- DISH Network LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01060 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 are unpatentable: claims 1–2, 4–6, 8–10, 12–14, and 16–17 as obvious over Amit and Jacobsen; claims 2–3, 7, 9–13, 15, and 17 as obvious over Amit, Jacobsen, and DSL-Book.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“Considering the parties’ proposals and the record evidence, we adopt the following level of ordinary skill in the art, which we apply in this Decision: A POSITA would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, and two to three years of experience with broadband communication networks. Additional professional experience could substitute for education, and additional education could substitute for professional experience. We find Patent Owner’s proposal to limit a POSITA’s education and experience to “broadband networks over coaxial cables” too narrow. Although Patent Owner points to various parts of the ’249 patent as supporting its restrictive proposal, other parts of the patent are not so limited. For example, the patent’s technical field and summary are not limited to coaxial cable, and the patent discusses LAN wiring, twisted pair, and satellite as communications media that can be used. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:11–16, 2:65–66, 3:9–37, 3:58–61, 7:4–5. In addition, while Patent Owner indicates that the ’249 patent addresses “the problem of tap port-to-port isolation and providing a suitable signal path for terminal-to-terminal communication in a coaxial cable wired building” (id. at 3:4–7), we see no reason why this problem and the solutions proposed in the ’249 patent (using frequency bins to bit load or equalization) would not be equally applicable to other kinds of communication media. Therefore, we find our adopted skill level to be consistent with the problems and solutions identified in the ’249 patent and prior art references asserted by Petitioner. In addition, we find the adopted” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“Only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner contends that the challenged claims would have been “obvious under any reasonable interpretation, so no express constructions are required.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not offer any construction for any claim term. Accordingly, there is no dispute over claim construction that we need to resolve. We apply the ordinary and customary meanings consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b).” slip op. at 15
- BurdenUnpatentable
“On this record, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Jacobsen was publicly accessible more than one year before the ’249 patent. Jacobsen is thus § 102(b) prior art. By its own terms, Jacobsen indicates that it is one of the National Cable Television Association (“NCTA”) 1994 Technical Papers related to the 43rd Annual NCTA Convention and Exposition, New Orleans, Louisiana, May 22–25, 1994. Ex. 1007, 1–3, 6. This event and related papers address topics that would have interested persons in the field as we define their skill level. See § II.B, supra. The listing of Jacobsen as one of the papers covered in the event schedule suggests that POSITAs attending this event would have known of and had access to Jacobsen. Ex. 1007, 2–3. In fact, Mr. Bates, Patent Owner’s own expert witness, who was at least a person having ordinary skill in the art, testified that he was aware of Dr. Jacobsen’s work in the late 1990s, well before the priority date. See Ex. 1029, 52:10– 55:1. Therefore, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have known of Jacobsen before the priority date. See Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that a catalog distributed at a conference was a printed publication); In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding a slide presentation at a conference was a printed publication); Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. AB Fortia, 774, F.2d 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that a paper disseminated to six people of ordinary skill in the art and discussed with between 50 and 500 people skilled in the art was a printed publication). The evidence further demonstrates that Jacobsen was acquired by the Linda Hall Library, Kansas City, Missouri, on September 19, 1995 and made available to the public shortly afterward. Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 4–5, 13; Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 7, 17. Availability to interested persons more than one year before the ’249 patent is corroborated by other publications of Jacobsen, as well as Dr. Acton’s testimony. Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 10–13; Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 10–12, 16–17; Ex. 1003 ¶ 247. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments against Jacobsen. There is no requirement in the law for Ms. Munford to be an interested person or POSITA in order for her to testify about how the Linda Hall Library acquired and cataloged Jacobsen so that interested persons would be able to access it. Her testimony relates to the public accessibility of Jacobsen, not its technical content. See, e.g., Ex. 1031 ¶ 6. She need not qualify as a POSITA to offer this testimony. Ms. Munford further testified that MARC records are used by the public to discover materials within a library’s collection, and that library users, which would include interested persons and POSITAs, do not require knowledge of how MARC records are maintained in order to use them. Ex. 1031 ¶ 8. And even if MARC records are editable, as Patent Owner argues, Patent Owner has not shown that the MARC record for Jacobsen was altered, and Ms. Munford states that such an alteration would have been unusual practice for a library. Ex. 1022 ¶ 4; Ex. 1031 ¶ 14.” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“On this record, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Jacobsen was publicly accessible more than one year before the ’249 patent. Jacobsen is thus § 102(b) prior art. By its own terms, Jacobsen indicates that it is one of the National Cable Television Association (“NCTA”) 1994 Technical Papers related to the 43rd Annual NCTA Convention and Exposition, New Orleans, Louisiana, May 22–25, 1994. Ex. 1007, 1–3, 6. This event and related papers address topics that would have interested persons in the field as we define their skill level. See § II.B, supra. The listing of Jacobsen as one of the papers covered in the event schedule suggests that POSITAs attending this event would have known of and had access to Jacobsen. Ex. 1007, 2–3. In fact, Mr. Bates, Patent Owner’s own expert witness, who was at least a person having ordinary skill in the art, testified that he was aware of Dr. Jacobsen’s work in the late 1990s, well before the priority date. See Ex. 1029, 52:10– 55:1. Therefore, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have known of Jacobsen before the priority date. See Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that a catalog distributed at a conference was a printed publication); In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding a slide presentation at a conference was a printed publication); Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. AB Fortia, 774, F.2d 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that a paper disseminated to six people of ordinary skill in the art and discussed with between 50 and 500 people skilled in the art was a printed publication). The evidence further demonstrates that Jacobsen was acquired by the Linda Hall Library, Kansas City, Missouri, on September 19, 1995 and made available to the public shortly afterward. Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 4–5, 13; Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 7, 17. Availability to interested persons more than one year before the ’249 patent is corroborated by other publications of Jacobsen, as well as Dr. Acton’s testimony. Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 10–13; Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 10–12, 16–17; Ex. 1003 ¶ 247. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments against Jacobsen. There is no requirement in the law for Ms. Munford to be an interested person or POSITA in order for her to testify about how the Linda Hall Library acquired and cataloged Jacobsen so that interested persons would be able to access it. Her testimony relates to the public accessibility of Jacobsen, not its technical content. See, e.g., Ex. 1031 ¶ 6. She need not qualify as a POSITA to offer this testimony. Ms. Munford further testified that MARC records are used by the public to discover materials within a library’s collection, and that library users, which would include interested persons and POSITAs, do not require knowledge of how MARC records are maintained in order to use them. Ex. 1031 ¶ 8. And even if MARC records are editable, as Patent Owner argues, Patent Owner has not shown that the MARC record for Jacobsen was altered, and Ms. Munford states that such an alteration would have been unusual practice for a library. Ex. 1022 ¶ 4; Ex. 1031 ¶ 14.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 7,594,249 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,594,249 - Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 21, 2025 · IPR2021-01150 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held that Petitioner had not shown claims 1–18 unpatentable under § 103 over Paxton, Sutton, and Ivershen because the combination did not teach or motivate transmission responsive to correlation.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“the Final Written Decision for “not clearly explaining its holding or rationale regarding motivation to combine and whether the proposed combination teaches the final limitation of claim 1: transmitting an indication of the first host responsive to the correlating.” Palo Alto Networks, 122 F.4th at 1384. In the opinion, the Federal Circuit explained that the Final Written Decision “never made a clear finding on whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Paxton by adding Sutton’s step of transmitting a notification of malicious activity after Paxton’s correlation step,” as proposed by Petitioner. Id. at 1385. The Federal Circuit stated that the Board “failed to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to modify Paxton to provide the recited notification as taught by Sutton in response to the correlation disclosed in Paxton.” Id. The Federal Circuit concluded that “[b]y reading Paxton and Sutton in isolation, the Board erred,” and that we vacate and remand for the Board to clarify and explain its holding on whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to transmit the identity of the first host (e.g., to an administrator) as taught by Sutton, responsive to the correlating disclosed by Paxton to improve network security.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“the alleged invention of the ’903 patent “had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and approximately 2–3 years of experience in the design or development of telecommunication systems, or the equivalent.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18–20). Petitioner further notes that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Id. Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill is similar, with Patent Owner contending that the ordinary skilled artisan “would be someone with a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or related field, and either (1) two or more years of industry experience and/or (2) an advanced degree in computer science or related field.” PO Resp. 12–13 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 27– 31). Similar to Petitioner, Patent Owner also states that a person of ordinary skill in the art “may have additional industry experience in lieu of a formal degree.” Id. at 13.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“After review of the current record, we conclude that no express claim construction is necessary for the purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“responsive to the correlation, we are not persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of these references in the manner advocated by Petitioner. Petitioner contends that this combination would only involve “[t]he application of known techniques (e.g., Sutton’s implementation of rules and data to define security policies, disallowed websites, etc.) to improve similar devices (e.g., servers, gateways, firewalls, etc. in Sutton’s and Paxton’s systems) to provide predictable results in the same way (e.g., to provide packet-filtering functions preventing communications with potentially malicious hosts).” Id. at 22–23.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 10,530,903 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,530,903 - PTAB · Jul 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00220 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 because Tesla showed a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–18 would have been obvious over Wallen and Berggren.
