- Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00807 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2 and 3 are unpatentable under § 103 over Gregorio, Ramsay, Tierling, Rossi, and Aldrich; claim 2 is also unpatentable over Gregorio, Ramsay, Wakuda, Rossi, and Aldrich.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“The parties agree that independent claim 2 includes means-plus- function limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.8 Pet. 2–6; PO Resp. 7–15. An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means . . . for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. In particular, the parties agree that the “driving component” and “control component” requirements of independent claim 2 are means-plus-function limitations. Pet. 2–6; PO Resp. 7. Construing a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 involves two steps: 1) identifying the claimed function and 2) identifying in the specification the corresponding structure that performs the claimed function. Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 296 F.3d 1106, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2002).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“1. Construction of “Driving Component” Petitioner contends that the claimed function of “driving component” is “drives the moveable component to oscillate within the housing.” Pet. 5; Ex. 2002, 2. Petitioner asserts that the corresponding structure is a coil of conductive wire 420” (Figures 4A–4G); “coil 514” (Figures 5A–5B); “coil 626” (Figure 6); “electromagnet” (Figures 10-11); “additional coils 1202 and 1204” (Figure 12); “coils 1302 and 1304” (Figure 13); “driving coils 1412 and 1414” (Figure 14); “coil 1510” (Figures 15–17); “stator coils” (Figures 24A-25). Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:2–34, 5:54–59, 6:32–35, 9:11–52, 9:64–10:22, 14:59); Ex. 2002, 2.). Patent Owner states that it “does not believe that the phrase involving a ‘driving component’ needs to be construed in order to resolve any issue in this proceeding.” PO Resp. 7. Patent Owner agreed to the above construction in the Apple Litigation, and the court adopted this construction. Ex. 2002, 2. The record supports Petitioner’s position and we adopt it.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s expert declarant contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree. Ex. 1003 ¶ 30. Patent Owner offers “a similar level of ordinary skill in the art.” See PO Resp. 4. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’337 patent specification.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“In contrast to Petitioner’s showing, at the passage cited by Patent Owner, Dr. Goossen, Patent Owner’s expert, does not provide a basis for his opinion that “the combined system of Gregorio-Ramsay-Rossi-Aldrich does not teach the claimed output to the power supply.” Ex. 2009 ¶ 156; PO Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 156). To the extent Dr. Goossen addresses the issue, like Patent Owner, Dr. Goossen concedes that “a POSITA would recognize in the [annotated drawing of Gregorio supplied by Petitioner] that a power supply is required that is not shown.” Ex. 2009 ¶ 116. And also like Patent Owner, Dr. Goossen concludes that Petitioner’s rationale that an “unshown power supply receives a signal from the processor is a sweeping conclusion that does not follow.” Id. For the reasons discussed above in connection with Patent Owner’s parallel arguments, this testimony is conclusory and unsupported. Primarily, it does not adequately address Petitioner’s showing and Dr. Hannaford’s testimony, discussed above, which relies on Gregorio’s statement that “[p]rocessor 12 outputs the control signals to drive circuit 26 which includes electronic components and circuitry used to supply LRA 18 with the required electrical current and voltage to cause the desired haptic effects.” Ex. 1004, 2:36–39 (emphases added). Dr. Goossen and Patent Owner also do not address the initial finding in the Institution Decision that “[t]he ’337 patent does not disclose any detail or structure for the controllable power supply, indicating that such a controllable power supply was well-known.” Inst. Dec. 30 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:33–35 (“The power supply 612 receives a control input 624 from the CPU to control the current supplied to the H-bridge switch for transfer to the coil 626.”)).16 And while Dr. Goossen contends that Dr. Hannaford’s reliance on Ramsay to further suggest control of the power supply is conclusory because “Dr. Hannaford’s statement about ‘the current provided from a power supply to the driving component’ has nothing to do with Ramsay’s disclosure,’” Dr. Goossen addresses Ramsay and Gregorio in isolation, without adequately addressing the combination, specifically where Gregorio teaches or suggests controlling a power supply in order to provide desired LRA amplitude and frequency haptic effects, which is in line with Ramsay’s teaching of user-customizable parameters to control amplitude and frequency for the same purpose. See Ex. 2009 ¶ 126; Pet. 53–54 (summarized above). Therefore, the Petition shows persuasively that Gregorio’s processor controls Gregorio’s power supply to provide power to its haptic unit or that such power supply control would have been obvious in view of Ramsay in order to allow a user to control the desired haptic effect.” slip op. at 41
