- Uber Technologies, Inc. v. LBT IP II LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 7, 2022 · IPR2022-00879 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied for claims 8–21 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim obvious over the asserted references.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of GPS and related positioning techniques, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“explains this calculation in any further detail, or explains anything about this calculation as it relates to what standard GPS receivers do when calculating position.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 77–79). But Petitioner’s complaints here implicate whether the ’724 patent provides sufficient written description or enablement of the invention defined by claim 13, i.e., issues that are beyond the scope of this inter partes review. Petitioner then concludes, based only on the foregoing: “Therefore, the sole basis for patentability is obvious in view of well-known techniques using standard GPS receivers.” Pet. 8. Petitioner’s declarant makes these same (conclusory) statements verbatim, without more, and with no further explanation or additional citations to evidence. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 77–79; Prelim. Resp. 22. We give such conclusory, unsupported assertions by Petitioner’s expert little or no weight. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 127 F.3d 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that a fact finder is not required to “credit the unsupported assertions of an expert witness”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Thus, as discussed above, we find Petitioner’s arguments unpersuasive.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,728,724 - Alarm.Com, Inc. v. Vivint, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 1, 2022 · IPR2022-00728 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 325(d), finding substantially the same art had been presented during prosecution and no material Office error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“GMBH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”), the Board applied a two-part framework in considering whether to exercise discretion to deny institution under § 325(d): “(1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8.” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied 325dInstitution denied
“After considering the Petition and associated evidence, we exercise” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Based on our review of the record at this stage, we find that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (listing the type of problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology as factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art). See also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”). Accordingly, for purposes of this decision and to the extent necessary, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner does not propose constructions for any claim terms. See Pet. 6 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)). On this record, we determine that no terms or phrases in the claims require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’ . . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,349,262 - PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Times Fiber Communications, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 24, 2022 · IPR2022-00831 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 9–19 because Patent Owner effectively disclaimed all challenged claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“claims challenged in a petition, no inter partes review is instituted. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Co., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“The patent owner may file a statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. [§] 253(a) in compliance with § 1.321(a) of this chapter, disclaiming one or more claims in the patent. No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”). For a disclaimer to be recorded in the Office, the disclaimer must: (1) Be signed by the patentee, or an attorney or agent of record; (2) Identify the patent and complete claim or claims, or term being disclaimed. . . . ; (3) State the present extent of patentee’s ownership interest in the patent; and (4) Be accompanied by the fee set forth in [37 C.F.R.] § 1.20(d). 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a); see also Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding § 253 disclaimer is immediately “recorded” on the date the USPTO receives a disclaimer meeting the requirements of § 1.321(a), and no further action is required in the USPTO).” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 10,589,957 - PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Times Fiber Communications, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 24, 2022 · IPR2022-00830 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–14 and 16–21 because the Patent Owner effectively disclaimed all challenged claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentDenied
“conclude a disclaimer of claims 1–14 and 16–21 of the ’632 Patent, under 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) has been recorded in the Office as of July 28, 2022. Ex. 2002. Vectra Fitness, Inc., 162 F.3d at 1382. The record shows that a completed Form PTO/SB/43 (“DISCLAIMER IN PATENT UNDER 37 CFR 1.321(a)”) was filed and received by the Office on that date. See Ex. 2002. The disclaimer form was signed by Lance D’Armico, Secretary for Patent Owner Times Fiber Communications, Inc. See Ex. 2002, 3; see also Ex. 2001 (recorded assignment of the challenged patent from Amphenol Corporation to Times Fiber Communications, Inc., executed on December 23, 2021). The form identifies Patent Owner as having a “100% Ownership Interest” in the ’632 Patent, and identifies claims 1–14 and 16– 21 as being disclaimed. See Ex. 2002, 3. The evidence also reflects payment of the required fee. See id. at 1, 4–5. We determine Patent Owner has met the requirements for an effective disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253 and 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). In