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  • PTAB · Oct 21, 2024 · IPR2024-00697 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Apple would prevail on at least one claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the degree. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 30–31). Patent Owner contends a POSITA would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a comparable field of study, and (2) at least two years of professional experience with electro-mechanical control systems, or other similarly relevant industry experience. Prelim. Resp. 3. Additional relevant industry experience may compensate for lack of formal education or vice versa. Id. Patent Owner further contends this is similar to Petitioner’s POSITA contention. Id. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’767 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

      “Patent Owner contends “the preamble of claim 1 is limiting based on Petitioner’s assertion in the District Court and based on the District Court’s order.” Prelim. Resp. 6. Patent Owner also contends “the District Court agreed with Patent Owner and ordered that the ‘control component’ term has its plain and ordinary meaning and is not subject to means-plus-function treatment.” Id. Patent Owner finally contends “there is no need for the Board to make claim construction determinations about Section 112, Paragraph 6 to decide institution.” Id. As to the preamble, we agree, for purposes of this decision, that claim 1’s preamble is limiting. The parties agreed that this preamble is limiting in the District Court case. Dist. Ct. Const. 10.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Term construed board ownTerm construed patent owner constructionMixed

      “As to the “driving component” recitation, the parties agreed to a construction in the District Court case. Dist. Ct. Constr. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the parties’ agreed construction. Pet. 6. The parties agreed the “driving component” term is a means-plus-function term. Dist. Ct. Constr. 11. The function is “drives the moveable component in each of two opposite directions.” Id. Corresponding structure includes “coils 420, 514, 626, 1202, 1204, 1302, 1304, 1412, 1414, 1510 (also shown in Figs. 16–17); electromagnets shown in Figs. 10–11; and equivalents thereof.” Id. As to “control component,” the District Court held that the term is not a means-plus-function term because the claim defines the term structurally by requiring a “microprocessor,” “control program,” and “switch.” Dist. Ct. Constr. 17–22. For purposes of this Decision, we agree with the District Court that means-plus-function treatment does not apply to the “control component” recitation because structure in claim 1 defines the component. Given the context provided by claim 1 as a whole, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood the “control component” as identifying a specific structure (requiring a microprocessor, control program, and switch as claim 1 recites). See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that the means-plus-function inquiry depends on “whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for a structure”).” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “With respect to other claim terms, Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim based on the ordinary and customary meaning of these terms. Thus, no other claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,093,767
  • PTAB · Oct 21, 2024 · IPR2024-00698 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5 under all six asserted § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Apple would prevail on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–5 of the ’767 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “On June 21, 2022, the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) issued a Memorandum titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings With Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Memorandum”),7 which states, among other things, that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Memorandum 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). In a September 25, 2024, submission, Petitioner has stated that “[Petitioner] will not pursue [in the related litigation] the same invalidity grounds raised (or any grounds that could have been raised) [in this IPR].” Ex. 1048 (citing Sotera, IPR2020-01019, Paper 12). In view of this stipulation, we do not exercise discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 12

    • Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner

      “Second, we determine both petitions, at this stage, to be strong. Patent Owner has not refuted the obviousness merits of either Petition, and, at this stage, we do not independently identify a flaw in Petitioner’s analysis. Third, we agree with Petitioner that it could not have reasonably addressed both the Shahoian and Izumi theories in one petition. Petitioner’s Notice 4. At the time Petitioner filed its petitions, Petitioner was reasonably uncertain as to whether or not the term “control component” is a means-plus-function term. If means-plus-function, Petitioner was reasonable in taking extra effort to address the term. Petitioner did not have space in one Petition to address both a means-plus-function possibility while also addressing both Shahoian and Izumi theories. Fourth, granting both Petitions will not place an undue burden on Patent Owner. As Patent Owner emphasizes, only five claims are at issue. Resp. 19–20. Moreover, we indicate, in this decision, our preliminary agreement with the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas that “control component” should not be construed as means-plus-function. See Section III(C), supra. Based on this indication, we hope that the parties may be able to narrow the focus of this proceeding at trial. We determine that these four reasons, along with all other circumstances specific to this particular matter, cumulatively weigh against exercising discretion to deny institution for this particular matter.” slip op. at 14

