- PTAB · Apr 12, 2023 · IPR2022-01427 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 over all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted obviousness challenges.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“the PTAB will not deny institution of an IPR or PGR under Fintiv (i) when a petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability; (ii) when a request for denial under Fintiv is based on a parallel ITC proceeding; or (iii) where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition. Interim Procedure 9. Here, Petitioner has filed such a stipulation, which provides the following: Samsung stipulates that, if the Patent Trial and Appeal Board institutes an IPR proceeding for U.S. Patent No. 9,318,160 on the grounds presented in Samsung’s petition in IPR2022-01427, Samsung will not pursue an invalidity defense in the Eastern District of Texas action (C.A. No. 21-463-JRG) that the patent claims subject to the instituted IPR are invalid based on grounds that were raised or reasonably could have been raised in the IPR. Ex. 1051. Thus, in light of Petitioner’s stipulation, we do not exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Pet. 23. Patent Owner argues that we should apply the district court’s constructions for “array die” and “chip select signals.” Prelim. Resp. 21–25. We provide a preliminary analysis of each of these terms below. The parties may address these and any other claim construction issues during the trial, and our final decision including any claim constructions will be based on the full record developed during the trial. 1. “Array Die” The district court construed “array die” as “array die that is different from a DRAM circuit” based on an argument during prosecution of the ’060 DRAM circuits 206A–D in U.S. Patent Application Publication 2008/0025137 A1 (Ex. 1011 (“Rajan137”)). Ex. 2004, 31–32 (citing January 13, 2014 Amendment at 10); see Ex. 1002 (’060 prosecution history), 465 (January 13, 2014 Amendment at 10) (“Rajan does not disclose ‘a plurality of stacked array dies.’ Rajan merely stacks DRAM circuits 206A–D, which are different from array dies.”). Patent Owner argues that we should adopt the district court’s construction so that there is a “consistent construction” between the two proceedings. Prelim. Resp. 23–24. Patent Owner, however, qualifies its position by arguing that “the statements it made during prosecution were specific to Rajan137’s DRAM circuits 206A–D and this should be made clear to the jury through the order instead of having the expert explain it at trial.” Prelim. Resp. 24 n.4 (citing Ex. 2005 (Patent Owner’s objections to the district court claim construction order), 1–2); see Ex. 2005, 2 (“[T]he Court should make clear that the claimed array die is one that is ‘different from Rajan’s DRAM circuits 206A–D.’”). Although Patent Owner appears to walk this qualification back by arguing in its Sur-reply that it withdrew its objections to the district court claim construction (Sur-reply 1–2 (citing Exs. 2010, 2011)), Patent Owner’s position here still appears to be that the term “array die” is one that is different from DRAM circuits 206A–D of Rajan137. For example, in disputing Petitioner’s unpatentability contentions, Patent Owner argues that “the Petition contains no analysis on how or why Kim’s or Riho’s memory dies are different from Rajan137’s DRAM circuits.” Prelim. Resp. 26–27; see also Prelim. Resp. 27 (“Missing from the Petition is any analysis on why the referenced DRAM dies in Grounds 1 and 2 differ from Rajan137’s” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had an advanced degree in electrical or computer engineering, or a related field, and two years working or studying in the field of design or development of memory systems, or a bachelor’s degree in such engineering disciplines and at least three years working in the field.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 60). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional training can substitute for educational or research experience, and vice versa,” and Petitioner identifies particular technology with which a person of ordinary skill in the art would 7 At this stage, Patent Owner does not present any objective evidence of nonobviousness (i.e., secondary considerations) as to any of the challenged claims. Council) industry standards and DRAM (dynamic random access memory) and SDRAM (synchronous DRAM) memory modules. Pet. 5. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed skill level at this time. See Prelim. Resp. 21 (“For purposes of this preliminary response only, Patent Owner applies the skill level proposed by Petitioner.”). To the extent necessary, and for purposes of this Decision, we accept the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner with the exception of the qualifier “at least,” which introduces vagueness as to the amount of experience.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Pet. 98–99 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 40, 45–46; Ex. 1030, 135–36; Ex. 1038, 68; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 589–606). Petitioner argues that Riho teaches that varying impedances between TSVs that result from, for example, manufacturing processes and chip placement, should be taken into account. Pet. 99–100 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 55–56, 61); see Ex. 1016 ¶ 61 (discussing that the chip located closest to the control chip has “smaller penetrating through resistance” than a chip farther from the control chip). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill “would have been motivated by Riho2 to account for these variations by selectively activating one or more drivers . . . to achieve the optimal driving strength for each ‘data conduit,’ thus saving power.” Pet. 100 (citing Ex. 1018 ¶¶ 96–97, Fig. 7A; Ex. 1017, 1:22–24, 5:11–14, Fig. 5; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 598–603); see also Pet. 100–01 (asserting that “[o]ther contemporaneous references confirm that adjusting the driver strength to account for the position of a die in stack was well known at the time” (citing Ex. 1039, code (57), 7:46–49, Fig. 6)). 