- Ao Kaspersky Lab v. Open Text Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Dec 21, 2023 · IPR2023-01199 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–4, 7–10, 12, and 15–18 on all petitioned grounds, and granted AO Kaspersky Lab’s motion to join IPR2023-00124.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Patent Owner’s argument is unavailing. Our rules specifically prohibit incorporation by reference. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another document. Combined motions, oppositions, replies, or other combined documents are not permitted.”). We therefore decline to consider, at this 2 Morris et al., U.S. Publ’n No. 2007/0016953 A1, published Jan. 18, 2007 (Ex. 1005). 3 van Oorschot et al., U.S. Patent No. 8,087,087 B1, issued Dec. 27, 2011 (Ex. 1006). 4 Capalik et al., U.S. Publ’n No. 2011/0321166 A1, published Dec. 29, 2011 (Ex. 1008). stage, the arguments presented in the Patent Owner Response in the 124 IPR. Because Patent Owner does not offer other arguments on the merits, for the reasons given in our institution decision in the 124 IPR, we determine that the information presented in the Petition shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in showing that the challenged claims would have been obvious. See 124 IPR, Paper 11.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review; and (4) address specifically how briefing and discovery may be simplified. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15, 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013). As noted above, the Petition asserts the same unpatentability grounds on which we instituted review in the 124 IPR, relying on substantially the same evidence.6 Joinder Mot. 1. If joinder is granted, Petitioner agrees to assume an “understudy” role and states that “[u]nless and until the current petitioners in IPR2023-00124 cease to participate in the instituted [124] IPR proceeding, [Petitioner] will not assume an active role.” Id. at 7–9. Petitioner represents that “[n]o additional grounds or arguments are being introduced, no new evidence or issues are being added, and no additional discovery or briefing or oral argument should be necessary as a result of [Petitioner’s] joinder.” Id. at 9. Petitioner further “agrees to adhere to all applicable deadlines set forth in the [124] IPR Scheduling Order.” Id. at 6– 7. We agree with Petitioner that joinder with the 124 IPR is appropriate under these circumstances. Patent Owner did not file an opposition to Petitioner’s joinder motion. Accordingly, we grant the joinder motion.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner’s argument in this regard also is unavailing. The 124 IPR was instituted on June 15, 2023, and Petitioner filed its joinder motion on July 14, 2023, before the joint motion to terminate in the 124 IPR was filed on November 20, 2023. The joinder motion is timely because joinder was requested no later than one month after institution of the 124 IPR. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). Additionally, the 124 IPR is still pending. The Petition therefore is not time-barred. Under these circumstances, we may grant Petitioner’s joinder motion.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached
“This argument also is unavailing. We need not decide whether a party has identified all real parties in interest at the institution stage absent an implication of a time bar or an estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315. SharkNinja Operating LLC v. iRobot Corp., IPR2020-00734, Paper 11 at 18–20 (PTAB Oct. 6, 2020) (precedential). We recognize Patent Owner’s allegation that, “without joinder, the [P]etition is time-barred.” Prelim. Resp. 2 (emphasis added). As explained above, however, the Petition is not time-barred, given that Petitioner has timely filed its joinder motion and the 124 IPR is still pending. Patent Owner does not allege a time bar or other estoppel would prevent institution if an unnamed party were identified as a real party in interest.” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,578,045 - Keysight Technologies, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 15, 2023 · IPR2022-01097 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5–13, and 15–20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 4 and 14 were not shown unpatentable because Sourcefire did not disclose the claimed responsive updating of an existing packet flow log entry.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not address this issue, and neither side argues that it might affect the patentability analysis or otherwise change the outcome. Thus, as 2 Sourcefire 3D System User Guide, Ver. 4.10, Mar. 16, 2011 (Ex. 1004). 3 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2015/0207809 A1 (Ex. 1029). we did at institution, we apply Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan, as we find it consistent with the ’917 patent and the asserted prior art. B.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“1. Threat Identifier and Threat Indicator Patent Owner identifies two terms that were construed in the ITC investigation involving the ’917 patent based on constructions agreed upon by the parties. PO Resp. 9. First, the parties in the ITC investigation agreed that “threat identifier” means “information that identifies one or more network threats.” Id. at 11 (citing Ex. 2004, 3). Second, the parties further agreed that “threat indicator” means “information that indicates a resource associated with a network threat,” “[f]or example, network addresses, ports, FQDNs, URLs, URIs, the type of threat, geographic information, anonymous proxies, actors, or the like.” Id. at 11–12 (citing Ex. 2004, 3). Patent Owner asserts that these constructions should be used in this proceeding. Id. at 12. Petitioner does not dispute these constructions, and we adopt them.4” slip op. at 12
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted
“Before we get to claim construction, we exclude Ex. 2018 as untimely because Patent Owner had the testimony before it filed the Response and was plainly aware of it, as it was alluded to in the Response. See PO Resp. 10; Mot. to Exclude Opp. 2 (admitting that the trial finished before the Response was filed and that Patent Owner filed other testimony excerpts with the Response). However, the exclusion is of little consequence because we find that the testimony would be devoid of probative value. Dr. Rubin is not a fact witness and has not been offered as an expert in this case. Patent Owner cites the testimony in an effort to show that Petitioner is taking inconsistent positions, but we fail to see how Petitioner’s conduct bears on the meaning of “flow” in the ’917 patent.” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyDecided for petitioner
“Before we get to claim construction, we exclude Ex. 2018 as untimely because Patent Owner had the testimony before it filed the Response and was plainly aware of it, as it was alluded to in the Response. See PO Resp. 10; Mot. to Exclude Opp. 2 (admitting that the trial finished before the Response was filed and that Patent Owner filed other testimony excerpts with the Response). However, the exclusion is of little consequence because we find that the testimony would be devoid of probative value. Dr. Rubin is not a fact witness and has not been offered as an expert in this case. Patent Owner cites the testimony in an effort to show that Petitioner is taking inconsistent positions, but we fail to see how Petitioner’s conduct bears on the meaning of “flow” in the ’917 patent.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 10,193,917 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,193,917 - PTAB · Dec 12, 2023 · IPR2023-01040 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 48–87 based on the petition’s asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“previously challenged the same claims of the same patent. General Plastic, Paper 19, 16. Here, Patent Owner asserts that although Petitioner did not do so, we should consider Petitioner as having a substantial relationship to Volkswagen, which is also as a defendant in Patent Owner’s infringement suit. Prelim. Resp. 50–51. In that regard, Patent Owner relies on Valve Corp. v. Electronic Scripting Products, Inc., IPR2019-00062, Paper 11, 2 (PTAB April 12, 2019) (precedential). We do not agree, because Valve involved parties that were accused of infringement based on the same product. Valve, Paper 11, 9–10. Here, Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner is accused of infringing “based on the same type of headlight technology” (Prelim. Resp. 51), but that is insufficient. Patent Owner asserts that both parties’ accused headlights were “developed jointly with Hella KGaA Hueck & Co.” (id.), but that also is an insufficient connection for us to consider two parties substantially related for purposes of discretionary denial. As Petitioner points out, it and VW are direct competitors, and they are accused of infringing based on two different products, not as a supplier and customer of a single product, as at issue in Valve. Prelim. Reply 1. Additionally, although Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner and VW “have a history of coordinating serial IPR petitions against asserted patents” (Prelim. Resp. 52), the facts of each case are unique and we will not infer a motive from prior proceedings. Having considered Patent Owner’s arguments,8 we conclude that the first General Plastic factor weighs strongly against discretionary denial.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“B. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner asserts that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, automotive engineering, optical engineering, applied physics, computer science, or similar disciplines, along with two years of experience working with intelligent vehicle systems, automotive control systems, or lighting control systems.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 33). Patent Owner does not dispute that level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 6. We adopt the undisputed level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION The parties agree that no express claim construction is required at this stage. Pet. 8; Prelim. Resp. 6. As discussed below, however, Patent Owner applies and argues for a particular construction of “classifying an object.” See infra at 11 (§ II.D.1.a). We discuss that potential construction below. Beyond that term, we agree with the parties and therefore do not further construe the claims for this decision. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“an object is an oncoming vehicle or anything else, i.e., classifying an object.” Prelim. Resp. 17. In Patent Owner’s view, Alden’s CPU instead “simply determines whether detected incoming light has a threshold intensity and controls the beam segments produced by the LED elements 119 of headlight 123 accordingly.” Id. at 17–18. Patent Owner takes the position that “classifying an object requires identifying an object and distinguishing that object among multiple classes or types of objects, such as distinguishing between vehicles, road signs, and pedestrians as described in the ’551 patent. Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1001, 44:36–45:44, 52:66–53:4). We do not agree that the two specification passages Patent Owner cites compel such a construction. The first passage relates to a preferred embodiment that includes “a machine vision system with pattern recognition capabilities as is known in the art.” Ex. 1001, 44:37–40. The ’551 patent describes that, using known pattern-recognition methods, camera outputs “are analyzed by appropriate computational means employing trained pattern recognition techniques to classify, identify or locate the contents.” Id. at 44:63–45:3. Although the specification states that known technologies can be sued to classify an image’s contents, that does not define or restrict the understanding of what is required to “classify” an object. The second passage states that, “[u]sing color and pattern recognition techniques it is possible to determine what is a sign.” Id. at 52:66–67. To the extent that informs our understanding of “classify,” is supports a simple correlation between an image and an object. It does not include distinguishing the object among multiple classes or types of objects as Patent Owner contends.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,955,551 - PTAB · Dec 12, 2023 · IPR2023-01039 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 8, 10–18, and 24–47 based on the petition grounds because Mercedes-Benz showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialDenied
“1. Lack of particularity First, Patent Owner contends that the Petition lacks particularity under 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) because it improperly combines anticipation and obviousness 3 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), effective March 16, 2013, amended the applicable statutes. Because the application from which the ’551 patent issued was filed before this date, the pre-AIA versions of §§ 102 and 103 apply. 4 US 2003/0137849 A1, filed Jan. 22, 2002 (Ex. 1005). 5 US 6,049,749, issued Apr. 11, 2000 (Ex. 1006). 6 US 2002/0057572 A1, published May 16, 2002 (Ex. 1007). 7 WO 2001/07538 A2, published Sept. 27, 2001 (Ex. 1008). grounds based on Alden alone. Id. at 49–52. We do not agree that the Petition’s approach presents a problem or is hard to understand. As discussed below, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not adequately supported its obviousness contention based on Alden alone (see infra at 17 (§ II.D.2)), but that does not undermine the anticipation ground or make it difficult to understand. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner that the Petition warrants discretionary denial for lack of particularity.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“Resp. 54–59. In that regard, Patent Owner relies on Valve Corp. v. Electronic Scripting Products, Inc., IPR2019-00062, Paper 11, 2 (PTAB April 12, 2019) (precedential). We do not agree, because Valve involved parties that were accused of infringement based on the same product. Valve, Paper 11, 9–10. Here, Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner is accused of infringing “based on the same type of headlight technology” (Prelim. Resp. 55), but that is insufficient. Patent Owner asserts that both parties’ accused headlights were “developed jointly with Hella KGaA Hueck & Co.” (id. at 56), but that also is an insufficient connection for us to consider two parties substantially related for purposes of discretionary denial. As Petitioner points out, it and VW are direct competitors, and they are accused of infringing based on two different products, not as a supplier and customer of a single product, as at issue in Valve. Prelim. Reply 1. Additionally, although Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner and VW “have a history of coordinating serial IPR petitions against asserted patents” (Prelim. Resp. 56), the facts of each case are unique and we will not infer a motive from prior proceedings. Having considered Patent Owner’s arguments,8 we conclude that the first General Plastic factor weighs strongly against discretionary denial.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner asserts that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, automotive engineering, optical engineering, applied physics, computer science, or similar disciplines, along with two years of experience working with intelligent vehicle systems, automotive control systems, or lighting control systems.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 33). Patent Owner does not dispute that level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 6. We adopt the undisputed level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,955,551 - PTAB · Nov 28, 2023 · IPR2023-01011 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution
Review was instituted on claims 1–4, 7, 8, 10–13, and 16–19, and AO Kaspersky Lab was joined to IPR2023-00126 because joinder was appropriate.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“response, determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314. A motion for joinder should (1) set forth reasons why joinder is” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“As noted, the Petition asserts the same unpatentability grounds upon which we instituted review in the ’00126 IPR, relying on the same evidence. See Motion 1. If joinder is granted, Petitioner agrees to assume an “understudy” role and states that “[u]nless and until the current petitioners in IPR2023-00126 cease to participate,” Petitioner “will not assume an active role.” See id. at 7–9. Petitioner also explains that “[n]o additional grounds or arguments are being introduced, no new evidence or issues are being added, and no additional discovery or briefing or oral argument should be necessary as a result of [Petitioner]’s joinder.” Id. at 9. Petitioner further “agrees to adhere to all applicable deadlines set forth in the [’00126 IPR] Scheduling Order.” Id. at 7. Because Patent Owner has not opposed the Motion, and because we agree with Petitioner that joinder with the ’00126 IPR is appropriate under these circumstances, we grant the Motion.