- Integrated Dna Technologies, Inc. v. Tecan Genomics, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Aug 11, 2025 · IPR2024-01502 · APJ James A Worth · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted the joint motion for adverse judgment after Patent Owner disclaimed claims 1–3, 5–11, and 14–17, and terminated the inter partes review.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Section 42.73 provides that “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: (2) Cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). We agree that adverse judgment and termination are appropriate in view of the disclaimer because no challenged claim remains.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 9,546,399 - Lululemon USA Inc. v. Nike, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 6, 2025 · IPR2024-00460 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–21 are unpatentable: claims 1–21 under Nishida grounds and claims 11 and 21 also over Nishida with Zuckerman; Zuckerman-only grounds fail for lack of a surrounding structure.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: A hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in textile engineering, mechanical engineering, or similar technical degree and at least 3 years of experience working with knitted textiles for use in fabric-based articles, including apparel such as footwear. Ex.1003, ¶¶34-37. For individuals with different educational backgrounds, a person could still be of ordinary skill in the art provided that person’s additional experience compensates for any differences in that person’s education as stated above. Id., ¶37. Pet. 14–15. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this proceeding, Nike applies lululemon’s proposed level of skill in the art.” PO Resp. 13. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Id. at 99:12–25. Dr. Brookstein stated during his deposition that he has “49 years of experience of teaching textile engineering.” Id. at 97:6–8. We credit Dr. Brookstein’s testimony over that of Dr. Pastore’s because it is consistent with the reference and based on decades of experience in the textile field. Nishida’s claim 1 states that, “during the production of the material web (1), [shoe patterns] . . . are produced by . . . a textile production method within the material web.” Ex. 1005, 9. We find that Nishida’s claim language discloses the recited, “simultaneously knitting a textile element with a surrounding textile structure.”” slip op. at 22
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We find the District Court’s reasoning persuasive, and we, like the District Court, decline to adopt Petitioner’s overly broad proposed construction. However, for purposes of deciding the dispositive fact issue before us, we need not determine the precise boundaries of “surrounding textile structure,” for example whether it completely or mostly encircles the textile element, and if “mostly,” what percentage of encircling is required. See Pet. Reply 2 (Petitioner characterizing Patent Owner’s position as “mostly” means over 50%); id. at 4 (Petitioner impliedly arguing that the “surrounding” need not be complete, i.e., 100%); PO Sur-reply 3–4 (Patent Owner arguing that “Zuckerman’s textile structures . . . each abut only about 25% of the periphery of Zuckerman’s blank.”). We find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not understand the portion of Zuckerman’s strip 13 in purple to surround the green blank 11 (textile element) under any reasonable construction of “surrounding textile structure.” Dr. Pastore testifies that “Zuckerman discloses two separate textile structures adjacent the blank—one on each side . . . they abut only two sides of Zuckerman’s blank, with each structure abutting only about a quarter of the blank’s periphery,” and opines that “a POSITA would not have understood these two separate structures, designated by purple in the figure above, to be a textile structure ‘surrounding’ the blank [shown in green].” Ex. 2003 ¶ 54. We find Dr. Pastore’s tesimony credible as it is consistent with Zuckerman’s Figure and with the plain and ordinary meaning of “surrounding” and with the Specification of the ’749 patent (particularly Figure 9). Dr. Brookstein’s testimony, on the other hand, is based on Petitioner’s overly broad proposed construction—that any part of a textile area that is not a textile element is “surrounding textile structure”—” slip op. at 44
Patent outcomesUS 8,266,749 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,266,749 - PTAB · Jul 22, 2025 · IPR2025-00342 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 2, and 6–11 based on the asserted obviousness grounds over Broggi, Huttenlocher, and Brady, with or without Bertozzi.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we institute review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner. The specification broadly states that the invention is “for assisting a motor vehicle guidance on the basis of image data” and raises “maneuvering trucks toward docking stations” as a “particular” application. E.g., Ex. 1001, 1:6–8. Similarly, it refers to a docking station for trucks as a “typical destination” used only “for example.” Id. at 3:43–44. Patent Owner does not point to anything in the prosecution history that would inform the construction of “potential destination.” The intrinsic record does not support Patent Owner’s narrow construction. Thus, for purposes of this decision, we do not construe “potential destination” as limited to a fixed location. No other aspect of the construction affects our determination whether to institute.