• Intel Corporation v. Parkervision, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 21, 2022 · IPR2020-01265 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 3 is unpatentable under §103 over Tayloe and the TI Datasheet; the Board did not reach the Tayloe and Kawada ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “outcome of this proceeding and we do not find that they do. Nonetheless, on the full record before us, we find that our identification of the level of ordinary skill in art in the Institution Decision as well as Patent Owner’s option (b) are supported by the prior art of record, the ’444 patent, and the opinions of Drs. Subramanian and Steer (which, as discussed above, recognize that additional work experience can compensate for the lack of a formal degree). Accordingly, we modify our preliminary finding to include option (b) from Patent Owner’s proposal. Thus, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related subject and two or more years of experience in the field of RF circuit design, or at least five years of work experience and training in the design and development of RF circuits and/or systems. We also find that less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther

    “proposes that it be construed to mean “an element that stores a nonnegligible amount of energy from an input electromagnetic (EM) signal.” Pet. Reply 10. Petitioner contends that its proposed construction expressly tracks the definition provided in the ’551 patent for “storage element,” which the parties agree is synonymous with “storage module.” Id.; see id. at 10 n.2. In particular, Petitioner asserts that the ’551 patent states: “Storage modules . . . refer to systems that store non-negligible amounts of energy from an input EM signal.” Id. (quoting Ex. 2007, 66:65–67). Petitioner notes that the ’551 patent also states that “the ‘goal of the storage modules’ is ‘to store non-negligible amounts of energy transferred from the EM signal’” and that the patent “specifically distinguishes storage elements from holding elements on this basis.” Id. at 10–11 (quoting Ex. 2007, 66:59–67 (“Holding modules . . . identify systems that store negligible amounts of energy from an under-sampled input EM signal with the intent of ‘holding’ a voltage value. Storage modules . . . on the other hand, refer to systems that store non-negligible amounts of energy from an input EM signal.”)). Thus, Petitioner contends “‘storage element’ should be construed accordingly.” Id. at 11 (citation omitted).” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “Owner fails to “establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention.” ClassCo, 838 F.3d at 1220. In particular, neither Patent Owner nor Dr. Steer makes any attempt to establish nexus with the elements recited in claim 3 based on a presumption of co-extensiveness or otherwise. Each instance in which Dr. Steer mentions claim 3, he only ties the discussion to energy transfer systems or energy sampling in general, which is based on Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction that we do not adopt. See, e.g., Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 229 (“energy transfer (energy sampling) system – of claim 3”), 230 (“energy sampling as set forth in claim 3”), 233 (“[u]sing energy sampling . . . as set forth in claim 3”), 234 (“energy sampling as set forth in claim 3”), 235 (same), 236 (same), 237 (“using the energy transfer (energy sampling) system of claim 3”), 238 (same), 239 (“energy sampling system as set forth in claim 3”). Thus, we find that Patent Owner fails to establish that a presumption of nexus is warranted and similarly fails to establish nexus absent the presumption. Accordingly, for the reasons above, Patent Owner has not satisfied its burden to establish nexus. See WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (patent owner “bears the burden of showing that a nexus exists”).” slip op. at 64

  Patent outcomesUS 7,110,444 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,110,444
• Unified Patents, LLC v. Engle Grange, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 19, 2022 · IPR2020-01334 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 1 is unpatentable over McCullough and DeBono under §103; the Board did not reach the other asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “proposed “a combined system that implements DeBono’s teaching into McCullough’s key fob system,” not that DeBono teaches a second authentication step using a key fob. Id. (citing PO Resp. 21–22; Pet. 41–46, 48–60). Petitioner explains that it “never proposed bodily incorporating DeBono’s biometric shifter into McCullough’s system, and accordingly, [Patent Owner’s] arguments as to DeBono alone miss the mark.” Id. at 14 (citing Pet. 41–46, 53). Petitioner reiterates that its “actual combination of McCullough and DeBono” “perform[s] McCullough’s already-disclosed key fob authentication in the same way a second time during gear shift, as taught by DeBono.” Id.” slip op. at 53

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsOther

    “4. Objective Considerations of Nonobviousness Neither party presents evidence of objective considerations of” slip op. at 67