Patent outcomesUS 8,860,337 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,860,337 - PTAB · Oct 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00611 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–10, 12, 13, 19, and 20 on all petition grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 was obvious over Douglas and Mark.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A claim is unpatentable under § 103 “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103; see KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties agree that experience could substitute for a degree, and vice versa. Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21); Prelim. Resp. 9. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar. Although we discern no difference in the outcome of this decision from choosing one over the other, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal for this decision. Only Petitioner’s proposed level is supported by testimonial evidence on the preliminary record, and it appears to be consistent with the problems addressed in the ’774 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:16–52. Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal for this decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“CLAIM CONSTRUCTION B. In an IPR, we construe a patent claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). This generally includes “construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. The ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term “is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent,” and “as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313, 1321. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argues that we need to construe any claim terms explicitly. See Pet. 2–3; Prelim. Resp. 9. However, the parties’ positions depend on interpreting the claim language in a particular way, and we discuss the relevant claim language below in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“At this stage, we find Petitioner’s arguments persuasive and disagree with Patent Owner. Patent Owner appears to equate a “fabrication profile” with a toolpath description, but nothing in the plain language of claim 1 supports that narrow interpretation. The ’774 patent describes a “fabrication profile” broadly and states that the profile can simply “include the dictionary [of configuration information],” or be “used to determine which machineready representation is available or suitable for a target printer.” Ex. 1001, 23:49–52. The preliminary evidence suggests that Douglas’s “operational parameters” would count as a “fabrication profile” because it is “the basis for generation of a machine-ready representation of the three-dimensional model that is executable on the target printer.” Id. at 23:37–39; see infra Section III.C.8. We also disagree that Petitioner’s argument is impermissible hindsight, because it is based on the disclosures in Douglas and Mark, and Petitioner has articulated a sufficiently persuasive reason to combine those references without referring to the ’774 patent itself. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (an obvious rationale is not improper hindsight if it “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure”). Finally, Petitioner appears to rely on Mark for providing a particular example of a fabrication profile, not to replace Douglas’s overall system in which the 3D printer can receive “operational parameters” rather than just G-code. See Pet. 8–10, 17–23; see also Ex. 1005 ¶ 41 (the print queue, which stores tool instructions, may be maintained locally on printers 204 or on print servers 208); see In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[A] determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.” (citing In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc))).” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,886,774 - PTAB · Oct 3, 2025 · IPR2025-00680 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 2 and 3 on all grounds in the Petition and granted Nintendo’s motion to join IPR2024-00807, subject to participation limits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“II. ANALYSIS A. Institution of Inter Partes Review We instituted an inter partes review in the Apple IPR on all challenged claims and all asserted grounds of unpatentability. Apple IPR, Paper 10 (institution decision); see also Apple IPR, Paper 2 (the “Apple Petition”). Petitioner here challenges the same claims and asserts the same grounds of unpatentability as those on which we instituted the Apple IPR. Compare Pet. 2, with Apple Petition 1; see also Mot. 1 (asserting the instant “Petition is substantively identical to Apple Inc.’s petition (‘Apple Petition’) in the Apple IPR, including that it relies on the same expert declaration,” and asserting “the same grounds presented in the Apple IPR”). As indicated, Petitioner also relies on the same declarant as did the petition in the Apple IPR. Mot. 1; compare Ex. 1003 (Hannaford Declaration), with Apple IPR, Ex. 1003 (same). Because the grounds of unpatentability in the instant Petition are identical to those in the Apple IPR and for the same reasons stated in our Decision to Institute in the Apple IPR, we institute inter partes review in this proceeding on the grounds presented in the Petition. See Apple IPR, Paper 10 (analyzing challenges in the Apple Petition).” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“We determine that Petitioner has met its burden of showing that joinder is appropriate because, as set forth above, the Petition (1) is substantially identical to the Apple Petition, (2) contains the same grounds based on the same evidence, and (3) relies on the same declaration, the Hannaford Declaration (Ex. 1003). Mot. 1, 4. Petitioner represents that “joinder will not negatively impact the Apple IPR trial schedule” and “expressly consents to the existing trial schedule.” Id. at 10; see also id. at 7 (“Proceeding with a consolidated inter partes review would avoid potential inconsistency, promote efficient review of the same claims for the same patent under the same grounds, and would result in a final written decision without delay.”). Petitioner also represents that as “long as Apple remains in the joined IPR, Nintendo remains in a limited ‘silent understudy’ role that does not actively participate in the IPR.” Id. at 8. The record supports Petitioner. In addition, the final written decision in the Apple IPR is due to issue on or before October 15, 2025, with the Oral Hearing complete and no further briefing due. See IPR 2024-00807, Paper 15 (Oral Hearing Transcript); Paper 18, 2–3. Therefore, as Petitioner argues, joinder by Petitioner will have little or no impact on the trial schedule in the Apple IPR. On the other hand, if the Board denies joinder, Petitioner submits that it “intends to file a separate petition for IPR (‘Second Petition’) that includes grounds in addition to some (or all) of the grounds in the Apple IPR.” Mot. 14.” slip op. at 10