view of this disclaimer, and as consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) and the Board’s precedential General Electric decision, we determine a denial of institution is sufficient to dispose of this case. See Gen. Elec. Co., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9. Thus, we decline to institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,913,632 - ADT LLC v. Vivint, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 22, 2022 · IPR2022-00612 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 325(d), finding substantially the same art had been considered and no material examiner error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Because (1) Saylor ’265 was made of record by the examiner and contains essentially the same disclosure as Saylor, (2) we find that the disclosures of Gregory relied upon by Petitioner are duplicative of Kellen and Thomson evaluated and distinguished during examination, and (3) Petitioner extensively relies on Saylor and Gregory in each of the asserted grounds of unpatentability, we determine that the Petition presents the same or substantially the same prior art that was previously presented to” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“the time of the alleged invention would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or computer engineering (or equivalent experience), and at least two years of professional experience in remote monitoring and control systems, Internet of Things (‘IoT’), home security systems, building automation systems, machine-to-machine (‘M2M’) communications, or other similarly relevant industry experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 25). Patent Owner does not provide its own assessment regarding the level of skill in the art, or otherwise dispute Petitioner’s assertion. See Prelim. Resp. Based on our review of the record at this stage, we find that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (listing the type of problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology as factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art). See also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”). we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party proposes specific claim constructions for any terms. Pet. 5; see Prelim. Resp. On this record, we determine that no terms or phrases in the claims require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’ . . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,349,262 - Dell Inc. / Dell Technologies Inc. v. Neo Wireless LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 21, 2022 · IPR2022-00277 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim over the asserted prior art.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). We have authority, acting on the designation of the Director, to determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’908 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Based on our review of the record at this stage, we find that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (listing the type of problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology as factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art). The prior art itself may be sufficient to demonstrate the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s description of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner submits that “[n]o formal claim constructions are necessary because ‘claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Pet. 5 (citing Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Patent Owner also does not propose any terms for construction. See generally Prelim. Resp. We determine that no terms require explicit construction to reach a decision on institution. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“would have had a reason to modify Ma in view of the advantages that TR teaches regarding its guard period. Pet. 7–11, 24 (citing Ex. 1006, 197, 199, 207–208, Figs. 4, 17; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 57–60, 96). However, Petitioner does not show sufficiently, on this record, that the above-discussed disclosures of Ma and TR would have led an ordinarily skilled artisan to incorporate TR’s guard period into Ma’s RACH when that artisan has considered the full disclosure of Ma. Specifically, Petitioner’s analysis, and Dr. Valenti’s testimony in this regard, are both general in nature and fail to explain adequately how or why one of ordinary skill in the art would have implemented TR’s guard period into Ma’s RACH structure.9 See TriVascular, 812 F.3d at 1066 (“Although the KSR test is flexible, the Board ‘must still be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references . . . without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.’” (citation omitted)). Instead, as Patent Owner points out (Prelim. Resp. 20–24), Ma teaches the use of a “spreading factor,” which causes Ma’s RACH signature to be “transmitted at a very low relative power level: e.g., -16 dB,” which “constitutes a very weak interference to the traffic and signalling channels.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 208. In addition, Patent Owner notes that Ma discloses the use of MC-OFDMA, which Ma teaches as introducing “a code multiplexing on top of the ‘frequency and time divisions’ created by the OFDMA.” Id. ¶ 149. For these reasons, and the reasons discussed below, we credit the declaration 9 Dr. Valenti’s testimony merely mirrors the Petition, and Dr. Valenti does not provide additional explanation to support Petitioner’s arguments. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 57–60, 96. testimony of Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. Alberth, that Ma’s teachings already addressed the problems TR’s guard period was meant to solve, and that there would have been “no need to add an additional timeslot to [Ma’s] RACH slot to further reduce interference between RACH and Mode-1.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 30.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,833,908 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Rightquestion, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 9, 2022 · IPR2022-00251 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–4, 6–15, and 17–21 were unpatentable over either asserted obviousness combination.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of authentication techniques, and related firmware and software, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 18, 24–26). Patent Owner states it “will apply the Petitioner’s definition of a [person of ordinary skill in the art] for the purposes of this response, but reserves the right to argue for a different definition should this Petition be instituted.” Prelim. Resp. 7.” slip op. at 12
