- PTAB · Oct 3, 2025 · IPR2025-00680 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 2 and 3 on all grounds in the Petition and granted Nintendo’s motion to join IPR2024-00807, subject to participation limits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“II. ANALYSIS A. Institution of Inter Partes Review We instituted an inter partes review in the Apple IPR on all challenged claims and all asserted grounds of unpatentability. Apple IPR, Paper 10 (institution decision); see also Apple IPR, Paper 2 (the “Apple Petition”). Petitioner here challenges the same claims and asserts the same grounds of unpatentability as those on which we instituted the Apple IPR. Compare Pet. 2, with Apple Petition 1; see also Mot. 1 (asserting the instant “Petition is substantively identical to Apple Inc.’s petition (‘Apple Petition’) in the Apple IPR, including that it relies on the same expert declaration,” and asserting “the same grounds presented in the Apple IPR”). As indicated, Petitioner also relies on the same declarant as did the petition in the Apple IPR. Mot. 1; compare Ex. 1003 (Hannaford Declaration), with Apple IPR, Ex. 1003 (same). Because the grounds of unpatentability in the instant Petition are identical to those in the Apple IPR and for the same reasons stated in our Decision to Institute in the Apple IPR, we institute inter partes review in this proceeding on the grounds presented in the Petition. See Apple IPR, Paper 10 (analyzing challenges in the Apple Petition).” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“We determine that Petitioner has met its burden of showing that joinder is appropriate because, as set forth above, the Petition (1) is substantially identical to the Apple Petition, (2) contains the same grounds based on the same evidence, and (3) relies on the same declaration, the Hannaford Declaration (Ex. 1003). Mot. 1, 4. Petitioner represents that “joinder will not negatively impact the Apple IPR trial schedule” and “expressly consents to the existing trial schedule.” Id. at 10; see also id. at 7 (“Proceeding with a consolidated inter partes review would avoid potential inconsistency, promote efficient review of the same claims for the same patent under the same grounds, and would result in a final written decision without delay.”). Petitioner also represents that as “long as Apple remains in the joined IPR, Nintendo remains in a limited ‘silent understudy’ role that does not actively participate in the IPR.” Id. at 8. The record supports Petitioner. In addition, the final written decision in the Apple IPR is due to issue on or before October 15, 2025, with the Oral Hearing complete and no further briefing due. See IPR 2024-00807, Paper 15 (Oral Hearing Transcript); Paper 18, 2–3. Therefore, as Petitioner argues, joinder by Petitioner will have little or no impact on the trial schedule in the Apple IPR. On the other hand, if the Board denies joinder, Petitioner submits that it “intends to file a separate petition for IPR (‘Second Petition’) that includes grounds in addition to some (or all) of the grounds in the Apple IPR.” Mot. 14.” slip op. at 10
NonePatents in suitUS 8,860,337 - PTAB · Sep 19, 2025 · PGR2025-00025 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–19 and all asserted grounds, finding it more likely than not that claim 1 is anticipated by the Gatorade Label.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Post-grant review is available for patents that issue from applications that at one point contained at least one claim with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f)(2)(A). After considering the briefing and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has shown that the ’422 Patent is eligible for post-grant review and has shown it is more likely than not that at least one challenged claim of the ’422 Patent is unpatentable under § 324(a). Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims of the ’422 Patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would possess at least (1) a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry or a related field, with (2) five years of experience in material identification and characterization using multiple analytical methods and field sampling, or equivalent research or professional experience.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶ 24). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition for one of ordinary skill in the art nor provide a proposed definition of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposal regarding the level of one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner
“336. The applicant explained that not all combinations of shrink films and light blocking materials are recyclable. Id. at 335. The applicant explained that films can be compatible with PET recycling in two ways, (1) the film can float in water and be separated from PET that sinks in water or (2) the PET films crystallize and “can be recovered with the PET stream.” Id. at 336 (citing “A Resource Document by the Association of Plastic Recyclers (APR)”) (found at Ex. 1002, 323–332) (emphasis omitted). The applicant explained that “removing the label before or during the recycling process is not evidence of the recyclability of the label” and that “[r]emoving the label during the recycling process is not equivalent to actually recycling the label.” Id. at 335. As such, a POSITA reading the prosecution history would understand that a label is not recyclable with a PET container, as recited by the independent claims, by removing the label from the PET recycle stream before or during the recycling process.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“To determine how a person skill in the art would determine if a shrink label is “recyclable” as recited in the independent claims, we look to how the Specification of the ’422 Patent describes or defines recyclable shrink labels. For example, the ’422 Patent states that PET shrink films are generally considered recyclable if no inks are retained on the film after a caustic wash cycle typically used in PET reclaiming processes. Ex. 1001, 6:61–65. The ’422 Patent further states that labels are fully recyclable if the polymers used are clear, preferably clear PET, and the labels include inks that can be washed off in a “typical PET recycling wash (caustic wash).” Id. at 11:44– 49; see also id. at 11:49–54 (describing embodiments in which the labels are free or substantially free of inks that cannot be washed off in a caustic wash or where the labels are free or substantially free of color plastics that cannot be recycled). The ’422 Patent further discusses “industry standards” for determining whether various embodiments of shrink labels are recyclable. See, e.g., id. at 11:29–53. For example, the Specification states that the “Association for Plastic Recyclers (APR) Critical Guidance Protocol for Clear PET Articles with Labels and Closures (PET-CG-02)” (Ex. 1005) can certify that a film is fully recyclable with a container or bottle. Id. at 11:34– 38. Additionally, the Specification states that labels “are recyclable according to the Evaluation of the Near Infrared (NIR) Sorting Potential of a Whole Plastic Article (SORT-B-01)” (Ex. 1010) and/or the “Evaluation of Sorting Potential for Plastic Articles Utilizing Metal, Metalized, or Metallic Printed Components (SORT-B-03)” (Ex. 1011). Ex. 1001, 11:39–44. The ’422 Patent further states that embodiments of the labels “are fully recyclable. For example, the labels may include inks that can be washed off in a typical PET recycling wash (caustic wash) and the polymers” are preferably clear PET. Id. at 11:44–48. The ’422 Patent thus provides various descriptions or standards to determine the recyclability of shrink labels. For the purposes of addressing the anticipation and obviousness grounds, we determine that any of these standards can be used to determine if a shrink label is “recyclable.” We note that our construction is preliminary and is based on the present record. We invite the parties to further the address the construction of “wherein the recyclable shrink label is recyclable with a PET container” during trial.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,961,422 - PTAB · Sep 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00632 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 are obvious over Yamaguchi-727.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Cerebrum Sensor Technologies, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) timely filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 9 (“Prelim. Resp.”).1 Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenInstituted
“We disagree. Positioning module 6 to face a “predetermined direction” is a form of preventing movement that falls within the scope of limitation 1b. Moreover, Yamaguchi-727 uses a method for preventing movement of its module 6 in its housing 20, silicone potting material, that is expressly recognized by the Specification of the ’421 patent when it states: “A common technique used to assist in fixturing the electrical sensor device 40 known within the automotive industry is to fill the internal cavity with a coating material such as a neutral silicone or the like for purposes of retaining placement position.” Ex. 1001, 13:56–60. Although the Specification also asserts that the sensor assemblies disclosed in the 421 patent “do not use or require the use of any such coating or filing agents or materials for any fixturing of the electrical sensor device 40,” id. at 13:61–64, limitation 1b merely requires that the “sensor device . . . is disposed within the internal cavity and attached therein to prevent movement of the device within the internal cavity,” id. at 30:25–27. Absent a persuasive argument to the contrary, we preliminarily conclude that Yamaguchi-727’s use of potting material to hold its module 6 in place within its housing 20 meets the requirements of limitation 1b. Both parties are encouraged to adduce intrinsic evidence relating to the meaning of limitation 1b at trial. For all the reasons set forth above, we find that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of proving the Yamaguchi-727 renders claim 1 unpatentable as obvious. 