- Google LLC / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al. v. Eyesmatch Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 4, 2025 · IPR2025-00297 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 were not shown unpatentable because the prior art did not establish the claimed distance-based variation in the rate of image-processing steps.
RulingsFinal written decision- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Putting aside the controversy over alleged impropriety and sandbagging in connection with the District Court’s Order, which we address infra in connection with Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike, we find the District Court’s “mirror-mimicking” construction to be well-reasoned and supported by the record, and we therefore adopt that construction and its reasoning. As the District Court points out, both the “double the distance” and “same size” aspects of its construction are expressly discussed in the ’109 patent. See Ex. 2008, 16 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:5–27, Figs. 5A, 5B). So, too, is “flipping” or reversing of the image disclosed. Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1001, 14:46–51, 15:41–47). Petitioner does not dispute that the ’109 patent discloses these aspects of “mirror-mimicking,” or even that the District Court’s claim construction is incorrect. Instead, Petitioner contends that “[t]he Board need not construe ‘mirror mimicking’ [beyond plain meaning] since the prior art expressly discloses mimicking a mirror.” Pet. Reply 6. Further. Petitioner characterizes the claim construction order as “a report and recommendation” by a magistrate judge that “the district court judge has not evaluated or adopted.” Id. at 6 n.2.9 We address infra whether the prior art “expressly” discloses “mirror- mimicking” as construed by the District Court. We, however, disagree with Petitioner that we should not construe this term. Given the controversy over whether Petitioner has argued for a different construction in the District Court, we cannot agree that an explicit construction of “mirror-mimicking” is an unnecessary step toward resolving this controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc., 200 F.3d at 803. We therefore adopt the District Court’s construction for “mirror-” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree. Petitioner demonstrates persuasively that a person of ordinary skill would have combined these references “to reduce distortion and provide a realistic mirror image.” Pet. 14–17; Haram Decl. ¶¶ 110–117. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner that by specifically disclosing “flipping” the image, Rosenberg is discouraging or teaching away from performing other transformations to achieve its objective of “replicat[ing] the performance of a standard household mirror.” See PO Resp. 32–33 (Patent Owner asserting lack of motivation to combine the references). A reference may be said to “teach away” “when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” Galderma Lab'ys, L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 738 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “A reference does not teach away, however, if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed. Id. Further, when conducting an obviousness analysis, the Board must consider a prior art reference “not only for what it expressly teaches, but also for what it fairly suggests.” Bradium Techs. LLC v. Iancu, 923 F.3d 1032, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 383 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). We are not convinced that the references before us “teach away” from performing the other transformations.” slip op. at 30
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
Patent outcomesUS 8,982,109 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,982,109 - Google LLC / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al. v. Eyesmatch Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00856 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 were not shown unpatentable because the cited combinations did not teach or suggest varying the rate of the claimed image-processing steps according to user distance.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner states that it “applies Petitioners’ proposed level of skill for purposes of this Response.” PO Resp. 14 (citing Forsyth Decl. ¶¶ 62– 63). For this Decision, we adopt the formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner and applied by Patent Owner as consistent with the prior art before us in this proceeding.7” slip op. at 13
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Putting aside the controversy over alleged impropriety and sandbagging in connection with the District Court’s Order, which we address infra in connection with Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike, we find the District Court’s “mirror-mimicking” construction to be well-reasoned and supported by the record, and we therefore adopt that construction and its reasoning. As the District Court points out, both the “double the distance” and “same size” aspects of its construction are expressly discussed in the ’109 patent. See Ex. 2008, 16 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:5–27, Figs. 5A, 5B). So, too, is “flipping” or reversing of the image disclosed. Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1001, 14:46–51, 15:41–47). Petitioner does not dispute that the ’109 patent discloses these aspects of “mirror-mimicking,” or even that the District Court’s claim construction is incorrect. Instead, Petitioner contends that “[t]he Board need not construe ‘mirror mimicking’ [beyond plain meaning] since the prior art expressly discloses mimicking a mirror.” Pet. Reply 6. Further. Petitioner characterizes the claim construction order as “a report and recommendation” by a magistrate judge that “the district court judge has not evaluated or adopted.” Id. at 6 n.2.9 We address infra whether the prior art “expressly” discloses “mirror- mimicking” as construed by the District Court. We, however, disagree with Petitioner that we should not construe this term. Given the controversy over whether Petitioner has argued for a different construction in the District Court, we cannot agree that an explicit construction of “mirror-mimicking” is an unnecessary step toward resolving this controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc., 200 F.3d at 803. We therefore adopt the District Court’s construction for “mirror-” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree. Petitioner demonstrates persuasively that a person of ordinary skill would have combined these references “to reduce distortion and provide a realistic mirror image.” Pet. 14–17; Haram Decl. ¶¶ 110–117. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner that by specifically disclosing “flipping” the image, Rosenberg is discouraging or teaching away from performing other transformations to achieve its objective of “replicat[ing] the performance of a standard household mirror.” See PO Resp. 32–33 (Patent Owner asserting lack of motivation to combine the references). A reference may be said to “teach away” “when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” Galderma Lab'ys, L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 738 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “A reference does not teach away, however, if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed. Id. Further, when conducting an obviousness analysis, the Board must consider a prior art reference “not only for what it expressly teaches, but also for what it fairly suggests.” Bradium Techs. LLC v. Iancu, 923 F.3d 1032, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 383 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). We are not convinced that the references before us “teach away” from performing the other transformations.” slip op. at 30
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We find that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that step 1(h) is taught or suggested by the references cited by Petitioner or the testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Karam. We agree, instead, with Patent Owner’s argument that “a [person of ordinary skill] would regard the disclosures in Rosenberg relating to proximity detection to be in connection with turning on or off various display modes and not in connection with varying the rate of one or more steps that are performed to transform a series of captured images of a user.” PO Resp. 33 (citing Ex.1005, ¶¶ 25, 32, 56, 69, 114). This distinction was explored during the final hearing. Petitioner’s counsel confirmed that in Rosenberg’s mirror mode, the rate of performing the processing steps does not vary: [THE BOARD]: It’s true that when the -- when Rosenberg is acting in the mirror mode, it’s always at the same rate, correct? It’s always performing those three processing steps at the same rate? [COUNSEL]: Correct. Hearing Tr. 34:13–16. We conclude that Rosenberg fails to disclose or suggest step 1(h) for the reasons given by Patent Owner and summarized above. We agree with Patent Owner’s analysis that in Rosenberg, when the mirror is off the processing steps are not performed, and when the mirror is on, the steps are performed “at an invariant rate.” PO Sur-reply 18–19.” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 8,982,109 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,982,109 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00714 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable: Goldenberg anticipates or renders claims 1–6, 8–13, and 15–19 obvious, and Goldenberg with Cruz-Hernandez renders claims 7, 14, and 20 obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar, supported by testimonial evidence, and consistent with the asserted prior art and the types of problems and solutions in the ’907 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:14–62. Because we discern no dispositive difference between the parties’ proposals, and neither party has argued that the choice between the two would affect the outcome,6 we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill for this decision. We note, however, that our decision would be the same under Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“to,” as recited in each of claims 1, 8, and 15, to “require[] a cause-and-effect relationship between a secondary event (e.g., a haptic effect) that occurs in reaction to a first event (e.g., entry of the user input element to one or more positions within the boundary range of positions).” PO Resp. 26–27 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 44). Patent Owner argues that “in response to” refers to more than just a coincidence and involves at least some degree of causality. Id. at 27 (citing American Calcar, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ex. 2007, 12–14 (dictionary definition); Ex. 2008, 7 (dictionary definition); Ex. 2006, 30:13–31:2, 32:8–11, 32:17– 21 (testimony by Mr. Ward)); PO Sur-reply 8–9 (citing Ex. 2009, 34:8–19, 36:5–21 (testimony by Mr. Ward)).” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“to,” as recited in each of claims 1, 8, and 15, to “require[] a cause-and-effect relationship between a secondary event (e.g., a haptic effect) that occurs in reaction to a first event (e.g., entry of the user input element to one or more positions within the boundary range of positions).” PO Resp. 26–27 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 44). Patent Owner argues that “in response to” refers to more than just a coincidence and involves at least some degree of causality. Id. at 27 (citing American Calcar, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ex. 2007, 12–14 (dictionary definition); Ex. 2008, 7 (dictionary definition); Ex. 2006, 30:13–31:2, 32:8–11, 32:17– 21 (testimony by Mr. Ward)); PO Sur-reply 8–9 (citing Ex. 2009, 34:8–19, 36:5–21 (testimony by Mr. Ward)).” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“To show anticipation under § 102, a petitioner must locate every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, in a single prior art reference. See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The limitations may be present in the reference “either explicitly or inherently.” In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In making this determination, we consider the reference “together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)).” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 10,627,907 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,627,907 - PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00629 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Beard and Laufer.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We may institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). If we institute an inter partes review, the trial must encompass all claims and grounds identified in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of one or more claims of the ’711 Patent. We, therefore, institute inter partes review of claims 1–20 on the grounds identified in the Petition. B.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had the following qualifications: [E]ither (1) a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Aerospace engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 years of academic or industry experience in the aerospace or avionics fields, or (2) at least four years of experience in any of the above industries. 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) included revisions to 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the applications from which the ’711 Patent claims priority were all filed after this date, the post-AIA version of §103 applies. See Ex. 1001, codes (60), (63). 2 U.S. Patent No. 9,769,387 B1, iss. Sept. 19, 2017 (Ex. 1009). 3 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2017/0059692 A1, pub. Mar. 2, 2017 (Ex. 1010). 4 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2012/0106800 A1, pub. May 3, 2012 (Ex. 1021). 5 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2017/0161911 A1, pub. June 8, 2017 (Ex. 1007). 6 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2013/0301905 A1, pub. Nov. 14, 2013 (Ex. 1024). 7 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2012/0004844 A1, pub. Jan. 5, 2012 (Ex. 1025). 8 PCT App. Pub. No. WO 2017/123477 A1, pub. July 20, 2017 (Ex. 1022). 9 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2017/0160751 A1, pub. June 8, 2017 (Ex. 1005). Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 50–54). Patent Owner does not presently dispute Petitioner’s proposed formulation. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt and apply Petitioner’s formulation regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art because it is (1) consistent with the ’711 Patent and the asserted prior art; and (2) it is supported by the testimony of Dr. Singhose. B.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“But the Detecting Limitations of claims 1, 19, and 20, merely require that a target be “detected.” The Detecting Limitations do not require that target detection be performed “aboard the reference UAV,” and claim 19 does not recite or require “machine learning.” Moreover, the Specification makes clear that the claims should not be limited to aspects of the disclosed embodiments, as Patent Owner proposes to do here. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:56–59 (“The invention is described in connection with such embodiments, but the invention is not limited to any embodiment. The scope of the invention is limited only by the claims . . . .”) Patent Owner additionally fails to cite any lexicographic definition or clear and unambiguous disclaimer of claim scope sufficient to limit the claims in the manner it proposes. We, thus, are not persuaded that the Detecting Limitations require “applying aboard the reference UAV a machine learning model to the capture image for: (i) identifying a target in the captured image.”” slip op. at 8
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“Priority Date of the Challenged Claims Petitioner contends that claims 1–20 of the ’711 Patent “should not have priority to the October 9, 2016 filing date of U.S. provisional [patent] application 62/405,972 due to a lack of written description support.” Pet. 3. Petitioner thus “assumes” a priority date of October 1, 2017 (the filing date of U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/556,449) for purposes of this proceeding. Id. at n.2; see also Ex. 1003, code (60). Patent Owner does not presently dispute Petitioner’s contention that the ’711 Patent is not entitled to a priority date earlier than October 1, 2017. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s undisputed contention that the ’711 Patent is not entitled to a priority date prior to 10 Any determination, no matter how designated in this Institution Decision (except our ultimate decision to institute), is preliminary and non-binding. Our Final Written Decision, based on a fully developed record of arguments and evidence, will state our binding determinations, findings, and conclusions. If a party disagrees with this preliminary construction, or any other determination set forth in this Institution Decision, that party should present its arguments at trial. The parties are reminded that any arguments not made during trial will be considered waived. Patent Owner is further reminded that arguments in the Preliminary Response are not preserved and will be considered waived at trial unless those arguments are re-raised in the Patent Owner Response. The parties are additionally reminded that arguments raised in subsequent briefing must be set forth in full in the briefs themselves, and may not be incorporated by reference from prior filings such as the Preliminary Response. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3). October 1, 2017.11 Accordingly, Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that all of the cited references qualify as prior art. See Pet. 4–6. D.