249 patent and prior art references asserted by Petitioner. In addition, we find the adopted skill level consistent with the education and experience that a POSITA would have had. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17–18; Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 57–58.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther

    “Only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner contends that the challenged claims would have been “obvious under any reasonable interpretation, so no express constructions are required.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not offer any construction for any claim term. Accordingly, there is no dispute over claim construction that we need to resolve. We apply the ordinary and customary meanings consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b).” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “On this record, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Jacobsen was publicly accessible more than one year before the ’249 patent. Jacobsen is thus § 102(b) prior art. By its own terms, Jacobsen indicates that it is one of the National Cable Television Association (“NCTA”) 1994 Technical Papers related to the 43rd Annual NCTA Convention and Exposition, New Orleans, Louisiana, May 22–25, 1994. Ex. 1007, 1–3, 6. This event and related papers address topics that would have interested persons in the field as we define their skill level. See § II.B, supra. The listing of Jacobsen as one of the papers covered in the event schedule suggests that POSITAs attending this event would have known of and had access to Jacobsen. Ex. 1007, 2–3. In fact, Mr. Bates, Patent Owner’s own expert witness, who was at least a person having ordinary skill in the art, testified that he was aware of Dr. Jacobsen’s work in the late 1990s, well before the priority date. See Ex. 1029, 52:10– 55:1. Therefore, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have known of Jacobsen before the priority date. See Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that a catalog distributed at a conference was a printed publication); In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding a slide presentation at a conference was a printed publication); Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. AB Fortia, 774, F.2d 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that a paper disseminated to six people of ordinary skill in the art and discussed with between 50 and 500 people skilled in the art was a printed publication). The evidence further demonstrates that Jacobsen was acquired by the Linda Hall Library, Kansas City, Missouri, on September 19, 1995 and made available to the public shortly afterward. Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 4–5, 13; Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 7, 17. Availability to interested persons more than one year before the ’249 patent is corroborated by other publications of Jacobsen, as well as Dr. Acton’s testimony. Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 10–13; Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 10–12, 16–17; Ex. 1003 ¶ 247. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments against Jacobsen. There is no requirement in the law for Ms. Munford to be an interested person or POSITA in order for her to testify about how the Linda Hall Library acquired and cataloged Jacobsen so that interested persons would be able to access it. Her testimony relates to the public accessibility of Jacobsen, not its technical content. See, e.g., Ex. 1031 ¶ 6. She need not qualify as a POSITA to offer this testimony. Ms. Munford further testified that MARC records are used by the public to discover materials within a library’s collection, and that library users, which would include interested persons and POSITAs, do not require knowledge of how MARC records are maintained in order to use them. Ex. 1031 ¶ 8. And even if MARC records are editable, as Patent Owner argues, Patent Owner has not shown that the MARC record for Jacobsen was altered, and Ms. Munford states that such an alteration would have been unusual practice for a library. Ex. 1022 ¶ 4; Ex. 1031 ¶ 14.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “We do not agree with Patent Owner that Amit is restricted to “single frequency” modulation. PO Resp. 52–56. As Petitioner notes, Amit describes that its HCNM modem uses a channel (e.g., DOCSIS) containing two sub-channels for upstream and downstream signals. Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1005, 15:18–28). This meets Patent Owner’s definition for multicarrier communications as multiple subcarriers to provide communications of a single channel. PO Sur-Reply 6. We further note that the claims do not recite “multicarrier communications” so the distinction Patent Owner attempts to draw is not supported by commensurate language in the claims. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (limitations not appearing in a claim cannot be relied upon for patentability). Furthermore, even if Amit were restricted to single carrier modulation, as Patent Owner argues, Petitioner relies on Jacobsen for its teaching of multicarrier modulation. Pet. 62–66; PO Resp. 52–56. In essence, Patent Owner attacks Amit individually and does not properly consider how a POSITA would have understood the combined teachings of Amit and Jacobsen. “Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the [challenge] is based upon the teachings of a combination of references.” In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)).” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 7,594,249 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,594,249
• DISH Network LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01060 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17 are unpatentable: claims 1–2, 4–6, 8–10, 12–14, and 16–17 as obvious over Amit and Jacobsen; claims 2–3, 7, 9–13, 15, and 17 as obvious over Amit, Jacobsen, and DSL-Book.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Considering the parties’ proposals and the record evidence, we adopt the following level of ordinary skill in the art, which we apply in this Decision: A POSITA would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, and two to three years of experience with broadband communication networks. Additional professional experience could substitute for education, and additional education could substitute for professional experience. We find Patent Owner’s proposal to limit a POSITA’s education and experience to “broadband networks over coaxial cables” too narrow. Although Patent Owner points to various parts of the ’249 patent as supporting its restrictive proposal, other parts of the patent are not so limited. For example, the patent’s technical field and summary are not limited to coaxial cable, and the patent discusses LAN wiring, twisted pair, and satellite as communications media that can be used. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:11–16, 2:65–66, 3:9–37, 3:58–61, 7:4–5. In addition, while Patent Owner indicates that the ’249 patent addresses “the problem of tap port-to-port isolation and providing a suitable signal path for terminal-to-terminal communication in a coaxial cable wired building” (id. at 3:4–7), we see no reason why this problem and the solutions proposed in the ’249 patent (using frequency bins to bit load or equalization) would not be equally applicable to other kinds of communication media. Therefore, we find our adopted skill level to be consistent with the problems and solutions identified in the ’249 patent and prior art references asserted by Petitioner. In addition, we find the adopted” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner contends that the challenged claims would have been “obvious under any reasonable interpretation, so no express constructions are required.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not offer any construction for any claim term. Accordingly, there is no dispute over claim construction that we need to resolve. We apply the ordinary and customary meanings consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b).” slip op. at 15

