- PTAB · Apr 13, 2023 · IPR2022-01576 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Petruzzelli.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons provided below, we determine Petitioner has satisfied the threshold requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Because Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim of the ’985 patent is unpatentable, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims based on all grounds raised in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.08(a).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art: would have a degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related discipline, along with relevant experience (at least 1– 2 years for a Ph.D., 2–3 years for a Master’s, and 3+ years for a Bachelor’s) researching or developing graphical user interfaces (GUIs) for ultrasound systems or other medical imaging devices. EX1007, ¶¶14–19. The person would have general knowledge of GUIs for ultrasound systems or other medical imaging devices as of April 18, 2014. Id.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction Petitioner asserts that no claim terms require construction at this stage. Pet. 15. Patent Owner does not offer any claim constructions, but does challenge Petitioner’s choice not to offer any claim constructions, and suggests that we should deny the Petition on that basis. Prelim. Resp. 75– 77. We find Patent Owner’s arguments unavailing. First, we note that the parties have not offered competing claim constructions, such that there is no specific claim construction issue between the parties at this time. Second, we note that we consider Petitioner’s interpretation of the claims sufficiently clear based on their application of the claims on the art. Thus, we are able to proceed without explicitly construing any claim terms, and we are not persuaded to deny on that basis. In view of the above, we do not construe any claim terms. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“To establish anticipation, every element and limitation of the claimed invention must be found in a single prior art reference, arranged as in the claim. Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 9,538,985 - PTAB · Apr 13, 2023 · IPR2022-01575 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6, 12, 13, and 15 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated and/or obvious over Halmann.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in the Petition and any response thereto shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Considering the arguments presented in the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the information presented in the Petition establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in challenging at least 1 of the claims 1–6, 12, 13, and 15 of the ’168 patent as unpatentable under the grounds presented in the Petition. Pursuant to § 314, we hereby institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner “does not believe any terms require construction at this stage.” Pet. 10. At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner has not yet filed a response. For purposes of this decision, we do not expressly construe any terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017)), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1695 (April 30, 2018) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“We have reviewed Petitioner’s evidence and argument, and find that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Halmann discloses this limitation of claim 1 for the purposes of institution.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,867,168 - Apotex Inc. v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 10, 2023 · IPR2022-01524 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution
Institution denied because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–14 and 26–30 were unpatentable over the asserted anticipation and obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS “In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). An inter partes review may be instituted if the information presented by Petitioner in the Petition, in view of Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response and the preliminary record, shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314.” slip op. at 19
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“As an initial matter, we find Petitioner has insufficiently addressed the issue of inherent anticipation by Dixon (or any other prior art) and has done so in a merely conclusory manner. There is no dispute that Dixon (as well as the other asserted prior art) discloses angiogenic eye disorder treatment using the same drug (aflibercept), at the same dose (2 mg), administered in the same way (intravitreal injection), and administered at the same dosing regimen (an initial, a secondary, and a tertiary dose), as required by all challenged claims. See generally Pet.; Prelim. Resp. Petitioner relies on these facts, and the results of a phase 2 clinical trial that followed a different dosing protocol (one not claimed) to establish that the results limitations of claims 1, 26, and 29 are inherent to the phase 3 clinical trials (VIEW 1 and 2) with a dosing regimen that is claimed. See Pet. 38–39. Petitioner calls the claimed results limitations mere newly discovered results of a known