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,514,711 - PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00530 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–9 on all petition grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Whitmarsh.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). If we institute an inter partes review, the trial must encompass all claims and grounds identified in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. We, therefore, institute inter partes review of claims 1–9 on the grounds asserted in the Petition. B.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“permission module,” as used in claim 1, has “a well understood structural meaning in the computer technology field.” 792 F.3d at 1350. Rather, the limitation in question is “drafted in the same format as a traditional means-plus-function limitation, and merely replaces the term ‘means’ with ‘nonce’ word ‘module,’ thereby connoting a generic ‘black box’ for performing the recited computer-implemented functions.” Id. And, while claim 1 recites the “outputs” of the permission module (i.e., a determination regarding the permissions of an aerial system), “the claim does not describe how the [permission module] interacts with other components in the [discrimination system] in a way that might inform the structural character of the limitation- in-question or otherwise impart structure to the [permission module] as recited in the claim.” Id. at 1351. We also reviewed the Specification, and we agree with Petitioner that the Specification identifies the following structure as corresponding to the claimed permission module: “storage on-board the disruption module 105, storage on-board the identification receiver 102, a remote computing system connected to the disruption module…, or [] any other suitable computing system.” See Pet. 12; Ex. 1001, 9:64–10:4. slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableInstituted
“from nearby UAVs wireless communications that include information or signatures unique to the UAVs, such as a MAC [media access control] address of the UAV, that is used to identify the transmitting UAV.” Pet. 16– 18 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 20, 27; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 8, 10, 13, 15–17; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 117–118). For example, Petitioner cites Whitmarsh’s teachings that “[a]ll drones have a unique identifier, such as a media access control (MAC) address, that can be determined or read by the DDS [drone defense system] and can be used to identify the drone.” Id. at 16 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 13). Based on these teachings, Petitioner submits that the signal received from the UAVs includes an aerial system identifier signal unique to the aerial system. Id. at 17–18 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 27; Ex. 1006 ¶ 13).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,249,199 - PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00525 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claim 21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood it is obvious over Beard.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). If we institute an inter partes review, the trial must encompass all claims and grounds identified in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of claim 21, the sole challenged claim. We, therefore, institute inter partes review of claim 21 on the grounds asserted in the Petition. B.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[E]ither (1) a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Aerospace engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 years of academic or industry experience in the aerospace, avionics, telecommunications, or electronic device manufacturing industry, or (2) at least four years of industry experience in any of the above industries. Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 47). Patent Owner does not presently dispute Petitioner’s proposed formulation. See generally Prelim. Resp. For 3 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. US 2016/0253907 A1, published Sept. 1, 2016 (Ex. 1010). 4 PCT Pub. No. WO 2016/078093 A1, published May 26, 2016 (Ex. 1011). 5 PCT Pub. No. WO 2016/154949 A1, published Oct. 6, 2016 (Ex. 1012). 6 U.S. Pat. App. Pub. No. US 2016/0127890 A1, published May 5, 2016 (Ex. 1013). 7 PCT Pub. No. WO 2015/043123 A1, published Apr. 2, 2015 (Ex. 1014). purposes of this Decision, we adopt and apply Petitioner’s formulation regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art because it is (1) consistent with the ’959 Patent and the asserted prior art; and (2) it is supported by the testimony of Dr. Chowdhary. B.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“But before describing the embodiments cited by Patent Owner, the Specification plainly states: “Any terms not expressly defined herein have their conventional meaning as commonly understood by those having skill in the relevant art(s).” Ex. 1001, 4:64–67. Thus, the Specification itself cautions against construing the claim terms such as “secure identifier” as limited to the scope of the disclosed embodiments. Here, Patent Owner has not cited any express definition of “secure identifier,” or identified any explicit disclaimer of claim scope that might justify narrowing the scope of this claim term to specific embodiments disclosed in the Specification. In the absence of such a definition or disclaimer, we are not persuaded that the scope of the claim term “secure identifier” should be limited to specific aspects of the preferred embodiments cited by Patent Owner. See Prelim. Resp. 7–14. On this record, and at this stage of the proceeding, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction and preliminarily construe “secure identifier” as “a credential that can be used to securely verify the identity of a device, such as an airborne object or ground-based transmitter.”8” slip op. at 10