  • BurdenUnpatentable

    “On this record, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Jacobsen was publicly accessible more than one year before the ’249 patent. Jacobsen is thus § 102(b) prior art. By its own terms, Jacobsen indicates that it is one of the National Cable Television Association (“NCTA”) 1994 Technical Papers related to the 43rd Annual NCTA Convention and Exposition, New Orleans, Louisiana, May 22–25, 1994. Ex. 1007, 1–3, 6. This event and related papers address topics that would have interested persons in the field as we define their skill level. See § II.B, supra. The listing of Jacobsen as one of the papers covered in the event schedule suggests that POSITAs attending this event would have known of and had access to Jacobsen. Ex. 1007, 2–3. In fact, Mr. Bates, Patent Owner’s own expert witness, who was at least a person having ordinary skill in the art, testified that he was aware of Dr. Jacobsen’s work in the late 1990s, well before the priority date. See Ex. 1029, 52:10– 55:1. Therefore, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have known of Jacobsen before the priority date. See Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that a catalog distributed at a conference was a printed publication); In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding a slide presentation at a conference was a printed publication); Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. AB Fortia, 774, F.2d 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that a paper disseminated to six people of ordinary skill in the art and discussed with between 50 and 500 people skilled in the art was a printed publication). The evidence further demonstrates that Jacobsen was acquired by the Linda Hall Library, Kansas City, Missouri, on September 19, 1995 and made available to the public shortly afterward. Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 4–5, 13; Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 7, 17. Availability to interested persons more than one year before the ’249 patent is corroborated by other publications of Jacobsen, as well as Dr. Acton’s testimony. Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 10–13; Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 10–12, 16–17; Ex. 1003 ¶ 247. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments against Jacobsen. There is no requirement in the law for Ms. Munford to be an interested person or POSITA in order for her to testify about how the Linda Hall Library acquired and cataloged Jacobsen so that interested persons would be able to access it. Her testimony relates to the public accessibility of Jacobsen, not its technical content. See, e.g., Ex. 1031 ¶ 6. She need not qualify as a POSITA to offer this testimony. Ms. Munford further testified that MARC records are used by the public to discover materials within a library’s collection, and that library users, which would include interested persons and POSITAs, do not require knowledge of how MARC records are maintained in order to use them. Ex. 1031 ¶ 8. And even if MARC records are editable, as Patent Owner argues, Patent Owner has not shown that the MARC record for Jacobsen was altered, and Ms. Munford states that such an alteration would have been unusual practice for a library. Ex. 1022 ¶ 4; Ex. 1031 ¶ 14.” slip op. at 21