RulingsInstitution decision- Director reviewOther
“Memorandum (“Memorandum”) issued on March 26, 2025, Patent Owner filed its Discretionary Denial Brief on April 7, 2025. Paper 6. Petitioner filed its Opposition Brief on May 27, 2025. Paper 8. On June 13, 2025, Acting Director Stewart issued a decision determining that discretionary denial of institution is not appropriate in this case and referring the Petition to us for merits and other non-discretionary statutory considerations. Paper 9.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had a bachelor’s degree from an accredited program in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and at least two years of professional experience relating to wireless communication technology” and “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’670 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art. slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“establishes sufficiently for the purpose of institution that the combined teachings of Wallen and Berggren teach or suggest all of the limitations recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 14
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,206,670 - PTAB · Jun 26, 2025 · IPR2025-00217 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–5, 10–15, and 20 on all four asserted § 103 grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we institute review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS A. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner asserts that ordinarily skilled artisans “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of wireless communication systems or design of similar communication systems.” Pet. 15. Petitioner’s proposed definition, which Patent Owner does not dispute, appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’153 patent, and we adopt it here.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“The parties’ dispute on this issue turns on claim construction. Petitioner’s approach requires we read “accumulation” as updating transmission power for each received TPC command. That is consistent with some aspects of the ’153 patent’s description. See Ex. 1001, 9:29–42 (“[S]tep is the magnitude of the amount added to an accumulator upon receipt of each TPC command. . . . [T]he transmit power PTx(k) may be updated each time a new TPC command is received.”). Patent Owner’s approach requires only that TPC commands cumulatively affect transmission power. That also appears consistent with the ’153 patent’s description. See id. at 9:35–36 (“The transmit power PTx(k) may be updated for every frame period.”). Based on those disclosures, it appears that the Specification supports Patent Owner’s broader construction. We need not resolve the “accumulation” claim-construction dispute at this stage, because Petitioner’s Zeira-based ground justifies institution, as discussed below. The parties should address the proper construction for “TPC command accumulation” in the instituted trial.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner that the present record shows Andersson’s and Khan’s approaches couldn’t or wouldn’t be combined in the manner Petitioner asserts. Although shared-channel applications may have motivated Khan’s approach, it seems that scheduling grants applicable to a particular UE could be transmitted to that UE along with Andersson’s TPC commands. Thus, Patent Owner does not undermine Petitioner’s prior-art combination on the present record. The additional record developed through trial may ultimately support Patent Owner on this point, but at present, this argument does not justify denial of institution. Patent Owner additionally takes issue with Petitioner’s asserted benefits such as “allowing for a larger number of active wireless units,” reducing complexity, and reducing latency. Prelim. Resp. 38 (quoting Pet. 26–27). Those disputes raise potential factual issues that are best resolved through trial.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,952,153 - PTAB · Jun 26, 2025 · IPR2025-00219 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 11–22 based on the Petition’s asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we institute review.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Patent Owner submits that the asserted combination is unworkable and that skilled artisans would not have made it because Andersson’s DPCCH is a dedicated channel sent to a single UE, whereas Khan’s TPC commands and scheduling grants are sent using a shared channel—“a channel that is shared by the UEs attached to a particular base station.” Prelim. Resp. 20. Because Khan’s TPC commands and scheduling grants “are intended for different UEs that share the channel,” unlike Andersson’s TPC commands in a dedicated channel, Patent Owner asserts, “the two frame structures cannot be combined in the manner Petitioner suggests.” Id. at 20–21. Although Andersson describes “other bits” in its data structure, Patent Owner asserts that those “would necessarily be intended for the UE that the DPCCH is dedicated for” and would not work for Khan’s scheduling grants. Id.” slip op. at 8