NonePatents in suitUS 8,860,337 - Amgen, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb CompanyAdverse judgmentPTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2025-00603 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner based on its statutory disclaimer of claims 1–18, then terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“In other words, the Smith & Nephew decision makes plain that entry of adverse judgment (as opposed to a denial without adverse judgment) is appropriate in situations where a patentee seeks to regain, through continued prosecution, subject matter that is patentably indistinct from previously surrendered subject matter. Id. That is precisely the situation at hand. Claim 43, pending in the ’822 continuation application, is of the same or broader scope than disclaimed claim 1 of the ’529 patent, as shown in Petitioner’s claim chart:” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 11,332,529 - Kohler Co. v. Delta Faucet Co.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00700 · APJ Jane E Inglese · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, and 9 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 3–8 and 10–24 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted references failed to establish limitations including the claimed light pipe features.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. Petitioner’s witness (Mr. Cook) qualifies as a POSITA under this definition, and, therefore, is qualified to opine from the perspective of a POSITA on technical matters included within the areas of expertise prescribed by the definition. As indicated above, Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA does not require education in the field of optics and professional experience designing or analyzing optical apparatus, unlike Patent Owner’s definition. We are aware, however, that Patent Owner’s witness (Dr. Klopp) has more extensive experience with optical systems and methods than Petitioner’s witness (Mr. Cook). Compare Ex 1003 ¶¶ 8–14, Ex. 2005, 39:21–59:17, with Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 3–20, Ex. 2004, 1–2, Ex. 1015, 10:22–13:25. Although Mr. Cook possesses excellent credentials in the field of mechanical engineering, his experience in the design and analysis of optical systems and methods is sparse and insubstantial compared to that of Dr. Klopp. Id. Due to this difference in experience levels, in instances where the witnesses express differing views on factual issues related to optical systems and methods, we will accord more weight to Dr. Klopp’s testimony than to Mr. Cook’s.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed
“through the light transmission portion and bottom output face 313 of light conductor 38, which teaches transmitting light in parallel with the longitudinal axis of the housing. Tseng does not disclose or teach that light is emitted through the side surface of annular protrusion 383 in a direction perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the housing. Ex. 1004 ¶ 97. Petitioner’s assertions that this would be the case consist solely of conclusory statements, supported only by citations to Mr. Cook’s declaration. Mr. Cook, however, simply repeats Petitioner’s conclusory statements, without providing sound technical reasoning supported by objective evidence to explain and support his opinions. Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 101– 102, 105, 195–198, 202. We, therefore, accord little weight to Mr. Cook’s opinion on this particular matter because it “merely repeats, verbatim, the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support,” and “does not cite to any additional supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning [in] support.” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). Furthermore, Mr. Cook’s opinion conflicts with that of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Klopp, who opines that a “POSITA would understand from Tseng’s third embodiment that light from the LED would bypass the annular protrusion 383 of outer cliff 381, while transmitting downwardly toward the output face 313.” Compare Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 174–175, 190–194, with Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 101–102, 105. As discussed above, Mr. Cook is qualified to opine from the perspective of a POSITA on technical matters included within the expertise of a person meeting Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA, which do not include optics and optical apparatus. We, therefore, credit Dr. Klopp’s opinion over that of Mr. Cook on this particular factual issue of how it is directly related to optical systems and methods about which Mr. Cook possesses limited relevant experience. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 6–15 (experience in communication systems and electronics); Ex. 2005, 55:16–58:19 (design experience with electronics that use indicator lights or fiber-optic communications; no professional experience with light pipes, diffusers, or plumbing fixtures). Dr. Klopp possesses substantial research and professional experience with optical methods, fiber optic light pipes, light guides, diffusers, prisms, and analysis of faucets, spray heads, and plumbing fixtures. See Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 6–10 Supra 8 (discussing weight accorded to conflicting witness testimony); see also Resp. 2–3 (arguing that “Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Cook, is a mechanical engineer with substantial professional experience in electronics for high-voltage power systems and communications, but he has limited experience with the claimed subject matter.”).” slip op. at 34