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner

    “that “[t]o the extent the preamble is limiting, McCullough in view of DeBono and Chung discloses [it], or at least renders [it] obvious.” Pet. 46. The preamble of claim 1 is written in Jepson form. “Jepson form allows a patentee to use the preamble to recite ‘elements or steps of the claimed invention which are conventional or known.’” Epcon Gas Sys. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Kegel Co. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); see 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(e) (describing the structure of a Jepson claim). Because a Jepson claim “evidences the intention to use the preamble to define, in part, the structural elements of [a] claimed invention,” the Federal Circuit has held that a “preamble is a limitation in a Jepson-type claim.” Epcon Gas, 279 F.3d at 1029 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, we determine that the preamble of claim 1 is limiting and address it herein.” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 8,548,645 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,548,645
• Veeam Software Corporation v. Hybir, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 2, 2021 · IPR2020-01040 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as obvious over Field; the Board did not reach the alternative Strong and Field ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “As we noted in the Institution Decision, Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response proposed a level of ordinary skill in the art that was very similar to Petitioner’s proposal. Inst. Dec. 15 (citing Prelim. Resp. 28). On the preliminary record at that time, we found both parties’ proposals consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record. Id. (citing Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978)). And, on that record, we found that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have “a Bachelor of Science degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Software Engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least three to five years of academic or industry experience in the fields of data storage, data backup, data restoration, data replication and deduplication, and/or data synchronization.” Id. at 16.” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingNo construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “which states: “A method of synchronizing electronic data stored on a first client device with at least a second client device.” Ex. 1001, 19:8–9. Petitioner contends the preamble of claim 1 is not limiting because it states a purpose or intended use for the method recited and neither the term synchronizing nor the full preamble is referenced again in other claim elements. Pet. 10 (citing Arctic Cat Inc. v. GEP Power Prods, Inc., 919 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). In our Institution Decision, we preliminarily determined that the preamble of claim 1 does not limit the scope of the claim. See Inst. Dec. 18–19. Patent Owner does not contest that preliminary determination in its Response and confirmed at the oral hearing that it does not contend the preamble is limiting. See generally PO Resp.; Tr. 107:15– 16 (confirming that Patent Owner does not assert the preamble is limiting). Accordingly, for the reasons explained in our Institution Decision and because the parties agree, we maintain our preliminary determination and reaffirm that the preamble of claim 1 is not limiting, and, therefore, we need not expressly construe it.” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “unclear. Nonetheless, we find that Field teaches receiving a first “inventory” for the reasons explained by Petitioner and based on our construction of “inventory” at least because Field receives an itemized list of electronic data in the form of one or more signatures. Thus, since Field teaches an “inventory,” we do not agree with Patent Owner that Field teaches away from an “inventory.” Additionally, “[a] reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference . . . would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Haruna, 249 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Mfg. Mich. Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); see In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that, to teach away, the prior art must “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed”). Patent Owner, however, fails to identify, and we do not discern, any indication in Field that criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages one of ordinary skill in the art from following Field’s teachings or modifying Field as proposed by Petitioner. Further, to this latter point, we do not discern any specific argument by Patent Owner that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to modify Field as Petitioner proposes, aside from Patent Owner’s assertions of teaching away.22 Considering the complete record before us, for the reasons explained above we find that Petitioner has established that Field teaches or suggests limitation 1A.1 and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason with rational underpinning to modify Field as proposed by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 54

  Patent outcomesUS 9,679,146 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,679,146
• Veeam Software Corporation v. Hybir, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 2, 2021 · IPR2020-01039 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Field and Anderson; claim 5 over Field, Anderson, and Ackerman; and claim 11 over Field, Anderson, and Coombs.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Accordingly, we find that the complete record does not support” slip op. at 33

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “away and (2) whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Field in light of potential inefficiencies. With respect to whether Field teaches away, Patent Owner’s argument is premised, in part, on a requirement derived from its proposed construction of “inventory”—that the claimed “inventory” must include additional data, such as filenames and directories. As discussed above, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s construction. Similar to Patent Owner’s earlier argument of a teaching away, Patent Owner fails to identify anything in Field that criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages one of ordinary skill in the art from creating an inventory, as properly construed. Accordingly, we do not find that Field teaches away from using or creating an inventory.” slip op. at 69