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Limitation is indefinite. Ex. 2020, 13. Patent Owner argued the limitation should be given its “[p]lain and ordinary meaning; no construction necessary.” Id. After the filing of the Petition and Preliminary Response, the district court in the District Court Case entered a Markman order construing the Secure Backup Limitation, among others. Id. at 13–15, 19. The district court construed the Secure Backup Limitation to mean “create a backup of the record that is protected from unauthorized access and transmit it to a storage service.” Id. at 15. In adopting this construction, the district court found “[t]he words of this disputed phrase have well-understood meanings:” Generally, a “backup” may be either (1) the act of backing up, or (2) a backup copy of data. e.g., See, https://www.yourdictionary.com/backup (last visited Mar. 29, 2022) (defining “backup” as “the act or an instance of backing up computer data, files, etc.” and, alternatively, as “[a] backup copy of data, a file, etc.”). Here, the claims recite “performing a . . . backup,” which aligns only with the former—performing the act of backing up. The limitation is silent as to whether the storage is secure or insecure, but requires the act be “secure.” “Secure” in this context, as already determined with respect to “secure storage,” means “protected from unauthorized access.”” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“another network 115] are a ‘restricted interface’ and petitioner has not offer[ed] a single piece of evidence to the contrary.” Prelim. Resp. 38. Patent Owner argues “Petitioner’s ‘expert’ does not even opine on whether [the skilled artisan] would have viewed a local interface, data bus, or another network as a restricted interface.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 100–101); see id. at 40. Indeed, neither Petitioner nor its expert provides any express construction for what a “restricted interface” is in the context of the ’512 patent, and as argued by Patent Owner (id.), neither explains sufficiently, let alone with particularity, how or why Johansson’s “local interface, data bus, or another network 115” discloses or teaches the claimed “restricted interface.” See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (“particularity”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) (“How the challenged claim is to be construed.”).” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,929,512 - Airbus Americas, Inc. v. Harper Engineering CompanyInstitution deniedPTAB · May 20, 2022 · IPR2022-00195 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable on the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Moreover, a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, the Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, we conclude that the information does not show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ordinary skill in the art in light of the subject matter of the ’244 patent, which is not limited to “aeronautical” or “aerospace” applications, claims a “stowage bin assembly” and a “hinge assembly,” and expressly refers broadly to “transportation vehicles” as typically including “overhead storage compartments,” identifying “airplanes” only as an “example” of a “transportation vehicle.” Ex. 1001, code (57), 1:12–15, 7:31–8:64. Patent Owner’s argument appears to be no more than a transparent attempt to baselessly suggest that Dr. Codd should be excluded from testifying because he lacks “the proper background or sufficient experience in the field” under Patent Owner’s unreasonable proposed level of ordinary skill. See Prelim. Resp. 17–18. Dr. Dershowitz’s testimony in support of Patent Owner on the level of ordinary skill is not credible because it is inconsistent with the ’244 patent and the asserted art. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 58–63. For example, Dr. Dershowitz acknowledges that “[h]inges are common to many mechanical systems,” but then suggests “being familiar with hinges in general may not directly apply to the specifics of this invention” without identifying anything “specific” to the ’244 patent that requires the level of skill Dr. Dershowitz endorses. Id. ¶ 62. Dr. Dershowitz suggests “hinges used in storage solutions that are stationary have fewer requirements related to mass and volume and are not subject to the same forces and stresses that are experienced on an aircraft,” however, the challenged claims of the ’244 patent do not preclude “stationary” storage solutions, do not require anything pertaining to “mass and volume,” and are not required to withstand any “forces and stresses” experienced on an aircraft. Dr. Dershowitz’s opinion that “[d]ue to the unique environment and specialized nature of the technology at issue” a person of ordinary skill in the art would have needed “to have an educational background and experience that is specific to the aerospace field” is not supported by the ’244 patent or the asserted art. See id. ¶ 63; see also Ex. 1005 ¶ 2 (Rheaume stating it “relates to a hinge assembly and, more particularly to a hinge assembly for retaining a door of a storage bin”); Ex. 1006 ¶ 2 (Savian stating it “relates generally to overhead storage bin assemblies”); Ex. 1008, 3:24–27 (Frazier stating it discloses “improvements to standard luggage and storage bins commonly found in commercial aircraft as well as other aircraft, buses, passenger vans, and other vehicles”). Dr. Dershowitz’s misapprehension of the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art is a consideration we apply in weighing his opinion of how a” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Dr. Dershowitz’s testimony in support of Patent Owner on the level of ordinary skill is not credible because it is inconsistent with the ’244 patent and the asserted art. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 58–63. For example, Dr. Dershowitz acknowledges that “[h]inges are common to many mechanical systems,” but then suggests “being familiar with hinges in general may not directly apply to the specifics of this invention” without identifying anything “specific” to the ’244 patent that requires the level of skill Dr. Dershowitz endorses. Id. ¶ 62. Dr. Dershowitz suggests “hinges used in storage solutions that are stationary have fewer requirements related to mass and volume and are not subject to the same forces and stresses that are experienced on an aircraft,” however, the challenged claims of the ’244 patent do not preclude “stationary” storage solutions, do not require anything pertaining to “mass and volume,” and are not required to withstand any “forces and stresses” experienced on an aircraft. Dr. Dershowitz’s opinion that “[d]ue to the unique environment and specialized nature of the technology at issue” a person of ordinary skill in the art would have needed “to have an educational background and experience that is specific to the aerospace field” is not supported by the ’244 patent or the asserted art. See id. ¶ 63; see also Ex. 1005 ¶ 2 (Rheaume stating it “relates to a hinge assembly and, more particularly to a hinge assembly for retaining a door of a storage bin”); Ex. 1006 ¶ 2 (Savian stating it “relates generally to overhead storage bin assemblies”); Ex. 1008, 3:24–27 (Frazier stating it discloses “improvements to standard luggage and storage bins commonly found in commercial aircraft as well as other aircraft, buses, passenger vans, and other vehicles”). Dr. Dershowitz’s misapprehension of the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art is a consideration we apply in weighing his opinion of how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the prior art at issue.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that no claim terms require construction. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 64–66). Patent Owner proposes an express construction for “stowage bin door” and “self-opening mechanism.” Prelim. Resp. 13– 17. We find no claim term requires an express construction in reaching our decision for the reasons below to deny institution of inter partes review. See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,801,244 - Airbus Americas, Inc. v. Harper Engineering CompanyInstitution deniedPTAB · May 20, 2022 · IPR2022-00192 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 2–6 or 12–17 were unpatentable; claims 1 and 7–11 had been disclaimed.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“obvious over Rheaume and Savian. Pet. 32–51. Each of claims 2–6 and 12–17 requires a “hinge assembly” that includes “a self-opening mechanism.” Ex. 1001, 7:47–8:8, 8:27–64. Petitioner relies only upon Savian as teaching a “self-opening mechanism.” Pet. 32–34, 45. We focus our discussion on the “self-opening mechanism” limitation because it is dispositive and, for the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that Savian teaches this limitation.” slip op. at 21
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“More importantly, Petitioner provides no sufficient reasoning and cites no support for construing the required “self-opening mechanism” to be so broad as to include a mechanism that provides “only some damping against gravity to be ‘self-opening.’” Reply 2. We agree with Patent Owner that, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, a component that only opposes opening is not a “self-opening mechanism.” See Sur-reply 2. In short, as shown by Patent Owner, the plain and ordinary meaning of “self-opening mechanism” in the context of the ’315 patent, as required by claims 2–6 and 12–17, is a mechanism that acts on its own accord to open the stowage bin door. See Prelim. Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2006). An express construction of any other claim term is not necessary for” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentable
“obvious over Rheaume and Savian. Pet. 32–51. Each of claims 2–6 and 12–17 requires a “hinge assembly” that includes “a self-opening mechanism.” Ex. 1001, 7:47–8:8, 8:27–64. Petitioner relies only upon Savian as teaching a “self-opening mechanism.” Pet. 32–34, 45. We focus our discussion on the “self-opening mechanism” limitation because it is dispositive and, for the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that Savian teaches this limitation.” slip op. at 21
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“9 Patent Owner also argues that we should exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. §325(d) to deny institution of inter partes review. Prelim. Resp. 36–46. We deny institution of inter partes review for the reasons provided above and, therefore, do not reach Patent Owner’s arguments regarding discretionary denial.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,760,315 - Iko Industries, Inc. / Iko Industries Ltd. v. Kirsch Research And Development, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 20, 2022 · IPR2022-00416 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because IKO Industries, Inc. and real party in interest Tarco were served more than one year before the petition, barring review under § 315(b).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barInstitution denied
“We agree with Patent Owner. Despite Petitioner’s “certif[ication],” quoted by Patent Owner in the Preliminary Response, that “Petitioner is not barred or estopped from requesting inter partes review challenging the patent claims on the grounds identified herein” (Pet. 2), the uncontroverted evidence before us demonstrates otherwise. As Patent Owner points out, the January 7, 2022, filing date of the Petition is more than twenty months after both Petitioner IKO Industries, Inc. and real party in interest Tarco were served in the IKO and Tarco lawsuits, respectively. See Exs. 2003, 2005.1” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,308,482
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.