- Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00651 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 6, 7, and 9–20 were unpatentable over any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’680 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“target value” is part of a command that is sent from a computing device to a server and then to a controller. The controller then receives a measurement of the fluid by a sensor and determines whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” If the measurement does not satisfy the “target value,” further operations are undertaken. The recited operation sequence makes clear that the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” is not as Dr. Wooley opines because the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time is represented by the measurement taken by the sensor, 11 Some claim language less relevant to construing “target value” was omitted for ease of reference. which the controller then uses to determine whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” Additionally, claim 1 recites that the “target value” is sent as part of a command to the controller. The “target value” is not sent to the controller from the sensor, as might be expected if the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” were as Dr. Wooley opines. Petitioner and Dr. Wooley’s construction would also result in “target value” meaning effectively the same thing as the measurement of the fluid by the sensor, a concept that is separately recited in claim 1 and to which the “target value” is compared. The Specification of the ’680 patent does not support Petitioner’s understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value.” Although the Specification does not recite “target value,” it recites “target state,” and describes “target state” sufficiently to understand the plain and ordinary meaning of “target” as used in “target value” and “target state.” In particular, the ’680 patent explains that “[i]n some embodiments, the process 104 includes receiving, via a network interface, from a remote user device, (e.g., via a command-center server) a command to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state.” Ex. 1001, 11:48–51. This portion reflects that the command is seeking to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state. In other words, the “target value” or “target state” is not generally “the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time”; rather, it is a value or state that the fluid-handling device is desired to be in, as Patent Owner and Dr. Durham explain. Additionally, just as claim 1 recites a directional component for the “target value” to be sent to the controller in a command, so too does the Specification describe a “target state” as being sent in a command from a remote user device. Thus, the Specification clearly supports the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Patent Owner and Dr. Durham and not the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Petitioner and Dr. Wooley. slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“time-stamped process data, report exception therein to the remote host, and extract and transmit time-stamped process data to the remote host.” Ex. 1005, Abst. (emphases added). Almadi explains that its remote field systems must include a plurality of controller units “to issue commands to, and gather and process data from a plurality of field devices, including remote systems and instruments, . . . [and] a database server for the storage of process data retrieved from the remote subsystems and instruments.” Id. at 2:22–30 (emphases added). Based on these disclosures, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not established that Almadi discloses element [1.4]. Specifically, the teachings from Almadi identified by Petitioner refer to process data, which is data retrieved from the remote subsystems/field devices. Thus, we understand that Almadi’s teaching—of using an Ethernet switch to transmit “process data”—describes transmitting data from the remote subsystems/field devices. See Ex. 1005, 3:13–17, cited in Pet. 15. But claim 1 and particularly element [1.4], recites “sending, with the server, the target value to the network address [which identifies a controller of the fluid-handling device13] via the network,” which is different than sending process data from the field devices to the remote host or database server for storage.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,175,680 - Tanklogix, LLC v. SiteproInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00650 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 18–32 and 34 were unpatentable over Kahn or Kahn and Gutierrez.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’871 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 18–32 and 34 of the ’871 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The respective proposed levels of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art are similar, with Patent Owner proposing two years of experience compared to Petitioner proposing significant experience with remotely controlling fluid-handling devices, like SCADA systems. Patent Owner also proposes more extensive experience in lieu of educational experience. While we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications to be acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’871 patent and the asserted prior art. Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the qualifications adopted.