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “On this record, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Jacobsen was publicly accessible more than one year before the ’249 patent. Jacobsen is thus § 102(b) prior art. By its own terms, Jacobsen indicates that it is one of the National Cable Television Association (“NCTA”) 1994 Technical Papers related to the 43rd Annual NCTA Convention and Exposition, New Orleans, Louisiana, May 22–25, 1994. Ex. 1007, 1–3, 6. This event and related papers address topics that would have interested persons in the field as we define their skill level. See § II.B, supra. The listing of Jacobsen as one of the papers covered in the event schedule suggests that POSITAs attending this event would have known of and had access to Jacobsen. Ex. 1007, 2–3. In fact, Mr. Bates, Patent Owner’s own expert witness, who was at least a person having ordinary skill in the art, testified that he was aware of Dr. Jacobsen’s work in the late 1990s, well before the priority date. See Ex. 1029, 52:10– 55:1. Therefore, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have known of Jacobsen before the priority date. See Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that a catalog distributed at a conference was a printed publication); In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding a slide presentation at a conference was a printed publication); Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. AB Fortia, 774, F.2d 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that a paper disseminated to six people of ordinary skill in the art and discussed with between 50 and 500 people skilled in the art was a printed publication). The evidence further demonstrates that Jacobsen was acquired by the Linda Hall Library, Kansas City, Missouri, on September 19, 1995 and made available to the public shortly afterward. Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 4–5, 13; Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 7, 17. Availability to interested persons more than one year before the ’249 patent is corroborated by other publications of Jacobsen, as well as Dr. Acton’s testimony. Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 10–13; Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 10–12, 16–17; Ex. 1003 ¶ 247. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments against Jacobsen. There is no requirement in the law for Ms. Munford to be an interested person or POSITA in order for her to testify about how the Linda Hall Library acquired and cataloged Jacobsen so that interested persons would be able to access it. Her testimony relates to the public accessibility of Jacobsen, not its technical content. See, e.g., Ex. 1031 ¶ 6. She need not qualify as a POSITA to offer this testimony. Ms. Munford further testified that MARC records are used by the public to discover materials within a library’s collection, and that library users, which would include interested persons and POSITAs, do not require knowledge of how MARC records are maintained in order to use them. Ex. 1031 ¶ 8. And even if MARC records are editable, as Patent Owner argues, Patent Owner has not shown that the MARC record for Jacobsen was altered, and Ms. Munford states that such an alteration would have been unusual practice for a library. Ex. 1022 ¶ 4; Ex. 1031 ¶ 14.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 7,594,249 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,594,249
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Headwater Partners II LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Jun 18, 2025 · IPR2025-00426 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 11–15 over Jarvinen and Fox under § 103 and granted Samsung’s motion to join the T-Mobile IPR.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Because the issues presented in the instant Petition are identical to those in the T-Mobile IPR, we determine for the same reasons that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that at least one of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. Therefore, we institute inter partes review for the same reasons stated in our Decision on Institution in the T-Mobile IPR. See IPR2024-01468, Paper 17.” slip op. at 7