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Weighing the Graham Factors On balance, considering the complete record before us, Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the combination of Field, Anderson, and Coombs would have rendered the subject matter of claim 11 of the ’545 patent obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 99

  Patent outcomesUS 9,037,545 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,037,545
• Walmart Inc. / Z-Shade Co., Ltd. et al. v. Caravan Canopy International, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 22, 2021 · IPR2021-00449 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 are unpatentable as obvious over Yang and Lynch because the combination teaches the claimed elements and increased headroom supplied a reason to combine with a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “invention of the ’040 patent would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in the mechanical arts, including but not limited to mechanical engineering and industrial design, (2) at least two years of experience in the design or analysis of mechanical devices, fabricated frames, and/or kinematic linkages, and (3) at least a basic understanding of ergonomics. As to part (1), although the parties outline generally similar requirements as to formal schooling, Patent Owner’s proposal provides enhanced clarity as to the identity of the related disciplines, which we view as supported by the record. See, e.g., Klopp Pet. Decl. ¶ 1, Ex. A; Rake Decl. ¶¶ 4, 7–9, 19. As to part (2), the parties again outline similar requirements as to work experience, but Petitioner’s proposal provides added detail on experience in relevant design features, which we view as supported by the record. See Exs. 1004–1007. As to part (3), given the nature of the technology at issue, we view a basic understanding of ergonomics as relevant to one of ordinary skill in the art. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 3:12–49 (discussing operation of the invention by a person); Rake Decl. ¶ 31, cited at PO Resp. 4. This is the same level of ordinary skill adopted in the Decision on Institution. See Dec. Inst. 32–34.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “centrally-disposed, long, slender object.” Pet. 28–32. Patent Owner responds that the District Court rejected this proposal and held that the phrase should be given its “plain and ordinary meaning.” PO Resp. 5–6; see also Ex. 1018 at 6–10 (the District Court declining to construe “center pole”). We do not discern a need to construe explicitly this phrase because doing so would have no effect on the analysis below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “applicant acted as a lexicographer as to the term “stretching.” We determine that the Specification supports an understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning as extending or spreading out rather than as “make taut” or in “tension.” As argued by Petitioner, “[t]here is no description requiring that a roof be made taut or placed under tension” and, “[t]o the contrary, the specification consistently uses the word ‘stretch’ to describe extending or spreading out.” Pet. Reply 11. For example, in the eleven instances the Specification uses some form of the word “stretch” (aside from in claim 1), six instances relate to “stretching” the frame (or some component of the frame), rather than the roof. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 3:4–6 (discussing how “the collapsible tent frame of this invention is easily and quickly stretchable or collapsible, thus allowing a user to easily and quickly pitch or strike a tent” (emphasis added)), 3:15–19 (“When it is necessary to pitch the tent, the four side poles 10 are pushed outwardly at the same time, thus stretching the tent frame. When the side poles 10 are pushed outwardly as described above, the sliders 70 move upward along the side poles 10 while stretching the two 14 Under the same logic, Patent Owner’s construction of “stretching” as “make taut” should be rejected because it would render superfluous the “sustaining” requirement in that any “center pole” that makes taut a tent’s roof would also sustain it. Cf. PO Sur-reply 5. types of ribs 20 and 30.” (emphasis added)), 3:23–24 (discussing how “the center pole ribs 30 are fully stretched by the support links 40” (emphasis added)), 3:29–30 (discussing “[w]hen the tent is pitched with the frame being fully stretched as described above” (emphasis added)), 4:12–14 (“When the frame is stretched so as to pitch a tent, the center pole is fully moved upwardly along with the center pole ribs.” (emphasis added)). These instances do not align with Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “stretching” as in “tension” or “make taut.” We find particularly supportive of the above-determined construction that in one of those six instances, the Specification directly contrasts—using a disjunctive “or”—“stretchable” with “collapsible.” See Ex. 1001, 3:4–6 (discussing how “the collapsible tent frame of this invention is easily and quickly stretchable or collapsible, thus allowing a user to easily and quickly pitch or strike a tent” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “On the full record developed at trial, we determine that the increased total ceiling height—i.e., “headroom” as used in the Petition—provides adequate “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness” based on the proposed modification. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cited with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Here, the unmodified version of Yang is most similar to the middle example in Petitioner’s graphic above, as it has no structure underneath the tent roof (as roof support bars 7 and groove joints 6 are essentially at the height of the canopy itself). Compare Pet. Reply 20, with Ex. 1004, Fig. 4. The modified device—Yang modified with apex portion 50 of Lynch—is most similar to the rightmost example in Petitioner’s graphic, as the height of the canopy has been increased at least somewhat as compared to the middle example. See Pet. Reply 20; see also PO Resp. 24 (acknowledging that the proposed modification would “increase the height of the roof (the ceiling height)”). The record supports that this increased total ceiling height—even if only for certain locations where a person might stand—would have motivated one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Yang based on Lynch as proposed. This determination is supported by the testimony of Dr. Klopp, who states that “[i]ncreased headroom in some places under a tent is desirable for stationary users, especially for users of above average height.” Klopp Reply Decl. ¶ 113, cited at Pet. Reply 19.” slip op. at 45