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“actuators and the remote control of fluid handling devices, including the receipt with the user-interface module of “a user command to actuate an actuator via a presented control interface” (limitation [18.7]) and “account authorized to send commands to remotely control fluid handling devices” (limitation [18.11]). We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses or teaches these limitations because the evidence does not provide support that there is remote control of fluid handling devices or the use of a user command on a control interface to send a command to a fluid handling device, for instance. Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but we do not discern that it teaches or discloses the capability to remotely control fluid handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, the Kahn disclosures that Petitioner repeatedly relies upon for allegedly teaching this control are deficient. See Ex. 1005, 10:62–67, 14:35– 15:2, 15:62–16:32; see also Pet. 12–14, 16–18. Kahn discloses that “the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance.” Ex. 1005, 10:62–67. Communication unit 112B is part of the local “sensor unit,” wherein the detection conditions determined by the sensor are communicated to remote devices by communication unit 112B. See id. at 3:31–33, 5:62–6:2, 6:27–35, 7:33–37, 13:7–12, Figs. 1A–1C. Kahn discloses that the sensor units, which include communication units 112B, can be located near shut-off valves and can communicate with distant locations. See id. at 11:1–13. There are no disclosures, however, in the above passages that there is remote control of fluid handling devices, that there is a user command on a control interface that actuates an actuator, or that there is a command sent to the facility actuators via a network connection, as required in limitations [18.5]–[18.7] and [18.9]–[18.12], respectively. Rather, the disclosure indicates that the communication unit 112B includes on-site alerts and that the local (non-remote) communication unit 112B can be interfaced with the control valve.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,488,871 - PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00739 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 3, and 6–8 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Jaszlics and Rallison.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review may not be authorized by statute “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the record before us, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of claims 1, 8, 13, and 20 of the ’277 patent. Accordingly, we institute the requested inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with two years combined experience in designing and/or developing interactive location-based computer systems/software, such as video games or other simulations incorporating location information (such as GPS information associated with a user’s physical location), and in designing and/or developing computer systems/software involving graphical virtual and/or augmented reality. A person could also have qualified as a person of ordinary skill in the art with some combination of (1) more formal education (such as a master’s of science degree) and less technical experience, or (2) less formal education and more technical or professional experience. (EX1002, ¶¶21-25.) Pet. 4. Patent Owner at this stage does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. As Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“persuasive for several reasons. The claim does not recite “a defined physical playfield.” Rather, the claim recites “a physical playfield.” The Specification’s discussions of “playfield” cited by Patent Owner use non-limiting language such as “for example” and “may” in describing the playfield. See Ex. 1001, 2:37–41, 2:61–67, 3:21–23, 8:50–64. The disclosed examples of “a physical playfield” include “the physical world, a physical environment, or a defined physical playfield” (Ex. 1001, 1:56–58), which indicates that the applicant intended “a physical playfield” as claimed to encompass more than a defined or “bounded” physical playfield. This indication is consistent with the Specification’s disclosure that “the game world corresponds to an actual area of the physical world (such as the planet Earth or New York City).” Ex. 1001, 11:12–14. Thus, in one disclosed embodiment, the physical playfield is the entire (unbounded) world. We are persuaded that the Specification’s descriptions of various embodiments with defined playfields and undefined playfields support construing the scope of a “physical playfield” as encompassing defined boundaries, or a “bounded” playfield, as well as a “physical playfield” with undefined boundaries, or an “unbounded” playfield. Limiting the claim term to only “bounded” play spaces would read out broader embodiments from the claim scope. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that interpreting a claim to exclude an embodiment disclosed in the written description “is rarely, if ever, correct and would” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Even if we were to accept Patent Owner’s unsupported contention that the location of Jaszlics’s image processor is outside of the display device, this would result in only two identified, predictable locations of the image processor. The image processor would either be located outside of the display device or inside of the display device. We are persuaded that substituting Rallison’s location of inside the display device instead of outside the display device provides sufficient reason to combine the teachings of Jaszlics and Rallison. See Uber Techs., Inc. v. X One, Inc., 957 F.3d 1334, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (reversing the Board’s determination of lack of motivation “because Okubo’s terminal-side plotting and Konishi’s server-side plotting were both well known in the art, and were the only two identified, predictable solutions for transmitting a map and plotting locations, it would have been obvious to substitute server-side plotting for terminal-side plotting in a combination of Okubo and Konishi”) (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007)).