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,706,500 - Charter Communications, Inc. / Altice USA, Inc. v. Touchstream Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2024-01231 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 22–26 are unpatentable under §103; claims 1–21 were not shown unpatentable because the cited combinations do not teach or justify the claimed server-side command conversion.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’251 patent would have had: (1) the equivalent of a four-year, B.S. degree from an accredited institution in computer science, computer engineering or an equivalent field; (2) approximately two years of professional experience with Internet-based video delivery systems; and (3) working proficiency with network architecture, including Internet-hosted server-client systems, and with computer programming. PO Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 2025 ¶¶ 24–25). Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Wicker, testifies that the parties’ definitions are only “slightly different,” and that if Dr. Wicker were to adopt Petitioner’s definition, that would not change any of his opinions. Ex. 2025 ¶ 24. Because the parties’ definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art only “slightly differ,” we accept the assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’251 patent and the asserted prior art. Regardless of which definition is applied, our analysis and decision would not change.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction Both parties propose construing the claim term “media player” because it was construed in a related inter partes review proceeding as well as in a district court case. Pet. 19; PO Resp. 21. According to Patent Owner, construing “media player” to mean “software for playing media” would be consistent with the construction applied in both related proceedings. PO Resp. 21. Petitioner agrees, noting that the term “media player” “‘refers to software and not to a hardware device.’” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1164, 13). player” used by both parties, and we need not engage in any further claim construction because there are no claim construction disputes that bear on the issues before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Alleged Obviousness of Claims 1–26 in View of Danciu and Mahajan or” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed
“Mr. Lett testifies that Mahajan “allows for its server media abstraction module to be located in a processing device that may not typically be labeled a ‘server,’ such as remote control 14 of Danciu.” Ex. 1198 ¶ 9 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 162; Ex. 1114 ¶ 17). Yet, both Petitioner and Mr. Lett fail to explain how or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would take the distributed nature allowed by Mahajan and completely flip its teachings to put a client or remote device process on a server device. Mr. Lett further fails to explain how or why one would want to move Mahajan’s abstraction layer in the first place. Although Mahajan teaches that its system can operate in a distributed environment, based on the explicit disclosure of Mahajan and its examples, we do not understand “distributed” to mean that (i) the server processes can occur on client devices and (ii) that client processes can occur on server devices. See Ex. 1114 ¶¶ 51, 58, 60, 61, 76, 77. Rather, we understand “distributed computing environments” to encompass “an environment where tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linked through a communications network” because that is what is taught in Mahajan. Id. ¶ 58. Our understanding is supported by the testimony of Mr. Lett. See Ex. 1198 ¶ 8 (reciting the explicit disclosure in Mahajan). It is clear, based on the plain reading of Mahajan, that the distributed environment indicates that server 202 and client 204 could be located in different locations, but would be linked through a communications network where user-command 230 flows from client 204 to server 202. See Ex. 1114 ¶ 35, Fig. 2. At no point does Mahajan teach or even suggest that user-commands 230 would flow from server 202 to client 204 as proposed by Petitioner. Additionally, we find insufficient reason in the record to explain Petitioner’s argument appears to be based completely on hindsight bias created in view of the challenged claims. Therefore, we find little credibility in Mr. Lett’s testimony regarding the change or in Petitioner’s position. To the contrary, we find Dr. Wicker’s testimony to be credible because it is supported by the disclosures in both Mahajan and Danciu. Specifically, we agree with Dr. Wicker, who testified that Mahajan does not describe an abstraction layer as ever being on “a server in the network.” See Ex.1197, 18:21–24. We also find Dr. Wicker’s testimony credible when he explained that even if Mahajan’s abstraction layer were implemented on a server in a network as posited by Petitioner, it still would not result in the claim mapping proposed by Petitioner. See Ex. 2025 ¶ 45 (Dr. Wicker: “[T]he two abstraction modules work together to create a ‘collaboration media abstraction layer 130.’”) (citing Ex. 1114 ¶ 22; Ex. 2027, 39:6–40:12, 44:10–19 (Mr. Lett reading from and agreeing with paragraph 45 of Dr. Wicker’s Declaration)).” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Mr. Lett testifies that Mahajan “allows for its server media abstraction module to be located in a processing device that may not typically be labeled a ‘server,’ such as remote control 14 of Danciu.” Ex. 1198 ¶ 9 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 162; Ex. 1114 ¶ 17). Yet, both Petitioner and Mr. Lett fail to explain how or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would take the distributed nature allowed by Mahajan and completely flip its teachings to put a client or remote device process on a server device. Mr. Lett further fails to explain how or why one would want to move Mahajan’s abstraction layer in the first place. Although Mahajan teaches that its system can operate in a distributed environment, based on the explicit disclosure of Mahajan and its examples, we do not understand “distributed” to mean that (i) the server processes can occur on client devices and (ii) that client