- PTAB · Feb 27, 2025 · IPR2024-01227 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all grounds for claims 1–5 and 8–13, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 8 is anticipated by Fukui and claims 1 and 8 are obvious over Fukui-based grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been unpatentable over the proposed prior art. We analyze the asserted grounds with the above-noted principles in mind.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“Patent Owner contends that we should deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) “because the Petition presents ‘the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously . . . presented to the Office.’” Prelim. Resp. 25–31 (alteration in original). Specifically, Patent Owner explains, the Office previously considered Sedor during the ’542 patent’s prosecution, and Sauter was made of record but not considered during prosecution. Id. Patent Owner, however, states that it “recognizes that this argument only reaches Sauter-based grounds, not Fukui-based grounds. This argument thus only needs to be addressed after the Board confirms the fundamental deficiencies in Petitioner’s Fukui-based grounds.” Id. at 25 n.3. Because, as set forth below, we do not, on the present record, find any “fundamental deficiencies in Petitioner’s Fukui-based grounds” that inhibit institution of trial, we regard Patent Owner’s § 325 request as moot, and we need not consider it further.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have [had] a B.S. degree or equivalent in mechanical or electrical engineering or similar fields, in addition to a minimum of two years of professional experience with or graduate studies involving design, development, and/or utilization of optical communication systems.” Pet. 26. On the present record, Patent Owner does not dispute this proposed level of skill. Prelim. Resp. 1–31. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’542 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“enough to resolve . . . the lead Fukui ground” but that “[t]here are two disputes relevant to the alternative Sauter ground.” Pet. 22. With respect to the first of these “disputes,” Petitioner presents two claim constructions for the claim term or phrase “cassette width as measured between outer side edges thereof of one of one, two, three, four and six standard width units.” Id. at 23. The constructions are said to be from “the co-pending litigation,” with one characterized as “Patent Owner’s proposed construction”6 and the other as “CommScope’s proposed construction.”7 Of note is Petitioner’s 6 The claim construction attributed to Patent Owner is: “cassette width as measured between the outer side edges thereof that accommodates one of one, two, three, four, or six receptable modules.” Pet. 23. 7 Petitioner’s construction is: “The cassette width as measured between the outer side edges thereof equals one, two, three, four, or six times the contention that “[Patent Owner]’s construction cannot be correct,” and accompanying explanation in that respect. Id. at 22–23, 24. Patent Owner acknowledges that there is a dispute between the parties as to the noted claim construction but urges that “[t]he Board, however, need not fully resolve this claim construction dispute,” as, in Patent Owner’s view, the grounds based on Sauter are deficient based on either construction. Prelim. Resp. 21–22. We are mindful of Petitioner’s view that Patent Owner’s litigation construction is not correct. We also question whether that construction adds clarity in substituting “width that accommodates” for “width of,” and replacing “standard width units” with “receptable modules,” without, on this record, support for such word variations. Nevertheless, our determination whether to institute trial does not require resolution of any claim construction dispute, nor does it necessitate that we adopt any particular construction for the pertinent claim term. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). We invite the parties to develop the record more fully on this claim- construction issue during trial.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,435,542 - PTAB · Feb 27, 2025 · IPR2024-01218 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–5 and 8–13 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute an inter partes review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“Stated somewhat generally, the core question underlying Patent Owner’s challenge to Petitioner’s Fukui-based grounds is whether a conversion module (e.g., 20) that is formed by coupling together two unit modules establishes that conversion module as a new structure identifiable as a unitary cassette. We discern that Fukui uses the term “conversion module” to refer to component 10, and uses that same term, i.e., “conversion module” to refer to component 20. See, e.g., Ex. 1004, 6:33–35, 7:23–25. The components 10A and 10B that make-up conversion module 20 are characterized as each being a “unit module.” See, e.g., id. at 7:25–27. Thus, once unit modules 10A and 10B are coupled together to form the structure that is “conversion module 20,” the current record reasonably suggests that the conversion module 20 is a component analogous to conversion module 10, but with a larger width, i.e., two times the width. Further, Fukui also characterizes unit modules 10A and 10B as being “fixed” to one another via coupling member 21 (see, e.g., id. at 10:11–16) and forming “one body” (see, e.g., id. at 8:2–3). Further still, as described and shown in Fukui (e.g., Figure 5), conversion module 20 is structured to operate via a singular multicore optical connector 16 from which optical fibers F1 extend to all of the single-core optical connectors 17 of the conversion module. Id. at 7:52– 8:6. Thus, conversion module 20 is recognizable has having a singular system of fiber optic components within its body. At this time, we regard such characterization of the coupled unit modules 10A and 10B as reasonably giving rise to an understanding that the resulting conversion module 20 constitutes a unitary module or cassette component.” slip op. at 20