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the degree. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 30–31). Patent Owner contends a POSITA would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a comparable field of study, and (2) at least two years of professional experience with electro-mechanical control systems, or other similarly relevant industry experience. Prelim Resp. 3. Additional relevant industry experience may compensate for lack of formal education or vice versa. Id. Patent Owner further contends this is similar to Petitioner’s POSITA contention. Id. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’767 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,093,767
  • PTAB · Oct 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00807 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 2 and 3 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “Office (“USPTO”) issued a Memorandum titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings With Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Memorandum”),8 which states, among other things, that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Memorandum 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). In a September 18, 2024 letter, Petitioner states that “Apple hereby stipulates that if the PTAB authorizes petitioner to enter this stipulation into evidence in IPR2024-00807 and institutes the proceeding, Apple will not pursue in the above-captioned litigation the same invalidity grounds raised (or any grounds that could have been raised) in IPR2024-00807 for any claim of the patent.” Ex. 1048 (citing Sotera, IPR2020-01019, Paper 12). 8 The Memorandum is available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretion ary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf. Applying the guidance provided in the Memorandum, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution in this proceeding under Fintiv because Petitioner submitted a Sotera stipulation.” slip op. at 8

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any preliminary response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all remaining challenged claims, claims 2 and 3, and the grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner’s expert declarant contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA), would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree. Ex. 1003 ¶ 30. Patent Owner offers “a similar level of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 4. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’337 patent specification.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

      “For purposes of this proceeding, the parties agree that independent claim 2 includes means-plus-function limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.9 Pet. 2–6; Prelim. Resp. 7–14. An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means . . . for performing a specified function without the 9 As indicated above, statutory citations are to the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 112. See supra note 1. recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. In particular, the parties agree that the “driving component” and “control component” requirements of independent claim 2 are means-plus-function limitations. Pet. 2–6; Prelim. Resp. 7–14. Construing a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 involves two steps: 1) identifying the claimed function and 2) identifying in the specification the corresponding structure that performs the claimed function. Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 296 F.3d 1106, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2002).” slip op. at 10

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,860,337
  • PTAB · Oct 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00806 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–8, 14–17, 19, and 20, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability over the asserted §103 combinations.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “Office (“USPTO”) issued a Memorandum titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings With Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Memorandum”),8 which states, among other things, that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Memorandum 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). In a September 18, 2024 letter, Petitioner has stated that “Apple hereby stipulates that if the PTAB authorizes petitioner to enter this stipulation into evidence in IPR2024-00806 and institutes the proceeding, Apple will not pursue in the above-captioned litigation the same invalidity 8 The Memorandum is available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretion ary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf. grounds raised (or any grounds that could have been raised) in IPR2024-00806 for any claim of the patent.” Ex. 1048 (citing Sotera, IPR2020-01019, Paper 12). Applying the guidance provided in the Memorandum, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution in this proceeding under Fintiv because Petitioner submitted a Sotera stipulation.” slip op. at 8