processes can occur on server devices. See Ex. 1114 ¶¶ 51, 58, 60, 61, 76, 77. Rather, we understand “distributed computing environments” to encompass “an environment where tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linked through a communications network” because that is what is taught in Mahajan. Id. ¶ 58. Our understanding is supported by the testimony of Mr. Lett. See Ex. 1198 ¶ 8 (reciting the explicit disclosure in Mahajan). It is clear, based on the plain reading of Mahajan, that the distributed environment indicates that server 202 and client 204 could be located in different locations, but would be linked through a communications network where user-command 230 flows from client 204 to server 202. See Ex. 1114 ¶ 35, Fig. 2. At no point does Mahajan teach or even suggest that user-commands 230 would flow from server 202 to client 204 as proposed by Petitioner. Additionally, we find insufficient reason in the record to explain Petitioner’s argument appears to be based completely on hindsight bias created in view of the challenged claims. Therefore, we find little credibility in Mr. Lett’s testimony regarding the change or in Petitioner’s position.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 8,356,251 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,356,251 - Charter Communications, Inc. / Altice USA, Inc. v. Touchstream Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2024-01262 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 22–26 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 1–21 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not teach or justify the claimed server-side command conversion.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’251 patent would have had: (1) the equivalent of a four-year, B.S. degree from an accredited institution in computer science, computer engineering or an equivalent field; (2) approximately two years of professional experience with Internet-based video delivery systems; and (3) working proficiency with network architecture, including Internet-hosted server-client systems, and with computer programming. PO Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 2025 ¶¶ 24–25). Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Wicker, testifies that the parties’ definitions are only “slightly different,” and that if Dr. Wicker were to adopt Petitioner’s definition, that would not change any of his opinions. Ex. 2025 ¶ 24. Because the parties’ definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art only “slightly differ,” we accept the assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’251 patent and the asserted prior art. Regardless of which definition is applied, our analysis and decision would not change.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction Both parties propose construing the claim term “media player” because it was construed in a related inter partes review proceeding as well as in a district court case. Pet. 19; PO Resp. 21. According to Patent Owner, construing “media player” to mean “software for playing media” would be consistent with the construction applied in both related proceedings. PO Resp. 21. Petitioner agrees, noting that the term “media player” “‘refers to software and not to a hardware device.’” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1164, 13). player” used by both parties, and we need not engage in any further claim construction because there are no claim construction disputes that bear on the issues before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Alleged Obviousness of Claims 1–26 in View of Danciu and Mahajan or” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“attempts to extrapolate Mahajan’s specific teachings and specific architecture into a general principle such that specific commands are converted to universal commands and then universal commands are converted to specific commands regardless of the location of the process within a distributed system. See Tr. 14:5–11. Rather, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s extrapolation arguments are unsupported by Mahajan. We understand Petitioner argues that Mahajan’s “distributed computing environments” would have rendered it obvious to alter the location where command conversions occur. Pet. 41; Reply 10–11, 14. Mr. Lett testifies that Mahajan “allows for its server media abstraction module to be located in a processing device that may not typically be labeled a ‘server,’ such as remote control 14 of Danciu.” Ex. 1198 ¶ 9 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 162; Ex. 1114 ¶ 17). Yet, both Petitioner and Mr. Lett fail to explain how or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would take the distributed nature allowed by Mahajan and completely flip its teachings to put a client or remote device process on a server device. Mr. Lett further fails to explain how or why one would want to move Mahajan’s abstraction layer in the first place. Although Mahajan teaches that its system can operate in a distributed environment, based on the explicit disclosure of Mahajan and its examples, we do not understand “distributed” to mean that (i) the server processes can occur on client devices and (ii) that client processes can occur on server devices. See Ex. 1114 ¶¶ 51, 58, 60, 61, 76, 77. Rather, we understand “distributed computing environments” to encompass “an environment where tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linked through a communications network” because that is what is taught in Mahajan. Id. ¶ 58. Our understanding is supported by the testimony of Mr. Lett. See Ex. 1198 ¶ 8 (reciting the explicit disclosure in Mahajan). It is clear, based on the plain reading of Mahajan, that the distributed environment indicates that server 202 and client 204 could be located in different locations, but would be linked through a communications network where user-command 230 flows from client 204 to server 202. See Ex. 1114 ¶ 35, Fig. 2. At no point does Mahajan teach or even suggest that user-commands 230 would flow from server 202 to client 204 as proposed by Petitioner. Additionally, we find insufficient reason in the record to explain” slip op. at 24