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Petitioner reasons that skilled artisans would have been motivated to use Huttenlocher’s pattern-matching technique as part of Broggi’s vehicle-detection method because Broggi suggests using a “traditional pattern matching technique.” Pet. 16–17. Further, Petitioner reasons, the combination would result in “improved vehicle detection and efficient use of processing resources.” Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1006, 23; Ex. 1003 ¶ 62). For the claimed storing step, Petitioner relies additionally on Brady. Id. at 54–56. Brady discloses a visual vehicle-tracking system that keeps “a vehicle log 102 of all vehicles currently within the scene, including vehicles’ associated track histories, inertial history 104 of the scene . . . and potential future track positions.” Ex. 1007, 11:21–26. Petitioner reasons that skilled artisans would have had reason to use Brady’s teachings as asserted because “Broggi omits implementation details how the associated data is processed and stored” and because the combination “would improve Broggi’s platooning through accurate and consistent tracking of the preceding vehicle positions used in the associated vehicle path determinations, thereby improving the user experience during platooning.” Pet. 20–21 (citing Ex. 1007, 11:21–25; Ex. 1003 ¶ 67).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableInstituted
“Patent Owner challenges Petitioner’s reliance on Broggi as relating to platooning rather than guidance to a fixed endpoint. Prelim. Resp. 21–38. All of Patent Owner’s arguments in that regard depend on us adopting Patent Owner proposed construction for “potential destination.” Id. As discussed above, we do not agree that the claimed potential destinations should be limited to fixed locations. See supra at 7–8 (§ II.B.1). Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding platooning rather than guidance to a fixed endpoint. Although Patent Owner asserts that Broggi also does not calculate an “optimized path” as claimed (Prelim. Resp. 29–33), that argument similarly depends on a construction for “potential destination” that is limited to fixed locations. See id. at 31 (arguing that the “car taught in Broggi cannot calculate an ‘optimized path’” because it “has absolutely no knowledge of the destination for the platoon”), 32 (“[I]n Broggi, the ARGO does not calculate a path to a destination because it doesn’t have any knowledge regarding the destination of the preceding car.”). We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument because, as discussed, the challenged claims do not require an optimized path to a fixed location, but instead read on an optimized path to a transitory location, such as the location of Broggi’s preceding vehicle at a given time. We agree with Petitioner that Broggi teaches an optimized path because it generates steering commands that lead toward the preceding vehicle and because those commands consider the steered vehicle’s capabilities. See Pet. 34–35. Additionally, Patent Owner challenges Petitioner’s reliance on Huttenlocher as failing to disclose the claimed “mathematical tree structure.” Prelim. Resp. 38–62. All of Patent Owner’s arguments in that regard depend on us adopting Patent Owner’s proposed construction for “mathematical tree structure.” Id. As discussed above, we do not agree that the claimed mathematical tree structure is limited to a single tree. See supra at 8–10 (§ II.B.2). Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding Huttenlocher’s tree structure. Patent Owner does not otherwise challenger Petitioner’s contentions based on Broggi, Huttenlocher, and Brady. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions and evidence, and conclude on the present record that Petitioner is likely to prevail with the unpatentability of claims 6–8 and 11. D. OBVIOUSNESS OVER BROGGI, HUTTENLOCHER, BRADY, AND BERTOZZI” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,336,805 - PTAB · Jul 16, 2025 · PGR2025-00012 · APJ Debra L Dennett · PGR · Institution
Instituted PGR on claims 1–3 based on five grounds; the Board found each ground met the institution threshold on the preliminary record.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute a post-grant review under 35 U.S.C. § 324. Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). A post-grant review may also be instituted when “the petition raises a novel or unsettled legal question that is important to other patents or patent applications.” See id. § 324(b). Applying that standard on behalf of the Director (37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a)) and in consideration of the Petition, Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail in establishing unpatentability of claims 1–3 of the ’201 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“At this stage of the proceedings, neither Petitioner’s nor Patent Owner’s proffered definitions of the level of skill appear appropriate. Petitioner’s proposal requires as little as a bachelor’s degree in organic chemistry and two years of experience as a laboratory technician working on development of molecules with targeted biological activity, and an ambiguous “understanding” of certain processes. Patent Owner’s proposal, other the other hand, requires multiple years of both formal training and actual, practical experience in highly specialized fields that involve detection of optical or radiolabeled compounds and use of molecular imaging techniques such as PET and SPECT. For the purposes of this decision, on the record at this time, we find that a POSA would have had a Ph.D. in chemistry, biochemistry, or a comparable field or an M.D., and at least four years of experience in chemical synthesis of compounds that may be used to target biologically-significant tissues. This definition appears consistent with the level of skill shown in the prior art references of record. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The parties will have the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Martin and Dr. VanBrocklin in this proceeding to develop a full record for us to determine the weight that each expert’s testimony should be given. We invite the parties to further brief the definition of a POSA here, and whether we should discount either experts’ testimony due to lack of qualifications.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“c) Analysis On the present record, we find that “low molecular weight” is not limited to Patent Owner’s proposed “from about 50 Daltons to about 1,500 Daltons.” The cited evidence relied on in the Pomper Declaration all concerns metabolomics and metabolites, and we find no reason that even a vague definition of metabolites applies to the claimed compounds. See Ex. 1002, ¶ 102. Moreover, the uncontested fact that several of the B moieties alone—without the A moiety or L linker—specifically identified in the ’201 patent fall outside of Patent Owner’s proposed definition is persuasive (see id., ¶ 103), as we normally do not interpret claim terms in a way that excludes examples disclosed in the specification. See, e.g., Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (rejecting proposed claim interpretation that would exclude disclosed examples in the specification). In addition, the opinion stated in the Pomper Declaration that “the term of ‘low molecular weight’ is well accepted in the chemical arts’” and the declarant “recognize[s] that low molecular weight compounds would have a molecular weight of typically form about 50 Daltons to about 1,500 Daltons” is offered by a co-inventor. We, as factfinder, have discretion to weigh the credibility of expert witnesses and to give each item of evidence such weight as appropriate. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”). In this case, we find that the published references on metabolites do not support the opinion. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d at 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”) The Pomper reference (Ex. 1006) also uses the term “low molecular weight”—without further characterization of the term—and is uninformative as to the meaning of the term. See Ex. 2002, ¶ 60; Ex. 1006, ¶ 12. The table giving the molecular weight of a “selection of compounds disclosed by Pomper” (see Ex. 2002, ¶ 62) is not persuasive in defining “low molecular weight,” as it does not explain how those included were “selected” and does not include molecular weights for all of the examples.7 In addition, Patent Owner’s definition does not appear to apply to all claimed compounds.8 7 At least one of the examples (SRV73) not included in the table appears to have a molecular weight well over “about 1,500 Daltons.” 8 See, e.g., claim 113 of Ex. 1006. Patent Owner’s arguments distinguishing “low molecular weight” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“The ’201 patent defines “alkyl” as “a straight (i.e., unbranched) or branched chain, acyclic or cyclic hydrocarbon group, or combination thereof” “ that has “the number of carbon atoms designated (i.e., C1–C10 means one to ten carbons, including 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 carbons)” and “[i]n particular embodiments, the term ‘alkyl’ refers to C1-20 inclusive, including 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 carbons” “unless otherwise stated.” Ex. 1001, 39:44–58. Although substituents at the R1x position in the claims are limited to “C1-6alkyl,” those at position R3x are not. Ex. 1001, Certif. Corr. Patent Owner’s representation that “Jansen I provides ‘the following definitions’ stating that ‘alkyls groups of this invention comprise from 1 to 6 carbon atoms’” is inaccurate. See Prelim. Resp. 19. In fact, Jansen I states: The term “alkyl” by itself or as part of another substituent refers to a fully saturated hydrocarbon of Formula CxH2x+1 wherein x is a number greater than or equal to 1. Generally, alkyl groups of this invention comprise from 1 to 6 carbon atoms. Alkyl groups may be linear or branched and may be substituted as indicated herein. When a subscript is used herein following a carbon atom, the subscript refers to the number of carbon atoms that the named group may contain. Ex. 1007, 22:16–23 (emphasis added). Neither the ’201 patent nor its incorporation by reference of Jansen I would have conveyed to a POSA that the “(CO)alkyl” of the substituent in the R3x