process. Id. (citing Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1381). As Patent Owner identifies, it is not so simple. The evidence of the results of the VIEW 1 and 2 trials itself (found in the ’572 patent) shows that some, but not all, patients treated with the claimed dosing regimen achieved “a gain in visual acuity” as recited by claim 1, “a gain in visual acuity” that is “as effective” “as monthly administration of 0.5 mg of ranibizumab” as recited by claim 26, or “maintaining visual acuity” “as effective[ly]” “as monthly administration of 0.5 mg of ranibizumab” as recited by claim 29. See Ex. 1001, 13:5–38 (Table 1). As Patent Owner points out, the ’572 patent’s described studies 1 and 2, when following the claimed dosing regimen (2Q8), were not always effective treatments––achieving mere maintenance (as opposed to improvement or “gains”) of vision 95.1% and 95.6% (respectively) of the time. Id.; see Prelim. Resp. 34–37 (citing Ex. 1001, 13:8–27; Ex. 1014, 4, 6; Ex. 1030, 9; Ex. 2021 ¶¶ 109–111; Ex. 2022). Thus, the evidence shows that, although most would, about 4–5% of patients (or, possibly, an even higher number based on Patent Owner’s cited evidence––Ex. 1030, 9) would not see the gains in visual acuity required by claims 1 and 26 or the maintenance in visual acuity required by claim 29. It is well established that “[i]nherency . . . may not be established by probabilities or possibilities” and “[t]he mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” In re. Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (CCPA 1981) (quoting Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 102 F.2d 212, 214 (CCPA 1939)). Here, the evidence shows that the claimed results limitations may typically flow from the claimed method, but not necessarily.” slip op. at 33
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Relating to the claim construction, the Federal Circuit found that patent at issue was “clear” that the tissue fibrosis, recited by the claim as arrested or regressed by the otherwise recited treatment, was not the same as and did not necessarily accompany the symptom of erectile disfunction (taught in and the focus of the relied-upon prior art), although the former (fibrosis) may frequently result in the latter (disfunction). Id. at 1059. The Federal Circuit held that the “arresting or regressing” clause was more than a mere statement of intended result, but was a limitation carrying patentable weight because the phrase was drafted as a part of a separate step of the method rather than of the preamble, the “arresting or regressing” language demanded efficacy, and the efficacy was linked to specific treatment minimum duration and dosage. Id. at 1060–61. The patients exhibiting these two issues were not necessarily the same. In part because the Board did not consider the arresting/regressing result limitation in its unpatentability analysis, the Federal Circuit agreed with the patent owner that the Board’s findings were insufficient. Id. at 1064, 1067. The Federal Circuit found that that prior art reference relied upon in the Board’s decision for teaching the claimed treatment, and also relied upon to link the condition of fibrosis with the symptom of erectile dysfunction, did not teach treating a population of patients suffering from erectile dysfunction only because of a fibrosis condition and, even though such patients may have had fibrosis, it was not certain; and further found that other cited prior art did not make certain a link between fibrosis and such dysfunction. Id. at 1065–66. This, the Federal Circuit found, was error. We find in agreement with Patent Owner that the results limitations of the challenged claims are limitations and must be given patentable weight for the same reasons arresting or regressing a tissue fibrosis was a limitation in Los Angeles Biomed. Similarly, here the claims are directed to expressly required results of the administration of aflibercept to patients at 2 mg at an initial dose, in at least one secondary dose 4 weeks later, and in at least one tertiary dose 8 weeks later. Therefore, we find that in claim 1, “wherein the patient achieves a gain in visual acuity within 52 weeks following the initial dose,” is a limitation. Further, in claim 26, “wherein the method is as effective in achieving a gain in visual acuity as monthly administration of 0.5 mg of ranibizumab by intravitreal injection in human subjects with age-related macular degeneration at 52 weeks following the initial dose,” is a limitation. And, in claim 29, “wherein the method is as effective in maintaining visual acuity as monthly administration of 0.5 mg of ranibizumab by intravitreal injection in human subjects with age-related macular degeneration at 52 weeks following the initial dose,” is a limitation.” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureNot shown unpatentableInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable
“A prior art reference without express reference to a claim limitation may anticipate by inherency. See In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “Under the principles of inherency, if the prior art necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the claimed limitations, it anticipates.” Id. (quoting MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,253,572 - Ericsson, Inc. v. Dali Wireless, IncInstitutedPTAB · Mar 9, 2023 · IPR2022-01419 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–19 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would have been obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons below, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. As discussed below, we have considered our whether to exercise our discretion to deny pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and determined not to exercise this discretion. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“other information defining or describing the way data is being transmitted by a wireless access point because Petitioner only maps “radio resources” to analog downlink RF carriers. Pet. 37–40. Thus, whether “radio resources” encompass other information defining or describing the way data is being transmitted by a wireless access point is not at issue here. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“2. Analysis Petitioner argues that Sabat-552 teaches a baseband unit communicatively coupled to another baseband unit, or receiving radio resources from another baseband unit, as claimed in claims 6, 12, and 17, or the indirect connection to yet another baseband unit, as claimed in claim 7. Pet. 52–56 (citing Ex. 1008, 6:55–61, Fig. 1; Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 107, 109, 110, 113). Petitioner argues that the combination would be motivated by Sabat- 552’s teaching of easily sharing the system among service providers to reduce costs, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have expected success. Id. at 54–55 (citing Ex. 1008, 2:48–58, 3:65–4:5; Ex. 1012 ¶ 110).” slip op. at 25
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelNot reached
“Patent Owner responds that “it is well settled law . . . that 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3) does not apply to a patent owner defending the validity of issued claims in IPR proceedings because the patent owner is not ‘obtaining’ a patent in this post-issuance proceeding as required by the language of § 42.73(d)(3).” Prelim. Resp. 2–3. Patent Owner also asserts that “the claims of the ’499 patent are also materially different from the claims of the ’178 patent such that Patent Owner is not taking any positions inconsistent with the prior IPR proceeding.” Id. at 3, 17–20. of institution as discussed above, we do not reach alleged estoppel under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3).” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,334,499 - Ricetec, Inc. v. BASF SEAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 8, 2023 · PGR2021-00114 · APJ Tina E Hulse · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 are unpatentable: they lack written description support and are anticipated by Hinga; the Board also found the challenged dependent claims obvious over the listed combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“As explained in our Institution Decision (Dec. Inst. 5–6), we do not discern a substantive difference between the parties’ respective definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art. Although Petitioner states a POSITA must have one to two years of postdoctoral research experience and Patent Owner’s definition requires at least five years of “research experience,” Patent Owner’s definition does not indicate a specific time for that research (i.e., it could include research during or after a doctoral program). Neither party addresses or contests the other party’s definition in their post-institution papers. See generally PO Resp.; Pet. Reply; PO Sur-reply. Accordingly, we find the parties’ respective definitions to be equivalent and consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art as reflected by the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Moreover, we find that Dr. Shaner and Dr. Somers are both qualified to opine from the perspective of a skilled artisan as both are persons of at least ordinary skill in the art, based on either party’s definition. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 4–15; Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 5–11, App’x A; see also Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 22 F. 4th 1369, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“To offer expert testimony from the perspective of a skilled artisan in a patent case—like for claim construction, validity, or infringement—a witness must at least have ordinary skill in the art.”).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“amount.” Pet. Reply 14. Patent Owner, however, argues that we erred in our construction because the Specification explicitly defines “effective amount” to mean “the amount of herbicide required to achieve at least about 65% phytotoxicity of conventional [i.e., wild, non-mutant] rice (e.g., red rice) in field applications.” PO Resp. 10 (quoting Ex. 1001, 6:34–37). Because the inventors served as their own lexicographers, Patent Owner asserts the Specification’s express definition controls. Id. at 10–11 (citing Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“When a patentee explicitly defines a claim term in the patent specification, the patentee’s definition controls.”)). Nevertheless, Patent Owner acknowledges that the “less than 10% injury” language “is indeed a limitation of the ’346 Patent claims.” Id. at 11. Having considered the arguments and evidence presented at trial, we agree with Patent Owner that