- Intel Corporation v. 3d Surfaces, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Apr 19, 2023 · IPR2022-01591 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 10–20 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood that claims 10–20 would have been obvious over Sfarti and Foley.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had “a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related scientific field, and approximately two years of work experience in computer graphics or, alternatively, two years work towards a masters or doctorate degree in these proceeding, Patent Owner “applies Petitioner’s definition.” Prelim. Resp. 10. We agree with Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“On this record, we agree with Petitioner that “unit” does not connote any particular structure, and that the terms “tessellation unit,” “transform unit,” “lighting unit,” and “rendering unit” recite function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function. Therefore, these terms should be construed as means plus function terms. “Construing a means-plus-function claim term is a two-step process. The court must first identify the claimed function. Then, the court must determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (citation omitted). In cases involving a special purpose computer-implemented means-plus-function limitation, the Federal Circuit requires “that the specification disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed function.” Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “A description of the function in words may disclose, at least to the satisfaction of one of ordinary skill in the art, enough of an algorithm to provide the necessary structure under § 112, ¶ 6.” Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “The law is clear that patent documents need not include subject matter that is known in the field of the invention and is in the prior art, for patents are written for persons experienced in the field of the invention.” S3 Inc. v. NVIDIA Corp., 259 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Claim 10 recites “a transform unit that transforms the graphic objects into transformed objects.” Claim 15 recites a similar limitation. Claim 12 recites “said transform unit transforms the spatial coordinates of said graphic objects.” The specification discloses that the function of “transform[ing] the graphic objects into transformed objects” and “transform[ing] the spatial coordinates of said graphic objects” is performed by a graphics processing unit (GPU) including a dedicated processor programmed to execute the transform step of the disclosed microcode. Ex. 1001, 5:63–6:3; 7:10–15, 7:19–20, 12:49––52; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 106–107. We construe “transform unit” as a means plus function limitation with the function of transforming graphic objects into transformed objects (claims 10 and 15), or the function of transforming the spatial coordinates of said graphic objects (claim 12), and with the corresponding structure of a GPU including a dedicated processor programmed to execute the transform step of the microcode disclosed in the specification. b) Tessellation unit Claim 10 recites “a tessellation unit for tessellating the transformed objects.” Claims 11 and 15 recite a similar limitation. The specification discloses that the function of “tessellating the transformed objects” is performed by a GPU that includes a dedicated processor coupled between the transform unit and a lighting unit, where the dedicated processor is programmed to execute the tessellating steps of the disclosed microcode. Ex. 1001, 6:4–59, 7:10–15, 7:20–24, 12:49–52; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 108–109. We construe “tessellation unit” as a means plus function limitation with the function of tessellating the transformed objects and with the corresponding structure of a GPU including a dedicated processor coupled between the programmed to execute the tessellating steps of the disclosed microcode. c) Lighting unit Claim 10 recites a “lighting unit comprising means for lighting triangles resulting from said tessellation unit.” Claim 13 recites “a lighting unit . . . for lighting the tessellated transformed objects.” Claim 15 recites “lighting vertices of triangles resultant from said tessellating using said lighting unit.” The specification discloses that the function of “lighting triangles resulting from said tessellation unit,” “lighting the tessellated transformed objects,” and “lighting vertices of triangles resultant from said tessellating” is performed by a GPU that includes a dedicated processor programmed to execute code to light the vertices of the triangles. Ex. 1001, 6:60–65, 7:10–15, 7:24–26, 12:49–52; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 110–111. We construe “lighting unit” as a means plus function limitation with the function of lighting triangles resulting from said tessellation unit (claim 10), lighting the tessellated transformed objects (claim 13), or lighting vertices of triangles resultant from said tessellating (claim 15), and with the corresponding structure of a GPU that includes a dedicated processor programmed to execute code to light the tessellated objects. d) Rendering unit Claim 14 recites “a rendering unit operatively coupled to the lighting unit for rendering the lighted, tessellated, transformed objects.” The specification discloses that the function of rendering the lighted, tessellated, transformed objects is performed by a GPU that includes a dedicated processor programmed to execute the rendering steps of the disclosed microcode. Ex. 1001, 6:65–7:3, 7:10–15, 7:24–26, 12:49–52; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 112–113. We construe “rendering unit” as a means plus function objects, and with the corresponding structure of a GPU that includes a dedicated processor to execute the rendering steps of the disclosed microcode.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“e) Remaining claim terms No other terms require express construction at this time. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“We agree with Petitioner. Pages 511–527 of Foley were previously presented to the Office. See Ex. 1001, code (56). In contrast, Petitioner relies on pages 17, 279–281, 508, 521, 721, 736–737, 807, 855, 866–871, 873–879, 888, and 890–892 of Foley. See Pet. 30–77. Out of all of the pages of Foley cited in the Petition, only one, page 521, was previously presented to the Office. On the record before us, there is no indication that any of the remaining pages of Foley cited in the Petition were presented to, or considered by, the Office. Notably, the IDS disclosure cited just 17 pages out of Foley’s over 1200 pages of content, but did not cite the pages that teach the feature that the Examiner found was patentable over the prior art. Compare Ex. 1017, at 177 (In the statement of allowable subject matter, the Examiner concluded that “the prior [art] fails to teach a tessellate unit coupled between the transform unit and the lighting unit.”), with Ex. 1007, at 807 (Foley teaches that “tessellation should occur after transformation into a coordinate system in which screen size can be determined” for the benefits of “enabl[ing] tessellation size to be determined adaptively, and limit[ing] the amount of data that is transformed.”); see also id. at 866–877. Thus, the 2 U.S. Patent No. 7,532,213, which was reissued as the ’534 patent at issue here. See Ex. 1001, code (64). previously presented to the Office. Patent Owner contends that even if Petitioner cites to portions of Foley not considered by the Office, the Examiner considered other references that are cumulative to and substantially the same as the portions of Foley cited by Petitioner. Prelim. Resp. 22. In particular, Patent Owner contends that the ’534 patent recognizes that pipeline graphics architecture was well-known at the time of invention, and that other references that teach pipeline graphics architecture were considered by the Office. Prelim. Resp. 23–24 (citing Ex. 1001, Fig. 2, 2:42–58; Ex. 1032, Fig. 2b, 5:18–22; Ex. 1033, Fig. 1A, 6:28–31, 21:1–3). We disagree with Patent Owner. Foley’s disclosure of a pipeline graphics architecture that teaches the benefits of employing dedicated processors for tessellating after transforming is explicit and, so far as we can tell from the record presented, is not found in any reference previously cited to the Office. See Ex. 1007, 807, 866–877. Thus, the same or substantially the same art was not previously presented to the Office.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham - PTAB · Apr 19, 2023 · IPR2023-00004 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–4, 9–11, 17, and 18 on all petitioned grounds and granted Dell’s motion to join the Intel IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In view of these representations by Dell, and having reviewed Dell’s Petition, we determine that, under the current circumstances, it is appropriate to exercise our discretion to institute inter partes review of the challenged claims based upon the same grounds authorized and for the same reasons discussed in our institution decision in the Intel IPR.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“As the moving party, Dell bears the burden of proving it is entitled to the requested relief. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). A motion for joinder should: set forth the reasons joinder is appropriate; identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; and explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review. See, e.g., PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019)6, 76–77.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 7,245,299 - Intel Corporation v. 3d Surfaces, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Apr 19, 2023 · IPR2022-01589 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 9–11, 17, and 18 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would be shown obvious over Sfarti and Foley.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“of the ’299 patent considered the same argument presented in the Petition’s obviousness combination of Sfarti and Foley, and correspondingly “determined that it would not have been obvious to modify the teachings of [Sfarti] to implement the ordered steps in a GPU” based on Foley. Prelim. Resp. 26–27 (citing Ex. 1002, 64–69, 112–114, 172–180). Specifically, we disagree that the Examiner’s double patenting rejection presents the same argument as the Petition’s obviousness combination. The Examiner stated “it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill to substitute the computer readable medium of claim 21 [of the ’501 patent] with the graphics processing unit of [original claim 1].” Ex. 1002, 67. The Examiner, in making this obviousness-type double patenting rejection3, did not find a prior art reference that showed a graphics processing unit with separately dedicated processors. Rather, the Examiner attempted to use the graphics processing unit recited in original claim 1 as prior art against itself. The applicant successfully argued against the Examiner’s improper use of the pending claims as prior art by stating that the ’501 patent did not disclose the graphics processing unit incorporating the tessellation unit as claimed. See id. at 138, 175.” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“that upon institution Dell will not pursue any grounds in the [District Court Litigation] that were raised or reasonably could have been raised in its IPR petition for the challenged claims.” Reply 1 (citing IPR2023-00004, Paper 134). More precisely, however, Dell has actually stated in IPR2023-00004 that Dell “will stipulate, consistent with Sotera Wireless, that if this IPR [i.e., IPR2023-00004] is instituted, [Dell] will not pursue in the parallel district court proceeding any grounds raised or that reasonably could have been raised in this IPR for the challenged claims.” IPR2023-00004, Paper 13, 1 (emphases added). Contemporaneously with the present Decision, we are issuing a decision in IPR2023-00004 instituting review of the ’299 patent on the same two grounds being instituted here, and we also are joining the two proceedings together for purposes of trial. Thus, Dell’s stipulation has taken effect.” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“On this record, we agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill would have implemented the steps of transforming, tessellating, lighting, and rendering as taught by Sfarti in a graphics pipeline of dedicated processors as taught by Foley to yield the benefits of providing more processing power than a single CPU can provide, and significantly improving performance speed. See Pet. 31–38; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132–147. On this record we agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have performed tessellating after transforming using the graphics pipeline of dedicated processors of Foley to yield the benefits of adaptively determining tessellation size and limiting the amount of data that needs to be transformed as taught by Foley.” slip op. at 29