position in the claims is intended to comprise from one to six carbon atoms or is limited to any particular length and size. “(C(O)alkyl,” having no number of carbon atoms designated, means” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,938,201 - Trove Brands, LLC v. Camelbak Products, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00155 · APJ James A Worth · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 3–9, 11–17, or 19 were unpatentable on the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018).1 For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of claims 1, 3–9, 11–17, and 19 of the ’187 patent is unpatentable based on the grounds set forth in the Petition, and we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent coursework, and a year or more of experience in designing, prototyping, and/or manufacturing fluid containers or similar products. Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 29). Petitioner asserts that more work experience may substitute for a lower level of education, and vice versa. Id. Patent Owner admittedly sets forth “a similar, though slightly different, level of ordinary skill”: a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or the equivalent coursework and approximately one year of experience with liquid-containing devices, with more work experience substituting for less education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 27 (citing Ex.2001 ¶¶ 60–64). Patent Owner discerns no material difference between the definitions provided by the parties for purposes of the Board’s decision on whether to institute this proceeding. Id. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill as being consistent with the prior art, although our conclusion on whether to institute would be unchanged under either definition.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“The failure to use the word “means” in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112 ¶ 6 does not apply. Williamson v. Citrix Online, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). The presumption can be overcome and § 112 ¶ 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to “recite[ ] sufficiently definite structure” or else recites “function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function. “Construing a means-plus-function claim term is a two-step process.” Id. at 1351. “The [tribunal] must first identify the claimed function.” Id. “Then, the [tribunal] must determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function.” Id. There may be multiple claimed functions, each with disclosed corresponding structure. See id. at 1351–52.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We are persuaded by Patent Owner that the term “automatically” in “to automatically disengage the first and second catch structures” means that it is not just the force applied by the user that disengages the first and second catch structures, but also the bias of the mouthpiece that helps to disengage the first and second catch structures. In the first instance, we agree with Patent Owner that the claim itself recites that, upon actuation, the mouthpiece assembly is “release[d]” to “move via its bias from the stowed configuration to the dispensing configuration.” See Ex. 1001, 21:59–64. This meaning is supported by the Specification which states: “In some examples, the mouthpiece assembly is biased toward the dispensing configuration and thus moves automatically under its bias upon release by the user-release mechanism.” Ex. 1001, 1:64–67. We further agree with Patent Owner that the plain and ordinary meaning of “automatic” is that the user operation alone is not responsible for the action. For example, in one dictionary cited by Petitioner, “automatic” is defined as “2: having a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism.” See Ex. 2007, 1.11 The district court construction is consistent therewith. The district court identified two functions, the first of which is the same as that of the ’028 patent, i.e., “Automatically disengaging the first and second catch structures upon actuation of the user release mechanism and thereby releasing the mouthpiece assembly to move via its bias from the stowed configuration to the dispensing configuration.” See Section II.C.1, supra. In discussing that function, the district court states: “While a user may impart force upon user engagement portion 260 to release the mouthpiece, the bias of the mouthpiece towards the dispensing configuration causes the mouthpiece to move automatically, satisfying the requirements of Claim 1.” Ex. 2002, 16. We conclude that the term “automatically” in “adapted to” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,684,187 - PTAB · Jul 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00222 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8–11, 13–16, and 19 because the petition showed a reasonable likelihood of success on the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The Board determines whether to institute a trial on behalf of the Director. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). A decision to institute is “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition.” PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“relevant time would have had a “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2–3 years of experience in digital imaging systems.” Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–18). In the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner contends that a skilled artisan would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, physics, or a related subject, and two to three years of work experience in digital imaging.” Prelim. Resp. 30 (citing Ex. 2005 ¶ 82). For purposes of this Decision, and based on the current record, we adopt Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art. However, we note Patent Owner’s proposed characterization of a skilled artisan is not meaningfully different than the one proposed by Petitioner. Because we find the parties’ characterizations to be consistent with the ’158 patent and the asserted prior art, our analysis below applies Petitioner’s characterization for the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Prelim. Resp. 22–23 (citing Pet. 8; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 71–72; Ex. 2009 ¶ 34); see id. at 23–29 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:43–45, 1:52–53, 1:58–2:5, 2:34–47, 3:47– 57, 4:3–6, 5:3–15; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 74–81; Ex. 1015, 48; Ex. 1030, 150–151, 153, 515–517; Ex. 2011, 267–269; Ex. 2012, 2–3; Ex. 2015, 7:55–8:11, Fig. 5). At this stage of the proceeding, however, we decline to read into the accepted District Court construction of “integration time” the additional negative limitation that Patent Owner proposes––i.e., the term “scene” excludes a photograph or still image. This is an issue that warrants a more fully developed record by both parties. For now, even without having the benefit of Petitioner’s position on this issue, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would be successful in refuting Patent Owner’s proposed negative limitation. This is because the ’158 patent makes clear that the invention is intended to address “a need for a digital camera in which the effective single-frame dynamic exposure range is expanded” to accommodate situations wherein a scene may include “an indoor room with a window view of the outdoors, an outdoor scene with mixed shadows and bright sunshine, and evening or night scenes combining artificial lighting and shadows.” Ex. 1001, 1:43–49, 2:28–42, 3:39–41. The ’158 patent explains that “[i]mage capture by the camera is performed using multiple camera channels, and each camera channel is controlled during a frame under an independent integration time.” Id. at 3:47–50 (emphasis added). The ’158 patent states further that its “digital camera systems, through the use of multiple integration times, enable formation of an image having a wide dynamic range by combining the data from all camera channels to form a composite single frame.” Id. at 3:28–61 (emphasis added). Still further, the ’158 patent states for one exemplary embodiment that “[t]he integration time of at least one channel is controlled relative to the integration time of at least one other channel so that an image formed by combining data of a frame received simultaneously from the channels has a relatively large dynamic range.” Id. at 5:6–11 (emphasis added). Rather than supporting Patent Owner’s contention that the meaning of the term “integration time” excludes a photograph or still image, the above illustrative teachings from the ’158 patent establish at least a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would succeed in establishing that “integration time,” and the term “scene” more particularly, encompasses the time the image sensor collects and integrates signals for a photograph or still image. As Patent Owner appears to acknowledge, the ordinary meaning of “scene” encompasses a “shot,” as well as, a “frame” (Prelim. Resp. 27 (citing Ex. 2011, 267–269)) and, as such, it would be counterintuitive to adopt an interpretation of “integration time” that excludes the very parts that make up a scene. Additionally, dependent claim 2 suggests that “integration time” encompasses a frame of a scene because it recites, “[t]he device of claim 1,” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“demonstrated sufficiently that there is a reasonable likelihood it would be successful in establishing Matsushima discloses or renders obvious limitation 1.3. Petitioner’s evidence shows that Matsushima discloses “two independent imaging systems” controlled by CPU 30 that each form an image on the light-receiving surfaces of CCD sensors 18A and 18B via their respective imaging optics 14A and 14B. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 17, 28 (emphasis added). In that configuration, Matsushima teaches that CCD sensors 18A and 18B each has an associated CCD drive circuit 20A and 20B that apply CCD drive pulses to retrieve the accumulated signal charges of their respective CCD sensors. Id. ¶ 23. Additionally, Matsushima teaches that CCD sensors 18A and 18B each has an “electronic shutter function that controls the accumulation time (shutter speed) of the charge accumulated by each sensor via shutter gate pulses” and that the shutter speed is determined based on integration of the Red, Green, and Blue signals in a single frame by the integration circuit 60A and 60B. Id. ¶¶ 24, 31, 34–35. Patent Owner notably does not dispute Petitioner’s cited evidence shows Matsushima discloses a processing component configured to control the integration time for CCD sensors 18A and 18B. See Prelim. Resp. 34– 50. Instead, despite Matsushima’s teaching that its imaging systems are independent, Patent Owner argues that Matsushima does not disclose independently controlling the integration time for CCD sensors 18A and 18B. Id. This is so, according to Patent Owner, because Matsushima describes operating CCD drive circuits 20A and 20B synchronously and describes using a single, common shutter speed for each of CCD sensors 18A and 18B. Id. at 35–38 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 17, 23, 27, 31, 34–35; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 88–92). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner’s argument raises genuine issues of disputed fact that would be best resolved on a fully developed record, rather than undermining the reasonable likelihood of success of Petitioner’s contention. In particular, going forward, the record would benefit from the parties addressing the issue raised by Patent Owner regarding whether Matsushima discloses to a skilled artisan individually controlling the shutter speed of each CCD sensor 18A and 18B. For example, although Patent Owner notes that Matsushima suggests an embodiment that may use a single, common shutter speed value and an intention for each circuit to be driven synchronously, it is unclear why those facts demonstrate Matsushima fails to suggest individually controlling the integration time of the disclosed independent imaging systems. To the extent Patent Owner is suggesting that limitation 1.3 does not encompass individually controlling the integration time of CCDs sensor 18A and 18B to operate synchronously with a single, common shutter speed value, Patent Owner should explain how the intrinsic record of the ’158 patent and the understanding of a skilled artisan at the time of the invention supports that position. Nevertheless, at this time and on this record, we determine there is a reasonable likelihood of success that Matsushima renders unpatentable claims 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, 11, 13–16, and 19.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,232,158 - PTAB · Jul 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00221 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–8 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would have been shown unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that Petitioner demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Relying on the declaration testimony of Dr. Kotzin, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan for the ’889 patent [w]ould have been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the wireless communications systems that are pertinent to the ’889 patent. That person would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of wireless communication systems or design of similar communication systems. Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 25). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally, Prelim. Resp. Based on this record, and because there is no dispute, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’889 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We point out that in contrast with Patent Owner’s case law, the “indefinite article ‘a’ or ‘an’ in patent parlance usually carries the meaning of ‘one or more’ in open-ended claims containing the transitional phrase ‘comprising.’” KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “That ‘a’ or ‘an’ can mean ‘one or more’ is best described as a rule, rather than merely as a presumption or even a convention.” Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “The subsequent use of definite articles ‘the’ or ‘said’ in a claim to refer back to the same claim term does not change the general plural rule, but simply reinvokes that non-singular meaning.” Id. “The exceptions to this rule are extremely limited: a patentee must evince a clear intent to limit ‘a’ or ‘an’ to ‘one.’” 01 Communique Lab’y, Inc. v. LogMeIn, Inc., 687 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012). But for the time being, we need not decide this issue.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“D. Ground 1: Claims 1, 2, 5, and 6 – Obviousness over Dateki Petitioner contends that claims 1, 2, 5, and 6 of the ’889 patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Dateki. Pet. 21–47. Patent Owner opposes. Prelim. Resp. 33–64. Having considered the arguments and evidence before us, we determine that the record establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on this asserted ground of unpatentability. In their Preliminary Response, Patent Owner has limited the dispute at the institution stage mainly towards limitations [1.2], [1.3] and [1.4] and the claimed “control message.” We, therefore, address specifically the parties’ arguments with respect to these claim limitations.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,664,889 - Bowmar Archery LLC v. Matthew FuttereNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 30, 2025 · IPR2024-00401 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 7, 9, 11, 12, 15, and 17 were not shown unpatentable under any asserted anticipation or obviousness ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties do not identify, and we do not discern, any material difference between the parties’ proposed definitions. For purposes of this decision and based on the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill. Also, we note that we would reach the same conclusions under either proposed standard.