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  • PTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2023-01163 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Morris and Ray, with claims 10, 11, 13, and 20 also unpatentable over Morris, Ray, and Cox.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner proposes the same level of ordinary skill in the art, except that Patent Owner states that the industry experience would have been “in analyzing and/or designing exercise equipment (such as treadmills, bicycles, steppers, ellipticals) or in a similar field.” PO Resp. 15–16. Having considered the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposal comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’227 patent. Accord Inst. Dec. 8. Patent Owner’s proposal adds “analyzing” and removes “cardiovascular,” but these differences are immaterial to this proceeding. See Pet. Reply 28 n.10. Moreover, all of our analysis in this Decision would remain the same under Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “Patent Owner contends it means “data that would represent an amount of exercise of the user.” PO Resp. 4–6. According to Patent Owner, the Specification defines this claim term. Id. at 4–5 (citing Ex. 1001, 51:37– 40:59–6:4). In its briefing, Petitioner disagreed with Patent Owner’s proposed construction, arguing that it is “overly narrow . . . and arbitrarily excludes other forms of ‘exercise use data.’” Pet. Reply 2–4. However, during the oral hearing, Petitioner adopted Patent Owner’s proposal. Tr. 14:12–15:17. For purposes of this proceeding, we apply Patent Owner’s narrower construction and assume that “exercise use data” is “data that would represent an amount of exercise of the user.” We do not need to further construe this term because Petitioner shows that the challenged claims are unpatentable even under Patent Owner’s narrower construction of it.” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Morris and Ray because they provide complementary teachings and address similar objectives. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1004, Abstr., 5:41–48, 8:22–26, 11:56–61, 13:20–30; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 6, 25, 33, 35, Abstr.; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 135–138). Petitioner also asserts that Morris contemplates use of an optical sensor, provides exercise data and “a human analog display that mimic[s] the user’s bouncing motion,” and includes a signal processing and display system with the necessary capabilities to implement the combination. Id. at 16–17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 139–143; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 32–36, 50, 56–58, claims 29–37, Figs. 6, 11–12C); see also id. at 26–27 (asserting that “including multiple sensors in treadmills was a routine and well-known task”) (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 159–162). Petitioner further asserts that Ray expressly teaches that “its user validation and motivation technology could be ‘easily and affordably merged’ into a treadmill.” Id. at 18 (quoting Ex. 1004, 9:55–57) (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 143–144). Finally, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to make the proposed combination because it would have improved Morris’ treadmill to add both “Ray’s motivational image that showed a thinner image of the user as the intensity and duration of exercise increased” and Ray’s ability to share exercise data with a remote location. Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 7:11–22, 11:55–59, 13:50–57; Ex. 1006 ¶ 50; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 138, 145); see also id. at 16 (arguing that detection of a user’s presence could provide benefits, including motivation (citing Ex. 1004, 8:22–26, 11:56–61; Ex. 1006 ¶ 25)), 41 (arguing that data transmission was “a well-known and routine task” (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 188–189)). Patent Owner does not dispute these contentions. See PO Resp. We find that Petitioner has established that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to improve Morris’ treadmill by adding Ray’s camera, software instructions for validating user exercise data, its functionality of displaying a motivational image, and its ability to transmit exercise data to a remote location, and that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success. See Pet. 16–18, 26–27; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 135–138, 140–145, 161, 189; see also, e.g., Ex. 1004, 5:27–29, 7:11–22, 9:55–57.” slip op. at 22

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

      “We have considered the testimony of Mr. van der Weide, who agrees with Patent Owner (see Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 35, 60–71), but we give his testimony on these points little weight. Mr. van der Weide discusses Mr. Rawls’ testimony, but he does not meaningfully discuss Ray’s disclosure. See id. As a result, he does not reconcile his opinions with the apparently conflicting portions of Ray. In addition, Mr. van der Weide’s testimony is conclusory because he does not identify evidence or reasoning sufficient to support his opinion that Ray fails to teach or suggest these aspects of the claim. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”).” slip op. at 32