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 10,257,224 - PTAB · Oct 11, 2023 · IPR2023-00699 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–30 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Sophos would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“grounds, arguments, and evidence as presented in the parallel proceeding, this fact has favored denial.” Fintiv at 12. Petitioner stipulates that, “if the Board institutes the present petition, Petitioner[] will not assert that the challenged claims are invalid on the instituted grounds in the related litigation, nor any other possible prior art printed publication grounds based on the references in Grounds 1 and 2.” Pet. 68. This is broader than a Sand Revolution stipulation but somewhat less restrictive than a Sotera stipulation. See Sand Revolution II, LLC v. Continental Intermodal Group- Trucking LLC, IPR2019-01393, Paper 24 at 11–12 (PTAB June 16, 2020) (informative); Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 13–14 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential). While not rising to the level of a stipulation that the Interim Procedure indicates would preclude discretionary denial, Petitioner’s stipulation does mitigate concerns about overlapping issues with the related litigation. See Interim Procedure 7–8. We find this factor weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, and for the reasons set forth below, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims of the ’250 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review with respect to all challenged claims and grounds asserted in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2022).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner defines the level of skill as follows: A person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention . . . would have had a Bachelor’s degree in an accredited program of electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science or in a similar discipline, and would have had 2-3 years of practical work or research experience in the general fields of electrical engineering, computer science, networking, communications, and device and network security. . . . More advanced degrees or training in a related discipline or both can compensate for shorter work experience. Prelim. Resp. 29 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 50–54). Patent Owner does not explain at this stage why its proffered level of skill differs from Petitioner’s. We note that both definitions are largely similar. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’250 patent and prior art of record. We thus adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for the purposes of this decision. Our decision would not have changed had we adopted Patent Owner’s definition of the level of skill.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). The parties do not propose any claim constructions. See Pet. 9–10; Prelim. Resp. 28–29. As no terms are in dispute, we determine that no terms require construction at this stage. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,418,250 - Crowdstrike, Inc. v. Open Text Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Sep 12, 2023 · IPR2023-00556 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–30 on all grounds: the Board found a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–13, 15–27, 29, and 30 were obvious over Kester and Kennedy, and claims 14 and 28 over Kester, Kennedy, …
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition in view of the present record and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“circumstances, we treat this factor as weighing slightly in favor of denying institution.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“In evaluating arguments under § 325(d), we use a two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). Patent Owner has not demonstrated that this case satisfies the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework. It is undisputed that Petitioner’s combination of references was not of record during the ’389 patent’s prosecution because two of the three references are new and Patent Owner does not assert those new references are cumulative to any that were already before the Office. See Prelim. Resp. 31–33. Thus, the same art was not previously before the Office. Nor has Patent Owner shown that the same or substantially the same arguments were previously presented to the office. Even if Patent Owner is correct that the examiner did not identify Kester as disclosing any particular limitation of the independent claims, it does follow that the examiner actually considered that issue. To the contrary, because the examiner concluded that other references taught the independent claims’ elements, there was no need to consider whether Kester did as well. See Ex. 1002, 158–59. In these circumstances, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under § 325(d).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party proposes an express construction for any claim terms. Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 28–29. We agree that no claim terms require express construction to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,726,389 - PTAB · Aug 7, 2023 · IPR2023-00446 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20, finding a reasonable likelihood that Sourcefire and Emerging Threats render the claims obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’343 Patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’343 Patent on the grounds of unpatentability raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner’s arguments. The fact that the disclosures of cited references are the same or similar is unremarkable in that they are applied against the same claims. Additionally, Patent Owner has not presented evidence that the instant Petitioner applied the prior petition, and its non-institution, as a roadmap to try and correct errors of the prior petition. As such, we agree with Petitioner that factor (1) weighs strongly against discretionary denial.