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedOther
“Mr. Lett testifies that Mahajan “allows for its server media abstraction module to be located in a processing device that may not typically be labeled a ‘server,’ such as remote control 14 of Danciu.” Ex. 1198 ¶ 9 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 162; Ex. 1114 ¶ 17). Yet, both Petitioner and Mr. Lett fail to explain how or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would take the distributed nature allowed by Mahajan and completely flip its teachings to put a client or remote device process on a server device. Mr. Lett further fails to explain how or why one would want to move Mahajan’s abstraction layer in the first place. Although Mahajan teaches that its system can operate in a distributed environment, based on the explicit disclosure of Mahajan and its examples, we do not understand “distributed” to mean that (i) the server processes can occur on client devices and (ii) that client processes can occur on server devices. See Ex. 1114 ¶¶ 51, 58, 60, 61, 76, 77. Rather, we understand “distributed computing environments” to encompass “an environment where tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linked through a communications network” because that is what is taught in Mahajan. Id. ¶ 58. Our understanding is supported by the testimony of Mr. Lett. See Ex. 1198 ¶ 8 (reciting the explicit disclosure in Mahajan). It is clear, based on the plain reading of Mahajan, that the distributed environment indicates that server 202 and client 204 could be located in different locations, but would be linked through a communications network where user-command 230 flows from client 204 to server 202. See Ex. 1114 ¶ 35, Fig. 2. At no point does Mahajan teach or even suggest that user-commands 230 would flow from server 202 to client 204 as proposed by Petitioner. Additionally, we find insufficient reason in the record to explain Petitioner’s argument appears to be based completely on hindsight bias created in view of the challenged claims. Therefore, we find little credibility in Mr. Lett’s testimony regarding the change or in Petitioner’s position. To the contrary, we find Dr. Wicker’s testimony to be credible because it is supported by the disclosures in both Mahajan and Danciu. Specifically, we agree with Dr. Wicker, who testified that Mahajan does not describe an abstraction layer as ever being on “a server in the network.” See Ex.1197, 18:21–24. We also find Dr. Wicker’s testimony credible when he explained that even if Mahajan’s abstraction layer were implemented on a server in a network as posited by Petitioner, it still would not result in the claim mapping proposed by Petitioner. See Ex. 2025 ¶ 45 (Dr. Wicker: “[T]he two abstraction modules work together to create a ‘collaboration media abstraction layer 130.’”) (citing Ex. 1114 ¶ 22; Ex. 2027, 39:6–40:12, 44:10–19 (Mr. Lett reading from and agreeing with paragraph 45 of Dr. Wicker’s Declaration)).” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 8,356,251 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,356,251 - Charter Communications, Inc. / Altice USA, Inc. v. Touchstream Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2024-00322 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 22–26 are unpatentable under § 103; claims 1–21 were not shown unpatentable because the cited combinations do not teach or justify the claimed server-side command conversion.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’251 patent would have had: (1) the equivalent of a four-year, B.S. degree from an accredited institution in computer science, computer engineering or an equivalent field; (2) approximately two years of professional experience with Internet-based video delivery systems; and (3) working proficiency with network architecture, including Internet-hosted server-client systems, and with computer programming. PO Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 2025 ¶¶ 24–25). Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Wicker, testifies that the parties’ definitions are only “slightly different,” and that if Dr. Wicker were to adopt Petitioner’s definition, that would not change any of his opinions. Ex. 2025 ¶ 24. Because the parties’ definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art only “slightly differ,” we accept the assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’251 patent and the asserted prior art. Regardless of which definition is applied, our analysis and decision would not change.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction Both parties propose construing the claim term “media player” because it was construed in a related inter partes review proceeding as well as in a district court case. Pet. 19; PO Resp. 21. According to Patent Owner, construing “media player” to mean “software for playing media” would be consistent with the construction applied in both related proceedings. PO Resp. 21. Petitioner agrees, noting that the term “media player” “‘refers to software and not to a hardware device.’” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1164, 13). player” used by both parties, and we need not engage in any further claim construction because there are no claim construction disputes that bear on the issues before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Alleged Obviousness of Claims 1–26 in View of Danciu and Mahajan or” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundMotivation foundMixed