3. Patent Owner’s Arguments and Our Preliminary Analysis Patent Owner makes two arguments against Petitioner’s challenge to” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 9,318,160 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 15, 2023 · IPR2021-01345 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 4, 9–11, 13, 17, 18, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Hack and Garcia, Hack, Garcia, and Cordelli, or Hack and Porter.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would mean someone who, at the time of the invention in February 2004, had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, physics, or the equivalent, and two or more years of experience with LED devices and related LED circuit design. PO Resp. 7 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 41–48). Petitioner contends that there is little difference between these definitions and that Patent Owner does not tie any of its arguments to the minor differences. Reply 1–2. We agree. However, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the level of skill because we are persuaded that it is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’252 patent and prior art of record, except that we delete the phrase “or more” to avoid including ambiguity in the definition of the level of skill. The outcome of this decision would not have changed had we adopted Petitioner’s definition.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Because the intrinsic record7 does not assist us with interpreting the term “folded,” we turn to the extrinsic evidence, including Patent Owner’s proffered dictionary definitions and expert testimony. As mentioned above, Patent Owner supplied two dictionary definitions for “fold.” See Exs. 2006, 2007. But these definitions are from non-technical sources and are non-contemporaneous with the ’252 patent’s priority date, and are thus of limited relevance to our analysis. Reply 14 n.7. As for expert testimony, Patent Owner’s expert submits that “[a] POSITA would understand that folding a substrate requires bending the substrate so that one part of the substrate is in full contact with another part of the substrate.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 81. However, Patent Owner’s expert provides no evidence or explanation for this conclusory assertion, so we give it little weight. See id.; PO Resp. 18–19; 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Further, as we will discuss in detail below, the prior art upon which 7 The parties do not address the prosecution history. Petitioner relies explicitly discloses a substrate that is flexible enough to be folded. See, e.g., Pet. 40; Ex. 1005 ¶ 76 (“[T]he display 106 could be thin and flexible enough to . . . fold into a housing 102[.]”). Thus, apart from explaining the errors in Patent Owner’s proposed construction, we determine that it is unnecessary for us to further analyze the proper scope of this term. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Because the intrinsic record7 does not assist us with interpreting the term “folded,” we turn to the extrinsic evidence, including Patent Owner’s proffered dictionary definitions and expert testimony. As mentioned above, Patent Owner supplied two dictionary definitions for “fold.” See Exs. 2006, 2007. But these definitions are from non-technical sources and are non-contemporaneous with the ’252 patent’s priority date, and are thus of limited relevance to our analysis. Reply 14 n.7. As for expert testimony, Patent Owner’s expert submits that “[a] POSITA would understand that folding a substrate requires bending the substrate so that one part of the substrate is in full contact with another part of the substrate.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 81. However, Patent Owner’s expert provides no evidence or explanation for this conclusory assertion, so we give it little weight. See id.; PO Resp. 18–19; 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner that Garbuzov discloses stacked LEDs, with a coating on one of those LEDs, notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary, which we discuss in detail below. To briefly summarize, first, we agree with Petitioner (and Patent Owner does not dispute) that Figure 39 (above) of the ’252 patent depicts an OLED. Second, we agree that each of the sets of layers Petitioner identifies in Garbuzov as an OLED has a similar structure as the OLED in Figure 39 of the ’252 patent, and is therefore an OLED. See, e.g., Ex. 1089, 48:3–6. Third, we agree with Petitioner that the phosphor layer 114 is applied to one of Garbuzov’s OLEDs within the stacked set of OLEDs, as shown in Garbuzov Figure 2, and therefore, that Garbuzov discloses coating an LED with a phosphor. Finally, we agree with Petitioner that phosphor layer 114 produces a change in color because Garbuzov describes phosphor layer 114 as “red downconversion phosphor layer 114.” See Ex. 1016, 3:32–33.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 10,492,252 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,492,252 - Eve Energy Co., Ltd. v. Varta Microbattery GmbHInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 14, 2023 · IPR2022-01484 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that the asserted combinations taught or suggested the claimed force-fitting connection holding the housing cup and top together.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“top” that “are held together by a force-fitting connection.” Ex. 3001, 1:28– 29 (claim 1), 2:51–52 (claim 23). The parties disagree about whether the references on which Petitioner relies teach or suggest this limitation. Pet. 28–32, 64–66; Prelim. Resp. 53–61. As discussed more completely below, we are able to determine whether to institute trial without deciding precisely what the ’835 patent means when it describes two parts as “held together by a force-fitting connection.” Accordingly, we need not, and do not, construe this term expressly. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017 (quoting Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803). Although we need not decide the precise meaning of “held together by a force-fitting connection” in order to decide whether to institute trial, we note (1) that, without some evidence to the contrary, a battery casing whose half-parts are “held together by” a particular condition must be a battery casing whose half-parts would no longer be held together if the condition were not present, and (2) that neither party has directed us to any evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, whatever a “force-fitting connection” is, a battery made in accordance with the teachings of the prior art is not a battery that is “held together by a force-fitting connection” unless that battery would cease to be held together in the absence of the “force-fitting connection.”” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentable
“Even if we accept Petitioner’s position that Kaun suggests radial forces around its seal, Petitioner has not presented sufficient evidence that such forces hold a housing cup and housing top together. With respect to the key “held together” recitation, Petitioner’s only argument or evidence in the Petition is a sole quote purportedly from Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Peckerar:” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 9,153,835 - Unified Patents, LLC v. Robocast, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 20, 2023 · IPR2022-01125 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable over Henley or Shoham and Richardson.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“establish anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102, each and every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). While the elements must be arranged in the same way as is recited in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test.” In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832–33 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Identity of terminology between the anticipatory prior art reference and the claim is not required. Prior art references must be “considered together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).” slip op. at 10
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019); see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Certain terms recited in the challenged claims were construed during prior litigation of the ’451 patent, i.e., the parent of the challenged ’932 patent. Ex. 1011 (claim construction order in cases involving Microsoft and Apple); Ex. 2009, 5 (clarification of certain claim constructions on summary judgment). Patent Owner advocates that we adopt such prior constructions in this proceeding, and Petitioner “does not dispute” such constructions. Pet. 10–13; Prelim. Resp. 6–8. We have reviewed the court’s claim-construction order, and adopt its construction of the following terms for purposes of this Decision. First, we construe “node,” which is recited in multiple claims, as “an identifier of a resource that includes an address to the resource and the duration for which the resource’s content is to be presented by default.” See Ex. 1011, 16–17; Pet. 12; Prelim. Resp. 7. Second, we construe “show structure of nodes,” which is recited in challenged independent claims 1 and 22, as well as in challenged dependent claim 4, as “a structure that is arranged for the display of content by specifying one or more paths through a plurality of nodes. The show structure of nodes specifies the duration of any display,” but there is no durational requirement separate from the construction of “node.” See Ex. 1011, 2–13; Pet. 11–12; Prelim. Resp. 7. Third, we construe “interactively variable duration information,” which is recited in challenged independent claim 1, as well as challenged dependent claims 2 and 26, as “a parameter specifying how long a content is to be displayed by default before a subsequent content is displayed, where the viewer of the content can change the parameter.” Ex. 1011, 22–23; Pet. 13; Prelim. Resp. 7.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related subject and two or more years of experience working with computer networks and the accessing and presentation of networked resources to users in the 1996 timeframe.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 51). Petitioner adds that “[t]his description is approximate, and a higher level of education or specific skill might make up for less experience and vice-versa.” Id. Patent Owner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have the equivalent of a four-year degree from an accredited institution (usually denoted as a B.S. degree) in computer science, computer engineering or the equivalent, and experience with, or exposure to, topics in computer networking, multimedia, and web systems. A person of ordinary skill in the art would also have approximately 3-5 years of professional experience with these topics.” Prelim. Resp. 6. In addition, Patent Owner say that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, while significant experience in the field might substitute for formal education.” Id. (citing Ex. 2005 ¶ 28). Both parties support their proposals with testimony by their respective experts. See Ex. 1012 ¶ 51; Ex. 2005 ¶ 28. Although the proposals differ in certain respects, they do not differ in ways that affect our decision to deny institution of the proceeding. Both proposals include baccalaureate degrees and experience in generally related fields, with both parties indicating that additional education or experience could compensate for some lack in the other. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which we find consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“distinction. See Ex. 2005 ¶ 30 (“Henley discloses a ‘video optimized stream server system 10,’ also referred to as ‘media streamer,’ for use by broadcasters to deliver content to end users, or viewers.”). In particular, Dr. Almeroth observes that, in Figure 1 of Henley, reproduced above, system controller 64 is illustrated graphically as connected to multiple user controls 65, but is shown connected only to a single display 66. Id. ¶ 31. This structure, in combination with Henley’s description of the drawing, leads Dr. Almeroth to conclude that user control 65 “corresponds to a ‘set top box[]’” for an end user, and that system controller 64 corresponds to a separate “‘user interface’ for the operator.” Id. Specifically, Dr. Almeroth points to Henley’s description of system controller 64 as “respond[ing] to inputs from user control set top boxes 65 to cause commands to be generated that enable media streamer 10 to access a requested video presentation.” Id.; Ex. 1013, 8:30–32 (emphasis added). Dr. Almeroth also notes Henley’s explanation that “[s]ystem controller 64 is further provided with a user interface and display facility 66 which enables a user to input commands, such as by hard or soft buttons, and other data to enable an identification of video presentations, the scheduling of video presentations, and control over the playing of a video presentation.” Ex. 2005 ¶ 31; Ex. 1013, 8:33–38. These disclosures by Henley support Dr. Almeroth’s conclusion that “[t]his ‘user interface and display facility 66’ is for an operator—not an end user.” See Ex. 2005 ¶ 31. Dr. Almeroth provides additional reasoning to support this conclusion. For example, Henley explains that “[s]ystem controller 64 responds to inputs from user control set top boxes 65 to cause commands to be generated that enable media streamer 10 to access a requested video presentation.” Ex. 1013, 8:30–32. In light of this, because an end user would interact with the set-top box shown as user control 65, Dr. Almeroth reasons that “it would make no sense” for display 66 to be for the end user. Ex. 2005 ¶ 32. We agree with this reasoning. In addition, Dr. Almeroth observes that Henley describes two types of interfaces for media streamer 10, a command line interface and a graphical user interface. Id. ¶ 33 (citing Ex. 1013, 18:47–50). Because the command line interface can be used for “batch” functionality, Dr. Almeroth reasons, and we agree, that the command line interface is for broadcast operators, rather than for end users. Id. With respect to the graphical user interface shown in Figure 8, reproduced above, Dr. Almeroth further reasons that a person of skill in the art would understand that it relates to operator controls, rather than end-user controls, because Henley specifically describes it as showing keys “used to operate the media streamer.” Id. ¶ 34; Ex. 1013, 4:5– 6. In other words, according to Dr. Almeroth, “[t]he graphical user interface corresponds to the command line interface.” Ex. 2005 ¶ 34. Dr. Almeroth’s reasoning is compelling. Notably, Figure 8 shows “Batch” button 130 and “Import/Export” button 132 to “move video data into and out of the media streamer.” See Ex. 1013, 19:20–22, 19:30–31. As Dr. Almeroth testifies, these are not functions that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand to be available for end users, but are appropriate for broadcast operators: “None of these commands are consistent with those that would be available to an end user of, e.g., a set top box or pay-per-view system.” Ex. 2005 ¶ 35. In light of this compelling testimony, we agree with Patent Owner and find that “Henley . . . does not describe . . . the end user’s interface or controls.” See Prelim. Resp. 22.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,965,932 - PTAB · Jan 6, 2023 · IPR2022-01204 · APJ Donna M Praiss · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–10, 12, 13, and 15–20 because the petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on asserted anticipation and obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–10, 12, 13, and 15–20 of the ’285 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“district court trial dates are set to occur before the issuance of the Board’s final written decision. The facts and reasoning of Fintiv are, at a minimum, only applicable to cases in which a trial date has been set by the district court in a copending litigation. But here, as will be discussed below, the parties agree that no trial date has been set, and the District Court has stayed the litigation. Prelim. Reply 8; Prelim. Sur-Reply 6 (“There has never been a trial date). Furthermore, that stay will continue until our final determination should we decide to institute trial. Without a trial date, we see no need to engage in a full analysis of the Fintiv factors, as there is no basis for Patent Owner’s argument for discretionary denial. Nevertheless, we address the Fintiv factors below13 and explain our reasons for not exercising discretion to deny institution based on § 314(a).” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“While we recognize that the plain language and grammar of the claims supports Petitioner’s proposed construction, we have also considered the District Court’s adopted construction and Patent Owner’s arguments which find support in the written description of the ’285 patent. In the end, however, we need not resolve this dispute at this time. Because the Petition provides sufficient evidence that the prior art references disclose the claimed functional groups, biomolecules, or organic dyes under either construction, it is not necessary for us to construe this claim term at this stage of the proceeding.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“including Petitioner’s Reply Brief (Paper 10, “Reply Br.”) and Patent Owner’s Sur-Reply Brief (Paper 11, “Sur-Reply Br.”), we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s proposed definition reads into the claim a numeric threshold for solubility from an embodiment that is nowhere apparent from the claim itself. Reply Br. 1–2. “[I]nterpreting what is meant by a word in a claim is not to be confused with adding an extraneous limitation appearing in the specification, which is improper.” In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation, 301 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis in original). Although courts must read a patent’s claims in light of the specification, see, e.g., Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998), that obligation does not authorize “reading a limitation from the written description into the claims,” which is characterized as “one of the cardinal sins of patent law,” SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Confining the scope of “capable of imparting solubility” to an unexpressed minimum solubility taken from one of the Specification’s embodiments crosses that line. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1432–34 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Claims to a co-polymer improperly interpreted to include two properties). In view of the foregoing, we construe the phrase “a non-ionic side group capable of imparting solubility in water” to not require any particular numeric threshold of solubility. No further construction of the claim is necessary to resolve the dispute between the parties with respect to institution of trial.. See Nidec Motor Corp. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,365,285 - Beckman Coulter, Inc. v. Sirigen II LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 6, 2023 · IPR2022-01208 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims and grounds because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner does not establish a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim of the ’303 patent. Thus, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialNot reached
“1 Because we deny the Petition on the merits, we do not address the parties’ arguments related to discretionary denial.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelOther
“Petitioner asserts that a person having ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have at least a Ph.D. degree in chemistry, or a bachelor’s or master’s degree plus experience involving the use and design of fluorescent probes or dyes.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 14–18). Patent Owner agrees that a POSITA may have a Ph.D. degree or master’s degree in chemistry, but asserts that a POSITA would also have “some experience with fluorescence” in addition to a Ph.D. degree in chemistry and that the experience of a POSITA with a master’s degree in chemistry is alternatively “industry experience in the field of biological detection systems.” Prelim. Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 7). For purposes of this Decision, we need not choose between the parties’ proposed levels of one of ordinary skill in the art, which are quite similar, as neither party asserts that the anticipation or obviousness analyses in this case would turn on which definition is adopted. See, e.g., id. at 10 (noting that the arguments and conclusions reached in the Preliminary Response “would not change” if Petitioner’s definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan were applied).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“structure of Formula (Ia),” including specific MU, L1 and L2, G1 and G2, n, and a, b, c, and d (which define the mol % of each unit within the structure) constituents, wherein each R group must be a “[n]on-ionic side group capable of imparting solubility in water in excess of 10 mg/mL.” Ex. 1006, 239:29–240:56. The ’303 patent expressly defines the phrase “[n]on-ionic side groups capable of imparting solubility in water” to refer to “side groups which are not charged and allow the resulting polymer to be soluble in water or aqueous solutions with no visible particulates.” Id. at 54:31–34. In view of structure of claim 1 and the express definition provided in the ’303 patent, we agree with Patent Owner that claim 1 requires that the non-ionic side group R must be capable of imparting solubility to the claimed conjugated polymer (having constituents that satisfy the claimed variables noted above) in excess of 10 mg/mL. Prelim. Resp. 13. On this record, it is not sufficient to show that a particular R group is capable of” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,575,303 - PTAB · Jan 6, 2023 · IPR2022-01207 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–14, 18, and 19 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. Thus, we hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–14, 18, and 19 of the ’620 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“be lifted for each patent for which the petition is denied. As noted above, there are six related petitions at the Board involving the patents before the court. The district court stayed the litigation “pending resolution of the IPR proceedings that have been instituted on the patents at issue in this case.” Ex. 2006, 2. Regarding the length of the stay, the district court explicitly ordered the parties not to use continuance of the fact discovery to October 28, 2022 “as grounds for . . . opposing institution of any post-grant proceeding.” Ex. 2007, 2. Regarding when the stay will be lifted, the order merely gives Patent Owner the opportunity to “seek to lift the stay as to any patents that are not instituted for review.” Ex. 2006, 2 (emphasis added). But we decline to speculate whether the district court would grant such a motion directed only to one of the six patents. Among the reasons warranting a stay of the litigation, the district court found “IPR has the potential to streamline issues for trial” and “the resources the parties will need to expend for experts could be significantly impacted by the outcome of any instituted IPR proceedings.” Id. Thus, the litigation is stayed pending the outcome of the six related proceedings, not merely the outcome of this institution decision, and the district court stayed the litigation for the explicit purpose of gaining efficiency and avoiding duplication of efforts by letting this inter partes review proceed to its conclusion first.14 See Prelim. Reply. 4–5. While Patent Owner may seek to lift the stay as to any patent for which institution is denied, the grant of any such request is uncertain. Accordingly, this factor strongly weighs against discretionary denial of institution.” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelOther
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have at least a Ph.D. degree in chemistry, or a bachelor’s or master’s degree plus experience involving the use and design of fluorescent probes or dyes.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 14–18). Patent Owner agrees that a POSITA may have a Ph.D. degree or master’s degree in chemistry, but asserts that a POSITA would also have “some experience with fluorescence” in addition to a degree in chemistry and that the experience of a POSITA with a master’s degree in chemistry is alternatively “industry experience in the field of biological detection systems.” Prelim. Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 7). For purposes of this Decision, we need not choose between the parties’ proposed levels of one of ordinary skill in the art, which are quite similar, as neither party asserts that the anticipation or obviousness analyses in this case would turn on which definition is adopted. See Prelim. Resp. 10 (Patent Owner stating that its arguments and conclusions “would not change” if Petitioner’s definition were applied).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Decided for patent owner
“The express language of claim 1 requires no solubility threshold, and dependent claim 10 demonstrates that where a solubility threshold was intended by the inventors of the ’620 patent they knew how to expressly set forth that threshold in the claims. Compare Ex. 1005, 213:26–27 (“capable of imparting solubility in water”), with id. at 218:12–14 (“The method according to claim 1, wherein each R is a non-ionic side group capable of imparting solubility in water in excess of 10 mg/mL.”). Thus, the claim language does not support applying a particular solubility threshold in claim 1. As noted by Patent Owner, the written description of the ’620 patent explains that “[i]n some embodiments, each R is independently a non-ionic side group capable of imparting solubility in water in excess of 10 mg/mL.” Id. at 54:2–10; Prelim. Resp. 12–13. This solubility threshold, however, is not in claim 1, and we decline to import such a limitation from the written description into claim 1 absent compelling reasons for doing so. See SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that “reading a limitation from the written description into the claims” is “one of the cardinal sins of patent law”); see also Thorner v. Sony Comp. Entm’t Am., LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It is likewise not enough that the only embodiments, or all of the embodiments, contain a particular limitation. We do not read limitations from the specification into claims; we do not redefine words.”). In view of the foregoing, we construe the term “non-ionic side group capable of imparting solubility in water” to not include any particular numeric solubility threshold.13” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,288,620 - Google LLC v. Parus Holdings, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 13, 2022 · IPR2022-01020 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021) (permitting the Board to institute trial on behalf of the Director). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the present record, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer science or a related field, and at least two years of experience with voice interfaces and information processing.” Pet. 8. Petitioner adds that “[m]ore education could substitute for less experience, and vice versa.” Id. Petitioner bases these contentions on declaration testimony from Mr. Lipoff. Id. (referencing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 40, 85).” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the three independent claims include language that indicates that each claim encompasses a set-up stage and a retrieval stage. When construing a claim, we start with the language of the claims themselves. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[T]he context in which a term is used in the [claim at issue] can be highly instructive.”). Claim 1 expressly recites that steps (a) through (h) are completed before step (i) and subsequent steps. Ex. 1001, 14:12–15; see Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Unless the steps of a method [claim] actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” (citation omitted)). For claim 16, its preamble recites “[a] method for allowing a phone user to set up and subsequently retrieve information in an audio format from a pre-defined portion of a pre-selected web [site].” Id. at 16:13–15; accord id. at 16:17–62 (affirmatively reciting “pre-defined portion of said pre-selected web site” in multiple steps in the body of the claim); see also Pet. 13 (“Furthermore, a [person having ordinary skill in the art] would have understood that Claim 16’s preamble is similar to element 1(i) of Claim 1.”); Prelim. Resp. 22–23; cf. Function Media, LLC v. Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (concluding that a claim that recites “processing” an “electronic advertisement” necessarily indicates that “the creation of the ad must happen before the processing begins”).” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“2. Other claim terms Except as provided above, we determine that we need not expressly construe any other claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). To the extent that the scope of any particular claim term requires discussion, however, we provide it in our assessment of the challenges, which we turn to next.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,516,190 - Alcon Inc. / Alcon Vision, LLC et al. v. Amo Development, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 2, 2022 · IPR2021-00853 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 12, and 13 were not proven unpatentable because the asserted combinations lacked a persuasive basis for achieving the claimed system with a reasonable expectation of success.