    Patent outcomesUS 10,032,227 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,032,227
  • PTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00697 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 3, 4, and 8 were not proven unpatentable: Rauhala does not disclose the required simultaneous signal-strength determinations, and Masaaki does not cure the deficiency for claim 4.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Following institution, Patent Owner maintained the same level of ordinary skill proposed in its preliminary response and did not address our discussion of the level of ordinary skill in the art in the Institution Decision. PO Resp. 24–25; see also Prelim. Resp. 24. For the reasons discussed in the Institution Decision, we adopt and apply for this Decision the level of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. See Dec. 8–10. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’825 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27– 31. Our decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “We agree with Patent Owner that the desired signal and interferer signal must be received at the same time. The plain language of the claim requires the wireless transceiver to “receiv[e] a wireless signal having a desired signal and an interferer signal,” the determining of a signal strength of the interferer signal and the determining of a signal strength of the desired signal must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. The specification supports this understanding. “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:20–22; see also id. at 5:31–33 (“FIGS. 2A and 2B illustrate examples of desired signals, interferers, and noise that may be received by one of the various circuits in a” slip op. at 21

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “We agree with Patent Owner that Rauhala does not state that the signal strengths are measured simultaneously or at the same time. Indeed, as discussed above, Rauhala indicates unequivocally in the same paragraph the opposite—that detector DET provides to control unit 42 “an indication about either the receive channel signal strength RSS or the strength of any signal on the reception band.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 17. Rauhala describes that “control unit 42 provides two one-bit control signals cA and cM” based on indications received from detector DET. Id. Importantly, Rauhala indicates that “at the same time as” describes how the control unit 42 uses the received inputs RSS and RSSn shown in Figure 4, which are described earlier in paragraph 17 as indications of either RSS or RSSn from detector DET. Id. (“Signal cA is 0 when signal RSS is greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the 11 Dr. Baker’s reply declaration correctly quotes Rauhala paragraph 17 but cites to paragraph 18. We deem this harmless error. same time smaller than Sn. . . . Signal cM is 1 when signal RSS is not greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the same time at least Sn. Otherwise, signal cM is 0.”). The burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Rauhala discloses the disputed limitations as arranged or combined in the claim. Petitioner does not persuasively reconcile these “either/or” statements regarding the functioning of detector DET with the “at the same time as” statements regarding control signals output by control unit 42 in paragraph 17. We do not find persuasive Petitioner counsel’s position expressed at the hearing that Rauhala’s “either/or” statements are “simply an imprecise description” (Tr. 16:22–24). We do not see a lack of precision in Rauhala’s “either/or” statements.” slip op. at 30

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “When asked at his deposition to explain Rauhala’s use of the word “or” regarding the functioning of detector DET, Dr. Baker asserted that “[detectors] can be designed to determine RSS or RSSn.” Ex. 2016, 85:5– 12. We find Dr. Baker’s testimony that “it’s reasonable that if you can design . . . the detector to detect one or the other, you can also design it to detect both” to be without factual support. Id. at 85:13–16. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence to support that would have led one of ordinary skill to design such a detector or to support that one of ordinary skill would have understood Rauhala’s detector to be so designed. Furthermore, Dr. Baker recognizes that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. We give little weight to Dr. Baker’s unsupported testimony that one could design a detector to detect both RSS and RSSn from the same wireless signal. See 37 C.F.R. 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., No. IPR2022-00624, 2022 WL 3648989, at *6 (PTAB 2022) (precedential) (Director affirming because “the cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported, adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight”).” slip op. at 31