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,179,277 - PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00738 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 3, and 6–8 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review may not be authorized by statute “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the record before us, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of claims 1, 3, and 6–8 of the ’448 patent. Accordingly, we institute the requested inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with two years combined experience in designing and/or developing interactive location-based computer systems/software, such as video games or other simulations incorporating location information (such as GPS information associated with a user’s physical location), and in designing and/or developing computer systems/software involving graphical virtual and/or augmented reality. A person could also have qualified as a person of ordinary skill in the art with some 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (Sept. 16, 2011), includes revisions to Section 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the challenged claims issued from an application claiming the benefit of the filing date of an application filed before March 16, 2013, we apply pre-AIA law. 2 U.S. Patent No. 6,166,744 issued Dec. 20, 2000 (Ex. 1003). 3 Int’l Patent Appl. Pub. No. WO 2003/107039 A2 published Dec. 24, 2003 (Ex. 1008). 4 U.S. Appl. Pub. No. 2002/0163486 Al published Nov. 7, 2002 (Ex. 1009) 5 U.S. Patent No. 6,361,438 B1 issued Mar. 26, 2002 (Ex. 1006). 6 U.S. Appl. Pub. No. 2004/0002843 A1 published Jan. 1, 2004) (Ex. 1007). combination of (1) more formal education (such as a master’s of science degree) and less technical experience, or (2) less formal education and more technical or professional experience. (EX1002, ¶¶21-25.) Pet. 5. Patent Owner at this stage does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. As Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“persuasive for several reasons. The claim does not recite “a defined physical playfield.” Rather, the claim recites “a physical playfield.” The Specification’s discussions of “playfield” cited by Patent Owner use non-limiting language such as “for example” and “may” in describing the playfield. Ex. 1001, 2:32–36, 2:55–61, 3:14–16, 5:63–65, 6:30–32, 8:31–45, 9:4–9, 19:60–20:22, 22:5–6. The disclosed examples of “a physical playfield” include “the physical world, a physical environment, or a defined physical playfield” (Ex. 1001, 1:56–58), which indicates that the applicant intended “a physical playfield” as claimed to encompass more than a defined or “bounded” physical playfield. This indication is consistent with the Specification’s disclosure that “the game world corresponds to an actual area of the physical world (such as the planet Earth or New York City).” Ex. 1001, 11:12–14. Thus, in one disclosed embodiment, the physical playfield is the entire (unbounded) world. We are persuaded that the Specification’s descriptions of various embodiments with defined playfields and undefined playfields support construing the scope of a “physical playfield” as encompassing defined boundaries, or a “bounded” playfield, as well as a “physical playfield” with undefined boundaries, or an “unbounded” playfield. Limiting the claim term to only “bounded” play spaces would read out broader embodiments from the claim scope. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that interpreting a claim to exclude an embodiment disclosed in the written description “is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support, which is wholly absent in this case”).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“A reference qualifies as prior art for an obviousness determination under § 103 only when it is analogous to the claimed invention. Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. . . . A reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem. If a reference disclosure has the same purpose as the claimed invention, the reference relates to the same problem, and that fact supports use of that reference in an obviousness rejection. In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Jaszlics discloses that the “invention relates . . . to systems for combining virtual images with real-world scenes” to provide applications such as virtual reality games (Ex. 1003, 1:13–21), which is the same field as the ’448 patent’s field of “location-based games and augmented reality systems” (Ex. 1001, Title). Turning to Sofer, the purpose of the detector of Sofer is to detect the location of objects in the user’s surrounding environment (Ex. 1008, Abstract; see id. at 2, 6, 11), which is the same purpose as the detector of the ’448 patent (Ex. 1001, 15:4–5; see id. at 1:28–31, 2:5, 16:11–18, 19:54–57). Therefore, Sofer’s detector is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem of detecting the location of objects in the user’s surrounding environment. We are sufficiently persuaded that Jaszlics and Sofer are analogous to the claimed invention.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,744,448 - PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00742 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 6-10, 14, 17, 24-28, and 30 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Director may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’243 patent on all grounds of unpatentability asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAOther
“portable device 100 as “portable” even when components of that “device” are integrated in a “non-portable” device, such as a car. Examples of such portable devices are provided as wireless telephones, PDAs, laptops; handheld devices, and music players. Ex. 1009 ¶ 22; See Ex. 1001, 4:22−28 (describing a visor as a portable gaming system); 7:21−27 (listing additionally Blackberries, Personal Electronic Devices, IPODs and any other portable electronic device, to be configured as a gaming system). Taking these disclosures together, the ’243 patent does not define the degree of the “portability” of the claimed device to require that the “portable device” must be completely “free of encumbering external connections.” If “portability” can include integrating a component of the “portable device” into a “non-portable device,” then there is support for holding that the recited “portable device” could be tethered to a non-portable device.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“rotation sensors are found not to be positioned on Levesque’s display, it would have been obvious to do so in light of Ronzani because Ronzani teaches equipping the head-mounted device with external and internal sensors). Petitioner’s arguments and evidence regarding motivation to combine amount to showing that “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). The inquiry at this juncture is whether Petitioner has shown sufficiently that an ordinarily skilled artisan is “able to recognize, based on her background knowledge, [a technique’s] potential to improve the device and be able to apply the technique.” Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 995, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artInstituted
“A reference that is in the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention is analogous art,5 and such a qualification means that one of ordinary skill in the art is presumed to have been aware of the reference and thus the refence properly may be considered if it predates the claimed invention. See Circuit Check Inc. v. QXQ Inc., 795 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Petitioner contends that the field of endeavor of the claims of the ’243 patent is “the field of portable user-worn devices for providing location based-entertainment.” Pet. 19−20. According to that description of the relevant field of endeavor, Petitioner argues that both Levesque and Ronzani are analogous to the ’243 patent. Id. Patent Owner appears to argue that the field of endeavor is “video games.” Prelim. Resp. 29−30. This is not the correct field of endeavor because although the claim recites a location based game system, the claims considerably focus on the head-mounted device. Indeed, for claim 1 all the structural elements claimed involve or are placed in the head-mounted device. Thus, “video games” generally is not an appropriate field of endeavor, as it is too broad and ignores the significant focus of the claims of the ’243 patent. Petitioner’s statement of the field of endeavor is, therefore, more indicative of the correct field of endeavor involved here. And as such, it is unpersuasive to argue that Ronzani does not belong to the field merely because it is not solely focused on video” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 11,904,243 - Alliance Laundry Systems, LLC v. Payrange LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2025-00573 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 7 or 11 were unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented fails to show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’772 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of claims 7 and 11 of the ’772 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) pertaining to the ’772 patent “would have had an educational background of, engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately three years of experience with electronic payment systems, vending machine technologies, or distributed network systems.” Pet. 19–20; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–26. “Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 20; Ex. 1003 ¶ 22. Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill. See Prelim. Resp. generally. On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the ’772 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“In this inter partes review, we apply the same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). In applying this standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. See id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We do not need to construe any terms expressly to determine whether or not to institute a trial. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,481,772 - PTAB · Sep 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00741 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 12, 17, and 20 of the ’493 patent on all asserted §103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its contentions of obviousness for claim 1 of the ’559 patent and claim 1 of the ’493 patent.” slip op. at 22
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“persuasive for several reasons. The claim does not recite “a defined physical playfield.” Rather, the claim recites “a physical playfield.” The” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Rallison is evidence of the knowledge that a head-mounted display would include a processor—provides sufficient rational underpinning for the combination of teachings. Petitioner proffers that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that including a processor in a head-mounted display is a known technique to improve a similar device (Jaszlics’s visor) in the same way and predictably. 