“Mr. Lett testifies that Mahajan “allows for its server media abstraction module to be located in a processing device that may not typically be labeled a ‘server,’ such as remote control 14 of Danciu.” Ex. 1198 ¶ 9 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 162; Ex. 1114 ¶ 17). Yet, both Petitioner and Mr. Lett fail to explain how or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would take the distributed nature allowed by Mahajan and completely flip its teachings to put a client or remote device process on a server device. Mr. Lett further fails to explain how or why one would want to move Mahajan’s abstraction layer in the first place. Although Mahajan teaches that its system can operate in a distributed environment, based on the explicit disclosure of Mahajan and its examples, we do not understand “distributed” to mean that (i) the server processes can occur on client devices and (ii) that client processes can occur on server devices. See Ex. 1114 ¶¶ 51, 58, 60, 61, 76, 77. Rather, we understand “distributed computing environments” to encompass “an environment where tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linked through a communications network” because that is what is taught in Mahajan. Id. ¶ 58. Our understanding is supported by the testimony of Mr. Lett. See Ex. 1198 ¶ 8 (reciting the explicit disclosure in Mahajan). It is clear, based on the plain reading of Mahajan, that the distributed environment indicates that server 202 and client 204 could be located in different locations, but would be linked through a communications network where user-command 230 flows from client 204 to server 202. See Ex. 1114 ¶ 35, Fig. 2. At no point does Mahajan teach or even suggest that user-commands 230 would flow from server 202 to client 204 as proposed by Petitioner. Additionally, we find insufficient reason in the record to explain Petitioner’s argument appears to be based completely on hindsight bias created in view of the challenged claims. Therefore, we find little credibility in Mr. Lett’s testimony regarding the change or in Petitioner’s position.” slip op. at 25
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed
“Mr. Lett testifies that Mahajan “allows for its server media abstraction module to be located in a processing device that may not typically be labeled a ‘server,’ such as remote control 14 of Danciu.” Ex. 1198 ¶ 9 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 162; Ex. 1114 ¶ 17). Yet, both Petitioner and Mr. Lett fail to explain how or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would take the distributed nature allowed by Mahajan and completely flip its teachings to put a client or remote device process on a server device. Mr. Lett further fails to explain how or why one would want to move Mahajan’s abstraction layer in the first place. Although Mahajan teaches that its system can operate in a distributed environment, based on the explicit disclosure of Mahajan and its examples, we do not understand “distributed” to mean that (i) the server processes can occur on client devices and (ii) that client processes can occur on server devices. See Ex. 1114 ¶¶ 51, 58, 60, 61, 76, 77. Rather, we understand “distributed computing environments” to encompass “an environment where tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linked through a communications network” because that is what is taught in Mahajan. Id. ¶ 58. Our understanding is supported by the testimony of Mr. Lett. See Ex. 1198 ¶ 8 (reciting the explicit disclosure in Mahajan). It is clear, based on the plain reading of Mahajan, that the distributed environment indicates that server 202 and client 204 could be located in different locations, but would be linked through a communications network where user-command 230 flows from client 204 to server 202. See Ex. 1114 ¶ 35, Fig. 2. At no point does Mahajan teach or even suggest that user-commands 230 would flow from server 202 to client 204 as proposed by Petitioner. Additionally, we find insufficient reason in the record to explain Petitioner’s argument appears to be based completely on hindsight bias created in view of the challenged claims. Therefore, we find little credibility in Mr. Lett’s testimony regarding the change or in Petitioner’s position. To the contrary, we find Dr. Wicker’s testimony to be credible because it is supported by the disclosures in both Mahajan and Danciu. Specifically, we agree with Dr. Wicker, who testified that Mahajan does not describe an abstraction layer as ever being on “a server in the network.” See Ex.1197, 18:21–24. We also find Dr. Wicker’s testimony credible when he explained that even if Mahajan’s abstraction layer were implemented on a server in a network as posited by Petitioner, it still would not result in the claim mapping proposed by Petitioner. See Ex. 2025 ¶ 45 (Dr. Wicker: “[T]he two abstraction modules work together to create a ‘collaboration media abstraction layer 130.’”) (citing Ex. 1114 ¶ 22; Ex. 2027, 39:6–40:12, 44:10–19 (Mr. Lett reading from and agreeing with paragraph 45 of Dr. Wicker’s Declaration)).” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 8,356,251 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,356,251 - Oracle Corporation v. Joseph L. De BellisAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00221 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–7, 15–23, and 25–30 unpatentable as obvious over the five asserted combinations; Zellweger was prior art under § 102(e).