2. Dependent Claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 Petitioner identifies the portions of Yamaguchi-727 that teach the limitations introduced in dependent claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24, all of which ultimately depend from claim 1. Pet. 32–40. Patent Owner relies upon its argument that Petitioner’s showing for claim 1 is deficient as the reason why Petitioner’s challenge to dependent claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 fails. We reject this argument for the reasons stated in Part II.C.1 above. Based on our review of Petitioner’s otherwise uncontested argument and evidence cited in support, we find that Petitioner also establishes a reasonable likelihood of proving that Yamaguchi-727 renders dependent claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 unpatentable as obvious. D. Remaining Challenges” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner complies with the requirement of identifying “[h]ow the claim language is to be construed” by setting forth proposed interpretations of various claim terms in the table above.7 Both cases cited by Patent Owner relate to an issue presented by a petitioner’s alleged inconsistent handling of whether a claim term is subject to interpretation as a means-plus-function element under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Orthopediatrics Corp. v. K2M, Inc., IPR2018-01546, Paper 10 at 11 (PTAB Feb. 14, 2019); 10x Genomics, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, IPR2023- 7 Neither party has identified any claim language that might invoke interpretation as a means-plus-function limitation, and we discern no such claim language. Additionally, we do not imply that a petitioner must always propose express interpretations for specific claim language to comply with Rule 42.104(b)(3). Rather, we only note that Petitioner has, by any measure, complied by expressly proposing interpretations for identified claim language.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“We disagree. Positioning module 6 to face a “predetermined direction” is a form of preventing movement that falls within the scope of limitation 1b. Moreover, Yamaguchi-727 uses a method for preventing movement of its module 6 in its housing 20, silicone potting material, that is expressly recognized by the Specification of the ’421 patent when it states: “A common technique used to assist in fixturing the electrical sensor device 40 known within the automotive industry is to fill the internal cavity with a coating material such as a neutral silicone or the like for purposes of retaining placement position.” Ex. 1001, 13:56–60. Although the Specification also asserts that the sensor assemblies disclosed in the 421 patent “do not use or require the use of any such coating or filing agents or materials for any fixturing of the electrical sensor device 40,” id. at 13:61–64, limitation 1b merely requires that the “sensor device . . . is disposed within the internal cavity and attached therein to prevent movement of the device within the internal cavity,” id. at 30:25–27. Absent a persuasive argument to the contrary, we preliminarily conclude that Yamaguchi-727’s use of potting material to hold its module 6 in place within its housing 20 meets the requirements of limitation 1b. Both parties are encouraged to adduce intrinsic evidence relating to the meaning of limitation 1b at trial. For all the reasons set forth above, we find that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of proving the Yamaguchi-727 renders claim 1 unpatentable as obvious. 2. Dependent Claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 Petitioner identifies the portions of Yamaguchi-727 that teach the limitations introduced in dependent claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24, all of which ultimately depend from claim 1. Pet. 32–40. Patent Owner relies upon its argument that Petitioner’s showing for claim 1 is deficient as the reason why Petitioner’s challenge to dependent claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 fails. We reject this argument for the reasons stated in Part II.C.1 above. Based on our review of Petitioner’s otherwise uncontested argument and evidence cited in support, we find that Petitioner also establishes a reasonable likelihood of proving that Yamaguchi-727 renders dependent claims 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 unpatentable as obvious. D. Remaining Challenges” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,835,421 - Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden Canada UlcAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01382 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s withdrawal of its motion to amend and entered adverse judgment against all challenged claims after their statutory disclaimer, terminating the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 11,740,423 - Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden Canada UlcAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01228 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s withdrawal of its motion to amend and entered adverse judgment on the disclaimed challenged claims, terminating the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 11,656,422 - Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden Canada UlcAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01227 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s withdrawal of its motion to amend and entered adverse judgment after it disclaimed challenged claims 1–5 and 8–13, terminating the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,435,542 - Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden Canada UlcAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01218 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment after it disclaimed challenged claims 1–5 and 8–13, terminating the inter partes review.