740 Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1004, 10:4−14; 740 Cooperstock Decl. ¶ 80). We do not find at this juncture that this argument is unsupported or speculative, as Patent Owner argues. Additionally, we understand Patent Owner’s arguments—that Jaszlics system would have no need for incorporating a processor in the visor as taught by Rallison—as contentions that Jaszlics either teaches away from such a combination or the benefits of such a configuration are outweighed by significant drawbacks. These contentions are underdeveloped and unsupported. Petitioner’s argument and evidence, at this juncture, reasonably explain the reasons to combine under precedent that there is a motivation to combine when “a known technique ‘has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way.’” See Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007)). The location of the processor in the head-mounted display of Jaszlics does not need to be the best option, so long as it is a suitable option. See PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1197-98 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Finally, as for Rallison and Jaszlics’s alleged incompatibility, we are not persuaded that more evidence is needed at this juncture for details on the modification of Jaszlics to include the processor of Rallison. Such argument amounts to a bodily incorporation argument, and our analysis focuses rather on whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the “teachings” as alleged. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Indeed, we note the evidence presented by Petitioner that a head-mounted display’s use of electronics to generate the displayed video images was well known. 740 Cooperstock Decl. ¶ 82; Ex. 1004, 10:4−14.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 11,376,493 - PTAB · Sep 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00740 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 12, 17, and 20 of both patents on all asserted § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim of each patent is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“For the reasons stated in this Decision, we determine Petitioner has satisfied the threshold requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Because Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim of the ’559 patent and at least one claim of the ’493 patent are unpatentable, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims based on all grounds raised in the instant Petitions. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill, would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with two years combined experience in designing and/or developing interactive location-based computer systems/software, such as video games or other simulations incorporating location information (such as GPS information associated with a user’s physical location), and in designing and/or developing computer systems/software involving graphical virtual and/or augmented reality. A person could also have qualified as a 2 US Patent No. 6,166,744, issued Dec. 26, 2000 (Ex. 1003). 3 US Patent No. 6,369,952 B1, issued Apr. 9, 2002 (Ex. 1004). 4 WO 03/107039 A2, published Dec. 24, 2003 (Ex. 1008). 5 US Patent Application US 2002/0163486 A1, published Nov. 7, 2002 (Ex. 1009). person of ordinary skill in the art with some combination of (1) more formal education (such as a master’s of science degree) and less technical experience, or (2) less formal education and more technical or professional experience. 740 Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 21−25); 741 Pet. 4. Patent Owner does not propose a level of ordinary skill. As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“At this stage, we do not find Patent Owner’s proposed construction persuasive for several reasons. The claim does not recite “a defined physical playfield.” Rather, the claim recites “a physical playfield.” The Paper 10 in the 740 IPR; and Patent Owner filed a Preliminary Sur-reply, filed as Paper 11 in the 740 IPR. Specification’s discussions of “playfield” cited by Patent Owner use non-limiting language such as “for example” and “may” in describing the playfield. Ex. 1001, 2:38−40, 2:63–3:2, 3:23–25, 6:11−13, 6:46−48, 8:48– 62, 9:23–28, 20:28−58, 22:1−4. The disclosed examples of “a physical playfield” include “the physical world, a physical environment, or a defined physical playfield” (740 Ex. 1001, 1:58−60), which indicates that applicant intended “a physical playfield” as claimed to encompass more than a defined, or “bounded” physical playfield. This indication is consistent with the Specification’s disclosure that “the game world corresponds to an actual area of the physical world (such as the planet Earth or New York City).” 740 Ex. 1001, 11:12−14. Thus, in one disclosed embodiment, the physical playfield is the entire (unbounded) world. We are persuaded that the Specification’s descriptions of various embodiments with defined playfields and undefined playfields support construing the scope of a “physical playfield” as encompassing a physical playfield with defined boundaries, or a “bounded” playfield, as well as a physical playfield with undefined boundaries, or an “unbounded” playfield. Limiting the claim term to only “bounded” play spaces would read out broader embodiments from the claim scope. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that interpreting a claim to exclude an embodiment disclosed in the written description “is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support, which is wholly absent in this case.”). We, therefore, agree at this juncture with Petitioner’s claim construction analysis, and note that the alleged goal of improving the safety in virtual reality gaming does not support Patent Owner’s construction.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Second, Petitioner’s explanation of its alternative theory—that Rallison is evidence of the knowledge that a head-mounted display would include a processor—provides sufficient rational underpinning for the combination of teachings. Petitioner proffers that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that including a processor in a head-mounted display is a known technique to improve a similar device (Jaszlics’s visor) in the same way and predictably. 