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  • PTAB · Oct 30, 2020 · IPR2020-00782 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Philips had recorded a statutory disclaimer of all challenged claims 15–17.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentDenied

      “Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e), “[t]he patent owner may file a statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. [§] 253(a) in compliance with § 1.321(a) of this chapter, disclaiming one or more claims in the patent. No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.” (Emphasis added.) A disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) shall be recorded in the Office, and is “considered as part of the original patent.” See 35 U.S.C. § 253(a).” slip op. at 5

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 6,976,958
  • PTAB · Jul 22, 2020 · IPR2014-00504 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Motorola’s rehearing request, leaving intact the remand decision that claims 1–4, 7, and 18 were not shown unpatentable on the instituted grounds.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the Board’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence, or to present new arguments or evidence.” slip op. at 3

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “that Dr. Tewfik’s testimony is not credible because he has “no personal knowledge” and “merely parrots the inventor’s claim chart.” Req. 6. We disagree, because we considered and analyzed expressly Petitioner’s argument and the basis for Dr. Tewfik’s testimony. Remand Dec. 27, 30. We determined that Dr. Tewfik’s testimony was credible, in that it was testimony concerning his opinion with respect to the claim chart, and also that his testimony was based, at least in part, on his personal experience with Windows 98 and its functionalities. Id. at 30. Indeed, the Federal Circuit noted that the rule of reason requires us to consider all pertinent evidence, and then noted explicitly that Dr. Tewfik’s testimony was one example of such pertinent evidence that needed to be considered. See Intellectual Ventures II, 692 F. App’x at 627–628. For these reasons, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked the credibility of Dr. Tewfik’s testimony.” slip op. at 6

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “not have changed the outcome of our Decision. In Figure 4, Kellerer shows a block with a central control unit, address management, routing, an application server, and network managers. Exhibit 1007, 45. This block diagram, however, does not specifically address whether or not Internet access requires an external service controller. Moreover, Petitioner provides no citations to any passages that describe the functions of the central control unit, address management, routing, the application server, and the network managers. See generally Req. 9–13. We are not persuaded that Kellerer teaches all of the components that are necessary to enable Internet access based on Figure 4 alone. That these components are located inside the car, as shown in Figure 3, also does not specifically address whether or not Internet access requires an external service controller. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Figures 3 and 4 render the stand-alone system limitation obvious.” slip op. at 12

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 7,382,771
  • PTAB · Mar 25, 2020 · IPR2019-01170 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied rehearing and maintained its denial of institution because Petitioner did not show that combining Fegen and Stevens would have made the claimed openings compatible with the asserted properties.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which provides: A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing, without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. We review our Decision under an abuse of discretion standard. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “motivated to adhere Fegen’s exterior garment layer to a substrate in order to provide a substrate material having water-proofing or scent blocking properties as taught by Stevens.” Pet. 31–32 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 55; Ex. 1006, 2:1–4, 3:50–53). In addition, the Petition asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art “would understand that the slits in Fegen extend all the way through the exterior layer and the substrate in order to permit attachments to be more easily secured to Fegen’s garment.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 62; Ex. 1005, Fig. 3). In the Decision, we determined that Petitioner had failed to establish sufficiently that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine Fegen and Stevens in the manner proposed. Dec. 14–16. In particular, we determined that providing slits or openings in the substrate of the proposed combination of Fegen and Stevens “would defeat, or at least greatly diminish, any water-proofing or scent blocking properties of the substrate.” Id. at 15. Thus, we disagreed with Petitioner’s contention that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to add a substrate to Fegen’s garment for the purpose of providing water-proofing or scent blocking properties. Id.” slip op. at 3

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “We disagree with this broad assertion because the Petition does not demonstrate sufficiently why providing openings in the substrate, as the claims require, would not have led one of ordinary skill in the art to consider such openings detrimental to the rationale of providing water-proofing or scent blocking properties. Petitioner’s assertion also ignores the fact that the corresponding openings in the substrate would allow sweat and odor to pass through freely, thereby decreasing the effectiveness of water-proofing and scent blocking properties. Although no evidence of record appears to state expressly that openings of the size claimed would allow sweat and odor to pass freely through the substrate, this fact would have been readily apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art. Thus, the Rehearing Request fails to demonstrate that a reasonable fact finder could not have arrived at this fact, such that our determination is supported by substantial evidence. See OSI Pharm., 939 F.3d at 1381–82.” slip op. at 4