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’725 patent; however, we also agree with Patent Owner that such a definition should be flexible enough to include a person with a lesser academic degree and having experience working in the field, such as an engineer with clinical experience in ophthalmic surgery, as well as also including a medical doctor, such as an ophthalmic surgeon with experience working with medical optics and lasers, and that these people may collaborate. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” as evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Such an expanded definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art, including aspects of both parties’ definitions, is appropriate here, based on our review of the record. Thus, we find that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have been someone with a PhD, MS, or BS degree in physics, biomedical engineering, or a related science such as nuclear engineering, having more or less experience in research, manufacturing, or designing medical optics or medical lasers (e.g., 5 years for a PhD or more to compensate for lesser degrees), or an ophthalmic surgeon, but that such persons would have worked in collaboration with one another to fill any necessary gaps in knowledge (e.g., the engineer would consult the medical doctor on clinical issues or physiology and the medical doctor would consult the engineer on technical issues). This definition marries the two proposed by the parties and is appropriate in view of the record.” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not ask that this claim language be expressly construed or contest Petitioner’s proposed interpretation. See Resp. 11–15. Although it is not necessary for our final decision in this proceeding to construe this claim language because it is not essential to our conclusions on patentability, as it is uncontested, we adopt as our own Petitioner’s proposed construction of “imaging device configured to acquire point by point image data from locations distributed throughout a volume of a crystalline lens.”” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Turning to the disputed term “automatically” in this context, we agree with Patent Owner that the plain meaning of the term “automatically” is that the “control system” can, on its own and without human intervention, perform the subsequently recited step. Resp. 11–15; see also Pet. 10 (Petitioner agreeing this is the plain meaning). This is supported by the Specification, which states, inter alia, that “the entire system is controlled by the controller CPU” and describes alternative embodiments where (1) the system is fully in control and where (2) user input identifies targets. Ex. 1027, 12:23–25, 13:25–44, Figs. 14, 15. However, we also agree with Petitioner that just because the claimed “control system” is configured/programmed to perform (i.e., capable of performing) some tasks “automatically” (i.e., entirely on its own), this does not mean user input (e.g., from a surgeon) must be altogether excluded. Pet. 10–11. In fact, user input must be possible and is within the scope of the independent claim. “By definition, an independent claim is broader than a claim that depends from it, so if a dependent claim reads on a particular embodiment of the claimed invention, the corresponding independent claim must cover that embodiment as well.” Littelfuse, Inc. v. Mersen USA EP Corp., 29 F.4th 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Here claim 2, requiring automatic target identification, and claim 5, requiring user input on target identification, each depends from claim 1 and illuminates its scope, which must be broad enough to encompass both. Thus, although requiring (in claim 1) that a “control system” can perform certain recited functions, and that some are performed (according to claim 2) “automatically,” that same “control system” must also be capable of allowing a user input on the locations of targets for laser treatment (according to claim 5). Such optional user input required by dependent claim 5 is described in the Specification, which includes embodiments where a surgeon can adjust the size, location, and shape of the treatment pattern, can determine the optimal cutting contours in patients, and can provide “user input” to define targets or adjust computer-defined parameters as necessary. Ex. 1027, 10:55–45; 10:67–11:2, 13:25–55, 13:63–14:2. Regardless, the configuration of independent claim 1’s “control system,” which must be programmed to and capable of performing its own recited steps/functions, is not diminished by the requirements of either dependent claim. Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corporation, 831 F.3d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he language of a dependent claim cannot change the scope of an independent claim whose meaning is clear on its face.”).” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“generally. “The presence or absence of a reasonable expectation of success is . . . a question of fact,” and this “requirement refers to the likelihood of success in combining references to meet the limitations of the claimed invention.” Intelligent Bio-Sys., 821 F.3d at 1366–67. Based on the record, we conclude that, even if it would have been potentially advantageous to in some way incorporate the use of Baikoff’s and Li’s OCT imaging and measuring into Swinger’s system and method for cataract surgery (for example, to replace the use of ultrasound imaging with OCT), we agree with Patent Owner that, other than the (ultimately) conclusory testimony of its witness Dr. Izatt (see, e.g., Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 110, 144, 151, 161, 163–165, 168), there is no persuasive evidence that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined these references with the result being a control system configured to (automatically or not in practice) image cataractous eye tissue, identify the targets therein (capsule and lens) to be cut with a laser, and