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “Petitioner’s Motion addresses each of these considerations. Mot. 1–8. According to Petitioner, its “[P]etition challenges the validity of the same claims of the ’868 patent on identical grounds to those in the T-Mobile IPR,” “[t]here are no substantive differences between [Petitioner’s] and the T-Mobile IPR Petitioners’ Petition,” and “[Petitioner] also relies on the same supporting evidence.” Id. at 4–5. Petitioner argues that its “petition will not raise any new issues of unpatentability and will not impose any additional burden on the Board or Patent Owner, or add additional complexity to the case,” and that joinder will not unduly burden or negatively impact the trial schedule. Id. at 6. Further, Petitioner agrees to take an “understudy” role, and “[u]nless and until the current Petitioners in [the T-Mobile IPR] cease to participate in the T-Mobile IPR, [Petitioner] will not assume an active role.” Id. at 7–8. Thus, according to Petitioner, Patent Owner will not suffer prejudice if the two proceedings are joined. Id. at 8. Patent Owner has not disputed the above contentions by Petitioner and does not point to any particular prejudice relating to joining the two proceedings. In light of these considerations, Petitioner has shown that joinder to the T-Mobile IPR is appropriate in this case. Therefore, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 8

  None
  Patents in suitUS 9,094,868
• Askeladden L.L.C. v. Calabrese Stemer LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 17, 2025 · IPR2024-00368 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as anticipated by Horie; the Board did not reach the alternative obviousness ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The definition of a person having ordinary skill in the art that we adopted in the Institution Decision is supported by the testimony of Dr. Akl. Ex. 1003 ¶ 22. Patent Owner states that it agrees with that definition, while also proposing a broader definition that includes those with other qualifications. PO Resp. 2. Although Patent Owner argues that “the supporting evidence [for its addition] is broadly present in the case, namely, in the Patent-in-Suit and the associated intrinsic evidence” (PO Sur-reply 3 n.6), Patent Owner does not direct us to any specific portion of the record. See United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866–67 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A brief must make all arguments accessible to the judges, rather than ask them to play archaeologist with the record.”). Additionally, while Patent Owner proposes expanding the definition, Patent Owner has not explained how that difference would materially affect the outcome of this proceeding. PO Resp. 2; PO Sur-reply 3 & nn. 4, 6. Dr. Akl uses Petitioner’s definition in his testimony (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 22, 23) and Patent Owner makes no argument regarding how, if we adopted Patent Owner’s broader definition, Dr. Akl’s conclusions would be affected. Patent Owner’s use of its definition does not describe the conclusions of one “educated in general physics” differently to one of ordinary skill as defined by Petitioner. PO Sur-reply 6. Patent Owner does not present declarant testimony regarding knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art under any definition.3 For these reasons, we maintain the definition of a person having ordinary skill in the art we adopted in the Decision on Institution: a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had experience in the hardware and software used in the field of securely transmitting and processing authorization requests over wired and wireless networks, such as requests for the processing of financial transactions, and a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related study, and would have one or two years of experience with wired and wireless 3 See infra footnote 5. as financial transactions. Less experience is necessary with additional education (e.g., a Master’s degree), and likewise, less education is necessary with additional work experience (e.g., 5–6 years).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Having analyzed the arguments and the evidence cited by Patent Owner, we do not agree. We begin with the claim language, which does not further describe the two transmission channels, let alone contradict the plain meaning. Ex. 1001, 6:5–19. Dependent claims also shed no additional light. Certain claims further specify transmission-channel-related requirements: that the first transmission channel be “selected from the group consisting of wireless and landline channels” (claim 7); that the request received via the first transmission channel be “provided via the Internet” (claim 5); or that the notifying step (via a second transmission channel) comprise “sending an SMS message to the customer (claim 2). Id. at 6:20–21, 6:28–29, 6:33–35. No claims further restrict claim 1 by describing both transmission channels. Id. Claim 9 requires that the notification be “substantially concurrent,” but nothing in the record establishes that substantially concurrent authorization and notification would require non-overlapping transmission channels, or that an overlap in the transmission channels, even if it did “encumber” the authorization process with the notification process, would prevent the processes from being “substantially concurrent.” While Patent Owner presents arguments about “the gist” of the invention (PO Resp. 4) and describes “an immediate separation of the two processes” as being disclosed by Figures 1 and 2 of the ’564 patent’s specification, we do not see in the specification an indication of a special disavowal of a broader scope. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316–1317; PO Resp. 13 (“The specification of the ‘564 Patent does not express any intent to impart a novel meaning to the term distinct.”). Although we agree with Patent Owner that Figure 1 illustrates transmission channels that are separate and non-overlapping, we do not see any indication that this is more than a description of preferred embodiments or that there was a limitation of the invention to these embodiments, and our reviewing court “has repeatedly ‘cautioned against limiting the claimed invention to preferred embodiments or specific examples in the specification.’” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). The specification similarly does not support that Figure 2 is intended as limiting.” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Because we do not adopt Patent Owner’s construction (including considering its arguments regarding speed and security of transmissions in the ’564 patent), and instead adopt a construction encompassing overlapping between distinct transmission channels, see supra Section II.C.1, we determine that the requirement of limitation 1d that “the second transmission channel [must be] distinct from the first transmission channel” is disclosed by the different connections, different hardware elements, and independent operation of the two transmission channels identified in Horie, even though they overlap to some extent. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 44, Fig. 1; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 224–227; see PO Resp. 9. Lastly, Horie discloses that the authorization of a transaction occurs without requiring a response from the customer. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 57, 58, 73; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 232–233. For these reasons, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 1 was anticipated by Horie.” slip op. at 29