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner’s assertions that Patent Owner has not shown conception of the noted claim language prior to Zellweger’s filing date. For example, claim 1’s limitation 1A requires “determining a database schema.” We find no mention of this in Patent Owner’s conception evidence.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not identify any evidence in the ’720 patent, its file history, or elsewhere, to support its restrictive construction of the claim language, nor do we find any lexicographical definition or disavowal of claim scope to support it. Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Absent lexicography or disavowal, we do not depart from the plain meaning of the claims”). Hence, the ordinary and customary meaning of “providing a list of database fields” in limitation 1B is not limited to the time a search query was 3 A patent related to the ’720 patent, US Patent No. 9,507,835 B2, filed December 17, 2015, uses the term “search-on-the-fly” in its claims. In contrast, the ’720 patent’s claims are directed toward the truncation feature described in the patent. This suggests that Patent Owner chose not to limit the ’720 patent’s claims to the context of “search-on-the-fly” notwithstanding the ’720 patent’s title. Ex. 1001, code (54). submitted.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends as follows: A person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention (“POSITA”) would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related subject, and at least two years of experience working with databases, computer networks, and related web technologies. A more advanced degree can substitute for less work experience and vice versa. Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 57–61). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the problems, solutions, technology, and educational level set forth in the ’720 patent and the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. See generally PO Resp.; Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Accordingly, we apply Petitioner’s proposed level in this Decision.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Specifically, Petitioner contends that Cochran seeks to provide an efficient and user-friendly method to search computer databases, and recognizes that pick lists for searches may be voluminous and exceed the capacity of a pick box to display them simultaneously such that Cochran would benefit from improved navigation methods. Pet. 55–56 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:4–19, 10:58–65; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 482–485). Petitioner asserts that Zellweger sought to remedy the same problem of navigating long pick box lists, and argues that a POSITA would have looked to Zellweger’s Alphabet or Content Lists to replace Cochran’s scroll bars. Id. at 56–57 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 485). Petitioner contends that the combination is “nothing more than using one known method (Zellweger) to improve another known method (Cochran) according to the express teachings of Zellweger to yield predictable results.” Id. at 57. Petitioner contends that Cochran and Zellweger are analogous because they are directed to the same field of accessing information in databases through graphical interfaces that make information more accessible, and are both implemented as computer software. Id. (citing Ex. 1005, code (57), 1:14–20, 4:2–57; Ex. 1007, code (57), 1:35–40, 2:30–43; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 480–481). Petitioner alleges that a POSITA would have had a high expectation of success because, among other reasons, altering Cochran to truncate entries using Zellweger’s Alphabet and Content List menus would require nothing more than routine programming. Id. at 57–58.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 6,760,720 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,760,720 - PTAB · May 7, 2025 · IPR2021-00906 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board denied the motion to amend with proposed substitute claims 69, 70, 77, and 78 because the ’872 application did not provide written-description support.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“for the Federal Circuit. Papers 75–78. On February 3, 2025, the Federal Circuit issued a decision in which it stated: “We vacate and remand the Board’s decision with regard to claims 69 and 77, and their dependent claims, but otherwise affirm.” Paper 80.3 The formal mandate from the Federal Circuit was issued on March 12, 2025. Paper 79.” slip op. at 3
- 112 supportMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“Per the Federal Circuit’s instruction, the “first message” must come before the “another message” and “message preceding the another message.” However, the “first message” identified by Patent Owner, i.e., the RRC Connection Setup message, occurs after what Patent Owner identifies as the “another message,” i.e., the RRC Connection Request message. That mismatching sequence is evident from Figure 15 reproduced above.” slip op. at 8
NonePatents in suitUS 7,580,388
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.