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesOther
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,941,830
  • PTAB · Oct 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00734 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 3, 15, 17, and 19–21, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the asserted obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Based on the current record and for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 3, 15, 17, and 19–21 in the ’518 patent on all challenges included in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention “would have been someone”: (1) “knowledgeable with the computer networking techniques available at the time”; and (2) “who had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of experience working with computer networks, including network security.” Pet. 7. Petitioner also asserts that “[l]ack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Id. Dr. Crovella’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertions. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 15–16. Based on the current record and for purposes of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’518 patent as well as the asserted references. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 16.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Based on the current record, we determine that no claim term requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial. slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “Based on the current record, Petitioner establishes sufficiently for purposes of institution that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had reasons, i.e., as articulated by Dr. Crovella, to combine the teachings of Gai, Yip, and Kwan in the way Petitioner proposes. See Pet. 14–21, 27, 29–31, 38; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 51–58, 62–72, 91–92, 98, 101, 121. Based on the current record, Petitioner also establishes sufficiently that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teachings of the references. See Pet. 16–17, 22, 38; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 59–60, 73–74, 121. (f) Preliminary Conclusion About Alleged Obviousness As discussed above, Petitioner’s analysis addresses how the combined disclosures in Gai, Yip, and Kwan teach claim 1’s subject matter. See supra §§ III.D.4(a)–(d). Additionally, Petitioner provides reasons with rational underpinnings as to why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Gai, Yip, and Kwan in the way Petitioner proposes and would have had a reasonable expectation of success. See supra § III.D.4(e). Hence, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of proving that claim 1 is unpatentable under § 103(a) because the claim would have been obvious over Gai, Yip, and Kwan.” slip op. at 34

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,623,518
  • PTAB · Sep 18, 2024 · IPR2024-00665 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Institution

    Institution denied because Petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable under the proposed obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

      “II. ANALYSIS A. Principles of Law A petition must show how the construed claims are unpatentable under the statutory grounds it identifies. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim for a petition to be granted. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 8

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of skill in the art, we consider the type of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. U.S., 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Petitioner contends the following assessment in connection with a person of ordinary skill in the art: The Challenged Claims pertain to a method of recovering geothermal heat. However, “[m]any of the techniques are derived from oil and gas industry.” EX1001 at 4:23-24. Accordingly, here, a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) is a person with a Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree, and/or Ph.D. in Chemical Engineering, Petroleum Engineering, Energy Resource Engineering, or the like, or at least five years of experience engineering, drilling, and constructing wells. Furthermore, a person with less formal education but more experience, or more formal education but less experience, could also have met the relevant standard for a POSITA. Pet. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 34–36). Patent Owner does not offer its own assessment of a POSITA. For purpose of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesOther

      “own for any claim term. Patent Owner does, however, note that “claim element 9c[13] includes the terms ‘means for,’ which are presumed to invoke 13 The referenced “claim element 9c” reads in-part “Means for producing a water density difference and a pressure difference between said first means-plus-function treatment under Section 112.” Prelim. Resp. 17 (citing Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Power2B Inc., IPR2022-01378, Paper 12 at 11 (PTAB Mar. 15, 2023) (citing Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part))). Patent Owner further submits that “[u]nder Rule 104(b)(3),[14] Petitioner had an obligation to provide a construction of claim element 9c that includes both the claimed function and the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” Id. We agree with Patent Owner that the term “means for” when appearing in a claim triggers a rebuttable presumption that treatment under § 112 applies. On the record before us, however, Petitioner has not explained why the noted presumption has been rebutted or does not apply, and has not provided a construction of the pertinent “means for” term in the Petition in contradiction to the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 104(b)(3).” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “While it is certainly the case that “a prior art reference is relevant for all that it teaches to those of ordinary skill in the art,” see In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264-65 (Fed. Cir. 1992), it is incumbent on a petitioner, in advancing a permissible theory of obviousness, to explain why a skilled artisan would recognize to pick and choose certain aspects of a reference and combine them with other aspects of the reference, particularly so where the reference itself does not suggest such combination. See In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“It is impermissible within the framework of section 103 to pick and choose from any one reference only so much of it as will support a given position, to the exclusion of other parts necessary to the full appreciation of what such reference fairly suggests” ) (citation and inner quotes omitted). Here, Petitioner’s oscillation between different embodiments of Rinaldi in an attempt to reach the requirements of claim 1 is not adequately explained, and more closely resembles impermissible hindsight. See Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. The Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017). (“[W]e cannot allow hindsight bias to be the thread that stitches together prior art patches into something that is the claimed invention.”). In sum, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its assertion that claim 1 is unpatentable as a part of Petitioner’s proposed Ground 1.” slip op. at 18