  Patent outcomesUS 5,944,040 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 5,944,040
• Walmart Inc. / Z-Shade Co., Ltd. et al. v. Caravan Canopy International, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 22, 2021 · IPR2020-01026 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 are unpatentable as obvious over Yang and Lynch; the Board did not reach the alternative grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “We determine that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’040 patent would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in the mechanical arts, including but not limited to mechanical engineering and industrial design, (2) at least two years of experience in the design or analysis of mechanical devices, fabricated frames, and/or kinematic linkages, and (3) at least a basic understanding of ergonomics. As to part (1), although the parties outline generally similar requirements as to formal schooling, Patent Owner’s proposal provides enhanced clarity as to the identity of the related disciplines, which we view as supported by the record. See, e.g., Klopp Pet. Decl. ¶ 1, Ex. A; Rake Decl. ¶¶ 4, 7–9, 19. As to part (2), the parties again outline similar requirements as to work experience, but Petitioner’s proposal provides added detail on experience in relevant design features, which we view as supported by the record. See Exs. 1004–1007. As to part (3), given the nature of the technology at issue, we view a basic understanding of ergonomics as relevant to one of ordinary skill in the art. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 3:12–49 (discussing operation of the invention by a person); Rake Decl. ¶ 31, cited at PO Resp. 4. This is the same level of ordinary skill adopted in the Decision on Institution. See Dec. Inst. 32–34.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “1. “Center Pole” Petitioner proposes to construe “center pole” in element 1A as a “centrally-disposed, long, slender object.” Pet. 28–32. Patent Owner responds that the District Court rejected this proposal and held that the phrase should be given its “plain and ordinary meaning.” PO Resp. 5–6; see also Ex. 1018 at 6–10 (the District Court declining to construe “center pole”). We do not discern a need to construe explicitly this phrase because doing so would have no effect on the analysis below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningOther

    “Under the claim construction standard applied in this proceeding, “[t]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history.” Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313). “There are only two exceptions to this general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.” Id. (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). For the reasons below, we view the plain and ordinary meaning of “stretching” on the complete record here as extending or spreading out, in line with portions of Petitioner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 13