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“After reviewing the evidence, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s assessment that Emerging Threats is cumulative to Stolfo, which the Examiner considered during prosecution. Patent Owner previously distinguished its claims from Stolfo by arguing, in part, that “Stolfo describes that network statistics may be used to ‘modify the decoy traffic such that it appears statistically similar to normal traffic,’” and that “Stolfo describes generating decoy traffic and not applying a transformation to existing network traffic.” Ex. 1002, 87 (quoting Ex. 2001 ¶ 124). Patent Owner also argued that “the decoy traffic used in Stolfo does not prevent an exfiltration operation[, but instead,] Stolfo explains that ‘[t]hese traps use decoy information . . . to attract, deceive, and/or confuse attackers (e.g., inside attackers, external attackers, etc.) and/or malware.’” Id. (quoting Ex. 2001 ¶ 124). In contrast, as Petitioner asserts, Emerging Threats discloses its rules to be Snort rules for preventing exfiltration. Pet. 37–43. Petitioner’s explanations of the different rules disclosed in Emerging Threats illustrate their use in preventing exfiltration, and not merely applying processes to decoy traffic. Id. Petitioner also discusses the correspondences between specific rules provided in Emerging Threats and operators disclosed in the ’343 Patent. Id. As such, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner that Emerging Threats is merely cumulative to Stolfo. Therefore, we are not persuaded that Petitioner’s combination of Sourcefire and Emerging Threats is cumulative to the art previously considered by the Examiner in the prosecution of the application that issued as the ’343 Patent, or that the proposed grounds are based on the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously presented to the Office. In conjunction with Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner has not shown that the Office erred, we conclude that, given the circumstances presented here, Patent Owner has not demonstrated that Petitioner’s proposed grounds are based on the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously presented to the Office. As a result, we need not further consider whether Petitioner has shown error on the part of the Office. Accordingly, although we have considered Patent Owner’s request for our exercise of discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), on the record before us, we conclude that denial of institution on that basis is not warranted. We proceed to consider the merits of Petitioner’s proposed grounds of unpatentability below.” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“Weighing the evidence of the public accessibility of Emerging Threats in the relevant timeframe, we determine that Petitioner has established that Emerging Threats qualifies as a printed publication under § 102(b) for purposes of institution. The presence of the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine copy suggests that the document was available and was accessible on December 2, 2010, prior to the March 12, 2013 effective filing date of the ’343 Patent. We have concerns that Dr. Staniford is only able to vaguely assert that the rules provided in the text document appear to be true copies of the rules that existed in 2010. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 204. Given the nature of inter partes review, however, we can be concerned only with the publication itself; we cannot rely on or inquire into how some system performed or was used in the relevant timeframe. Nonetheless, we are persuaded by Dr. Staniford’s unrebutted testimony that Snort was begun as an open source project in the late 1990s, that the Bleeding Snort project launched in 2004 as an independent clearing house for Snort rules, and that the project continues as Emerging Threats. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 202–203. This testimony is sufficient, for purposes of institution, to show that one of ordinary skill in the art, at and prior to the effective filing date of the ’343 Patent, would have known to look to the Emerging Threats website for Snort rules that could be applied to conventional cyber defense systems. We determine this to be a reasonable showing, at this stage of the proceeding, that Emerging Threats was sufficiently publicly accessible to be a printed publication. With respect to Patent Owner’s arguments regarding searchability of the Emerging Threats website, given its notoriety, we are unpersuaded that persons of ordinary skill in the art proceeding to the website would not have been able to search its contents and find the rules logged thereon that would have been applicable to the users’ network security concerns. Even based on Patent Owner’s presentation of the website (Prelim. Resp. 40 (citing Ex. 1030, 11; Ex. 1054)), we are persuaded that it would only have required the exercise of reasonable diligence to find the rules list, given the knowledge that one of ordinary skill would have had regarding Emerging Threats. Petitioner asserts that specific rules can be located within Emerging Threats by searching for their unique SID (Pet. 38 n.9), but persons proceeding to the website without knowledge of a specific SID would have found this to be of little help. Nonetheless, the number of locations that the rules may be located on the Emerging Threats website is still limited and users would have been able to utilize the “Last Modified” indicator, showing which directories had been modified recently, to narrow down any search, assuming that items that had not been modified for some time would be less worthy of search. As such, we are not persuaded that persons of ordinary skill in the art, proceeding to the Emerging Threats website, would not have been able to have searched its contents and find the rules contained thereon.” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,567,343 - PTAB · Jul 24, 2023 · IPR2023-00445 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–27, finding a reasonable likelihood that Law renders at least one challenged claim unpatentable; it instituted all petition grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“We agree with Petitioner’s arguments. The fact that the disclosures of cited references are the same or similar is unremarkable in that they are applied against the same claims. Additionally, Patent Owner has not presented evidence that the instant Petitioner applied the prior petition, and its non-institution, as a roadmap to try and correct errors of the prior petition. As such, we agree with Petitioner that factor (1) weighs strongly against discretionary denial.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’266 Patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–27 of the ’266 Patent on the grounds of unpatentability raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments. Under Petitioner’s discussion of Law, Internet 155 is the other network and LANs 150a and 150b constitute a single network through network access device 149c. If we take the LANs as a single network, then intrusions prevented by either firewall would protect the overall network collectively. As discussed below, we are persuaded, by Petitioner, that one of ordinary skill in the art would have regarded the paired LANs of Law as viewable as a single network, when compared to the Internet, and each firewall would provide protections to the single network. Patent Owner also argues that Law does not teach or suggest that network access device 149c joins LANs 150a and 150b into a single network because these networks still need to communicate with each other over yet another network, such as the Internet. Prelim. Resp. 33–35. Patent Owner also argues that a device that controls network access between two sub-systems or a sub-system and the Internet does not transform two separate networks into one. Id. at 34–35. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments. As Petitioner points out, Law refers to “network 150,” rather than separately specifying subnetworks 150a and 150b. Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 55). We also agree with Petitioner that all network traffic between joined LANs 150a and 150b and the Internet must pass through either firewall 146a or 146b, and that Law’s disclosure of an alternative “bypass” embodiments confirms that ordinarily skilled artisans would have viewed firewalls 146a and 146b as providing the entire interface across the boundary of the network. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 64–65). We have considered Petitioner’s evidence and arguments with respect to limitation [1.0], including the relevant testimony of Dr. Jacobson, and Patent Owner’s traversing arguments, and find Petitioner’s evidence and arguments to be sufficient to show that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that Law teaches or suggests this limitation.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner also asserts that the preambles of independent claims 1, 8, and 15 are limiting, and asserts that the preambles are “essential to understand the ‘all traffic traversing the boundary’ limitation in the body of the claims.” Prelim. Resp. 23. We discuss the understanding of those limitation in our analysis below, determining the preambles to be limiting in the context discussed.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,785,266 - PTAB · Jul 24, 2023 · IPR2023-00448 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–33 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Keysight would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“include (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) the type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior-art solutions to those problems; (4) the rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) the sophistication of the technology; and (6) the educational level of workers active in the field. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696–97 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Not all factors may exist in every case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case. Id. These factors are not exhaustive, but merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Moreover, the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Based on the current record, we determine that no claim term requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial. “[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). When considering whether the combined disclosures in Law and Golnabi teach the invention covered by claim 1, however, we discuss a claim-construction issue, i.e., whether separately listed claim elements are distinct components of the claimed invention. See infra § III.D.3(f)(iii).” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a reason to combine Golnabi’s teachings with Law’s teachings in the way Petitioner proposes. See Pet. 18–19, 38; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 53–57, 80. Specifically, Golnabi teaches techniques for analyzing and modifying firewall policy rules to “optimize the firewall policy and efficiency.” Ex. 1009, 305–06, 308–14; see Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 53–54. As an example, Golnabi discloses combining rules having similar characteristics using “an aggregation algorithm to generate a minimum number of firewall policy rules for efficiency,” e.g., “aggregated by combining the common fields” in multiple rules. Ex. 1009, 308; see Ex. 1003 ¶ 80. For instance, if multiple rules have “matching fields with an exception of source port field,” the “rules are then aggregated” by “combining all the source ports as a range of these source ports to get one generalized rule.” Ex. 1009, 308; see Ex. 1003 ¶ 53. Similarly, “the IP addresses of 129.110.10.7 and 129.110.10.1 can be aggregated to 129.110.10.*” where the * character represents a specified range. Ex. 1009, 308–09; see Prelim. Resp. 22 (quoting Ex. 1009, 308–09).” slip op. at 53
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,012,474
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.