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“to the ’299 patent “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related scientific field, and approximately two years of work experience in computer graphics or, alternatively, two years[’] work towards a masters or doctorate degree in these scientific fields.” Pet. 10; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 96–97. Patent Owner “applies Petitioner’s definition” in the Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 9.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,245,299 - PTAB · Mar 3, 2023 · IPR2022-01359 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1, 3, 4, and 6–15 on all asserted obviousness grounds based on Park, Kim, Williams, and, for claims 11–13, Hileman.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“III. DISCRETION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) Patent Owner argues the Board should exercise discretion to deny institution under Fintiv6 “due to the advanced state of the parallel District 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), included revisions to 35 U.S.C. § 103 that became effective after the filing of the applications to which the ’191 patent claims priority. Therefore, we apply the pre-AIA version of the statute. 2 WO 01/11523 A1, published Feb. 15, 2001 (Ex. 1005) (“Park”). 3 KR2003-0085802, published Nov. 7, 2003 (Ex. 1007). The Petition relies on a certified translation of this Korean language reference (Ex. 1006), which we refer to herein as “Kim.” 4 WO 2008/052013 A2, published May 2, 2008 (Ex. 1008) (“Williams”). 5 US 2003/0040944 A1, published Feb. 27, 2003 (Ex. 1009) (“Hileman”). 6 Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). Court proceeding.” See Prelim. Resp. 4–15. Petitioner contends that the Fintiv factors do not favor discretionary denial here. See Pet. 71–74. After considering the parties’ arguments and the circumstances of this case, we decline to exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). In particular, Petitioner has stipulated that if inter partes review is instituted it will not pursue the invalidity grounds raised in the Petition or any other ground that reasonably could have been raised in the Delaware litigation. Ex. 1033, 1. The Director has provided guidance stating that, when such a stipulation is presented, the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of the parallel litigation. See Ex. 1013, 3, 7.7 That guidance applies here.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s argument is not persuasive. Even assuming the Examiner considered the particular disclosures Patent Owner cites in Angert, Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Park and Kim provide additional teachings that are material to the challenged claims. For example, the Petition relies on Park’s teaching that the delivery agent has a mobile digital camera that provides the customer with a “live video feed of the delivery of their order” that they can “interactively view, in real-time.” See, e.g., Pet. 18, 34–35 (quoting Ex. 1005, 4:27–32, 48:18–20). Moreover, the Petition relies on Kim’s teaching that in addition to providing images of the delivery, a delivery agent can utilize a digital camera in mobile communication terminal to send images of the product to the customer so they “can confirm whether the product ordered is identical to the product being delivered.” Id. at 19 (citing Ex. 1006, 1–2). As explained in our analysis of Ground 1 below, such teachings are material to Petitioner’s patentability challenges. We see no corollary to these teachings in Angert nor does Patent Owner otherwise identify any similar teachings or arguments the Examiner previously considered. See generally Prelim. Resp. 44–46. For these reasons, the Petition does not present the same or substantially the same art or arguments as that previously presented to the Office. Because the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework has not been met, we decline to exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Petitioner’s showing is sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in demonstrating that claims 1 and 14 are obvious over Park, Kim, and Williams. Patent Owner’s arguments against institution in the Preliminary Response are unavailing on the current record. We address those arguments below.” slip op. at 28
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) in August 2009 (the earliest alleged priority date) would have been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the electronic commerce arts that are pertinent to the ’191 patent. That person would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of electronic commerce. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). Patent Owner offers a similar description of a POSITA. Prelim. Resp. 19. At this stage, we find Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art to be sufficiently supported by the record and apply it for purposes of this Decision. Moreover, we do not perceive any meaningful difference between the parties’ respective descriptions of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,202,191 - PTAB · Mar 3, 2023 · IPR2022-01358 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5, 8, 9, 12, 14, 18, 19, and 21–28 on all asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“After considering the parties’ arguments and the circumstances of this case, we decline to exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). In particular, Petitioner has stipulated that if inter partes review is instituted it will not pursue the invalidity grounds raised in the Petition or any other ground that reasonably could have been raised in the Delaware litigation. Ex. 1033, 1. The Director has provided guidance stating that, when such a stipulation is presented, the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of the parallel litigation. See Ex. 1013, 3, 7.8 That guidance applies here.