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “the context of its own invention, “constructed for stretching and sustaining a tent’s roof when a tent is pitched with the tent frame,” it is important to note that the Figure 3 embodiment in Lynch includes Velcro fasteners 35 that secure side panel 18 of canopy covering 12 to corner support member 22. See id. at 6:60–64 (“As is shown in phantom in FIG. 3, canopy covering 12 has a side panel 18 which is additionally secured to a top portion of corner support member 22 by means of corresponding hook and loop fasteners, such as Velcro fasteners 35.”). The issue here is whether the “center pole” in the context of the modified device (which does not include Velcro fasteners configured as in Lynch) is “constructed for stretching and sustaining a tent’s roof when a tent is pitched with the tent frame.”20 We determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that this requirement would be satisfied in the context of the modified device, even without Velcro fasteners. We first address whether the “center pole” in the modified device is “constructed for . . . sustaining a tent’s roof when a tent is pitched with the tent frame.” Petitioner states that after modifying roof bearing beam 8 in Yang to include apex portion 50 from Lynch, the “center pole” would “heighten and hold up the fabric tent roof” from Yang. Pet. 40 (citing Klopp Pet. Decl. ¶¶ 74–79). According to Petitioner, the proposed modification “would further push up the tent’s rooftop ‘to increase space for activities’ as well as creating more tension in the rooftop to reduce the risk of the rooftop ‘collapsing, bending, or leaking rainwater when raining.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1004 at 6–7; Klopp Pet. Decl. ¶¶ 77–79). We agree that the apex of the roof in Yang as modified by Lynch’s teachings would be higher than the 20 In the Reply, Petitioner seeks to rely on Lynch’s disclosure of using Velcro to attach the roof to the tent frame. See Pet. Reply 17 (bottom paragraph). As argued by Patent Owner, this is a new argument provided for the first time in reply. See PO Sur-reply 12–13; see also Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Health, Inc., 805 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“We see no error in the Board’s rejection of [a petitioner’s] reliance, in its Reply submissions, on previously unidentified portions of a prior-art reference to make a meaningfully distinct contention.”); Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 73 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuide Consolidated (“TPG”) (“Petitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.”). We do not consider Velcro fasteners as part of the modified device.” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 5,944,040 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 5,944,040
• Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbHAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 2, 2020 · IPR2018-01670 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Burroughs and Steenfeldt-Jensen; Petitioner’s motion to exclude is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “preliminary finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Accordingly, we maintain and reaffirm that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, or an equivalent degree” and “would have understood the basics of medical-device design and manufacturing, and the basic mechanical elements (e.g., gears, pistons) involved in drug-delivery devices.” Dec. to Inst. 15 (quoting Pet. 15).” slip op. at 11

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Therefore, we are not persuaded to exclude the exhibits or expressly limit their purpose pursuant to FRE 105 and Petitioner’s Motion is denied with respect to these exhibits.” slip op. at 93

  Patent outcomesUS 8,679,069 unpatentable
  Nonecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,679,069
• Triple Plus Ltd. v. Mordechai Ben OldAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 16, 2019 · PGR2018-00038 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · PGR · Final written decision

  Claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over the Triple+ NWL, including the obvious substitution of a butterfly valve for its ball valve.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenDecided for petitioner

    “We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. Petitioner bears the burden of proving unpatentability of the challenged claim, and the burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). To prevail, Petitioner must prove unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. See 35 U.S.C. § 326(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). This Final Written Decision is issued” slip op. at 2