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached

    “Obviousness Over Horie Petitioner additionally argues that each of claims 1–9 are obvious over Horie. Pet. 38–43. Because we determine that the challenged claims are anticipated by Horie, we do not address the parties’ arguments regarding those claims based on an alternate ground. See Boston Sci. Scimed, Inc. v. Cook Gp. Inc., 809 F. App’x 984, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“We agree that the Board need not address issues that are not necessary to the resolution of the proceeding.”).” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 8,783,564 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,783,564
• Askeladden L.L.C. v. Calabrese Stemer LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 17, 2025 · IPR2024-00369 · APJ Andreas Baltatzis · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 are unpatentable: claims 1–2 and 6–7 as anticipated, and claims 3–5 as obvious over Horie and Kobayashi.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time the invention was made “would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related study, and would have at least one or two years of experience with wired and wireless networks used to securely process requests for authorization of activity such as financial transactions.” Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Additionally, Petitioner contends that “[l]ess experience is necessary with additional education (e.g., a Master’s degree), and likewise, less education is necessary with additional work experience (e.g., 5–6 years).” Id. Patent Owner does not oppose or comment on Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. We determine this level of skill, with the exception of the open-ended phrase “at least,” which we remove from Petitioner’s proposal, comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’706 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “construction.” Pet. 8. However, Petitioner explains the term “merchant’s” recited in independent claims 1 and 6. Id.; see Ex. 1001, 5:54, 5:56, 6:52. The possessive term “merchant’s” is not followed by a subject noun. See id. Petitioner contends that during prosecution of the parent patent, U.S. Patent No. 7,357,310 B2, “the applicant explained that the ‘secure network and the ‘payment guarantee’ channel are illustrated between the acquirer 8 [sic] and the modem 5 of the merchant’s terminal.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1013, 45). Accordingly, Petitioner asserts that both instances of “merchant’s” should be read as “merchant’s terminal.” Id. Institution Decision (Inst. Dec. 11), Petitioner adds that Patent Owner in a related proceeding explained “the expression may refer to anything in possession of, or under the control of the merchant, as the use of the possessive form implies.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing IPR2024-00367, Paper 10 (Patent Owner Response), 4)10. This explanation accords with Petitioner’s argument that “merchant’s” includes least a “merchant’s terminal.” Accordingly, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument and interpret “merchant’s” as at least including a “merchant’s terminal.”” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “We need not construe explicitly any other claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12

  • BurdenDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that Horie anticipates claims 1 and 2. Pet. 21–30. As discussed above, Patent Owner has not presented any arguments in a Response. The burden however remains on Petitioner, so we examine the Petition’s contentions to determine if they show by a preponderance of the evidence that the claims are unpatentable. For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Horie anticipates claims 1 and 2.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 7,954,706 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,954,706
• Askeladden L.L.C. v. Calabrese Stemer LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 17, 2025 · IPR2024-00367 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4 are unpatentable as anticipated by Horie; the Board did not reach the alternative obviousness ground and dismissed Petitioner’s motion to exclude as moot.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We maintain the definition of a person having ordinary skill in the art that we adopted in the Institution Decision. First, it is supported by the testimony of Dr. Akl. Ex. 1003 ¶ 22. Second, Patent Owner states that it adopts that definition. PO Resp. 3. Third, to the extent Patent Owner proposes expanding the definition, Patent Owner has not explained how that difference would materially affect the outcome of this proceeding. Id. Fourth, Patent Owner does not point to sufficient evidence to support its position. Id. Although Patent Owner argues that “the supporting evidence [for its addition] is broadly present in the case, namely, in the Patent-in-Suit and the associated intrinsic evidence,” Patent Owner does not direct us to any specific portion of the record. See id. We decline to search the record to find the evidence that supports it. See United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866–67 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A brief must make all arguments accessible to the judges, rather than ask them to play archaeologist with the record.”).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “As discussed below, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Horie anticipates claims 1 under Patent Owner’s proposed construction. See Section II.E.3. Because we only construe limitations “to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,” we do not expressly construe this limitation. See Nidec, 868 F.3d 1017 (quoting Vivid, 200 F.3d at 803).” slip op. at 12

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “preserved the objection by filing a timely motion to exclude. Mot. Exclude. Specifically, Petitioner argues that we should exclude Exhibit 2001 for three reasons: (1) it is untimely and prejudicial (37 C.F.R. §§ 42.23(b), 42.53(b); Fed. R. Evid. 403), (2) hearsay (Fed. R. Evid. 802), and (3) the best evidence rule (Fed. R. Evid. 1002). Id. The Stemer Declaration is used only to support Patent Owner’s arguments with respect to secondary considerations.5 PO Sur-reply 19–22; Ex. 2001; Ex. 2002. Because we do not reach obviousness, see infra Section II.F, we do not consider the Stemer Declaration, and we therefore dismiss the motion to exclude as moot.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