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“IV. REQUEST FOR DENIAL UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 325 Patent Owner contends that the Board should exercise its discretion to deny under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) on the theory that the Petitioner relies on substantially the same prior art and arguments that were previously considered by the Office. See Prelim. Resp. 31–37. Patent Owner, however, states the following: “Patent Owner recognizes that this argument only reaches Sauter-based grounds, not Fukui-based grounds. This argument thus only needs to be addressed after the Board confirms the fundamental deficiencies in Petitioner’s Fukui-based grounds.” Id. at 31, n.4. Because, as set forth above, we do not agree at this time as to any “fundamental deficiencies in Petitioner’s Fukui-based grounds” that inhibit institution of trial, we regard Patent Owner’s § 325 request as moot, and need not consider it further.” slip op. at 23
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We are mindful of Petitioner’s view that Patent Owner’s litigation construction is not correct. We also question whether that construction adds clarity in substituting “width that accommodates” for “width of,” and replacing “standard width units” with “receptable modules,” without, on this record, support for such word variations. Nevertheless, our determination whether to institute trial does not require resolution of any claim construction dispute or necessitate that we adopt any particular construction for any claim term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). 9 The claim construction attributed to Patent Owner is: “cassette width that accommodates one of one, two, three, four, or six receptable modules.” Pet. 21. 10 Petitioner’s construction is: “The cassette width equals one, two, three, four, or six times the standard width unit, without an additional amount. This means the cassette width must be evenly divisible by the standard width unit.” Pet. 21.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,795,107 - Menard, Inc. v. Signify Holdings B.V.InstitutedPTAB · Feb 14, 2025 · IPR2024-01469 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all petitioned challenges and granted Menard’s motion to join the Luminex IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Here, Petitioner presents substantively identical challenges to claims 1–20 in the ’336 patent based on the same prior art, the same evidence, and the same unpatentability theories as Luminex presents in the Luminex IPR. Compare Pet. 15–89, with IPR2024-00101, Paper 1 (“Luminex Pet.”) at 15–89. According to Petitioner, the Petition differs from Luminex’s petition only because of different party names and updated sections concerning standing, related matters, real parties in interest, and counsel. Mot. 4. Because Petitioner presents substantively identical challenges to claims 1–20 in the ’336 patent based on the same prior art, the same evidence, and the same unpatentability theories as Luminex presents in the Luminex IPR, Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial for the same reasons Luminex satisfied the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial. See Luminex Pet. 15–89; Luminex Inst. Dec. 19–64; Pet. 15–89.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“Consistent with § 315(b) and § 315(c), the Board’s rules provide that “[a]ny request for joinder must be filed, as a motion under § 42.22, no later than one month after the institution date of any inter partes review for which joinder is requested.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). The Board’s rules also provide that § 42.101(b)’s one-year time bar “shall not apply when the petition is accompanied by a request for joinder.” Id. We instituted an inter partes review in the Luminex IPR on September 9, 2024. Luminex Inst. Dec. 1. On September 23, 2024, Petitioner filed the Petition and the Motion for Joinder. Pet. 91; Mot. 7. Under § 42.122(b), Petitioner timely filed the Petition and the Motion for Joinder. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b).” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“If joined to the Luminex IPR, Petitioner agrees to take an “understudy” role and only “substantively participate” if Luminex is terminated from the Luminex IPR. Mot. 1, 5–6. Further Petitioner agrees that the following conditions will apply to it in its “understudy” role “so long as Luminex remains an active party”: (1) “all filings by [Petitioner] in the joined proceeding be consolidated with the filings of Luminex, unless a filing solely concerns issues that do not involve Luminex”; (2) Petitioner “shall not be permitted to raise any new grounds not instituted by the Board in the Luminex IPR, or introduce any argument not already introduced by Luminex”; and (3) “with regard to taking of testimony, [Petitioner] will abide by 37 C.F.R. § 42.53 or any agreement between the Patent Owner and Luminex.”” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel appliesOther
“5. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, we determine that it is appropriate under the circumstances here to join Petitioner as a party to the Luminex IPR. See §§ III.D.2–III.D.4. The estoppel provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) will apply to Petitioner.” slip op. at 18
NonePatents in suitUS 10,299,336 - PTAB · Jan 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01186 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims are obvious over Zhou and Kwatra, with Shi added for certain dependent claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–20 of the ’894 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have the following characteristics: “a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing or digital cameras.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner states that, “[a]lternatively, a POSITA would have four years of experience working on image or video processing or digital cameras.” Id. Petitioner further contends “[a]n advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim Resp. 3. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’894 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner “does not believe any terms require a formal construction.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner agrees “no claim terms presently require construction.” Prelim. Resp. 11–12. We do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Based on the evidence presented, Petitioner adequately establishes that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Zhou and Kwatra with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 8–10, 30–35; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 104–117; Ex. 1004, 1:41–45, 7:41– 42, 7:47–54, 9:64–65, 11:55–67, Fig. 7; Ex. 1005, code (57), 1:17–19, 1:52– 57, 5:64–6:5, 13:23–48, 13:66–14:37, 16:13–32, 17:38–48, 18:54–56, 26:12–21, Fig. 13.