the inventors acted as their own lexicographer to define “effective amount” and that that definition governs its meaning. Phillips, 415 F.3d 1316 (“[O]ur cases recognize that the specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.”). We, therefore, construe the term “effective amount” to mean “the amount of an herbicide required to achieve at least about 65% phytotoxicity of conventional rice (e.g., red rice) in field applications.” As explained further below, however, whether incorporated into the construction of “effective amount” or not, the claim language itself further requires that the “effective amount” encompass a specific range of amounts of herbicide (i.e., 14 g AI/Ha to 40 g AI/Ha of quizalofop) and cause “less than 10% injury” to the mutant rice. See Ex. 1001, claim 1.” slip op. at 10
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateUnpatentable
“Mankin would derive the herbicide range suggested by Patent Owner and Dr. Somers from the “rules of thumb,” that range is much broader than the claimed range. Claim 1 recites that the effective amount is 14 g AI/Ha–40 g AI/Ha of quizalofop, but, according to Dr. Somers’s calculations from the Assure II herbicide label, a POSITA would understand the effective amount to be 19.25–154 (or 19.25–184.8) g AI/Ha. Ex. 2036 ¶ 54; PO Resp. 38. Patent Owner does not identify anything in the specification that would allow a POSITA to “immediately discern” the specific range limitations of the claims. See General Hospital, 888 F.3d at 1372. As the Federal Circuit has stated, “one cannot disclose a forest in the original application, and then pick a tree out of the forest and say here is my invention.” Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1326. Thus, we are not persuaded that the disclosure of a broad range of effective amounts via the Assure II herbicide label coupled with Dr. Somers’s undisclosed “rules of thumb” provide written description support for the narrower range limitations of the claims. Moreover, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner is impermissibly working backward from the claimed ranges to determine whether Dr. Somers’s “rules of thumb” can be used to re-create the claimed range from the herbicide label. Pet. Reply 15. That is not the test for written description. Written description “requires a statement of an invention, not an invitation to go on a hunting expedition to patch together after the fact a synthetic definition of an invention.” Indivior UK Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs. S.A., 18 F. 4th 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Dr. Somers’s “rules of thumb” applied to the extrinsic herbicide label would be understood by a POSITA as a description in Mankin of the range limitation of the claims. Rather, as Dr. Somers concedes, his “rules of thumb” in conjunction with the herbicide label represent a starting point for a POSITA to test plants to determine what the effective amount range should be. See Ex. 2036 ¶ 53 (referring to a “dose response analysis” between 0.5x and 4x). But “a ‘mere wish or plan’ for obtaining the claimed invention is not sufficient.” See Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011).” slip op. at 30
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)EnabledNot shown unpatentable
“We are not persuaded. Given the state of the art in 2017, and the known availability of the G2096S seeds at that time, we find the ’346 patent specification enables the claims. The ’346 patent specification clearly describes the G2096S mutant ACCase rice and its use in the claimed method for treating rice. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:37–45, 57:51–61. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the ’346 patent specification has not omitted the G2096S herbicide tolerant rice. Rather, the ’346 patent specification expressly identifies the G2096S mutant rice that possesses the phenotype of tolerance to the effective amounts of herbicides, and describes the method for treating that mutant rice with those effective amounts. See, e.g., id. at 8:8–12; 57:51–61. Thus, we are not persuaded that we erred in relying on Hinga’s seed deposits to determine that Petitioner has failed to meet its burden to prove that the ’346 patent specification fails to enable the challenged claims. Cf. Wands, 858 F.2d at 736 (stating “[n]o deposit is necessary if the biological organisms can be obtained from readily available sources.”).” slip op. at 46
Patent outcomesUS 11,096,346 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,096,346 - Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Aegis Therapeutics, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 9, 2023 · IPR2021-01324 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, and 7–17 are unpatentable under §102 or §103; claims 3–6 and 18–20 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“in Table 1 and the formulations of Potta claim 21 (i.e., ‘from about 0.1% w/w to about 15% w/w epinephrine or a salt thereof’), because such formulations would elicit the desired biological or medicinal response.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 272. Dr. Weinstein provides an essentially identical opinion. Ex. 1003 ¶ 286. Neither declarant supports their opinion with any explanation as to why the Potta formulations would provide the claimed plasma epinephrine concentration or elicit a biological or medicinal response. Accordingly, we do not credit these opinions, and determine that Petitioner has not met its burden to establish that Potta inherently anticipates claim 3. See n re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”).” slip op. at 29