740 Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1004, 10:4−14; 740 Cooperstock Decl. ¶ 80). We do not find at this juncture that this argument is unsupported or speculative, as Patent Owner argues. Additionally, we understand Patent Owner’s arguments—that Jaszlics system would have no need for incorporating a processor in the visor as taught by Rallison—as contentions that Jaszlics either teaches away from such a combination or the benefits of such a configuration are outweighed by significant drawbacks. These contentions are underdeveloped and unsupported. Petitioner’s argument and evidence, at this juncture, reasonably explain the reasons to combine under precedent that there is a motivation to combine when “a known technique ‘has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way.’” See Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007)). The location of the processor in the head-mounted display of Jaszlics does not need to be the best option, so long as it is a suitable option. See PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1197-98 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Finally, as for Rallison and Jaszlics’s alleged incompatibility, we are not persuaded that more evidence is needed at this juncture for details on the modification of Jaszlics to include the processor of Rallison. Such argument amounts to a bodily incorporation argument, and our analysis focuses rather on whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the “teachings” as alleged. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Indeed, we note the evidence presented by Petitioner that a head-mounted display’s use of electronics to generate the displayed video images was well known. 740 Cooperstock Decl. ¶ 82; Ex. 1004, 10:4−14.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,828,559 - PTAB · Sep 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00737 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 2, 4–7, 13, and 17 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Meta would show at least one challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review may not be authorized by statute “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of claims 1, 2, 4–7, 13, and 17 of the ’476 patent. Accordingly, we institute the requested inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with two years combined experience in designing and/or developing interactive location-based computer systems/software, such as video games or other simulations incorporating location information (such as GPS information associated with a user’s physical location), and in designing 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (Sept. 16, 2011), includes revisions to Section 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the challenged claims issued from an application claiming priority to an application filed before March 16, 2013, we apply pre-AIA law. 2 US Patent No. 6,166,744 issued Dec. 26, 2000 (Ex. 1003). 3 Wayne Piekarski et al., “Integrating Virtual and Augmented Realities in an Outdoor Application,” Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE and ACM International Workshop on Augmented Reality (1999) (Ex. 1004). 4 US Patent No. 6,361,438 B1 issued Mar. 26, 2002 (Ex. 1006). 5 US Patent No. 6,951,515 B2 issued Oct. 4, 2005 (Ex. 1005). 6 US Publ. No. 2004/0002843 A1 published Jan. 1, 2004 (Ex. 1007). 7 WO 01/42809 A2 published June 14, 2001 (Ex. 1008). and/or developing computer systems/software involving graphical virtual and/or augmented reality. A person could also have qualified as a person of ordinary skill in the art with some combination of (1) more formal education (such as a master’s of science degree) and less technical experience, or (2) less formal education and more technical or professional experience. (EX1002, ¶¶21-25.) Pet. 5–6. Patent Owner, at this stage, does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill. See generally, Prelim. Resp. As Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“persuasive for several reasons. The claim does not recite “a defined physical playfield.” Rather, the claim recites “a physical playfield.” Ex. 1001, 21:6– 7; 22:26–27. The Specification’s discussions of “playfield” cited by Patent Owner use non-limiting language such as “for example” and “may” in describing the playfield. Id. at 2:32–36, 2:55–61, 3:14–16, 5:63–65, 6:30– 32, 8:30–44, 9:4–9, 19:60–20:22, 22:5–6. The disclosed examples of “a physical playfield” include “the physical world, a physical environment, or a defined physical playfield” (Ex. 1001, 1:51–53), which indicates that applicant intended “a physical playfield” as claimed to encompass more than a defined, or “bounded” physical playfield. This indication is consistent with the Specification’s disclosure that “the game world corresponds to an actual area of the physical world (such as the planet Earth or New York City).” Ex. 1001, 10:58–61. Thus, in one disclosed embodiment, the physical playfield is the entire (unbounded) world. We are persuaded that the Specification’s descriptions of various embodiments with defined playfields and undefined playfields support construing the scope of a “physical playfield” as encompassing defined boundaries, or a “bounded” playfield, as well as a “physical playfield” with undefined boundaries, or an “unbounded” playfield. Limiting the claim term to only “bounded” play spaces would read out broader embodiments from the claim scope. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that interpreting a claim to exclude an embodiment disclosed in the written description “is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support, which is wholly absent in this case.”). We, therefore, agree at this juncture with Petitioner’s claim construction analysis, and note that the alleged goal of improving the safety in virtual reality gaming does not support Patent Owner’s construction. Paper 10, 2 (Petitioner arguing that by describing an augmented reality system where a user can view the physical surroundings, a “bounded” physical playfield is not necessary). Further, we find unpersuasive, at this juncture, Patent Owner’s arguments related to embodiments of how the information about the playfield is captured and stored to construct the playfield and perform scaling. Prelim. Resp. 7−13. As Petitioner notes, and we agree, none of these features are recited in the independent claims. Paper 10, 2. And, to the extent there is a distinction between being “on” or “off” the “physical playfield” as Patent Owner argues, the claim language requires no such determination or detection.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“physical playfield” as properly construed. Prelim. Resp. 30. As discussed in our claim construction above, we are not persuaded that the claim term “physical playfield” is limited to a bounded physical play space. However, even under the Patent Owner’s proposed narrower construction, we are sufficiently persuaded that the combination teaches a bounded physical play space. Jaszlics discloses that its system creates virtual elements in theme parks and entertainment-oriented environments. Ex. 1003, 2:14–16, 2:67– 3:1; see id. at 18:48–55. We are sufficiently persuaded that a theme park is a bounded physical play space. In addition, Jaszlics discloses training armored vehicle crews by using both virtual vehicles and actual vehicles moving over real terrain. Ex. 1003, 1:38–60. We are sufficiently persuaded that a skilled artisan would have envisioned that such training occurs on a military base, which is bounded.8 Jaszlics further discloses that its training field includes boundary markers. Ex. 1003, Fig. 15, 10:1–9. We are sufficiently persuaded that the tank training field of Jaszlics, which has boundary markers and is located on a military base, is a bounded physical play space. Therefore, even under Patent Owner’s narrower construction, we are sufficiently persuaded that a person of ordinary skill would have recognized that a user would have played at least some of the video games provided by the combined system of Jaszlics and Piekarski in a bounded physical play space such as a theme park or a military base. slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,585,476 - PTAB · Sep 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00141 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Remand
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Nishida-based challenges.
RulingsRemand decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“partes review of U.S. Patent No. 8,266,749 B2 (“the ’749 patent,” Ex. 1001). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). The Petition challenges the patentability of claims 1–21 of the ’749 patent. Nike, Inc. (“Patent Owner”)2 filed a Preliminary Response to the Petition. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). With our authorization, Petitioner filed a Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response (Paper 10) and Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 13). We discretionarily denied institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Paper 20. Petitioner filed a request for Director Review of the Decision denying institution. Paper 21. Director Review was granted, the Decision denying institution of inter partes review was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Board. Id. at 4. Specifically, the case was “remanded to the Board with instructions to consider Petitioner’s Nishida grounds and to determine whether the Petition should be instituted.” Id. at 3–4.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’749” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“In support of Petitioner’s position, Dr. Adanur testifies that “Nishida discloses that the unfinished surface area 1.1 is part of the web 1 itself,” that Nishida discloses that the computer-controlled process can (using Nishida’s phrase) “put in” up to seven different textile fibers or yarns into the web of material in one operation, and that, “[t]hus, Nishida discloses simultaneously knitting its layouts 2 and tongue 40 (each a ‘textile element’) with the unfinished surface area 1.1 (a ‘surrounding textile structure’).” Ex. 1002 ¶ 216 (citing Ex. 1022, 2:12–20, 4:47–55, 5:45–49). For purposes of institution, we credit that testimony over the testimony of Dr. Pastore, because, on the current record, we regard Dr. Adanur’s testimony as more consistent with the evidence. This and the other related issues may be explored more fully during the trial.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) in the field of the ’749 patent in March 2004 would have been someone with at least a few years of experience in knit materials and knitting methods and machines that can be used in making footwear, or a bachelor’s degree in textile-related sciences, engineering, or industrial product design, or equivalent academic or work experience, including in the footwear industry. EX1002, ¶68. Such a person of ordinary skill would have at least a general understanding of general construction processes and materials used in the manufacturing process of fabric-based articles. For individuals with a lower educational level, a person could still be of ordinary skill in the art provided that person’s working experience compensates for any such lower educational level, or vice versa. See id. Pet. 23–24. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response, Nike applies Skechers’ definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 14. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,266,749
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.