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“Patent Owner’s argument is not persuasive. Even assuming the Examiner considered the particular disclosures Patent Owner cites in Angert, Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Park and Kim provide additional teachings that are material to the challenged claims. For example, the Petition relies on Park’s teaching that the delivery agent has a mobile digital camera that provides the customer with a “live video feed of the delivery of their order” that they can “interactively view, in real-time.” See, e.g., Pet. 18, 34–35 (quoting Ex. 1005, 4:27–32, 48:18–20). Moreover, the Petition relies on Kim’s teaching that in addition to providing images of the delivery, a delivery agent can utilize a digital camera in mobile communication terminal to send images of the product to the customer so they “can confirm whether the product ordered is identical to the product being delivered.” Id. at 19 (citing Ex. 1006, 1–2). As explained in our analysis of Ground 1 below, such teachings are material to Petitioner’s patentability challenges. We see no corollary to these teachings in Angert nor does Patent Owner otherwise identify any similar teachings or arguments the Examiner previously considered. See generally Prelim. Resp. 44–46. For these reasons, the Petition does not present the same or substantially the same art or arguments as that previously presented to the Office. Because the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework has not been met, we decline to exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“On the current record, we disagree with Patent Owner and find that Petitioner has articulated a sufficient rationale for combining the references. Petitioner asserts, supported by the testimony of its declarant and teachings in Park and Kim, that the combination would “enhance the reliability of the delivery” and “increase customer satisfaction” by providing a “a sensory cue of a visual comparison between the product to be delivered and the desired product.” See Pet. 20–23 (citing exhibits). Petitioner also explains that the problem Kim’s product confirmation functionality is intended to address is “particularly acute” for perishable items such as food, which Park teaches its system is designed to deliver. Id. at 21. Petitioner acknowledges that adding Kim’s functionality would add time to the delivery process, but argues that “[a]ny additional time . . . could be absorbed into the desired hour delivery time of Park” or “alternatively, a POSITA would have recognized that the confirmation teachings of Kim could be provided as an option to the user with an advisory message to the user that such confirmation may add time to his or her order.” Id. at 23–24. Petitioner’s rationale is reasonable on the current record. While Park is focused on providing fast delivery, it would seem that a POSITA would also understand that delivering the wrong product is likely to cause an even greater delay then the additional time necessary to for the delivery agent to send a product image and receive customer confirmation. See Pet. 23 (urging that incorporating Kim’s functionality “would reduce the likelihood in Park that the delivery agent made an incorrect delivery, thereby saving resources in the Park system (e.g., by preventing the delivery of goods that would need to be returned and/or refunded”) (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 56; Ex. 1021, 3:4–53). Moreover, Petitioner’s argument that the product confirmation functionality could be presented as an option so as to balance the competing desire for fast delivery would seem to be a reasonable exercise of a POSITA’s ordinary creativity. See KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (“A person of ordinary skill in also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”).” slip op. at 30
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). Patent Owner offers a similar description of a POSITA. Prelim. Resp. 18–19. At this stage, we find Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art to be sufficiently supported by the record and apply it for purposes of this Decision. Moreover, we do not perceive any meaningful difference between the parties’ respective descriptions of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,115,067 - PTAB · Mar 3, 2023 · IPR2022-01357 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 10, 14–17, 21, 22, and 24–26 based on a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 24, and 26 are obvious over Park and Kim.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Instacart submits that one skilled in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of electronic commerce” and that “[l]ack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). Consumeron responds that one skilled in the art “would have been someone with a background in electrical engineering, computer science, or the like and two years of working with platforms for the acquisition and delivery of products.” Prelim. Resp. 18. At this stage, we discern no meaningful difference between the levels of skill in the art espoused by the parties, given that working in the field of electronic commerce necessarily entails working with platforms for the acquisition and delivery of products. Accordingly, for purposes of institution, we adopt the level of skill in the art as articulated by Instacart.” slip op. at 4