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted

    “subject declaration was filed as Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response. Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response states: “Patent Owner, Mordechai Ben Old, hereby submits the following preliminary response in the form of declaration.” Paper 7, 2. To the extent Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response/declaration would be given any weight post-institution, we agree with Petitioner that it would be considered routine discovery and that Patent Owner was required to make himself available for deposition. See Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,761 (“Routine discovery includes: . . . (2) the cross-examination of the other side[’]s declarants . . . .”). Patent Owner did not do so. Additionally, the record reflects that Patent Owner has continued to fail to participate in this proceeding. In particular, Patent Owner did not respond to our Order specifying “that Patent Owner shall appear . . . on or before May 30, 2019, and show cause as to why adverse judgment should not be issued against Patent Owner for abandonment of the contest pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4).” Paper 14, 3. Accordingly, in light of Patent Owner’s failure to participate in the proceeding by appearing for a deposition by Petitioner or otherwise, we agree that the appropriate remedy is to exclude Patent Owner’s declaration, submitted as its Preliminary Response (Paper 7). Thus, to the extent we would have considered Patent Owner’s declaration at this post-institution stage of the proceeding, we decline to do so.3” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “have had: “a Bachelor of Science degree in a field of engineering or a closely related discipline, and at least one year of practical academic or industrial experience designing, testing and/or manufacturing fluid control valves.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 28–30). As discussed above, Patent Owner did not file a Response. We reiterate our preliminary finding from the Decision on Institution, that, consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record, we adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner based on the present record. See Dec. on Inst. 10; Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “one exception that the Triple+ NWL includes a ball valve whereas claim 1 requires a butterfly. See id. at 32–63; see also id. at 31 (“the Triple+ NWL discloses every element of claim 1 except for the choice of quarter turn rotary valve type,” i.e., the claimed butterfly valve). Petitioner asserts that “[t]he ball valve is interchangeable with the claimed ‘butterfly,’ and it would have been obvious to [a person of ordinary skill in the art] to substitute one for the other.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–40, 56–57). Petitioner relies upon Dr. Johnson’s testimony in support of this position. See, e.g., id. at 36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–40). In particular, Petitioner states: a ball valve (like in the Triple+ NWL) is a member of the same family of valves as the butterfly. Except for the shape of the valve member, both are functionally and operationally identical, and both can and were used as shut-off valves for main water lines entering a residence or other structure. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–40). Petitioner asserts that “[t]he Triple+ NWL used a ball valve and was intended for use as a shut-off valve on the main water line.” Id. at 37. Petitioner thus contends that: (1) this use for any quarter turn rotary valve type was well known to one of ordinary skill in the art, id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39–40); (2) “replacing a ball valve with a butterfly valve was a ‘simple design choice and an obvious replacement’” to a person of ordinary skill in the art, id. at 37–38 (quoting Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 56– 57); and (3) “[s]ubstituting one known type of a valve for another— particularly within the same family of valves such as the quarter turn rotary valve family—is the epitome of an obvious design choice” to a person of ordinary skill in the art, id. at 38 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 416, 421).7” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 9,671,031 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,671,031
• Fredman Bros. Furniture Company, Inc. v. Bedgear, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 12, 2018 · IPR2017-00352 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 8–13, 15–18, and 20–24 are unpatentable: Rasmussen anticipates claims 1, 4–6, 8, 11, 13, 17, 18, 22, and 23; the remaining challenged claims are obvious over the stated combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownNo construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “construction’ as used herein refers to a construction having overall porosity greater than the inherent porosity of the constituent material or inherently having high porosity.” Ex. 1049, 1:37–40. Based on the full record, we agree with parties that “open cell construction” is defined in the specification, and we interpret it in accordance with that definition to mean “a construction having overall porosity greater than the inherent porosity of the constituent material or inherently having high porosity.” See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Although an inventor is indeed free to define the specific terms used to describe his or her invention, this must be done with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.”).” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “various prior art approaches employed, the types of problems encountered in the art, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology involved, and the educational background of those actively working in the field.” Jacobson Bros., Inc. v. U.S., 512 F.2d 1065, 1071 (Ct. Cl. 1975); see also Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. U.S., 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (quoting with approval Jacobson Bros.). We find, based on our review of the record before us, that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it is consistent with the record’s indication of “the various prior art approaches employed, the types of problems encountered in the art, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology involved, and the educational background of those actively working in the field.” See, e.g., Pet. 7–12 (“Technology Background”); PO Resp. 3–4 (“Background of the Relevant Technology at the Time of the ’134 Patent”); Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 2–4; Ex. 1008; Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 3–6; Ex. 1044; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 36–54. We resolve any differences in favor of including “several years of industry experience in applying the moisture and heat transfer properties of materials” as part of “at least one year of experience in the design of pillows and other sleep-related textile products” of a person holding a “bachelor’s degree in textile science, textile engineering, or a similar field.” See Rhodes Decl. ¶ 5 (“I am also an adjunct professor . . . teaching . . . an entry level course for textile and fashion majors.”), ¶ 6 (“I received a Bachelor of Science degree in Textile Design.”), ¶ 70 (“I met at least these minimum qualifications to be a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention.”); Ex. 1062 ¶ 4 (“I teach concepts relating to moisture and heat transfer in my textile curriculum in my academic role as a professor”). Therefore, we apply Petitioner’s definition, quoted above, in our analysis of the challenges under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Pet. 15–16.” slip op. at 58