    Patent outcomesUS 10,129,825 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,129,825
  • PTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00698 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 7–11, 13, and 19–21 were not shown unpatentable because Rauhala does not disclose simultaneous desired and interferer signal-strength determinations, defeating anticipation and the obviousness combination.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “The two proposals are materially similar in the education requirement, but differ marginally in professional experience required (three versus five years). See supra. While we were persuaded, on the preliminary record, that both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposals were consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’202 patent and the prior art of record, on balance, we determined that Petitioner’s proposal was a better reflection of the level of skill in the prior art, and we therefore adopted it for our Institution Decision. See Institution Dec. 12–13. For this Decision, we adopt the description of the person of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’202 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Baker I Decl. ¶¶ 28–32. Our Decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “85:13–16. He admits that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence that would have led a person of ordinary skill to design such a detector. Our Trial Practice Guide cautions against crediting such unsupported testimony: The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony. Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, the testimony must be based on sufficient facts and data. Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). “Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35 (Nov. 2019).7 We therefore give Dr, Baker’s unsupported testimony on this issue little weight.” slip op. at 24

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Having considered the positions of the parties, we find that for the purpose of this decision, we do not need to construe these terms to resolve a dispute.” slip op. at 9

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “requirement.” Pet. Reply 5. We do not agree with Petitioner. We find that the language of the claims supports Patent Owner’s argument that the desired signal and the interferer signal are received together. As discussed infra, claim limitations 7.7 and 7.8 recite determining a signal strength of the interferer signal and determining a signal strength of the desired signal. These determinations must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. See Larson II Decl. ¶ 70; Baker II Decl. ¶¶ 48–49 (explaining that consideration of signal strengths detected at the same time would be “essential”). The specification of the ’202 patent further supports this finding: “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:22–24; see also Figs. 2A, 2B (showing interferer signals and desired signals together).” slip op. at 17

    Patent outcomesUS 10,524,202 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,524,202
  • PTAB · Jul 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00465 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Irwin renders at least one challenged claim obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied

      “Even assuming Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner and assuming we may exercise our discretion to deny institution based on unclean hands (see Kavo Dental Techs, LLC v. Osseo Imaging, Inc., IPR2020-00659, Paper 10 at 19 (PTAB June 10, 2020)), Patent Owner essentially asks us to resolve multiple factual issues related to its contract dispute with Linq3 to justify denial of institution. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 1– 26. Many, if not all, of these issues appear to be involved in the contract dispute, which will be resolved by the Arizona state court. We are not in a good position to make determinations about these particular issues at this stage of the proceeding, on the limited record before us. Rather, we find that the state court is better suited to address the conduct of Linq3 of which Patent Owner complains. Accordingly, we leave these matters for the state court. To the extent Patent Owner seeks to pursue its argument that Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner, even though no time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) has been asserted, Patent Owner may raise the issue of real party in interest again in its Patent Owner Response, and the parties may brief and argue the issue during trial.” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied

      “We disagree. First, we agree with Patent Owner that the fact pattern presented here is not the typical situation in which the factors from General Plastic are considered. In particular, this proceeding challenges claims of a different patent than the patents at issue in PGR2020-00084 and IPR2023- 01235. Challenging claims of different patents significantly distinguishes the facts here from those in General Plastic, and we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to extend General Plastic in this regard. Accordingly, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 11

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached

      “Even assuming Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner and assuming we may exercise our discretion to deny institution based on unclean hands (see Kavo Dental Techs, LLC v. Osseo Imaging, Inc., IPR2020-00659, Paper 10 at 19 (PTAB June 10, 2020)), Patent Owner essentially asks us to resolve multiple factual issues related to its contract dispute with Linq3 to justify denial of institution. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 1– 26. Many, if not all, of these issues appear to be involved in the contract dispute, which will be resolved by the Arizona state court. We are not in a good position to make determinations about these particular issues at this stage of the proceeding, on the limited record before us. Rather, we find that the state court is better suited to address the conduct of Linq3 of which Patent Owner complains. Accordingly, we leave these matters for the state court. To the extent Patent Owner seeks to pursue its argument that Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner, even though no time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) has been asserted, Patent Owner may raise the issue of real party in interest again in its Patent Owner Response, and the parties may brief and argue the issue during trial.” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “5. Weighing the Graham Factors “Once all relevant facts are found, the ultimate legal determination [of obviousness] involves the weighing of the fact findings to conclude whether the claimed combination would have been obvious to an ordinary artisan.” Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1361. On balance, considering the record presently before us, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that Irwin would have rendered the subject matter of claims 1–9 and 11–24 of the ’451 patent obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 38