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,320,221
  • PTAB · Sep 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00431 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4 under § 103 over Ashfary and Mirfakhraei, and claim 2 over Ashfary, Mirfakhraei, and Welles.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in a petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, and accompanying exhibits and evidence, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim in the inter partes review. Therefore, we grant institution of an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’518 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Accordingly, we agree with and will use Petitioner’s proposed level for this Decision.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “1. “means for determining signal activity” Petitioner contends that the claimed function of “determining signal activity” does not require further construction. Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1001, claim 2; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 108–109). As to the corresponding structure, Petitioner asserts that the ’518 patent describes different approaches for determining signal activity. Id. Petitioner states that one approach is to perform a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) on data samples from an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) using the same receiver signal path that is used for data communication. Id. at 24–25 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:51–9:27, 11:7–23; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 109–110). Petitioner contends that another approach is to measure received signal power with an envelope detector. Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1001, 11:23–29; Ex. 1002 ¶ 110). Petitioner asserts that the envelope detector is another corresponding structure for “determining signal activity.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 110).” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that Mirfakhraei is not in the same field of endeavor, and therefore not analogous, to the ’518 patent. Mirfakhraei’s title, abstract, “Field of the Invention,” and claims describe its bit loading process for multicarrier communications generally, and do not limit its modems or receivers to using telephone lines as the communication medium. Ex. 1006, codes (54, 57), ¶ 1, claims 1–18. Although telephone lines are mentioned in the “Description of the Related Art” and “Detailed Description of the Preferred Embodiments” sections, Mirfakhraei cautions that “[a]lthough the invention has been described with reference to particular embodiments, the description is only an example of the invention’s application and should not be taken as a limitation.” Id. ¶ 36. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that Mirfakhraei’s field of endeavor is limited to telephone lines or DSL, as Patent Owner argues.” slip op. at 20

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 7,295,518
  • PTAB · Sep 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00430 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in a petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, and accompanying exhibits and evidence, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim in the inter partes review. Therefore, we grant institution of an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’690 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “A POSITA6 would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a similar discipline, and three to four years of experience working in signal processing and/or communication systems/networks. Additional education may substitute for experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 115–120). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For this stage of the proceeding, we agree with and will use Petitioner’s proposed level for this Decision.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Since the parties apply what they contend is the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms in their briefs, and have stipulated in the Cox case that the plain and ordinary meaning applies, and Patent Owner argues that the district court’s construction in the Charter case is the plain and ordinary meaning, there is no controversy concerning claim terms that we need to resolve in this Decision. Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 10; Ex. 1005, 104–105; Ex. 2001, 2. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). At this stage of the proceeding, therefore, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning to the claim terms consistent with their ordinary and customary meaning under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). We note, however, that Patent Owner seems to consider the court’s construction in the Charter case to require that the claimed “probe” must be of a type that can be compared with a reference signal. Prelim. Resp. 10. We question whether all of the different types of probes mentioned and claimed in the ’690 patent would require comparison with a reference signal. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:7–19. However, this is a matter best resolved, if necessary, on a full record at trial.” slip op. at 14