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“would be used to construe the claim[s] in a civil action [held] under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms generally are given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by the ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of the invention when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We construe terms in controversy only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner asserts that the claim terms do not require construction and should be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 13. Patent Owner contends that it applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms. Resp. 7. Taking into consideration the information presented, we determine that none of the claim terms requires express construction for purposes of resolving the dispute before us.” slip op. at 9
- BurdenMixed
“perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of Tseng’s housing (internal 33 and external 34 sleeves). “In an inter partes review, the burden of persuasion is on the petitioner to prove ‘unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence,’ 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), and that burden never shifts to the patentee.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015)); see also Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017 (en banc (quoting Magnum Oil)).” slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 10,393,363 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,393,363 - Padagis US LLC v. Neurelis, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Sep 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00465 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of proving claim 1 obvious over Gwozdz and Meezan.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the relevant art. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) secondary considerations (i.e., objective indicia) of nonobviousness when presented.6 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). To show unpatentability based on a combination of teachings, “[a]n obviousness determination [also] requires finding both that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” CRFD” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[A POSA] would have been a pharmaceutical scientist, chemist, or biologist involved in the research and development of pharmaceutical formulations and/or delivery, and would have at least a Bachelor’s degree with at least 5 years of experience, or a Master’s, Ph.D. or Pharm.D. degree with several years of experience. In addition, a POSA would have had knowledge of benzodiazepine structure and function, and would further have knowledge and practical experience working with intranasal and transmembrane formulations, including knowledge of the physiology and anatomy of the nasal cavity, with relevant experience in developing intranasal formulations. Pet. 23–24; Ex. 1062 ¶ 20. Patent Owner “does not dispute” Petitioner’s POSA definition at this stage. Prelim. Resp. 18. We apply Petitioner’s proposed POSA definition for this Decision, which definition appears to be generally consistent with the cited prior art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“standard used in a civil action before the courts under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing claim language in accordance with its ordinary and customary meaning as understood by the POSA, in view of the patent’s specification and considering the patent’s prosecution history. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). We need only expressly construe terms to the extent needed to resolve the controversy before us. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019).” slip op. at 8
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“applicant, as part of the bargain with the public, must describe his or her invention so that the public will know what it is and that he or she has truly made the claimed invention.” AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co., KG v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “[T]he test for sufficiency [of the written description requirement] is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date sought.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (explaining that “the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1352 (“[A] description that merely renders the invention obvious does not satisfy the requirement.”).” slip op. at 25
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,241,414 - Padagis US LLC v. Neurelis, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Sep 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00466 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–27 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim, including claim 1 over Gwozdz and Meezan.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. For reasons explained below, we conclude that Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail with respect to at least one of the ’786 patent’s challenged claims.1 We institute inter partes review on all challenged claims. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“We find that Petitioner has made a threshold showing that the ’558 Provisional does not provide written description support for claim 1’s pharmaceutical solution consisting of each of the recited elements, including n-dodecyl beta-D-maltoside. It is true that “n-Dodecyl β-D-maltoside” can be found listed in the SIGMA Catalog. Ex. 1026, 316. But Dr. Donovan’s testimony helps put that listing in context. It is merely one among well over 100 ionic and non-ionic detergents listed in the cited six pages of the SIGMA Catalog. See 1026, 316–321; Ex. 1062 ¶ 50. When further considered in the context of paragraphs 150–152 of the ’558 Provisional, which generically suggest that “enhancer” compounds can be used in “some embodiments”—then introducing at least 15 classes of potential enhancers16 including “preferred” lysophospholipids and acyl carnitines—the listing of n-dodecyl beta-D-maltoside among at least 150 biological detergents in the SIGMA Catalog is even more remote. Moreover, although satisfaction of the written description requirement is not limited to what is exemplified in a priority application, none of the ’558 Provisional’s examples use any “enhancer,” much less any detergent, any alkyl glycoside, or n-dodecyl beta-D maltoside in particular. The 16 The ’558 Provisional suggests that whether “a given compound” will function as an “enhancer” in a formulation requires testing. Ex. 1008 ¶ 150 (indicating “an in vivo or good model test” may “determin[e] whether the uptake of the drug is enhanced to a clinically significant degree”). ethanol. See Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 172–174 (Examples 1 and 2). In short, we find no sufficient disclosure of “blaze marks” in the ’558 Provisional that point to the inventors’ possession of a pharmaceutical solution that includes n-dodecyl beta-D-maltoside as claimed. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (analogizing an application’s generic disclosures to a forest of unmarked trees and explaining that, “to satisfy the written description requirement,” there must be “blaze marks directing the skilled artisan to that tree [within the forest that represents the claimed invention]” in the application).” slip op. at 28
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for patent owner
“and applying collateral estoppel to vacate a claim construction in an underlying IPR). In an IPR, “a party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel must show: ‘(1) the issue is identical to one decided in the first action; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the first action; (3) resolution of the issue was essential to a final judgment in the first action; and (4) [the party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action.’” Google LLC v. Hammond Development Int’l, Inc., 54 F.4th 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994)) (alteration in original).14 “It is [also] well established that patent claims need not be identical for collateral estoppel to apply.” Id. at 1381. Instead, “collateral estoppel requires the issues of patentability be identical.” Id. If “the differences between the unadjudicated patent claims and adjudicated patent claims do not materially alter the question of invalidity, collateral estoppel applies.” Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps South, LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (affirming application of collateral estoppel where claims adjudicated as obvious required a “polymeric” gel whereas similar, unadjudicated claims required a “block copolymer” gel). “Collateral estoppel also applies to common issues in actions involving different but related patents.” Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 252 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2001), vacated on other grounds, 353 U.S. 1109 (2002).” slip op. at 22
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artReference not prior artMixed
“We agree that at least one portion of Gwozdz is not prior art. To establish that the cited disclosures in Gwozdz are prior art, Petitioner must show support for those disclosures in the Gwozdz Provisional. In re Riggs, 131 F.4th 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (explaining that “the portion of the application relied on . . . as prior art must be supported by the provisional application”). Petitioner did not establish that Gwozdz’s disclosure of “penetration enhancers” finds support in the Gwozdz Provisional. Pet. 22. Conversely, Patent Owner shows that the phrase is absent in the Gwozdz Provisional. Prelim. Resp. 37.20 Based on this record, we determine that Gwozdz’s mention of “penetration enhancers” is not prior art to the 19 Patent Owner argues this “penetration enhancers” disclosure in Gwozdz is not prior art regardless which of the disputed priority dates (March 28, 2008, or March 27, 2009) one accords to the challenged claims. Prelim. Resp. 33. 20 We also agree that collateral estoppel does not bar Patent Owner from challenging Gwozdz’s prior-art status in this case. Patent Owner’s apparent concession that Gwozdz was prior art during the 451 IPR does not equate to the issue being actually litigated. Prelim. Resp. 34–35; Ex. 1040, 14 (“Patent Owner does not contest that Gwozdz is entitled to this filing date” of the Gwozdz Provisional). Purdue, 767 F. App’x at 922 (determining “[t]he priority date for the Joshi reference . . . cannot be determined based on collateral estoppel” where patentee could have argued, but did not in fact argue, Joshi’s prior-art status in an earlier matter).” slip op. at 35