  Patent outcomesUS 7,357,310 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,357,310
• Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2024-00477 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as anticipated by and obvious over Komata; the Board did not reach the Tsuji or Rosenberg grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner contends that a POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science (or an equivalent degree), and two years of practical or industry experience in the field of human computer interaction (HCI), including implementation of computer-based systems and software for providing haptic feedback effects to a user. . . . Also, a person could have qualified as a [POSITA] with more formal education and less practical or industry experience, or vice versa. PO Resp. 17–18 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 17). Although these level of skill definitions are not the same, the differences are minor, and Patent Owner does not argue that its level of skill definition is dispositive. To the contrary, Patent Owner asserts that “[i]n any event, the challenged claims of the ’260 Patent are patentable under either . . . definition.” Id. at 18. We apply Petitioner’s level of skill but would have reached the same result had we applied Patent Owner’s.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “As we explained in our Institution Decision, we disagreed then, and still disagree, “that the second pressure must be detected after the first pressure is detected (or that the third pressure must be detected after the first pressure is detected) simply because the second pressure is greater than the first pressure (and the third pressure is greater than the second pressure).” Dec. 27. As we explained there, “[t]he claimed relative magnitudes of the first, second, and third pressures do not define any temporal relationships regarding the detection of the pressures.” Id. We agree with Petitioner that claim 1 recites quantitative relationships for the pressures, not temporal relationships. Reply 4. For example, claim 1 requires “the second pressure greater than the first pressure” but says nothing about when the second pressure must be greater than the first pressure. A key misconception undergirding Patent Owner’s argument is its statement that “a ‘first pressure’ must first exist before the invention can detect that the ‘second pressure’ is greater.” PO Resp. 27 (emphasis added). The claim does not require detecting that the second pressure is greater than the first pressure. Limitation [1c] simply says, “detect a second pressure on the first input device, the second pressure greater than the first pressure.” In other words, all the detection that this limitation requires is detecting a second pressure. The claim then observes that the second pressure is greater than the first pressure but does not require detecting this. Limitation [1e] similarly detects pressure but not the comparison: “detect a third pressure on the first input device, the third pressure greater than the second pressure.” Thus, it does not follow that “a ‘first pressure’ must first exist before the invention can detect that the ‘second pressure’ is greater.” See id. Accordingly, we determine that Patent Owner’s analysis of the claim language is unpersuasive.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Our decision here does not depend on the meaning of this term. Patent Owner only argues the phrase “tactile sensation” for Petitioner’s challenge over Rosenberg, which we do not reach because Petitioner’s challenge over Komata is dispositive. See PO Resp. 63–66. Accordingly, we do not construe this term.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “that Komata discloses all the limitations of claim 1. Patent Owner does not dispute that Komata discloses all the limitations of claim 1. Instead, Patent Owner disputes that Komata discloses the order of all the steps of claim 1, based on its construction requiring the steps to be performed in order. PO Resp. 50–54; Reply 17 (observing that Patent Owner “does not dispute that Ground 1 demonstrates how Komata anticipates or renders obvious claims 1–7 if [Patent Owner’s] ordered-steps argument is rejected”); Sur-reply 12–14 (not disputing the Reply’s observation). As Patent Owner’s argument relies on a claim construction we have not adopted, Patent Owner fails to undermine Petitioner’s persuasive showing.7 To the extent, as we note above, that the claims may require a partial ordering (i.e., limitation [1a] preceding limitation [1b] and limitation [1c] preceding limitation [1d], see supra Section I.A.1.a), Petitioner has persuasively shown that Komata discloses such ordering. a. Summary as to Claim 1 For the above reasons, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is anticipated by and would have been obvious over Komata. 3. Dependent Claims 2–7 Petitioner also contends that claims 2–7 would have been obvious over Komata. Pet. 28–35. Patent Owner does not dispute these dependent claims. Petitioner provides detailed explanations indicating where Komata teaches or suggests the limitations of claims 2–7, supported by Mr. Ward’s testimony. Id. We determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2–7 are anticipated by and would have been obvious over Komata.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 7,336,260 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,336,260
• Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2024-00478 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable because Petitioner proved that Rosenberg I anticipates them.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, plus at least two years of industry or graduate level experience with software engineering, haptics programming, and/or human-computer interaction, including experience with user-interfaces and applications involving touchscreens, touchpads, and related technologies.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “feedback that simulates a mechanical detent.” PO Resp. 28; Sur-reply 3. Petitioner “does not explicitly disagree” that a virtual detent is “vibrotactile feedback that simulates a mechanical detent.” Reply 2. Petitioner asserts that “[i]f there is a dispute, it is whether Rosenberg I’s vibrotactile feedback ‘simulates a mechanical detent’ because [Patent Owner] says such simulation requires a sense of mechanical resistance and Rosenberg I allegedly lacks such simulated resistance.” Id. (citing PO Resp. 58–59).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “To the extent Patent Owner urges us to require virtual detents to vary on a system or application basis, we do not find this interpretation required by the claims or specification either. Although the claims refer to “a plurality of systems,” they do not recite different detent profiles for each of those systems. Claim 1, for example, recites “receiving a detent profile associated with one of the systems.” The other claims are similar. Patent Owner’s reliance on non-limiting specification language is also unavailing. E.g., Ex. 1001, 8:38–46 (“can” and “may”), 4:30–44 (“embodiment” and “may”).” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