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“’071 Application lack adequate written description support for the “secure identifier” claim limitation. For a patent claim to be entitled to the priority date of an earlier-filed application, the earlier application must provide complete written description support for the claim as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). L.A. Biomedical Rsch. Inst. at Harbor-UCLA Med. Ctr. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 849 F.3d 1049, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“L.A. Biomed”). To satisfy this requirement, the written description must “reasonably convey” to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor had possession on the claimed priority date of each limitation of the later-claimed subject matter. L.A. Biomed, 849 F.3d at 1057. It is not enough that an earlier application’s disclosure “renders the later-claimed invention obvious;” as “the disclosure must describe the claimed invention with all its limitations.” L.A. Biomed, 849 F.3d at 1057. On this record, we agree with Petitioner that the ’153 Provisional and ’071 Application lack adequate written description support for the “secure identifier” limitation of claim 21. We have preliminarily construed “secure identifier” as “a credential that can be used to securely verify the identity of a device, such as an airborne object or ground-based transmitter.” See supra § II.B. As discussed above, the Specification of the ’959 Patent does not use the term “secure identifier,” but the Specification contains extensive discussion of the need for an identification credential that is secure (e.g., difficult for a bad actor to clone or impersonate). See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:56– 65 (discussing the need for a system that is difficult to “clone”), 10:20–49 (discussing the need “trust” between a drone and ground-based equipment, and the need for a way to verifying the drone’s credentials), 11:5–12:62 (disclosing the use of encryption and a rotating SSID to generate a secure identifier for a drone). None of the portions of the Specification cited above is present in the ’153 Provisional or the ’071 Application. See generally Ex. 1006, 1007. The ’153 Provisional and ’071 Application discuss the need for identifiers for low-altitude aircraft (see, e.g., Ex. 1006, 2; Ex. 1007, 9), but there is no discussion of any need for an identification credential to be secure or resistant to cloning or impersonation. See generally Ex. 1006, 1007. The ’153 Provisional and ’071 Application do not disclose the use of encryption, SSIDs (much less rotating SSIDs), or any other technologies for the purpose of verifying the authenticity of an identification credential. See generally id. Based on our review of the ’153 Provisional and ’071 Application, we preliminarily conclude that neither of these applications would have reasonably conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor then had possession of the concept of the “secure identifier” that was later claimed in the ’959 Patent.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,713,959 - PTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00545 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 3–11, 13–21, and 23–30 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review may not be instituted unless the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable based on the grounds advanced here. Thus, for reasons explained below, we institute inter partes review of claims 1, 3–11, 13–21, and 23–30 of the ’904 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“F. Claim Construction We interpret a claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2024). Under this standard, we construe the claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Id. at 18–19. Petitioner also notes that “[a] person could also have qualified with more formal education and less technical experience, or vice versa.” Id. at 19. Patent Owner does not offer a definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner’s definition appears to be consistent with the field of the invention reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’904 patent. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“1. Rationale for proposed combination Petitioner asserts Merriman061 teaches that it is “highly desirable to target advertisements to the appropriate potential customer base” and discloses “techniques for gathering profile information about users and 26 1:52–53, 1:64–2:3, 2:6–30, 4:44–5:7, 5:50–59, 7:46–8:30, 8:39–46; Ex. 1002 ¶ 123). According to Petitioner, Jaye “recognizes the importance of collecting profile information for targeted advertising” and discloses “techniques for combining profile information from multiple local websites visited by users into more comprehensive global profiles that may be shared with ‘interested outside parties, such as advertisers.’” Id. at 21 (citing Ex. 1005, code (57), 1:18–38, 2:6–10, 2:6–8, 2:15–3:40, 5:5–19, 6:1– 7:45, 8:40–10:41,14:22–25; Ex. 1002 ¶ 123). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to “incorporate Jaye’s techniques for collecting and combining profile information to enhance and improve Meriman061’s ad targeting by providing more information about the users to whom the ads are targeted.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 123). Having reviewed the arguments and evidence included in the Petition, including the Houh Declaration, which are not substantively addressed by Patent Owner at this stage, we are persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates, for purposes of this Decision, that it would have been obvious to combine Merriman061 and Jaye in the manner set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,494,904 - PTAB · Oct 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00698 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–11, 18–20, 23–25, and 28 on all petitioned grounds, based on a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted obviousness challenges.