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“As the moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). Having considered the arguments and evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not met its burden of proof. We agree with Patent Owner that “[n]o bright line rule prohibits the consideration of post-priority date evidence,” and that such evidence is permissible in certain contexts. Opp. 2–3. On this record we do not find that there is sufficient cause to exclude the challenged exhibits, because any consideration by the Board of these exhibits has taken into account their alleged post-priority date status. Thus, we do not find that maintaining the exhibits in this proceeding results in any unfair prejudice to Petitioner, or that the exhibits have confused the issues before us. Accordingly, we deny Petitioner’s motion to exclude.” slip op. at 73
- Skill levelOther
“II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the grounds of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“For the above reasons, on the full trial record we determine that” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 10,682,414 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,682,414 - Ericsson Inc. v. Dali Wireless Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Feb 1, 2023 · IPR2022-01212 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–12 because Ericsson showed a reasonable likelihood that claims would be unpatentable under the asserted § 103 grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review is under 35 U.S.C. § 314. See also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). To institute an inter partes review, the information presented in the Petition must show “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–12 of the ’338 patent.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Postgrant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites /default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_di strict_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf (the “Interim Procedure”). The Interim Procedure explains that “[c]onsistent with Sotera Wireless, Inc., the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Interim Procedure 3 (internal footnote omitted) (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A). The Interim Procedure explains that such a Sotera stipulation “mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB . . . . [and] allows the PTAB to review grounds that the parallel district court litigation will not resolve.” Id. at 7–8. Petitioner “adopts the identical stipulation from Sotera, namely, that if the IPR is instituted, . . . Petitioner will not pursue in the District Court Litigation any ground raised or that could have been reasonably raised in an IPR for the challenged patent.” Pet. 81.” slip op. at 55
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Determining the level of ordinary skill in the art involves various factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The prior art of record also reflects the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Institution Decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Patent Owner as it is consistent with the ’338 patent and the asserted prior art. Even if we were to adopt Petitioner’s similar assessment, it would not alter our decision to institute.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Turning to the claim language, limitation vii recites “reconfiguring each remote radio unit by: determining a load percentage for each remote radio unit.” Claim 1 simply does not specify how to determine the load percentage for each remote radio unit and “load percentage” is a broad term. Stated differently, claim 1 does not specify the numerator or denominator to be used in determining the load percentage, but the parties agree that the numerator is the amount of load used in an RRU, as indicated above. On this preliminary record, Petitioner’s interpretation of “available capacity” as including “a single radio, a group of radios or the entire DAS system, [able to] be determined using throughput, number of connections, number of users, number of carriers, or power,” is sufficient for purposes of institution. See Pet. Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:24–27; 5:13–15; 6:1–4; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104–06). On this preliminary record, as Petitioner argues (Pet. Reply 2) and contrary to Patent Owner’s construction, the claim language and the specification do not support limiting available capacity to a single RRU, or similarly, limiting the scope of “load percentage” to a load consumed by a remote radio unit divided by the assigned available capacity for that remote radio unit.6” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,682,338 - Apple Inc. v. Masimo CorporationInstitutedPTAB · Feb 1, 2023 · IPR2022-01299 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–30 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“For the reasons provided below, we determine Petitioner has satisfied the threshold requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Because Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim of the ’127 patent is unpatentable, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims on each of the Grounds raised in the Petition. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018); PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”); see also Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA Trial Proceedings (April 26, 2018).1 A.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not address the above definitions in its Preliminary Response but its expert, Mr. Goldberg, disagrees with Petitioner’s first definition insofar as it requires an academic discipline emphasizing both electrical and thermal technologies. Ex. 2051 ¶ 16. In this respect, Mr. Goldberg states that “he is unaware of such an academic discipline being available, whereas, Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Anthony, appears to assert that he has worked with “many such persons.” Cf. Ex. 2051 ¶ 16 with Ex. 1003 ¶ 21. Mr. Goldberg states that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in an academic discipline emphasizing the design of electrical systems, in combination with training or at least one to two years of related work experience with thermal management of electrical systems and capture and processing of data or information, including physiological monitoring technologies. Alternatively, the person could have had a Master of Science degree in a relevant academic discipline with less than a year of related work experience in the same discipline. Ex. 2051 ¶ 16. Despite providing an alternative definition of one of ordinary skill in the art, Mr. Goldberg indicates that his opinions with respect to the applied. Id. On the current record, we accept Petitioner’s proposed definitions, as” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“At this stage of the proceeding, we find the language “to reliably estimate LED wavelengths” and “used to estimate wavelengths of multiple LEDs” descriptive of intended use of the underlying terms rather than descriptive of what they are. Although Patent Owner points to evidence that certain embodiments of the ’127 patent use “thermal mass” and “bulk temperature” in the manner described in Patent Owner’s proposed constructions, we decline to import these use limitations into the claim terms. See In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404–05 (CCPA 1969) Reading a claim in light of the specification, to thereby interpret limitations explicitly recited in the claim, is a quite different thing from reading limitations of the specification into a claim, to thereby narrow the scope of the claim by implicitly adding disclosed limitations which have no express basis in the claim. We further note that Patent Owner fails to evidence the meets and bounds of “reliably estimate[ing] LED wavelengths,” such that the construction appears indefinite. In this respect, we note the Specification’s teaching that some embodiments include “a relatively significant thermal mass, which stabilizes and normalizes the bulk temperature so that the thermistor measurement of bulk temperature is meaningful.” Ex. 1001, 10:62–11:4. Considering the intrinsic evidence, we understand a “meaningful” temperature reading in the context of the ’127 patent to be one on a scale relevant to estimating LED wavelengths. aspects of construction upon which the parties appear to agree (see e.g., Prelim. Resp. 24 (citing Ex. 1012, 213)), we provisionally construe “thermal mass” as a mass having resistance to temperature change on a scale relevant to estimating LED wavelengths, and “bulk temperature” as a temperature representative of all or substantially all of a thermal mass.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“With respect to motivation to combine, Petitioner posits that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated “to implement a thermal core as suggested by Chadwick in Yamada’s board/substrate 15” to achieve various benefits, such as to “reduc[e] the amount of heat transmitted to the patient and increasing the ‘exposure time’ by which the patient can don the sensor without discomfort or heat-related safety concerns,” and/or “mitigate heat-induced spectral shifts in the wavelengths of light emitted by LEDs” Pet. 15–18; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 42–48. With respect to the first of these, Patent Owner argues that motivation is lacking because Chadwick’s metal core heat (citing Ex. Parte Burns, Appeal No. 2016-00351, 2017 WL 2132361, *2 (PTAB Apr. 28, 2017)). This would appear contrary to Patent Owner’s assertions that “Yamada provides no discussion regarding the purpose, function, or use of substrate 15,” whereas the purpose of Chadwick’s metal core is to dissipate heat and act “as a heat sink to cool the electronics.” Prelim. Resp. 35, 37 (citations omitted). As such, we do not find Patent Owner’s argument availing. With respect to Petitioner’s argument that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Chadwick and Yamada to “mitigate heat-induced spectral shifts in the wavelengths of light emitted by LEDs,” Patent Owner argues that “the claimed invention does not reduce wavelength shift; in fact, the ’127 patent accepts wavelength shift and provides a solution to compensate for it.” Prelim. Resp. 42. Accordingly, Patent Owner asserts, motivation is lacking