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,793,786 - Padagis US LLC v. Neurelis, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Sep 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00464 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–22, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Gwozdz and Meezan.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“3. Conclusion For the reasons discussed above and based on the present record, we find that Petitioner has made an adequate threshold showing that the issues presented in this Petition are substantially the same as the issues the Board previously considered in IPR2019-00451 and that Gwozdz’s effective date is March 28, 2008. We therefore determine that Petitioner has shown that it is reasonably likely to prevail in establishing that at least claim 1 would have been obvious over Gwozdz and Meezan. IV. CONCLUSION Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition. We institute trial on all challenged claims under the grounds raised in the Petition. PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed.” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[A POSA] would have been a pharmaceutical scientist, chemist, or biologist involved in the research and development of pharmaceutical formulations and/or delivery, and would have at least a Bachelor’s degree with at least 5 years of experience, or a Master’s, Ph.D. or Pharm.D. degree with several years of experience. In addition, a POSA would have had knowledge of benzodiazepine structure and function, and would further have knowledge and practical experience working with intranasal and transmembrane formulations, including knowledge of the physiology and anatomy of the nasal cavity, with relevant experience in developing intranasal formulations. Pet. 23; Ex. 1062 ¶ 20. Patent Owner “does not dispute” Petitioner’s POSA definition at this stage. Prelim. Resp. 16. We apply Petitioner’s proposed POSA definition for this Decision, which definition appears to be generally consistent with the cited prior art.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelMixed
“As the Board’s decision in the 451 IPR explicitly found written description inadequate for the “alkyl glycoside” limitation in the ’558 Provisional, which is the same issue raised here for the ’546 patent, Petitioner has shown that issue was actually litigated and decided in the 451 IPR. Where the same issue is actually litigated and decided as part of a final adjudication in an earlier action, the test for invoking collateral estoppel in a later action is met. On this record and for the reasons above, we are persuaded that collateral estoppel bars Patent Owner from arguing the challenged claims are entitled to the priority date of the ’558 Provisional.” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedMixed
“We agree that at least one portion of Gwozdz is not prior art. To establish that the cited disclosures in Gwozdz are prior art, Petitioner must show support for those disclosures in the Gwozdz Provisional. In re Riggs, 131 F.4th 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (explaining that “the portion of the application relied on . . . as prior art must be supported by the provisional application”). Petitioner did not establish that Gwozdz’s disclosure of “penetration enhancers” finds support in the Gwozdz Provisional. Pet. 22. Conversely, Patent Owner shows that the phrase is absent in the Gwozdz 9 Patent Owner argues that as the ’546 Patent claims priority to the ’439 Application, the “penetration enhancers” disclosure in Gwozdz is not prior art because Gwozdz and the ’439 Application were filed on the same day (March 27, 2009). Prelim. Resp. 21–22. 10 Patent Owner argues that the passage in Gwozdz concerning “penetration enhancers” is relevant solely to “a pharmaceutical composition for injection,” not for intranasal administration as required by the ’546 Patent. Prelim. Resp. 22. First, as noted above, based on the record presented, we determine that Gwozdz’s mention of “penetration enhancers” is not prior art to the challenged claims. Second, we disagree, however, that Gwozdz’s non-prior art mention of penetration enhancers is relevant solely to a pharmaceutical composition for injection as argued by Patent Owner. Gwozdz discloses that “[the] pharmaceutical compositions of the present invention” can be administered by a number of “nonlimiting” routes including intranasal administration. See Ex. 1009, 9:2–11. Provisional. Prelim. Resp. 20–21. Based on this record, we determine that Gwozdz’s mention of “penetration enhancers” is not prior art to the challenged claims. The phrase cannot, therefore, be used to establish a motivation to combine the asserted references.” slip op. at 18
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,895,546 - PTAB · Sep 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00632 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 are obvious over Yamaguchi-727.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Cerebrum Sensor Technologies, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) timely filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 9 (“Prelim. Resp.”).1 Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenInstituted
“We disagree. Positioning module 6 to face a “predetermined direction” is a form of preventing movement that falls within the scope of limitation 1b. Moreover, Yamaguchi-727 uses a method for preventing movement of its module 6 in its housing 20, silicone potting material, that is expressly recognized by the Specification of the ’421 patent when it states: “A common technique used to assist in fixturing the electrical sensor device 40 known within the automotive industry is to fill the internal cavity with a coating material such as a neutral silicone or the like for purposes of retaining placement position.” Ex. 1001, 13:56–60. Although the Specification also asserts that the sensor assemblies disclosed in the 421 patent “do not use or require the use of any such coating or filing agents or materials for any fixturing of the electrical sensor device 40,” id. at 13:61–64, limitation 1b merely requires that the “sensor device . . . is disposed within the internal cavity and attached therein to prevent movement of the device within the internal cavity,” id. at 30:25–27. Absent a persuasive argument to the contrary, we preliminarily conclude that Yamaguchi-727’s use of potting material to hold its module 6 in place within its housing 20 meets the requirements of limitation 1b. Both parties are encouraged to adduce intrinsic evidence relating to the meaning of limitation 1b at trial. For all the reasons set forth above, we find that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of proving the Yamaguchi-727 renders claim 1 unpatentable as obvious. 