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,574,894 - PTAB · Jan 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01165 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–21, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Zhou and Cai.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons provided below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim of the ’840 patent is unpatentable, and we institute an inter partes review. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that: A person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) in the field of the ’840 patent would have a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras. Alternatively, a POSITA would have four years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras. An advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 32). Patent Owner applies the same definition. Prelim. Resp. 9. We use this agreed-upon definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties both assert that no terms require a formal construction. Pet. 6–7; Prelim. Resp. 9–10. Reviewing the arguments set before us, we determine that no claims require construction to resolve a dispute between the parties at this time. Realtime, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther
“b) Reason to Combine & Expectation of Success As explained earlier, Petitioner asserts that it would have been obvious to improve Zhou’s video stabilization techniques by using the techniques in Cai for using future frames to characterize the video as having zero motion or not. Pet. 36. Patent Owner first argues that neither reference “offers any hint or suggestion of combining such reactive systems to create a proactive stabilization solution.” Prelim. Resp. 17; see also id. at 17–19 (similar). Patent Owner has not offered a claim construction, or otherwise explained, how the claims require a “proactive stabilization solution.” Thus, this argument is unpersuasive. Patent Owner next argues that Zhou and Cai are technically incompatible. Id. at 20–23. In particular, Patent Owner argues that Zhou “uses buffering to adjust stabilization strength,” whereas Cai uses buffering “for trajectory adjustment and distinguishing jitter from zero-motion or lowspeed movements.” Id. at 21–22 (emphasis removed). On this record, however, we are not provided with sufficient technical reasoning explaining how using the buffer for one purpose precludes its use for another purpose. Patent Owner cites its declarant, Dr. Foroosh, but his testimony merely repeats Patent Owner’s arguments without any meaningful elucidation. Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 70); 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022- 00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). On this record, we are shown no technical impediment with using the buffer in Zhou for distinguishing non-zero motion by looking ahead some number of frames, as proposed in the Petition.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,958,840 - PTAB · Jan 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01164 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–21, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Bell and Shi.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“5. Conclusion for the Bell & Shi Ground In summary, we determine on this limited record that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Shi discloses the low-light high-pass parameter of claim 1 and that there would have been a reason to combine Bell and Shi. We adopt Petitioner’s remaining unchallenged assertions regarding claim 1 as our own. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s objective indicia analysis, which is lacking a showing of nexus. In conclusion, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in showing that the subject matter of claim 1 of the ’840 patent would have been obvious in view of Bell and Shi. No issue unique to any of the other claims in this ground is raised at this time.” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“Looking to the claim language itself, we note that the claim mentions “low-light high-pass parameter” once, in the context of listing it as one of three alternative things covered by the claim. Ex. 1001, 30:35–38. We find the specification of the ’840 patent discusses the low-light high-pass parameter in two paragraphs. Id. at 21:59–22:21. In these passages, the ’840 patent states that the low-light high-pass parameter may be “a parameter that controls the amount/strength of smoothing performed to generate the smoothed trajectory.” Id. at 21:59–61. The parameter may take a value corresponding to the amount of motion blur compensation to be used. Id. at 22:8–21. Thus, the specification states that the low-light high-pass parameter is used to control the amount of motion blur compensation.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundOther
“Patent Owner then argues that Bell and Shi are incompatible techniques and would not be combined. Prelim. Resp. 19–20. In particular, Patent Owner argues that Bell preemptively adjusts for future motion, whereas Shi reacts only after blur is detected. Id. at 20. On this record, this argument is unpersuasive because Patent Owner has not sufficiently explained the alleged technical incompatibility. Patent Owner’s position relies on the testimony of Dr. Foroosh, but we do not credit his testimony here because it merely mirrors what Patent Owner has argued, without technical explanation. Ex. 2001 ¶ 65; 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight”); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). In contrast, both Bell and Shi look at future frames for motion smoothing. Ex. 1006, 10:10–16 (describing Bell’s “look-ahead buffer”); Ex. 1007, 1:61– 65 (describing Shi’s “use [of] future frames”). Thus, on this record, we are not persuaded that there is a technical incompatibility in the manner Patent Owner alleges.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusOther
“Prelim. Resp. 23–31. Patent Owner’s position is underpinned by its evidence purporting to show its “dominant position in the U.S. action camera market,” based on its “HyperSmooth technology” that it asserts “has garnered widespread industry recognition.” See generally id. However, even if we were to accept Patent Owner’s argument that it has a revolutionary and successful product, that does not mean that all claims of its patents would have been non-obvious. For us to give substantial weight to objective indicia of non-obviousness, a proponent must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention. ClassCo, Inc., v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “[T]here is no nexus unless the evidence presented is ‘reasonably commensurate with the scope of the claims.’” Id. (quoting Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2013)); see also Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“For objective evidence of secondary considerations to be accorded substantial weight, its proponent must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention.”) (cleaned up). Patent Owner here has not attempted a nexus analysis in its Preliminary Response. At best, it improperly incorporates by reference a claim chart (Exhibit 2016) served in the related ITC proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 25; 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another document.”). Even then, the claim chart appears to admit that claim 1 does not read on Patent Owner’s technology. Ex. 2016, 30.2 On this record, we cannot determine whether, or the extent to which, Patent Owner’s assertions of non-obviousness are due to the claimed invention because of the failure to show nexus to the subject matter of the claims.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,958,840 - PTAB · Jan 15, 2025 · IPR2024-01044 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 4, 8–23, and 27 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Jones renders at least claim 1 obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (2024). Upon consideration of the papers, we conclude that the information presented shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’629 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least 2–4 years of experience in the field of wireless communication,” and that “[e]quivalent education, work, or experience in this field could substitute for the foregoing qualifications.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 82). Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s definition. Prelim. Resp. 22. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 20. We view the” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther
“Here, neither party sets forth any term that we need to construe. Pet. 5–6; Prelim. Resp. 23. Thus, for purposes of our Decision on Institution, we afford the claim terms their plain and ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“52 subcarriers are used while “the DC subcarrier and 11 subcarriers near the edges of the 20 MHZ channel are not used for data transmission” (i.e., are set to zero). Ex. 1014, 2:14–30 (explaining the long training sequence for a conventional 802.11a preamble), 6:11–15. Notably, Jones also teaches that “packet formation block 314 may insert appropriate complex values at unused . . . subcarrier locations in each group of symbols D[k],” and that “any or all of the subcarriers k may be used to transmit data, thereby increasing the data rate.” Id. at 6:15–20 (emphasis added); see also id. at 8:22–24 (teaching that an extended long training sequence “can contain more than 52 non-zero subcarriers”). At this stage, we credit Dr. Buehrer’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to “add[] four subcarriers to 802.11a data and training fields [to] increase[] data rate throughput as taught in . . . Jones,” as this testimony is consistent with Jones’s teachings. Ex. 1005 ¶ 107. In addition, we agree with Petitioner and find that one of ordinary skill in the art extending the long training sequence would want to use the same 52 center subcarriers to maintain backwards compatibility with 802.11a. Pet. 28–29. This is supported by Jones’s teaching of having a long training sequence that “is usable in a process for determining whether the packet is an 802.11a packet or an extended-mode packet.” Ex. 1014, 8:37– 40. Moreover, Jones’s L2 example of an extended long training sequence maintains the same 52 center subcarriers as 802.11a, which also supports this finding. Id. at Fig. 4; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 96, 113. Thus, up to 11 subcarriers unused in 802.11a could be used for an extended long training sequence. “more than 52 non-zero subcarriers” can be used for an extended long training sequence, which explicitly teaches that only a portion of the 11 subcarriers may be used. Ex. 1014, 6:15–20, 8:22–24. In light of the above teachings, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to use only the next 4 nearest to the center of these 11 unused subcarriers. Ex. 1005 ¶ 87. The remaining 7 subcarriers would remain at zero.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham - PTAB · Jan 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00959 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–10 on all petitioned grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that Google would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), institution of review requires the information in the record to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Applying that standard on behalf of the Director (37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a)), we institute an inter partes review to determine whether Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–10 are unpatentable, considering all grounds in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s position in this regard invites us to err “by looking at [Fisher] individually” and separately from Kuwata, because “[t]he question in an obviousness inquiry is whether it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the relevant disclosures of the two references, not whether each individual reference discloses all of the necessary elements.” Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks LLC, 122 F.4th 1378, 1385–86 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting Game & Tech. Co. v. Wargaming Grp. Ltd., 942 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2019)); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (nonobviousness is not established by attacking references individually when unpatentability is predicated upon a combination of prior art disclosures); see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 420–421 (stating “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton,” and “in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle”). Finally, as to motivation for combining Kuwata and Fisher to practice the invention of claim 1, Petitioner’s contentions and Dr. Stevenson’s testimony justify institution of review. In particular, Dr. Stevenson testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated, in light of Fisher’s disclosures regarding updating of data files on a camera, to configure Kuwata’s camera to download updated image processing control data from a server via the Internet, in order to pair the camera with various printers including printers that were not yet on the market when the camera was manufactured. See Pet. 15–18, 22–26; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 86–89, 102–108. Based on the present record, we conclude Kuwata does not teach away from this combination, as Patent Owner would have it. Kuwata merely discloses that the camera manufacturer (as opposed to individual users of the camera) is in the best position to optimize the output control information CI utilized by the camera to reduce differences between images displayed to the user by the camera and images that are outputted by particular printers. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 75, 77. This does not detract from the benefits of updating the output control information CI after the camera is manufactured, for example so that the camera can be paired with printers that were not yet on the market when the camera was manufactured. Indeed, Fisher recognizes that “a manufacturer may create various ancillary data files 418, and make the ancillary data files 418 available on a distributed computer network like the Internet for subsequent downloading and utilization by camera device 110.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 55. That teaching in Fisher dovetails with Kuwata’s disclosure concerning camera manufacturers optimizing their cameras with various different printers. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the preliminary record supports, sufficiently to justify institution, Petitioner’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Kuwata and Fisher to practice the invention of claim 1.” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s position in this regard invites us to err “by looking at [Fisher] individually” and separately from Kuwata, because “[t]he question in an obviousness inquiry is whether it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the relevant disclosures of the two references, not whether each individual reference discloses all of the necessary elements.” Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks LLC, 122 F.4th 1378, 1385–86 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting Game & Tech. Co. v. Wargaming Grp. Ltd., 942 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2019)); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (nonobviousness is not established by attacking references individually when unpatentability is predicated upon a combination of prior art disclosures); see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 420–421 (stating “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton,” and “in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle”).” slip op. at 24
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“D. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art pertaining to the ’082 patent “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or related engineering disciplines, and two years of experience in digital image processing,” wherein “[r]elevant work experience can substitute for formal education and additional education could substitute for work experience.” Pet. 5; Ex. 1003 ¶ 60. “Patent Owner does not dispute the level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art . . . set forth in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 11–12. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears to be consistent with the ’082 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,428,082 - Google LLC v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedInstituted in partPTAB · Jan 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00957 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–8, 10–16, and 18 on all petitioned grounds, but did not institute review of disclaimed claims 9 and 17.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), institution of review requires the information in the record to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Applying that standard on behalf of the Director (37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a)), we institute an inter partes review to determine whether Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–8, 10–16, and 18 are unpatentable, considering all grounds in the Petition directed to those claims. We do not institute review as to claims 9 and 17 on any ground because they have been disclaimed. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e).” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgment
“disclaimer,” and “[n]o inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e). As a result of the statutory disclaimer, claims 9 and 17 are no longer regarded as claims challenged in the Petition. See Vectra, 162 F.3d at 1383 (“This court has interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in section 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”) (citing Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see also Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Inc., 933 F.3d 1367, 1372–75 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (disclaimer of claims during District Court patent infringement litigation “mooted any controversy” over the disclaimed claims, ending the Article III case or controversy requirement for District Court jurisdiction). In considering Federal Circuit precedent and our rules, we conclude we cannot institute a trial on claims that have been disclaimed, and, thus, no longer exist. Our conclusion is consistent with the statutory scope of inter partes review as laid out in 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(b) and 318(a) and is not at odds with SAS, supra. See, e.g., SAS, 584 U.S. at 367 (recognizing that “the claims challenged ‘in the petition’ will not always survive to the end of the case; some may drop out thanks to the patent owner’s actions”). Accordingly, we treat claims 9 and 17 as having never been part of the ’056 patent, such that Petitioner cannot seek inter partes review of those claims. Thus, we deny institution of review as to whether disclaimed claims 9 and 17 are unpatentable per Petitioner’s Grounds Three and Four.” slip op. at 32