because “[r]educing wavelength shift points in a different direction from the invention.” Id. at 43 (citing Ex. 2051 ¶ 80. This argument is also unavailing because, on the current record, claim 7 does require a solution to compensate for wavelength shift. See Section II.C.2, above. Accordingly, Petitioner’s proposed motivation does not “point[] in a different direction,” as Patent Owner contends. Patent Owner similarly argues that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable expectation of success because “[t]here is no evidence anyone before the inventors would have expected that a thermal mass could be designed to provide a bulk temperature to reliably estimate multiple LED wavelengths.” Again, Patent Owner’s argument is predicated on Patent Owner’s interpretation of claim 7, which we disagree with on the current record for the reasons provided above. See Section II.C.1–2. We do not read Moreover, as explained more fully above, LED wavelength has a known relationship to temperature and Petitioner has reasonably shown that LEDs of the Yamada/Chadwick combination would be thermally coupled to the thermal core, and thus dependent on the bulk temperature of the thermal core.” slip op. at 28
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,761,127 - Apple Inc. v. Masimo CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 24, 2023 · IPR2022-01274 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Apple did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–30 were obvious over the proposed prior-art combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“under the statutory grounds it identifies. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim for a petition to be granted. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute this proposed level of skill. Prelim. Resp. 10. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art and the ’502 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“in light of the specification. Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1279–80 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Thus, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by an ordinarily skilled artisan. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Neither party offers any express construction for any claim term. See Pet. 4; Prelim. Resp. 9. We determine that all claim terms should be given their ordinary and customary meaning and that it is unnecessary to make that meaning explicit for any term.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Although it is certainly the case that an obviousness analysis may take into account the inferences and creative steps that a skilled artisan might glean from the teachings of the prior art (see, e.g., KSR , 550 U.S. at 418), one must be cognizant that “hindsight is not an available analytical mechanism to show obviousness.” See In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 483 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J., dissenting). Indeed, “we patches into something that is the claimed invention.” See Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. The Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Without the guidance provided by the claims of the ’502 patent, it is difficult to conclude that Petitioner’s postulation as to a particular structure that results from combining the teachings of Lumidigm, Kotanagi, and Scharf is based on an objective assessment of what those teachings would have conveyed to a skilled artisan. It is clear from the Petition, however, that such structural configuration is necessary as the basis for Petitioner’s approach to arriving at the structural requirements of the claims.9 At the outset, we share Patent Owner’s view, and that of its declarant, Dr. Duckworth (Ex. 2002), that none of the prior art on which Petitioner relies discloses a convex protrusion with multiple openings or windows for multiple detectors. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp 28–29; Ex. 2002 ¶ 76. As discussed above, Petitioner attempts to arrive at such structure through a proposed amalgamation of prior art teachings that must include, for instance, arranging a convex protrusion with multiple openings or separate glass windows over Lumidigm’s optical sensors. In our view, however, Petitioner simply does not explain adequately why such configuration results from the actual teachings of the prior art.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,912,502 - Apple, Inc. v. Alivecor, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 6, 2022 · IPR2021-00971 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–30 are unpatentable under § 103 over Shmueli alone or in combinations with Osorio, Li 2012, Kleiger, and Chan.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownPetitioner expert creditedOther
“Patent Owner’s assertion that our originally proposed definition, would “classify all cardiologists as POSITAs,” is well taken. Accordingly, we apply the following modified definition, which is consistent with Petitioner’s representation before the ITC. For the purpose of this proceeding, a person of ordinary skill in the art may be a member of an interdisciplinary team including persons with backgrounds in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, biomedical engineering, computer science, and/or cardiology, and having at least two years of relevant work experience designing, using, or analyzing data from, cardiac monitoring devices.” slip op. at 27