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Relying on the declaration testimony of Dr. Doolittle, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan for the ’539 patent “would have had an undergraduate degree (i.e., B.S., B.S.E. or the equivalent) in electrical engineering, materials science, physics, or a similar discipline” and “would also have one to two years of experience in the field of LED packaging design.” Pet. 6. Petitioner additionally contends that “[m]ore education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” Id. Petitioner further contends that “[t]his person would have been capable of understanding and applying the teachings of the ’539 patent and the prior-art references discussed herein,” and “[m]oreover, the prior art reflects the level of skill at the time of the claimed invention.” Id. (citing Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 38–42). Patent Owner states that “solely for the purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner and its technical expert employ the same level of skill in the art as Petitioners.” Prelim. Resp. 22. Based on this record, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’539 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our obviousness analysisbelow. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that “no construction should be necessary to institute this petition.” Pet. 20. Patent Owner “requests that the Board adopt the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 22. Having considered the record, we determine that, at this stage, no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). We note, however, there may be some claim terms below whose constructions that the parties may wish to address during trial.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“and “how” the references would have been combined. As the Petition explains, Krummacher discloses radiation scattering particles having a size range of 50 to 1000 nm. See Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1107 ¶ 39). Petitioner further explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would use Stokes teachings to further refine that size range to optimize the particle size to preferentially scatter blue light. See id. at 26–27. Petitioner further provides reasons, suggested in Stokes itself, why a person of ordinary skill would have made this modification to Krummacher. See id. at 27–28 (citing Ex. 1108, 7:17–26; Ex. 1102 ¶ 128). Petitioner provides sufficient evidence that such a particle size selection was within the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 122–128, 140–144; Ex. 1108, 7:1– 17; Ex. 1124 ¶¶ 80–81. We note that we have reviewed the testimony of Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Schubert, but this testimony does not, at this stage, diminish the weight we give to Petitioner’s expert. Thus, we find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the combination of Krummacher and Stokes accounts for this limitation and that a person of ordinary skill would have combined the references in the manner suggested with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 23
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute an inter partes review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Supreme Court has held that the Board, in a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b), may not institute review on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018). Moreover, in accordance with our rules, “[w]hen instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2020); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”). Applying those standards, and upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’539 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,614,539 - PTAB · Oct 2, 2025 · IPR2025-00673 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–7 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Amazon would show at least one claim unpatentable over Shin and Aoyama.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in demonstrating at least one of claims 1–7 of the ’675 patent is unpatentable. We begin our analysis with the principles of law that generally apply to an asserted ground based on obviousness, we then assess the level of skill in the art, next we provide brief overviews of Shin and Aoyama, and then we address the parties’ contentions with respect to independent claims 1, 6, and 7.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. “The importance of resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The “person having ordinary skill in the art” is a hypothetical construct, from whose vantage point obviousness is assessed. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Factors pertinent to a determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art include “(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Env’t Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). “Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or 4 At this stage in the proceeding, SoundClear does not present arguments or evidence of secondary considerations. See Prelim. Resp. more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case.” Id. at 696–97. Relying on the testimony of Dr. Stern, Amazon argues the following: [a] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . would have had a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, electrical engineering, or a similar field, and approximately two years of industry or academic experience in a field related to controlling the audio output of electronic devices. Work experience could substitute for formal education and additional formal education could substitute for work experience. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 28–32). In the Preliminary Response, SoundClear does not address Amazon’s assessment of the level of skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding, we adopt Amazon’s uncontested assessment of the level of skill in the art because (1) it is consistent with the ’675 patent and the asserted prior art; and (2) it is supported by the testimony of Dr. Stern.