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner
  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Based on the full record, Petitioner sufficiently shows that Rasmussen’s “highly porous” “3D textile material” discloses the open cell construction of claim 1. Also, even if Rasmussen uses the “3D textile” broadly, the full record persuades us that Rasmussen discloses the limitations of claim 1. PO Resp. 4, 12–28; Rhodes Decl. ¶ 117; Ex. 1006 ¶ 29; Ex. 1007 ¶ 25; Parachuru Decl. ¶ 93. Also, our interpretation of the limitations of claim 1 does not require modifying or transforming a constituent base material. Patent Owner also responds that “Petitioner never even argues that the ‘interlaced,’ ‘spaced-apart,’ or ‘mesh’ strand structures are inherent from Rasmussen’s disclosure of 3-D textiles.” PO Resp. 55. Patent Owner states that “both parties’ experts acknowledge that 3D textiles, as well as highly porous 3D textiles, can have multiple possible configurations other than the ones recited in the claims,” and thus, Rasmussen does not disclose inherently the claimed structures. Id. at 55–57 (citing Parachuru Decl. ¶¶ 67–73, 92– 94, 158–160, 168–169; Ex. 2016, 15:23–16:7, 31:21–32:6, 36:3–7, 36:14– 18, 37:7–21, 49:4–12, 50:15–51:12, 52:19–53:3, 123:7–23, 135:23–136:24). The record, however, indicates that “highly porous” “3D textile material” has “interlaced strands or spaced-apart strands,” as argued by Petitioner and as required by claim 1. For the above reasons, Petitioner persuades us by a preponderance of the evidence that Rasmussen anticipates claim 1 based on disclosures related to its core.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 8,646,134 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,646,134
• Fredman Bros. Furniture Company, Inc. v. Bedgear, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 12, 2018 · IPR2017-00351 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10, 12–15, and 17–20 are unpatentable: Rasmussen anticipates the challenged claims, and Rasmussen combined with Doak, Mason, or Burton renders claims 5, 6, 12, and 19 obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner’s statement that the claim language “does not address (i.e., require or restrict) air entering through a structure other than a panel (e.g., a gusset) nor does it address any such air exiting the pillow in a particular manner (e.g., through a panel, gusset, or other structure).” See PO Resp. 47. The claim language requires “at least some air which enters through the panels” exits through the gusset alone or in combination with another structure. See id. The portions of the specification cited by Patent Owner support its above-quoted statement because the cited portions describe that the pillow allows lateral ventilation, gusset 20 provides venting, gusset 20 permits air exchange, and the panels can be made of open cell construction. See PO Resp. 48–49; Ex. 1047, 1:37–40, 2:12–15, 4:34–36, 4:56–58. Further interpretation is not required for determining whether Petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence the unpatentability of claim 1. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (construing explicitly only those claim terms in controversy and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “The specification of the ’883 patent states that an “‘open cell construction’ as used herein refers to a construction having overall porosity greater than the inherent porosity of the constituent material or inherently having high porosity.” Ex. 1047, 1:44–47. Based on the full record, we agree with parties that “open cell construction” is defined in the specification, and we interpret it in accordance with that definition to mean “a construction having overall porosity greater than the inherent porosity of the constituent material or inherently having high porosity.” See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Although an inventor is indeed free to define the specific terms used to describe his or her invention, this must be done with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.”).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Based on the full record, we concur with the parties that an express interpretation for “gusset” is not necessary for determining whether Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenge claims are unpatentable. See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803. We also determine that express interpretation of any other claim term is not necessary. See id.” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner also argues that the claims of the ’883 patent are not entitled to a priority date before June 22, 2012. Pet. 24. Petitioner argues that Rasmussen (Ex. 1006) is § 102(b) prior art, if the challenged claims are entitled only to a priority date of June 22, 2012. Petitioner alternatively argues that a provisional application (Ex. 1007, to which Rasmussen claims priority, see Ex. 1006, [30]) is § 102(e) prior art, if the challenged claims are entitled to the earlier priority date of June 22, 2011. Pet. 24. Petitioner, thus, provides parallel citations to Rasmussen and the provisional application, which Petitioner asserts is identical to Rasmussen. Pet. 24 n.1; Ex. 1057 (comparison of Rasmussen and its provisional). As discussed below, the full record persuades us that Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–4, 7–10, 13–15, 17, 18, and 20 are anticipated by Rasmussen under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) or § 102(e).” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 9,015,883 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,015,883

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.