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Notably, however, the district court did not adopt Consumeron’s proposed construction for this term. Instead, in a claim construction order dated January 18, 2023,6 the district court construed “mobile delivery agent system” to mean “a mobile system that includes at least a device to capture video or still images and a device set up to communicate with a remote server.” Ex. 1034, 1. In doing so, the district court expressly rejected Consumeron’s argument that an MDAS requires a “mobile computing device” and “the use of the internet.” Ex. 1035, 17. At this stage, we see no reason to depart from the district court’s careful and comprehensive analysis of this term. See id. at 13–17. Thus, for purposes of this proceeding, we adopt the district court’s construction of “mobile delivery agent system.”” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“We disagree with Consumeron that Instacart fails to articulate a sufficient reason for combining Park and Kim. Instacart asserts, with support from its declarant, that combining the teachings of Park and Kim would “enhance the reliability of the delivery” and “increase customer satisfaction” by “provid[ing] the sensory cue of a visual comparison between the product to be delivered and the desired product.” See Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 55; Ex. 1006, 1). Instacart also explains that the problem Kim’s product confirmation functionality is intended to address is “particularly acute” for perishable food items, which Park’s system is designed to deliver. Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 54; Ex. 1005, 1:11–21; Ex. 1006, 1–2; Ex. 1014, 2; Ex. 1022, 2–3). And although adding Kim’s functionality would add time to Park’s delivery process, Instacart notes that “[a]ny additional time . . . could be absorbed into the desired hour delivery time of Park” or “alternatively, a POSITA would have recognized that the confirmation teachings of Kim could be provided as an option to the user with an advisory message to the user that such confirmation may add time to his or her order.” Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 57). We find Instacart’s rationale for the asserted combination to be reasonable on the current record. Although Park is focused on providing fast delivery, one skilled in the art would have understood that delivery of an unacceptable product to the customer is of greater concern in terms of “cost and efficiency” than any additional time needed for the delivery agent to receive customer confirmation of an acceptable product. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 56.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“We have considered the parties’ arguments and determine that the circumstances of this case do not warrant discretionary denial of the Petition. In particular, because Instacart has submitted a Sotera stipulation (Ex. 1033), we will not discretionarily deny institution under § 314(a) in view of the parallel district court action. See Director Memorandum, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA-Post Grant Proceedings With Parallel District Court Litigation, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (June 21, 2022), at 3, 7 (addressing impact of Sotera stipulation on the exercise of § 314(a) discretion). In addition, contrary to Consumeron’s assertion, neither Park nor Kim are sufficiently cumulative of Angert to warrant discretionary denial under § 325(d). See Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, 2020 WL 740292, *3–4 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). That is because Park and Kim provide additional material teachings not disclosed by Angert that include, for example, Park’s teaching that the delivery agent has a mobile digital camera that provides the customer with a “live video feed” of their order that they can “interactively view, in real-time” (Ex. 1005, 4:27–32, 48:18–20) and Kim’s teaching that a delivery agent can utilize a digital camera in a mobile communication terminal to send images to the customer so they “can confirm” that the product ordered is identical to the product being delivered (Ex. 1006, 1–2). Consumeron does not identify any similar teachings in Angert. See Prelim. Resp. 46–47. Thus, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 325(d).” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,628,835 - PTAB · Mar 3, 2023 · IPR2022-01356 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 13–17, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 13 are obvious over Park and Kim.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of electronic commerce” and that “[l]ack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). Consumeron responds that one skilled in the art “would have been someone with a background in electrical engineering, computer science, or the like and two years of working with platforms for the acquisition and delivery of products.” Prelim. Resp. 19. At this stage, we discern no meaningful difference between the levels of skill in the art espoused by the parties, given that working in the field of electronic commerce necessarily entails working with platforms for the acquisition and delivery of products. Accordingly, for purposes of institution, we adopt the level of skill in the art as articulated by Instacart.” slip op. at 4
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Notably, however, the district court did not adopt Consumeron’s proposed construction for this term. Instead, in a claim construction order dated January 18, 2023,5 the district court construed “mobile delivery agent system” to mean “a mobile system that includes at least a device to capture video or still images and a device set up to communicate with a remote server.” Ex. 1034, 1. In doing so, the district court expressly rejected Consumeron’s argument that an MDAS requires a “mobile computing device” and “the use of the internet.” Ex. 1035, 17. At this stage, we see no reason to depart from the district court’s careful and comprehensive analysis of this term. See id. at 13–17. Thus, for purposes of this proceeding, we adopt the district court’s construction of “mobile delivery agent system.” 2. “real time” Consumeron proposes that the term “real time” be construed to mean “data that is passed along as it is gathered.” Prelim. Resp. 22–23. The district court agreed with that proposed construction. See Ex. 1034, 2; Ex. 1035, 22–26. At this stage, we see no reason to question the district court’s construction. As such, we adopt the district court’s construction of “real time.”” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“been motivated to combine the teachings of Park and Kim. See Prelim. Resp. 33–39. According to Consumeron, one skilled in the art would not have undertaken ‘to modify Park’s system with Kim’s technique because it directly undermine[s] Park’s requirement for ‘extremely fast and efficient’ delivery based on optimized routing algorithms used to determine delivery manifests” and “waiting for customer confirmation defeats Park’s intended goal.” Id. at 34. Consumeron also contends that Instacart “fails to show how this time [i.e., the time to send a product image and receive confirmation from the user] would even be factored into Park’s routing algorithms.” Id.; see also id. at 37–38 (“Petitioner’s bare-bone contention that Kim’s technique would only take two minutes to implement finds no evidentiary support from the record.”). We disagree with Consumeron that Instacart fails to articulate a sufficient reason for combining Park and Kim. Instacart asserts, with support from its declarant, that combining the teachings of Park and Kim would “enhance the reliability of the delivery” and “increase customer satisfaction” by “provid[ing] the sensory cue of a visual comparison between the product to be delivered and the desired product.” See Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 55; Ex. 1006, 1). Instacart also explains that the problem Kim’s product confirmation functionality is intended to address is “particularly acute” for perishable food items, which Park’s system is designed to deliver. Id. at 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 54; Ex. 1005, 1:11–21; Ex. 1006, 1–2; Ex. 1014, 2; Ex. 1022, 2–3). And although adding Kim’s functionality would add time to Park’s delivery process, Instacart notes that “[a]ny additional time . . . could be absorbed into the desired hour delivery time of Park” or “alternatively, a POSITA would have recognized that the confirmation teachings of Kim could be provided as an option to the user with an advisory message to the user that such confirmation may add time to his or her order.” Id. at 23–24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 57). We find Instacart’s rationale for the asserted combination to be reasonable on the current record. Although Park is focused on providing fast delivery, one skilled in the art would have understood that delivery of an unacceptable product to the customer is of greater concern in terms of “cost and efficiency” than any additional time needed for the delivery agent to receive customer confirmation of an acceptable product. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 56.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“Consumeron argues that we should exercise discretion to deny institution under § 314(a) due to the advanced state of the parallel district court action. See Prelim. Resp. 4–15. Consumeron also argues that we should exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because Park and Kim are substantially the same as another reference previously considered during prosecution of the ’594 patent, namely, Angert.11 Id. at 43–45. Instacart disputes that discretionary denial is warranted under either § 314(a) or § 325(d). See Pet. 67–73. We have considered the parties’ arguments and determine that the circumstances of this case do not warrant discretionary denial of the Petition. In particular, because Instacart has submitted a Sotera stipulation (Ex. 1033), we will not discretionarily deny institution under § 314(a) in view of the parallel district court action. See Director Memorandum, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA-Post Grant Proceedings With Parallel District Court Litigation, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (June 21, 2022), at 3, 7 (addressing impact of Sotera stipulation on the exercise of § 314(a) discretion). In addition, contrary to Consumeron’s assertion, neither Park nor Kim are sufficiently cumulative of Angert to warrant discretionary denial under § 325(d). See Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, 2020 WL 740292, *3–4 (PTAB Feb. 13,” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,244,594 - PTAB · Jan 5, 2023 · PGR2022-00046 · APJ Robert L Kinder · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on the design claim, finding PayPal more likely than not anticipates and renders the claim obvious; it also instituted on all other petition grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute a post-grant review under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018), which provides that review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition,” if “not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Applying that standard, for reasons explained below, we grant the Petition and institute a post-grant review of the challenged claim.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner further asserts that “[t]he designer of ordinary skill would be someone with a background in designing animated GUI’s, such as animated GUI’s that facilitate financial transactions.” Id. at 64 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 109). Based on the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s identification of the ordinary observer and designer of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision because they are consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art references and the ’453 patent, supported by witness testimony, and unopposed by Patent Owner at this juncture.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“portion with animated [GUI].” Ex. 1001, code (57). “Petitioner proposes that the ’453 Patent claim should be construed as a display screen portion with an animated graphical user interface displaying a series of images including the elements shown in non-broken lines in FIGS. 1-4,” and “in accordance with its explicit statements that the broken lines and the dot lines ‘form[] no part of the claimed design’ and that ‘[t]he process or period in 8 Petitioner refers to a graphical user interface as a GUI. which one image transitions to another image forms no part of the claimed design.’” Pet. 43–44. For purposes of this Decision, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed construction that the claim encompasses a display screen portion with an animated graphical user interface displaying a series of images including the elements shown in non-broken lines and agree that the broken lines and dot lines in the figures form no part of the claimed design. See id. To the extent that the features of the claimed design require further discussion, however, we provide it in our assessment of the challenges, which we turn to next.