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“arguments and evidence for purposes of institution that would support determining that a person of ordinary skill in the would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Shin and Aoyama. As one example, Amazon contends that the proposed combination is merely the addition of one known element (i.e., “Aoyama’s natural language processing and information retrieval”) to another known element (i.e., “Shin’s voice processing and response device”) to obtain predictable results (i.e., “identifying a user’s intent and providing information responsive to such intent”). Pet. 19–20 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 417; Ex. 1002 ¶ 83). As another example, Amazon contends the proposed combination also represents the addition of one known element (i.e., “Aoyama’s word replacement” feature) to another known element (i.e., “Shin’s distance-based content abbreviation/simplification”) to obtain predictable results (i.e., “using word replacement to simply content for distant users”). Id. at 25–26 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 417; Ex. 1002 ¶ 100). Amazon also presents sufficient arguments and evidence for purposes of institution that would support determining there is a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination. Id. at 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 84), 27–28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 102; Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 97, 98 Fig. 7). To the extent SoundClear argues that Amazon is required to identify a problem a person of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to solve when combining the teachings of Shin and Aoyama, we do not agree. See Prelim. Resp. 31–32. This line of argument runs contrary to the principles of law articulated in KSR. In KSR, the Supreme Court emphasized “an expansive and flexible approach” to an obviousness evaluation. KSR, 550 U.S. at 415; see also Jazz Pharm., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC, 895 F.3d 1347, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“KSR did not impose a rigid requirement to identify . . . a problem to be solved in the art . . . .”). The Supreme Court stated that, “[o]ften, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents,” amongst other things, “to determine whether there was apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Moreover, the Supreme Court explained that, “[u]nder the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.” Id. at 420.” slip op. at 26
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Based on the preliminary record, we discern no deficiency in Amazon’s characterizations of Shin, Aoyama, or the general background knowledge in the art. In addition, for purposes of institution, we are persuaded by Dr. Stern’s testimony concerning the relevant disclosures in Shin and Aoyama. At this stage of the proceeding, SoundClear argues that Shin does not teach limitations 1[b]—“a voice classifying unit configured 1[b][i] to calculate a distance between the user and the output-content control device by a proximity sensor 1[b][ii] to classify the voice into either a first voice or a second voice based on the calculated distance.” See Prelim. Resp. 19–22. a. Limitations 1[b]—“a voice classifying unit configured to 1[b][i] calculate a distance between the user and the output-content control device by a proximity sensor to 1[b][ii] classify the voice into either a first voice or a second voice based on the calculated distance” In the Preliminary Response, SoundClear contends that Shin fails to teach voice classification because “Shin is incapable of distinguishing [between] multiple voices.” Prelim. Resp. 21. More specifically, SoundClear argues that Shin cannot teach classifying a voice into a first voice or second voice because “Shin never refers to a ‘first user’ or ‘second user’ or ‘multiple users.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 generally); see also id. at 26– 27 (arguing that Amazon misstates the record because Shin never discloses a “first voice” nor a “second voice”). Instead, SoundClear asserts that Shin only contemplates a single user (i.e., user 10) when calculating the distance between the user and an electronic device (e.g., Shin’s electronic device 100). Id. at 21–22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37, 38). Based on the preliminary record, Amazon presents sufficient evidence that would support a finding that Shin teaches “a voice classifying unit configured to calculate a distance between the user and the output-content control device by a proximity sensor to classify the voice into either a first voice or a second voice based on the calculated distance.” Pet. 10–14. Shin discloses that “processor 120 may determine an output scheme of corresponding content based on a distance between a user and the electronic device 101.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 53. Shin’s processor 120 accomplishes this distance calculation by using distance detection module 180, which may include various sensors, such as a proximity sensor. Id. ¶ 66; see also id. ¶ 153 (disclosing an embodiment where electronic device 901 includes sensor module 940, which, in turn, includes proximity sensor 940G). Shin’s Table 3 illustrates how the distance between the user and electronic device 101 determines the output scheme. Id. ¶ 86, Table 3. For instance, Shin’s Table 3 illustrates classifying the user’s voice input as a “first voice” when the distance between the user and electronic device 101 is between 1 to 2 meters, and classifying the user’s voice input as a “second voice” when the distance between the user and electronic device 101 is less than 1 meter. Id. ¶¶ 86, 87, Table 3.” slip op. at 23