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,488,451
  • PTAB · Jul 23, 2024 · IPR2023-01399 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Adverse judgment

    The Board entered adverse judgment against ALD Social, LLC on claims 1–16 of the ’158 patent and terminated IPR2023-01399 after finding Patent Owner unequivocally abandoned the contest.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, and abandonment of the contest is construed by the Board to be a request for adverse judgment. See IPR2023-01398, Paper 8, 3 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)); IPR2023-01399, Paper 7, 3 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)). Our orders also stated: Under the specific circumstances of this case, we determine Patent Owner’s failure to file long-overdue mandatory notices required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(2) to demonstrate Patent Owner’s abandonment of the contest. Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(c), in the particular circumstances of this case, and in the interests of justice, we set a deadline for Patent Owner to file mandatory notices pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(2) no later than June 10, 2024. IPR2023-01398, Paper 8, 4 (emphasis in original); IPR2023-01399, Paper 7, 4 (emphasis in original). Our orders further explained that we “would view, in the particular circumstances of this case, Patent Owner’s filing of mandatory notices by the deadline as an indication that Patent Owner had not abandoned the contest.” IPR2023-01398, Paper 8, 4; IPR2023-01399, Paper 7, 4.” slip op. at 5

    None
    Patents in suitUS 9,402,158
  • PTAB · Jul 23, 2024 · IPR2023-01398 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Adverse judgment

    The Board entered adverse judgment against ALD Social, LLC on claims 1–14 of the ’054 patent and terminated IPR2023-01398 after finding unequivocal abandonment.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, and abandonment of the contest is construed by the Board to be a request for adverse judgment. See IPR2023-01398, Paper 8, 3 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)); IPR2023-01399, Paper 7, 3 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)). Our orders also stated: Under the specific circumstances of this case, we determine Patent Owner’s failure to file long-overdue mandatory notices required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(2) to demonstrate Patent Owner’s abandonment of the contest. Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(c), in the particular circumstances of this case, and in the interests of justice, we set a deadline for Patent Owner to file mandatory notices pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(2) no later than June 10, 2024. IPR2023-01398, Paper 8, 4 (emphasis in original); IPR2023-01399, Paper 7, 4 (emphasis in original). Our orders further explained that we “would view, in the particular circumstances of this case, Patent Owner’s filing of mandatory notices by the deadline as an indication that Patent Owner had not abandoned the contest.” IPR2023-01398, Paper 8, 4; IPR2023-01399, Paper 7, 4.” slip op. at 5

    None
    Patents in suitUS 9,198,054
  • PTAB · Jul 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00374 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–10 and all asserted grounds because the petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “petition for inter partes review. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016). In determining whether to exercise that discretion on behalf of the Director, the Board considers an early trial date in related litigation, among other factors, as part of an assessment of all relevant circumstances of the case—including the merits—to balance considerations such as system efficiency, fairness, and patent quality. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 5. When the same prior art is submitted in district court and to the Board, there are “concerns of inefficiency and the possibility of conflicting decisions.” Id. at 12. Petitioner can mitigate those concerns by presenting a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that” slip op. at 7

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

      “(2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. If a condition in the first part of the framework is satisfied and the petitioner fails to make a showing of material error, the Director generally will exercise discretion not to institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of industry experience in digital video processing, or a related field.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 10035 ¶¶ 76–78). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner uses the same skill level in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 21. We also apply Petitioner’s proposed skill level in this Decision. Pet. 3.” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 8,090,025
  • PTAB · Jul 18, 2024 · IPR2024-00327 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1 and 2 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Demircin renders claim 1 obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Upon consideration of the evidence currently of record, we conclude that the information presented shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’303 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “III. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL Patent Owner argues that we should exercise our discretion to deny the Petition based on the parallel district court litigation. Prelim. Resp. 33– 39 (citing Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential)). Petitioner, however, presented a Sotera stipulation.8 Pet. 76 (citing Ex. 1029). Thus, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution here. See Katherine K. Vidal, Interim” slip op. at 17