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner explains that PayPal was publicly accessible because “MPEP § 2128 states that YouTube videos ‘can be sources of prior art, provided the public accessibility requirements . . . are met,’” where “‘[p]rior art disclosures on the Internet . . . are considered to be publicly available as of the date the item was publicly posted,” and, here, PayPal is a YouTube video that was publicly posted on April 8, 2021 “and has received over 107,000 views,” with “a corresponding April 8, 2021 article posted by CNET [having] linked to this video.” Pet. 20 (citing MPEP § 2128; Ex. 1028). Petitioner also points out that “persons interested and having ordinary skill in cashless payment applications could locate PayPal exercising reasonabl[e] diligence . . . by searching the Internet for videos concerning QR code payment systems payments,” and that “PayPal has been viewed over 100,000 times, suggesting that PayPal is a well-known payment system and that persons interested and having ordinary skill in cashless payment applications could have easily located PayPal.” Id. at 20–21. Petitioner argues that PayPal qualifies as “otherwise available to the public” prior art because “the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office’s training materials specifically list YouTube videos as prior art that should be considered ‘otherwise available to the public’ under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a)(1) . . . [,] [a]nd the evidence described above confirms that PayPal was otherwise available to the public as of its publication date of April 8, 2021.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1032, 15). Based on the record before us, we determine it is more likely than not that PayPal qualifies as prior art, either as a printed publication or as otherwise available to the public.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness - Microchip Technology Inc. v. HD Silicon Solutions LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 7, 2022 · IPR2021-00752 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 and 9–17 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 8 was not shown unpatentable because the petitioner did not sufficiently explain why a skilled artisan would combine Trivedi and Yang.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 5. Patent Owner does not dispute this level of skill. See generally PO Resp. Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable and consistent with the prior art presented. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). We accordingly adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which is supported by Dr. Lee’s testimony. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 32.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“d) “the first film and the second film are deposited insitu.” First, we observe the meaning of “in-situ” is not dispositive. Patent Owner contends the term means deposited in the same chamber, or in chambers that are connected through a central chamber. PO Resp. 36 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 50). Dr. Lee agrees. Ex. 2010, 89:13–23; see also Tr. 20:8–12 concerned, I don’t think the parties are that far apart in our understanding in that as long as, you know, the reference is disclosing the ability for a wafer to be processed in the same chamber, that would satisfy in-situ.”).” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“disclosure is inapplicable to local interconnect fabrication. PO Resp. 34–36. Patent Owner has not argued that Joo is non-analogous art, nor has Patent Owner addressed either test for non-analogous art. See generally PO Resp. Specifically, Patent Owner has not addressed whether Joo is within the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention or whether Joo is otherwise reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Rather, Patent Owner contends that gate electrodes are different from local interconnects. See PO Resp. 7–11, 33–36. In any event, we agree with Petitioner that Joo is in the same field of endeavor as the ’033 patent. In the Background, the ’033 patent states that present invention relates to “integrated circuits, and more particularly to integrated circuit fabrication processes and structures.” Ex. 1001, 1:5–8. Similarly, Joo is directed to “the field of semiconductor manufacturing and more specifically to a method and apparatus for the selective oxidation of a composite silicon/metal film.” Ex. 1005, 1:5–10. Moreover, Joo states that its described processes and “composite film need not necessarily be used to form a gate-electrode but can be used to form other device features such as but not limited to capacitor electrodes and interconnects.” Ex. 1005, 5:41–” slip op. at 30
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“After consideration of the contentions and the evidence of record, we find that Petitioner has shown that the combination of Trivedi and Joo teaches each recitation of claim 3. Also, we are persuaded that Petitioner has offered articulated reasoning with a rational underpinning as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Trivedi and Joo in the manner recited in claim 3. Based on the complete record now before us, we determine that Petitioner has proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 3 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combined teachings of Trivedi and Joo.” slip op. at 39