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed

      “Prelim. Resp. 23 (citing Ex. 1013, 37) (annotated in red by Patent Owner). IEEE-802.16’s Table 5 shows that the CID is a field of a generic MAC header. Petitioner does not show sufficiently that the CID, located in the header, specifies content payload of a MAC message, as required by limitation 1A. Petitioner alternatively relies on IEEE-802.16’s ranging code index that it contends is another example of data that is in a ranging request parameter and is used for the ranging response payload. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1013, 49–51, 204–213, 576–579, 665–66; Ex. 1002 ¶ 149). Patent Owner asserts that the portions of IEEE-802.16 that Petitioner cites do not disclose that the ranging code index is sent as part of a ranging request message. Prelim. Resp. 25. Although the parts of IEEE-802.16 that Petitioner cites disclose that the ranging code index is sent from the SS to the BS and is included in a ranging response (Ex. 1013, 49–51, 204–213, 576–579, 665–66), the cited parts do not disclose that the SS sends the ranging code index to the BS in a ranging request. Consequently, Petitioner has not established that IEEE- 802.16 anticipates a ranging code index that is a parameter of a ranging request specifying the content payload of the ranging response corresponding to limitation 1A. For the foregoing reasons, on this record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood to prevail in showing that claim 1 is anticipated by IEEE 802.16.” slip op. at 18

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 8,284,690
  • PTAB · Sep 5, 2024 · IPR2024-00441 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had a degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, and three-to-four years of experience working with television signal processing and communication systems,” and “[a]dditional education may substitute for professional experience and significant work experience may substitute for formal education.” Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 40–42). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art in its Preliminary Response. Based on our review of the record before us, we determine that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it appears consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s definition for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “On the present record, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

      “persuaded on the current record that Patent Owner provides sufficient evidence to establish the failure of others. Patent Owner makes much of Broadcom and CableLabs allegedly failing to “realize the possibility of remote spectrum monitoring” prior to the ’008 patent. See Prelim. Resp. 50–52. The mere failure to “realize the possibility” of a certain technique or device, however, is not sufficient to show the failure of others. Rather, the failure of others as an indicium of nonobviousness generally 8 DOCSIS refers to “Data Over Cable System Interface Specification.” Ex. 1011, 1:42–43. relates to situations where others failed while attempting to address a particular problem. See In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended- Release Capsule Pat. Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Evidence that others tried but failed to develop a claimed invention may carry significant weight in an obviousness inquiry. . . . [E]vidence of failed attempts by others could be determinative on the issue of obviousness.” (emphases added)); see also Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., 81 F.4th 1202, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“Indeed, we have found that ‘[o]bjective considerations such as failure by others to solve the problem . . . may often be the most probative and cogent evidence of nonobviousness.’” (emphasis added)). In this case, Patent Owner does not show sufficiently that any alleged failure experienced by Broadcom or CableLabs (or any other party) occurred attempting to address a pertinent problem.” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,792,008
  • PTAB · Aug 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00597 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–18 on all asserted grounds and granted Apple’s motion to join IPR2023-01183.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’641 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’641 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition. And, for the reasons set forth below, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “In considering a motion for joinder, and whether such joinder is appropriate, the Board may consider “whether a new ground of unpatentability is raised in the second petition, how the cost and schedule of the first proceeding will be impacted if joinder is granted, and whether granting joinder will add to the complexity of briefing and/or discovery.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide November 20197 at 76 (citing Kyocera Corp. v. SoftView LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013)).” slip op. at 9

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Master’s degree in material science, chemical engineering, chemistry, or similar field with four years experience designing testing, and building secondary lithium batteries.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 51). Petitioner further contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been aware of “(1) positive electrode materials, (2) negative electrode materials, (3) separators, (4) electrolytes, (5) charge-discharge parameters, and (6) protection circuits, as well as ‘battery failure modes’ such as plating and the formation of dendrites.” Id. at 11–12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 50–51). Upon review of the prior art of record and the Petitioner’s arguments, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision as it appears consistent with the ’641 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner provides constructions for the terms “A method for improving . . . characterized in that,” “ratio of positive electrode material to negative electrode material as calculated by a theoretic capacity with a charge cut-off voltage set at 4.2 V” (claim 5), “as calculated by a specific capacity with a charge voltage limited to 4.2 V” (claim 1), and “at least 7500 of capacity” (claim 11). Pet. 8–11. For purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 8

    Claim constructioncites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,749,641

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.