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “3. Preliminary Analysis Regarding Claim 1 At this stage, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s contentions that the teachings of Demircin satisfy each limitation of claim 1. On the current record, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments that Demircin does not satisfy the parties’ agreed construction. As cited by Petitioner (see, e.g., Pet. 33, 43), Demircin teaches that when additional bandwidth becomes available, NAL units that were previously discarded or only partially transmitted may be transmitted in a delayed manner (Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 34, 104– 128, Fig. 13, 14). We are currently persuaded that Demircin teaches or reasonably suggests that such delayed NAL units could be received out of order and would be rearranged, as claimed.” slip op. at 16

    § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,986,303
  • PTAB · Jul 18, 2024 · IPR2024-00372 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 2–4 and 11 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would show them unpatentable as obvious over Phek, Segall, Martins, and He.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “such as system efficiency, fairness, and patent quality. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 5. When the same prior art is submitted in district court and to the Board, there are “concerns of inefficiency and the possibility of conflicting decisions.” Id. at 12. Petitioner can mitigate those concerns by presenting a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the Board. Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential). Here, Petitioner has presented such a stipulation: if the Board grants institution, Petitioner “agrees not to pursue any grounds raised in the petition, or any grounds [Petitioner] could have reasonably raised in the petition, in [the] district court litigation or any parallel proceeding” Ex. 1028, 1. “Consistent with [Sotera], the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Katherine K. Vidal, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (USPTO June 21, 2022).5 Thus, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 7

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “present arguments specifically directed to the subject matter recited in the rest of the claim. See Prelim. Resp. Even so, Petitioner has the burden to show that the challenged claims are unpatentable. Thus, we have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence submitted in connection with the remaining limitations and find them to be sufficient at this stage and on this record. From the current record, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in demonstrating that claim 2 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 25

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “digital video processing, or a related field.” Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 10036 ¶¶ 123–125). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Id. at 4. Patent Owner uses the same skill level in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 13. We also apply Petitioner’s proposed skill level in this Decision.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Patent Owner’s arguments, however, are based on an implicit construction for the second resolution converter. See § II.D.5.c supra. For the reasons discussed below, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments and the implicit construction. See id. Apart from rejecting the implicit construction of the second resolution converter, we agree with the parties that no claim term needs to be construed in this Decision.” slip op. at 9

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 10,218,995
  • Intuit Inc. v. Samesurf, Inc.All claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Jun 25, 2024 · IPR2023-00342 · APJ Phillip A Bennett · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Lebrun and Wang and over Prajapat and Wang; the contingent motion to amend is denied.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied

      “3. May Not Enlarge the Claim Scope An amendment may not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the” slip op. at 87

    • Strike new argumentDenied

      “comprise briefs filed by Petitioner in support of a motion to dismiss for lack of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in the parallel district court litigation involving the challenged patents. The exhibits were submitted together with Patent Owner’s Sur-reply (Paper 33). We have not relied on Exhibit 2006 or Exhibit 2007 in our analysis. Accordingly, we deny the motion as moot.” slip op. at 9

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

      “Accordingly, we deny Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude Exhibits 2005–” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “one of ordinary skill would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining compatible embodiments, and we credit Dr. Lieberman’s testimony because he supports his testimony with a passage from Lebrun that is consistent with his conclusion. Id. (stating “Lebrun describes several ‘variations on the group-surfing session,’ which includes a subsection of ‘multiple group surfing channels.’ Ex. 1005, 37:19, 43:5 (emphasis in original).”). Consistent with Lebrun’s description, Dr. Lieberman opines, and we agree, that “[a] POSITA would understand ‘multiple group surfing channels’ would be one example/scenario of the ‘variations on the group-surfing session,’ and the latter encompasses the former and the two embodiments are compatible and combinable.” Ex. 1034 ¶ 18.” slip op. at 42

    Patent outcomesUS 8,527,591 unpatentable
    § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,527,591

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