then operate that laser to actually make those cuts based in some part on that imaging. See Resp. 15–34. We credit Dr. Kang’s testimony that, as of the invention, the person of ordinary skill in the art would not have relieved the surgeon of responsibility for identifying cutting regions for laser capsulotomy and cataract surgery (as taught by Swinger), and relegated such task to a computer, which subsequently performs the procedure. Ex. 2087 ¶¶ 36–38, 42, 46, 62–66; see also Ex. 2088 ¶¶ 56–59, 68–71 (Dr. Walter testifying similarly). Dr. Kang takes issue with Petitioner’s positions that Baikoff and Li teach or suggest such reliance on a computer because, according to Dr. Kang, neither Baikoff nor Li (and indisputably not Swinger) teaches using a computer to identify laser cutting regions or to control laser surgery, and, in fact, they suggest reliance on a surgeon to interpret their OCT images to plan a subsequent surgery. See, e.g., Ex. 2087 ¶¶ 36–38, 42, 46, 62–66. We further credit Dr. Kang’s testimony that Petitioner fails to adequately explain, even were the ordinarily skilled artisan intent on combining Baikoff’s and Li’s OCT imaging systems with Swinger’s cataract surgery system, how it would have been accomplished to overcome the “substantial challenges” and achieve the claimed invention. See id. ¶¶ 63– 66; see also Resp. 27–28 (addressing Petitioner’s lack of explanation as to how to implement the combination).19 We agree that, beyond merely suggesting plugging one system into another, Petitioner does not explain how the person of ordinary skill in the art would have programmed Swinger’s computer control system to use Baikoff’s and Li’s OCT imaging systems and tissue recognition and measurement algorithms to determine capsulotomy cutting regions and then implement the planned cutting with a laser, even from a rudimentary perspective. See Pet. 35–40. Indeed, Petitioner concedes:” slip op. at 50
Patent outcomesUS 9,125,725 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,125,725 - Alcon Inc. / Alcon Vision, LLC et al. v. Amo Development, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 1, 2022 · IPR2021-00846 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–12 are unpatentable as obvious over Swinger, Weikert, and Benedikt (claims 1–8), and with L’Esperance added (claims 9–12).
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Both parties present compelling evidence that those of skill in the art would include individuals with experience in ophthalmology, as well as in the research, manufacture, and design of medical optics or medical lasers. Pet. 25; PO Resp. 8. The evidence of record also demonstrates that few individuals actually had such experience. Rather, teams of individuals with design laser surgery systems intended to make incisions in the lens of the eye. Accordingly, we find that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have been an ophthalmic surgeon or someone with a Ph.D., M.S., or B.S. degree in physics, biomedical engineering, or a related science such as optical engineering, with experience in researching, manufacturing, or designing medical optics or medical lasers (e.g., Ph.D. or five or more years to compensate for lesser degrees). Such individuals would have worked in collaboration with one another to fill any necessary gaps in knowledge (e.g., the engineer would consult the medical doctor on clinical issues or physiology and the medical doctor would consult the engineer on technical issues). This definition marries the two proposed by the parties.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner provides constructions for the terms “cataract incision” and “a delivery system for delivering the laser beam to the target tissue to form a cataract incision.” Pet. 7–9. Patent Owner provides a construction for the term “cataract incision.” PO Resp. 10–11. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence, including the fact that neither party disputes that Weikert expressly discloses cataract incisions under either parties’ interpretation of that term, we determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“A petition must “identify with particularity the grounds for institution and evidence supporting such grounds,” including “the prior art relied upon and evidence that it qualifies as such.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)). The Petition identifies the grounds for institution and the evidence supporting such grounds, and presents evidence that Weikert qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 5–6, 27–28. For example, Petitioner and Dr. Lubatschowski assert that CATARACT AND REFRACTIVE SURGERY “is a quarterly review series comprising chapters written by well-known specialists,” and that Weikert was included in the 2005 edition of CATARACT AND REFRACTIVE SURGERY as Chapter 14: Refractive Keratotomy: Does it Have a Future Role in Refractive Surgery? Ex. 1001 ¶ 73; Pet. 5–6, 27–28.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Benedikt describes its combined topometer/OCT imaging device as providing a “previously unattainable comprehensive topometerical/topographical illustration of the cornea” and discloses using this comprehensive data to automate corneal laser surgery. Ex. 1020 ¶¶ 39, 46; Pet. 55–56. In contrast to the comprehensive illustration of the cornea provided by Benedikt’s system, Petitioner demonstrates that HeNe beams are limited to visualizing the surface of eye tissue at a single point. Ex. 1070 ¶¶ 32–34; Pet. Reply 23; Ex. 1073, 254:2–14; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 29–31. As Petitioner proposes to use the system of Swinger to make incisions in the cornea, which Benedikt’s system can image comprehensively, we find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it beneficial to implement Benedikt’s imaging device to aid Swinger’s corneal surgery procedure(s). (2)” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 10,376,356 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,376,356
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.