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“1. Ferrule Petitioner argues that the ’177 patent “defines ‘ferrule’ as a ‘generally cylindrical body,’” which interpretation Petitioner asserts “is consistent with the ordinary meaning to [an ordinarily skilled artisan].” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:53–55; Ex. 1019 ¶ 61). Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s proposed interpretation of this claim term. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested interpretation of “ferrule.” 2. Blade Member Patent Owner argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As discussed in section II.C.2 above, we interpret a “blade member” to have a cutting surface. Petitioner does not support adequately its assertion that Lint’s barbs 19 have a cutting surface. Petitioner acknowledges that Lint discloses “barb 19,” but Petitioner merely labels the barbs as blade members in annotated versions of Lint Figure 2. Pet. 21–22, 24. Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Kuhn, provides substantially identical testimony, also failing to explain how Lint’s barbs have a cutting surface or perform a cutting function. See Ex. 1019 ¶¶ 68, 70. Such conclusory assertions fail to satisfy Petitioner’s burden of persuasion. To the contrary of Petitioner’s assertions, Lint discloses that its barbs do not perform a cutting function. Lint discloses that its barbs retract to the closed position upon impact with an animal. Ex. 1002, 2:62–67. Only when the arrowhead has “completely penetrated the flesh of an animal” does the spring urge the barbs into the extended position “to retain the arrowhead within the animal.” Id. at 2:67–70.6 Lint discloses that its barbs provide 6 During the hearing, Petitioner’s counsel argued that Lint’s disclosure of its barbs deploying “[a]fter the arrowhead 10 has completely penetrated the flesh of an animal” means the spring urges the barbs forward after the resistance to the removal of the arrow from an animal (id. at 1:53–57, 2:67–70), but Lint does not disclose its barbs as performing any cutting function. Thus, Lint’s barbs are not blade members with a cutting surface as we have interpreted the term above. Petitioner has failed to explain adequately how Lint discloses first and second blade members as recited in independent claims 1 and 11.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“A claimed modification to the prior art may be an obvious design choice if the claimed structure performs the same function as in the prior art and it presents no novel or unexpected result over the prior art. See In re Kuhle, 526 F.2d 553, 555 (CCPA 1975) (finding that the use of the claimed feature “would be an obvious matter of design choice” when it “solves no stated problem” and “presents no novel or unexpected result” over the disclosed alternatives); Ex parte Maeda, Appeal No. 2010-009814, at 6–7 (PTAB Oct. 23, 2012) (informative) (“‘design choice’ may be appropriate where the applicant fails to set forth any reasons why the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art would result in a different function or give unexpected results” (citing In re Chu, 66 F.3d 292, 298–99 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). The ’177 patent explains that the purpose of the recited blade members is to maximize the cutting surface of the arrowhead through an animal’s soft flesh to increase the likelihood of a successful kill and minimize undue suffering of the animal. Ex. 1001, 1:26–30, 4:8–10, 4:21–24. The purpose of Lint’s barbs, on the other hand, is to resist removal of the arrow from an animal. Ex. 1002, 2:67–70. Indeed, Lint discloses that only when the arrowhead has “completely penetrated the flesh of an animal” does the spring urge the barbs into the extended position. Id. Thus, contrary to the conclusory assertions of Petitioner and Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Kuhn (see Pet. 49–51; Ex. 1019 ¶ 119), the recited blade members and Lint’s barbs perform vastly different functions. Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Kuhn explains adequately how the proposed modification to Lint’s barbs would be a mere matter of design choice. For at least the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s first alternative” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 8,043,177 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,043,177 - PTAB · Jun 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00140 · APJ James A Worth · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–18 on all petitioned challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least claim 1 is obvious over Nakajima and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of claims 1–18 of the ’250 patent is unpatentable, and we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–18 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent coursework, and a year or more of experience in designing, prototyping, and/or manufacturing fluid containers or similar products. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 25). Petitioner asserts that more work experience may substitute for a lower level of education, and vice versa. Id. Patent Owner admittedly sets forth “a similar, though slightly different, level of ordinary skill”: a bachelor’s degree in mechanical experience with liquid-containing devices, with more work experience substituting for less education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 28 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 50). Patent Owner discerns no material difference between the definitions provided by the parties for purposes of the Board’s decision on whether to institute this proceeding. Id. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill as being consistent with the prior art, although our conclusion on whether to institute would be unchanged under either definition.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“For purposes of this decision on institution, we adopt the proffered dictionary definition of “mouthpiece” as “a part (as of an instrument) that goes in the mouth or to which the mouth is applied” (see Ex. 2005), and we construe this as an intended use of this component of the apparatus, because this definition is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term which is a compound of “mouth” and “piece” and also because this definition is consistent with the Specification. For example, the Specification describes the use of the mouthpiece as follows: “In use, the mouthpiece is adapted to be configured to the dispensing configuration by a user placing the mouthpiece in the user’s mouth and biting upon or otherwise compressing the appropriate portions of sidewalls 92 of the mouthpiece.” Ex. 1001, 8:45–49. We note that, although the Specification refers to bite-actuation of the mouthpiece, for example in the field of the disclosure and certain embodiments (e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:25–27), the independent claims do not require bite-actuation. The Specification identifies the mouthpiece as item 72 (which is depicted, for example, in Figure 25, reproduced supra). Ex. 1001, 3:7‒8. 7 Exhibit 2005 appears to be from an online Merriam-Webster dictionary accessed March 13, 2025. Ex. 2005, 4. At this time, there is no argument in the preliminary record that this definition would have been different before the critical date of the patent.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Although the construction of this limitation may be helpful in deciding the issues of unpatentability, we determine that the construction of this term would benefit from further briefing during the trial phase of this proceeding, and we invite the parties to continue to brief this issue. Therefore, we do not provide a preliminary construction of the term at this time.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,851,250 - PTAB · May 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00057 · APJ Hung H Bui · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all asserted grounds because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable, principally failing to address the required hardware action.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Turning now to our application of SuperGuide, we note the language of the claims and the specification, as correctly recognized by the Patent Owner, confirm that the conjunctive construction of the phrase “at least one of [A] the display, [B] the audio and [C] the hardware (HW) action” is correct. Prelim. Resp. 9–10.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“We agree with Patent Owner. First, the construction of the phrase “at least one of [A] the display, [B] the audio and [C] the hardware (HW) action” is conjunctive in light of the language of the claims and the specification of the ’887 patent. As such, Petitioner has the burden, but fails to show all three (3) components to be reproduced at Yun’s mobile device, including: [A] the display, [B] the audio and [C] the hardware (HW) action by the HW component of the mobile device. Second, as Patent Owner observes, and we agree, “Petitioner ignores the requirement for ‘the hardware (HW) action’ entirely” and does not even mention any “hardware (HW) action.” Prelim. Resp. 14.” slip op. at 22
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied merits
“35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. We may institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the contentions and the evidence of record at this preliminary stage, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’887 patent. For the reasons discussed below, we deny the Petition and do not institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’887 patent.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“K. Discretion to Denial Under § 314(a) Patent Owner argues that we should exercise discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and not institute trial, given the state of the parallel district court litigation. Prelim. Resp. 26–38. Because we determine that Petitioner does not establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing based on the merits of its challenges, we need not consider Patent Owner’s arguments regarding discretionary denial.” slip op. at 34
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,934,887
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.