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute the level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art . . . set forth in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 8; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 27–28. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears to be consistent with the ’056 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Petitioner argues “[n]o terms need to be construed . . . to resolve unpatentability.” Pet. 16–17. “Patent Owner contends that the claim terms should receive their ordinary and customary meaning in light of the specification and prosecution history, as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 8. Patent Owner does not proffer any constructions for particular terms. See id. Based on the arguments and evidence presented at this time, we determine no explicit construction is needed to resolve the parties’ controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,454,056 - PTAB · Jan 7, 2025 · IPR2024-01052 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 on all four asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success and insufficient nexus for GoPro’s objective-indicia evidence.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final but are made solely to determine whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–20 of the ’832 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have the following characteristics: “a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing or digital cameras[; a]lternatively, . . . four years of experience working on image or video processing or digital 7 Objective evidence of nonobviousness is presently asserted. Prelim. Resp. 23–30. cameras.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–38). Petitioner further contends “[a]n advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim Resp. 3. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’832 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“any viewing window determined for frames of a video is sufficient to be a function of progress merely because they are frames of a video that can be played back.” Prelim. Resp. 14. This argument is unpersuasive because it does not consider the entire context of claim 1. The relevant recitation requires more than just playback; instead, the recitation requires determining “a viewing window for the visual content as a function of progress through the progress length based on the rotational positions of the image capture device as the function of progress through the capture duration.” Ex. 1001, 28:44–48 (emphases added). The recitation as a whole requires making a specific determination for the viewing window at different points in time. Patent Owner also argues that “Petitioner’s theory would improperly render the limitation superfluous” because the claim elsewhere requires that visual content be viewable as a function of progress. Prelim. Resp. 14–15. Similarly, Patent Owner argues that the claims already require obtaining rotational positions as a function of progress. Id. at 20–21. We disagree that the limitation is superfluous. Aside from playback or obtaining rotational information, claims 1 and 11 also require that the viewing window be determined for different times within the video. In other words, if the viewing window were determined only once and this single determination were applied to every frame of an entire video, this would not meet the recitation, even if the video could be played back. slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Based on the evidence presented, Petitioner adequately establishes that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Thomason and Pacurariu with a reasonable expectation of success. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 76–81, 89–92; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 4, 8, 9, 27, 29, 35; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 26, 41, 46, 51–52, 55–57, Figs. 6–7. Pecurariu and Thomason are in the same field of endeavor, and we agree with Petitioner, on this record, that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Pecurariu’s teachings would have predictably improved Thomason. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner does not adequately establish reason to combine with rational underpinning. Prelim. Resp. 5–10. In particular, Patent Owner quotes the Petition at pages 23–24 and argues that these statements regarding reason to combine are unexplained and conclusory. Id. at 6–7. On the present record, we disagree with Patent Owner. Petitioner’s statements regarding reason to combine must be considered in view of the context provided by the entire Petition including Petitioner’s discussion of the teachings of Thomason and Pacurariu individually. See, e.g., Pet. 8–46. Similarly, the opinions of Dr. Katsaggelos regarding reason to combine (see, e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–92, 95, 104, 112, 115) must be considered given the complete context of Dr. Katsaggelos’s discussion of the cited art and technology. Id. ¶¶ 47–115. As explained above, Petitioner and Dr. Katsaggelos explain the references’ teachings and, based on these teachings, assert that a person having skill in the art would have had reason to combine with reasonable expectation of success based on those teachings. Reason to combine may properly come from the references themselves. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418 (explaining reason to combine may come from “interrelated teachings of multiple patents). On this record and based on the teachings of these references and the great similarity of the references’ technology, as we discuss above and, in more detail, below, Petitioner has a reasonable likelihood in showing that a person having skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of the references with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 34
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,336,832
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.