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,244,675 - Kohler Co. v. Delta Faucet Co.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00700 · APJ Jane E Inglese · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, and 9 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 3–8 and 10–24 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted references failed to establish limitations including the claimed light pipe features.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. Petitioner’s witness (Mr. Cook) qualifies as a POSITA under this definition, and, therefore, is qualified to opine from the perspective of a POSITA on technical matters included within the areas of expertise prescribed by the definition. As indicated above, Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA does not require education in the field of optics and professional experience designing or analyzing optical apparatus, unlike Patent Owner’s definition. We are aware, however, that Patent Owner’s witness (Dr. Klopp) has more extensive experience with optical systems and methods than Petitioner’s witness (Mr. Cook). Compare Ex 1003 ¶¶ 8–14, Ex. 2005, 39:21–59:17, with Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 3–20, Ex. 2004, 1–2, Ex. 1015, 10:22–13:25. Although Mr. Cook possesses excellent credentials in the field of mechanical engineering, his experience in the design and analysis of optical systems and methods is sparse and insubstantial compared to that of Dr. Klopp. Id. Due to this difference in experience levels, in instances where the witnesses express differing views on factual issues related to optical systems and methods, we will accord more weight to Dr. Klopp’s testimony than to Mr. Cook’s.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed
“through the light transmission portion and bottom output face 313 of light conductor 38, which teaches transmitting light in parallel with the longitudinal axis of the housing. Tseng does not disclose or teach that light is emitted through the side surface of annular protrusion 383 in a direction perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the housing. Ex. 1004 ¶ 97. Petitioner’s assertions that this would be the case consist solely of conclusory statements, supported only by citations to Mr. Cook’s declaration. Mr. Cook, however, simply repeats Petitioner’s conclusory statements, without providing sound technical reasoning supported by objective evidence to explain and support his opinions. Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 101– 102, 105, 195–198, 202. We, therefore, accord little weight to Mr. Cook’s opinion on this particular matter because it “merely repeats, verbatim, the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support,” and “does not cite to any additional supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning [in] support.” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). Furthermore, Mr. Cook’s opinion conflicts with that of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Klopp, who opines that a “POSITA would understand from Tseng’s third embodiment that light from the LED would bypass the annular protrusion 383 of outer cliff 381, while transmitting downwardly toward the output face 313.” Compare Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 174–175, 190–194, with Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 101–102, 105. As discussed above, Mr. Cook is qualified to opine from the perspective of a POSITA on technical matters included within the expertise of a person meeting Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA, which do not include optics and optical apparatus. We, therefore, credit Dr. Klopp’s opinion over that of Mr. Cook on this particular factual issue of how it is directly related to optical systems and methods about which Mr. Cook possesses limited relevant experience. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 6–15 (experience in communication systems and electronics); Ex. 2005, 55:16–58:19 (design experience with electronics that use indicator lights or fiber-optic communications; no professional experience with light pipes, diffusers, or plumbing fixtures). Dr. Klopp possesses substantial research and professional experience with optical methods, fiber optic light pipes, light guides, diffusers, prisms, and analysis of faucets, spray heads, and plumbing fixtures. See Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 6–10 Supra 8 (discussing weight accorded to conflicting witness testimony); see also Resp. 2–3 (arguing that “Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Cook, is a mechanical engineer with substantial professional experience in electronics for high-voltage power systems and communications, but he has limited experience with the claimed subject matter.”).” slip op. at 34
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“would be used to construe the claim[s] in a civil action [held] under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms generally are given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by the ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of the invention when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We construe terms in controversy only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner asserts that the claim terms do not require construction and should be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 13. Patent Owner contends that it applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms. Resp. 7. Taking into consideration the information presented, we determine that none of the claim terms requires express construction for purposes of resolving the dispute before us.” slip op. at 9
- BurdenMixed
“perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of Tseng’s housing (internal 33 and external 34 sleeves). “In an inter partes review, the burden of persuasion is on the petitioner to prove ‘unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence,’ 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), and that burden never shifts to the patentee.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015)); see also Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017 (en banc (quoting Magnum Oil)).” slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 10,393,363 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,393,363
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.