    “supports its proposed construction. See PO Resp. 32. Patent Owner argues that claim 15 recites a “system comprising” “an input device configured to control one of a plurality of systems,” and hence “the recited plurality of systems are subsystems in addition to the containing system.” Id. We question how this point supports Patent Owner’s proposal because this does not address why each system must “provide[] context for virtual detents.” But regardless, we find it unpersuasive because claim 15’s preamble is not limiting (merely reciting “A system comprising”). See Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[P]reamble language that merely states the purpose or intended use of an invention is generally not treated as limiting the scope of the claim.”); see also Tr. 80:4– 8 (Patent Owner conceding that the preamble is non-limiting). Nor is there any explicit language in claim 15 that would exclude any particular system, such as the system recited in the preamble, from the recited “plurality of systems.”” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 9,430,042 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 9,430,042
• Microsoft Corporation v. Eyesmatch Ltd.Instituted
  PTAB · May 28, 2025 · IPR2025-00296 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted review of claims 1–18 on all petition grounds and granted Microsoft’s motion to join IPR2025-00296 with IPR2024-00810.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “II. DECISION The challenges to the ’110 patent’s claims in this Petition are identical to the challenges in the ’810 IPR’s petition. See, e.g., Pet. 6; ’810 IPR, Paper 1, 8. Additionally, in this proceeding, Patent Owner has not argued that the Petition’s challenges lack sufficient merit to institute trial. See, e.g., Notice 1. For the same reasons we explained in the ’810 Institution Decision, we institute inter partes review of all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 4

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “Joinder is a matter within the Board’s discretion based on the particular circumstances of each proceeding. In this proceeding, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated that joinder with the ʼ810 IPR would avoid duplication and promote the efficient resolution of both proceedings.” slip op. at 5

  None
  Patents in suitUS 8,982,110
• Inductev, Inc. v. Witricity CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 20, 2025 · IPR2024-00105 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–13 and 16 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103(a) over the stated Fells-based grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had . . . a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, microelectronics, or equivalent, and . . . two to three years of industry or research experience,” and “a higher level of education or skill might make up for less experience, and vice-versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39–44). Patent Owner “does not disagree with Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art,” but “does not believe that resolution of the Petition depends on the precise definition of the level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 12. Petitioner’s proposed articulation is supported by testimonial evidence and appears consistent with the types of problems and solutions in the ’184 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:15–2:53. As it is uncontested, we adopt it for this decision.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “The parties agree that the terms of the contested claims should be given their ordinary and customary meaning, but neither party argues that we should construe any claim terms explicitly. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62– 63); PO Resp. 12. We agree with the parties that, for this decision, we do not need to construe any of the terms explicitly. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). However, the meaning of certain terms are contested, including most notably “magnetic field sensor,” and we discuss those terms below in the context of the prior art.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notNot reached

    “Petitioner argues that, to the extent the preamble is limiting, Fells discloses the recited wireless energy transfer system, and that the system includes facilities to detect FOD. Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 191, Fig. 2; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66–71, 96–101). Patent Owner does not specifically contest Petitioner’s arguments. See PO Resp. We agree with Petitioner’s argument that Fells discloses the preamble; thus, we need not decide whether the preamble is limiting. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 191, Fig. 2.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that the ordinary and customary meaning of “magnetic field sensor” refers to a device that measures only external magnetic fields. There is nothing in the claim language to suggest such a limitation: the plain language simply refers to a “magnetic field sensor,” without regard to how the sensor works or where it senses magnetic fields from. Ex. 1001, 12:16. In fact, the claim does not explicitly require sensing anything at all using the magnetic field sensor, merely reciting a “foreign object debris detection system” comprising the sensor and that the “foreign object debris detection system is configured to verify” the presence of FOD. The very general nature of how the magnetic field sensor is recited, without any explicit recitation of how its output may be used, undermines Patent Owner’s overly restrictive interpretation. Although the ’184 patent specification includes examples of measuring external magnetic fields to detect FOD, Patent Owner has not pointed to anything in the specification indicating an intent to restrict the term “magnetic field sensor” to only those sensors that measure external magnetic fields. Nor is there intrinsic evidence that an “eddy-current sensor” would not also be a magnetic field sensor, given that it senses magnetic fields. Indeed, as Petitioner persuasively argues, an eddy-current sensor still measures external magnetic fields—albeit magnetic fields generated within FOD through interaction with a powered sensor. Pet. 6–7; Ex. 1037 ¶¶ 14– 16, 25–29.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,027,184 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,027,184

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.