2. Dependent Claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 Petitioner identifies the portions of Yamaguchi-727 that teach the limitations introduced in dependent claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24, all of which ultimately depend from claim 1. Pet. 32–40. Patent Owner relies upon its argument that Petitioner’s showing for claim 1 is deficient as the reason why Petitioner’s challenge to dependent claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 fails. We reject this argument for the reasons stated in Part II.C.1 above. Based on our review of Petitioner’s otherwise uncontested argument and evidence cited in support, we find that Petitioner also establishes a reasonable likelihood of proving that Yamaguchi-727 renders dependent claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 unpatentable as obvious. D. Remaining Challenges” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner complies with the requirement of identifying “[h]ow the claim language is to be construed” by setting forth proposed interpretations of various claim terms in the table above.7 Both cases cited by Patent Owner relate to an issue presented by a petitioner’s alleged inconsistent handling of whether a claim term is subject to interpretation as a means-plus-function element under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Orthopediatrics Corp. v. K2M, Inc., IPR2018-01546, Paper 10 at 11 (PTAB Feb. 14, 2019); 10x Genomics, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, IPR2023- 7 Neither party has identified any claim language that might invoke interpretation as a means-plus-function limitation, and we discern no such claim language. Additionally, we do not imply that a petitioner must always propose express interpretations for specific claim language to comply with Rule 42.104(b)(3). Rather, we only note that Petitioner has, by any measure, complied by expressly proposing interpretations for identified claim language.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“We disagree. Positioning module 6 to face a “predetermined direction” is a form of preventing movement that falls within the scope of limitation 1b. Moreover, Yamaguchi-727 uses a method for preventing movement of its module 6 in its housing 20, silicone potting material, that is expressly recognized by the Specification of the ’421 patent when it states: “A common technique used to assist in fixturing the electrical sensor device 40 known within the automotive industry is to fill the internal cavity with a coating material such as a neutral silicone or the like for purposes of retaining placement position.” Ex. 1001, 13:56–60. Although the Specification also asserts that the sensor assemblies disclosed in the 421 patent “do not use or require the use of any such coating or filing agents or materials for any fixturing of the electrical sensor device 40,” id. at 13:61–64, limitation 1b merely requires that the “sensor device . . . is disposed within the internal cavity and attached therein to prevent movement of the device within the internal cavity,” id. at 30:25–27. Absent a persuasive argument to the contrary, we preliminarily conclude that Yamaguchi-727’s use of potting material to hold its module 6 in place within its housing 20 meets the requirements of limitation 1b. Both parties are encouraged to adduce intrinsic evidence relating to the meaning of limitation 1b at trial. For all the reasons set forth above, we find that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of proving the Yamaguchi-727 renders claim 1 unpatentable as obvious. 2. Dependent Claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 Petitioner identifies the portions of Yamaguchi-727 that teach the limitations introduced in dependent claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24, all of which ultimately depend from claim 1. Pet. 32–40. Patent Owner relies upon its argument that Petitioner’s showing for claim 1 is deficient as the reason why Petitioner’s challenge to dependent claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 fails. We reject this argument for the reasons stated in Part II.C.1 above. Based on our review of Petitioner’s otherwise uncontested argument and evidence cited in support, we find that Petitioner also establishes a reasonable likelihood of proving that Yamaguchi-727 renders dependent claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 unpatentable as obvious. D. Remaining Challenges” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,835,421 - LG Energy Solution, Ltd. v. Molecular Rebar Design, LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 2, 2025 · IPR2025-00355 · APJ Avelyn Ross · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner after it disclaimed claims 1–23, terminated the IPR, and cancelled the scheduled hearing.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, and we construe a disclaimer of all claims involved in a trial as a request for adverse judgment. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner has disclaimed all challenged claims, and has requested adverse judgment, we determine that it is appropriate to enter adverse judgment against Patent Owner pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) and to terminate this proceeding. Under these circumstances, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion, and grant Patent Owner’s request that the hearing in this matter, scheduled for September 15, 2025, be cancelled.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 9,636,649
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.