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner notes that the ITC applied the plain and ordinary meaning to the terms “arrhythmia” and “confirm” or “confirming.” PO Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 2010, 12–13). We understand “arrhythmia” as used in the context of the ’731 patent refers to “a cardiac condition in which the electrical activity of the heart is irregular or is faster (tachychardia) or slower (bradycardia) than normal.” See id. at 24–25 (quoting Ex. 1001, 1:40–42). This term does not appear to be in dispute. See Tr. 21:18-22:3 (“[Board”]: . . . Patent Owner raised the issue of claim construction for the term arrhythmia. Is there any dispute there? [Petitioner’s counsel]: Honestly, Your Honor, we considered that -- put a lot 23 of energy into considering it. We don’t believe so.”); see also, Tr. 53:24-54:2 (“[Board]: . . . Your claim construction of arrhythmia is merely a matter of precision and clarification rather than a contested point; is that correct? [Patent Owner’s counsel]: I believe that’s largely correct.”). Patent Owner also asserts, and we agree, that “confirm” and “confirming” are discrete requirements from “detect” in claims 3, 5, 6, 19, 21, and 22. See id. at 25. Accepting these clarifications, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning to all claim terms. D. Ground 1: Obviousness over Shmueli” slip op. at 30
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“sensor and “detect, based on the PPG data, the presence of an arrhythmia.”11 According to Petitioner, although Shmueli does not explicitly use the term arrhythmia, one of ordinary skill in the art reading Shmueli would have found it obvious that the text “Detect Irregular Heart Condition,” in element 38 of Shmueli’s Figure 7, refers to detecting the presence of arrhythmia based on PPG data. See Pet. 22–24; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 47–51. For the purpose of instituting trial, we determined that “one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Shmueli’s use of ‘irregular heart condition’ as referring to—or at a minimum, encompassing— arrhythmia, and, thus, disclosing the detection of arrhythmia.” DI 33–34. As discussed below, the arguments and evidence adduced at trial confirm our initial understanding.” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“pages 17–18 of Petitioner’s Reply, which we adopt in full. In short, Osorio relates to medical device systems and methods capable of detecting a pathological body state of a patient. Ex. 1005 ¶ 2. As discussed above, we do not read Osorio as limiting “pathological state” to epilepsy or other neurological condition. To the contrary, one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Osorio’s teachings applicable to “any pathological state,” including arrythmia. See e.g., id. at 44. As such, the references are not directed to different problems as Patent Owner urges. Further, even if one of ordinary skill in the art were to read Osorio as limited to the detection neurological events such as epilepsy, Osorio contains express teachings to monitor heart rate and heart rate variability for signs of arrhythmia. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 42, 43, 45, 46, 71; Ex. 1069, 58:23–59:3; 61:13–62:7. Whether Osorio’s detection of arrhythmias is viewed as a standalone goal, or as data for use in monitoring for epileptic seizures, does not materially affect the analysis. “Because Shmueli already renders arrhythmia detection obvious and Osorio motivates use of activity tracking to improve detection of any heart-related pathological conditions,” including arrhythmias, it is irrelevant whether Osorio’s ultimate goal is the detection of neurological events. Reply 18 (citing Pet. 23–24; Ex. 1004, 13:9–17, Fig. 7). With respect to Patent Owner’s reliance on Adidas, it is well established that a finding of obviousness does not require that all features of a secondary reference are “bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. Id. “[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. In the present case, we do not understand Petitioner to argue for the wholesale incorporation of Osorio into Shmueli’s device. Rather, Petitioner more narrowly argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would find it obvious to incorporate two elements of Osorio into Shmueli’s device: “using activity level monitoring to improve the accuracy of detecting a pathological event (e.g., arrhythmia), and (ii) determining HRV from HR and using HRV to detect the pathological event (e.g., arrhythmia),” because, for example, “HRV analysis is more robust . . . and is less affected by noise.” Pet. 30, 43–44, 48–49; see generally Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 151–167. Thus, even were Osorio ultimately limited to the detection of neurological events, Patent Owner’s suggestion that these targeted improvements would render Shmueli’s device inoperable for its intended purpose is unavailing. In view of the above, and all the argument and evidence adduced at trial, Petitioner has established sufficiently that one of ordinary skill in the” slip op. at 47
Patent outcomesUS 10,595,731 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,595,731
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.