Patent outcomesUS 6,774,033 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,774,033 - Apple Inc. v. Masimo CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 1, 2022 · IPR2021-00193 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–29 are unpatentable, principally as obvious over the asserted combinations of prior art; the Board did not reach the Goldsmith and Lo ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not challenge using Petitioner’s asserted level of skill, but notes that “asserted level of skill (1) requires no coursework, training or experience with optics or optical physiological monitors; (2) requires no coursework, training or experience in physiology; and (3) focuses on data processing and not sensor design.” PO Resp. 9–10 (citing Pet. 4–5; Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 35–38). We adopt Petitioner’s assessment for the person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) as set forth above, which appears consistent with the level of skill reflected in the Specification and prior art.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“construction of “cover” to exclude epoxy and resin. The plain and ordinary meaning of the term does not support Patent Owner’s view. A “cover” ordinarily connotes “something that protects, shelters, or guards.” Ex. 1050,3 288. That plain and ordinary meaning is consistent with the ’708 patent’s description of “flex circuit cover 360, which can be made of plastic or another suitable material . . . [and] can cover and thereby protect a flex circuit (not shown).” Ex. 1001, 22:63–65. It also is consistent with the ’708 patent’s description and illustration of “transparent cover 1432” in Figure 14D, which covers and protects detectors 1410c and conductors 1412c, and which “can be fabricated from glass or plastic, among other materials.” See id. at 36:23–32 (emphasis added), Figs. 14D–14E. This is not the situation in which a special definition for a claim term has been set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, 3 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th ed. (©2005). and precision, so as to give notice of the inventor’s own lexicography. See Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Nor do we discern that Patent Owner “demonstrate[d] an intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.” Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002).” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“We credit, instead, Dr. Kenny’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from Ohsaki that a convex protrusion will help prevent slippage, even in the context of Aizawa’s arrangement of four detectors surrounding a central emitter (or emitters, when modified per Inokawa) attached on the front side of the user’s wrist. See Ex. 1047 ¶ 37. This is because, even in Aizawa’s arrangement, the convex protrusion will “physically extend[] into the tissue and displac[e] the tissue,” as is illustrated for example in Ohsaki’s Figures 1 and 2, where translucent board 8 physically extends into and displaces the tissue of wrist 4. Id. Dr. Madisetti also testifies that “Aizawa reports that on the palm side of the wrist, a flat surface improves adhesion,” so “a POSITA would have believed that adding Ohsaki’s protruding surface would have disrupted the improved adhesion properties reported for Aizawa’s flat plate.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 85 (citing Ex. 1006, Figs. 3A–3B, ¶¶ 13, 26, 28, 30, 34; Ex. 1014, Figs. 3A–3B, ¶¶ 23–24). We disagree with this reading of Aizawa. It is true that Aizawa’s plate 6 is illustrated as having a flat surface (Ex. 1006, Fig. 1(b)), and that Aizawa states the plate “improve[s] adhesion” (id. ¶ 13). Aizawa also states: “the above belt 7 is fastened such that the acrylic transparent plate 6 becomes close to the artery 11 of the wrist 10,” and “[t]hereby, adhesion between the wrist 10 and the pulse rate detector 1 is improved.” Id. ¶ 26. These disclosures, however, indicate the improved adhesion is provided by the acrylic material of plate 6, not the flat surface of plate 6 as Dr. Madisetti would have it. See also id. ¶¶ 30, 34 (“Since the acrylic transparent plate 6 is provided . . . adhesion between the pulse rate detector 1 and the wrist 10 can be improved . . . .”). Thus, there is no teaching away from using a convex surface to improve the adhesion of Aizawa’s detector to the user’s wrist. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 126; Ex. 1047 ¶ 37. Finally, we acknowledge that both Aizawa and Ohsaki express a concern about exerting too much pressure against the front side of the user’s wrist, because this would make the user uncomfortable. See, e.g., Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 6, 26, 31; Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 6, 18, 24. Thus, a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that there are operational limits on how large the protrusion can be made in Aizawa. Nonetheless, claim 1 does not place any limitations on the size of the protrusion, and as discussed above a protrusion would improve the ability to avoid slippage of Aizawa’s detector 1 when worn on the front side of a user’s wrist. Therefore, it would have been obvious to add a protrusion to Aizawa’s detector 1 for that purpose, and optimize the size of the protrusion to avoid user discomfort.” slip op. at 53
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Aizawa’s plate 6 to include a convex protrusion, in order to help prevent slippage of Aizawa’s detector 1 on the user’s wrist, based on Ohsaki. A person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from Ohsaki that forming a convex protrusion on the face of an optically-based pulse sensor where it is pressed against the user’s wrist to gather optical data will beneficially prevent slippage of the sensor during operation. Ohsaki states: “The detecting element 2 is arranged on the user’s wrist 4 so that the convex surface of the translucent board 8 is in intimate contact with the surface of the user’s skin. Thereby it is prevented that the detecting element 2 slips off the detecting position of the user’s wrist 4.” Ex. 1014 ¶ 25 (emphases added). A POSITA would understand from this disclosure that forming a convex protrusion on the tissue-contacting face of a wrist-worn, optically-based pulse sensor will resist movement of the sensor on the user’s wrist during use. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 141–142; Ex. 1047 ¶ 52. A POSITA would also understand this resistance to be a beneficial result, because it will improve the pulse sensor’s ability to emit light into and detect light reflected from the user’s wrist, to generate a pulse signal. See Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 26, 30, 34; Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 23, 25, 27; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 125–126; Ex. 1047 ¶ 37.” slip op. at 51
Patent outcomesUS 10,299,708 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,299,708
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.