RulingsAdverse judgment- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 10,795,107 - Champion Laboratories, Inc. / First Brands Group, LLC v. Hengst SENo claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00603 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 5, 8–11, 15–17, 19, 23–25, and 28–30 were not shown unpatentable over Yokoyama, Yokoyama and Cline, or Honermann and Cline.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“On this record, we determine that the level of ordinary skill is reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (specific findings on the ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163–64 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Because the level of ordinary skill in the art is not in dispute, and because the parties’ definition is consistent with the disclosures in the ʼ203 patent, the prior art, and the declaration testimony of Mr. Nranian and Dr. Basirat, we view the prior art and arguments through this lens when determining whether the claims are unpatentable as obvious over the prior art.5 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (identifying “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art” as an underlying factual inquiry to be resolved in deciding obviousness, which is a question of law).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Although the parties spend significant portions of their briefing discussing the term “eccentric” and how it applies to certain figures from the ʼ203 patent and the relied-upon prior art, we determine that it is not necessary to expressly construe the term “eccentric” beyond the parties’ agreed-upon definition. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Rather, we adopt Patent Owner’s proffered definition because it is consistent with the intrinsic record and because it is not in dispute. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that the plain meaning of the term “eccentric” is defined as “located elsewhere than at the geometric center; also: having the axis or support so located.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing the Merriam-Webster online dictionary definition of the term “eccentric” for support). Petitioner agrees with this definition. Pet. 35 (asserting that certain prior art elements are eccentric “because they are not located at the center of the filter insert or housing”); Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”); see also Ex. 2017 ¶ 33 (Dr. Basirat testifying that “[a] POSITA would understand that ‘eccentric’ in the context of [the] ʼ203 patent, means that central axis is located elsewhere than at the geometric center [and] not placed centrally or not having its axis or other part placed centrally”). The parties’ definition of “eccentric” is also consistent with the usage of the term in the ʼ203 patent. Ex. 1001, 10:23–31; Fig. 17.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Rather, we adopt Patent Owner’s proffered definition because it is consistent with the intrinsic record and because it is not in dispute. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that the plain meaning of the term “eccentric” is defined as “located elsewhere than at the geometric center; also: having the axis or support so located.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing the Merriam-Webster online dictionary definition of the term “eccentric” for support). Petitioner agrees with this definition. Pet. 35 (asserting that certain prior art elements are eccentric “because they are not located at the center of the filter insert or housing”); Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”); see also Ex. 2017 ¶ 33 (Dr. Basirat testifying that “[a] POSITA would understand that ‘eccentric’ in the context of [the] ʼ203 patent, means that central axis is located elsewhere than at the geometric center [and] not placed centrally or not having its axis or other part placed centrally”). The parties’ definition of “eccentric” is also consistent with the usage of the term in the ʼ203 patent. Ex. 1001, 10:23–31; Fig. 17.” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“(opining that “Patent Owner’s construction of ‘having an axis no located in a geometric center’ is too narrow”). Mr. Nranian’s Declaration testimony in this respect is not persuasive for several reasons. First, it is internally inconsistent. Compare Ex. 1016 ¶ 3 (criticizing the “axis” language in Patent Owner’s definition), with id. ¶¶ 9, 11 (relying on that very language to support an argument). Also, Mr. Nranian’s proposed definition of “eccentric” to merely mean “not located at the center” begs the question of what, precisely, is “the center”? Mr. Nranian does not persuasively explain how far a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand she could travel from the exact center point of an object and still be in “the center” of that object. See Tr. 10:13–19 (Judge McGee asking whether the center is “a miniscule point in the middle of [the] disc”); see also id. at 10:25–12:26 (Judge Weatherly highlighting the significant ambiguity in referring to something as in “the center”). Also, Mr. Nranian’s opinion is inconsistent with how the ʼ203 patent compares something that is “central,” i.e., “at the center,” and something that is “eccentrically” located. Ex. 1001, 7:13–14 (describing pipe nozzle 15 as “central”); id. at 8:53–56 (describing a “through hole” as “located in the center of the front panel 22” depicted in Figures 7 and 8); id. at 10:23–31 (describing return 12 as “in the center” and outlet 13 as “eccentrically thereto” in Figure 17). Patent Owner’s colorized and annotated Figure 7 is reproduced below: Patent Owner’s colorized and annotated version of Figure 7 of the ʼ203 patent illustrates “central pipe nozzle 15” in yellow passing through the “through hole” located in “the center” of front panel 22. PO Resp. 20. Significantly, pipe nozzle 15 and the through hole in panel 22 are both described as “central” and in “the center” but must have different diameters; otherwise, “central pipe nozzle 15” would not be capable of traveling through “through hole 22.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 7. Thus, the ʼ203 patent intrinsically bases whether an element is “central” or “in the center” on whether its axis is located at the geometric center. This is also illustrated in Figure 17 of the ʼ203 patent, reproduced below: Figure 17 of the ʼ203 patent illustrates filter housing 10 with return 12 “in the center . . . and, eccentrically thereto, the outlet 13 with the seat 14 for the blocking element 24.” Ex. 1001, 10:23–30. Finally, Mr. Nranian’s narrow interpretation of “eccentric”––which excludes the “having the axis or support so located” in the geometric center language––is at odds with the arguments it was proffered to support. Cf. Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”).” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 9,023,203 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,023,203 - PTAB · Sep 3, 2025 · PGR2025-00021 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1, 3–7, and 12–20, finding it more likely than not that at least claim 1 would have been obvious over Kim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2023). Post-grant review is available for patents that issue from applications that at one point contained at least one claim with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112- 29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f)(2)(A). For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner establishes they are more likely than not to prevail with respect to the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of claims 1, 3–7, and 12–20 of the ’838 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) 3D memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may substitute for professional experience).” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner further contends that a” slip op. at 5
- BurdenInstituted
“(c) Analysis We have reviewed and considered both parties’ arguments and evidence and determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Kim discloses or suggests the limitations of claim 1. We disagree with Patent an “island” shaped landing pad that is surrounded on all four sides by auxiliary layer 122. Based on the present record, we do not understand the Petition to rely solely on the “island” landing pad embodiment of Kim because the Petition also refers to an embodiment in Kim that is not island shaped. See, e.g., Pet. 34–35 (citing, inter alia, Ex. 1005, Fig. 5). In this embodiment, the sides of protrusion pad PAD_P are “coplanar” with 2 of the edges of PAD_B (i.e., E3, E4). See, e.g., Ex. 1005, Fig. 5. We understand that, in this embodiment, PAD_P is not an “island” landing pad because the auxiliary layer would not surround the landing pad on the sides of the landing pad coplanar to edges E3 and E4. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, Fig. 5. Thus, in this embodiment, the asserted first material layer (i.e., insulating layer 110 and the portion of the auxiliary layer to the left of the landing pad) would not form one structure all the way around PAD_P, as contended by Patent Owner. Prelim. Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 61). Rather, the asserted first material layer would end as depicted by Petitioner. See, e.g., Pet. 34–35 (citing Ex. 1005, Fig. 4B).” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Patent Owner states that it does not believe any terms require construction. Prelim. Resp. 9. Based on the record before us, we determine that none of the claim terms discussed above require express construction for purposes of this Decision. To the extent the parties’ arguments raise additional claim construction issues, for efficiency, we address any such arguments in the context of our unpatentability analysis below.” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 12,010,838 - PTAB · Aug 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00631 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 5, 7–9, 11–13, and 15–22 on all five asserted § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute an inter partes review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Supreme Court has held that the Board, in a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b), may not institute review on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355–56 (2018). Moreover, in accordance with our rules, “[w]hen instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2020); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”). Applying those standards, and upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’027 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims (i.e., 1–3, 5, 7–9, 11–13, and 15–22) of the ’027 patent, based on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “possessed an undergraduate degree in chemistry, polymers, materials science, chemical engineering (or related field) and one to two years of experience with constructing and manufacturing tires, tire patches, tire decals/stickers and/or the like.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 6–11). According to Petitioner, “Additional education could compensate for less practical experience. Conversely, additional practical experience could compensate for less education.” Id. Patent Owner does not provide an alternate definition, but, “Patent Owner does not acquiesce to, and reserves the right to address, [Petitioner’s] definition of a POSA.” Prelim. Resp. 6 n.6. Petitioner’s proposed definition appears to be consistent with the disclosure of the ’027 patent, and we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the prior art itself may “reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Having considered the record, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s contentions that these disclosures indicate that Wilson’s patch would not meet the construction of “barrier material composition.” None of these disclosures even suggests that the base of Wilson’s patch is rigid as Patent Owner suggests. To begin with, the fact that the housing is “more rigid” provides no information about the absolute rigidness of the patch. See Ex. 1009, 9:16–21. As for the disclosure that the patch is contoured (id. at 3:35–67), Patent Owner provides only attorney argument to support its contention that the contour demonstrates that Wilson’s patch must be so rigid that it cannot be meet the claim limitation. In contrast, Petitioner demonstrates that Wilson discloses using the exact same materials described in the challenged patent (see Ex. 1001, 6:33–58 (noting “[e]lastomeric materials useful for forming the intermediate layer 24 include but are not limited to gum rubber, vulcanized natural rubber SBR . . . or comparable materials”); Ex. 1009, 3:49–55 (noting the patch may be constructed from natural rubber (NR), a preferred mixture of chlorobutyl rubber and natural rubber (CR/NR), or a preferred mixture of SBR and natural rubber (SBR/NR)), and provides detailed testimony from its expert to support its contentions (see Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 114–119). On the current record, we find Petitioner’s reasoning and evidence to be persuasive, and find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Willson discloses or teaches this limitation.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,124,027
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.