    • BurdenDecided for patent owner

      “Petitioner also argues that “[t]here is no evidence supporting a difference in effectiveness of the water-proofing and scent blocking properties of the substrate whether the substrate is a solid sheet of material or the substrate contains slots or openings in the same location as the exterior layer.” Reh. Req. 3. This argument, however, attempts to improperly shift the burden of persuasion away from Petitioner. “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). The burden of persuasion rests with Petitioner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). Thus, Petitioner has the burden of presenting evidence supporting its assertion that there is no difference in effectiveness of the water-proofing and scent blocking properties of the substrate with or without openings.” slip op. at 5

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 9,173,436
  • PTAB · Mar 17, 2020 · IPR2019-00505 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Unified Patents’ rehearing request and left institution denied because it had not shown JSC was reasonably likely to qualify as a publicly accessible printed publication.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing, without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. We review our Decision under an abuse of discretion standard. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

      “likelihood” standard applicable to decisions to institute an inter partes review. We agree with Petitioner that the “reasonable likelihood” standard applies to the issue of whether a reference asserted in a petition for inter partes review qualifies as a prior art printed publication. See id. at 3. As the Board held in a recent precedential decision, “at the institution stage, the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 4

    • BurdenInstitution denied meritsDecided for patent owner

      “are factual disputes that reach beyond the ‘reasonable likelihood’ standard and are more appropriately developed during an instituted trial.” Id. We disagree with this broad assertion because it ignores the fact that, in this case, as explained on pages 15‒16 of the Decision, Petitioner’s evidence does not meet a minimum threshold showing to even present a factual dispute as to availability and dissemination of the reference. See Hulu, Paper 29 at 13 (establishing that the Petition must identify, with particularly, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood of public accessibility before the critical date).” slip op. at 5

    § 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 6,411,871
  • PTAB · Oct 10, 2019 · IPR2018-00991 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied rehearing and left in place its discretionary denial of institution under § 314(a), concluding that the General Plastic factors supported denial.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing, without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. We review our Decision under an abuse of discretion standard. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDecided for patent owner

      “between Petitioner and the Prior Petitioners. Unlike the Valve case, however, the majority opinion did not find that the first factor favors denying institution. Rather, the majority opinion determined that the first factor weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution, but only moderately because of the complete overlap in the challenged claims between the Petition and the petition in the 136 IPR, as well as the overlap of many issues and arguments raised by the Petition and the 136 IPR petition. Dec. 12–13. Petitioner’s arguments do not establish that we overlooked or misapprehended anything, or used unreasonable judgment, in determining that the first factor weighs only moderately against exercising discretion to deny institution. Furthermore, even if we were to determine that the first factor heavily weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution, as advocated by Petitioner, this determination would not alter our overall weighing of the General Plastic factors.” slip op. at 8

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 9,144,700
  • PTAB · Jun 11, 2019 · IPR2018-00207 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–15 are unpatentable: claims 1, 3–6, 8–11, and 13–15 are anticipated by Thornberg ’983; claims 2, 7, and 12 are obvious over Thornberg ’983 and Karem. The motion to amend is denied.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner did not file a Patent Owner Response and has not otherwise disputed Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. See Tr. 77:1–6. We find, based on our review of the complete record, that the evidence of record supports a level of ordinary skill in the art consistent with Petitioner’s definition. Our findings are supported by the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record and the ’116 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:36–37 (“This invention relates generally to radio controlled toys such as airplanes and helicopters.”); Ex. 1006, 1:8–10 (“The present invention relates to the control of remotely operated vehicles, and more particularly to a variable reference for the control of a remotely operated vehicle.”), see id. at 3:41–44 (“The system provides for the referencing of vehicle commands based on an operator frame of reference so that control commands provided by the operator remain intuitive and independent of the orientation of the vehicle with respect to the operator.”). Thus, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it to our discussion below.” slip op. at 11

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “Ex. 1006, 5:22–29. We further observe that once the disclosed pitch/roll commands (i.e., command data) are provided to the pitch axis and roll axis transformation functions, the pitch axis transformation 410 and roll axis transformation 412 use transformation equations to determine a transformed pitch stick signal (TPSS) and a transformed roll stick signal (TRSS). See Ex. 1006, 6:17–28. In other words, the flight control computer transforms received command pitch/roll data into TPSS and TRSS commands. In performing this transformation, the pitch axis transformation function 410 and the roll axis transformation function 412 also receive a transformation angle (θ) input. Id. at 5:30–32. Thornberg ’983 teaches that the transformation angle θ is determined based on the true heading of the vehicle as determined by the navigation system 36 and the desired vehicle reference and vehicle reference mode. Id. at 5:31–35. As discussed above, we find that the true heading of the vehicle as determined by navigation system 36 provides motion data generated by a sensor. Thornberg ’983 teaches that the transformations into TPSS and TRSS take into account transformation angle (θ), which Thornberg ’983 teaches is determined based on the true heading (i.e., motion data) of the vehicle and the control data (pitch/roll commands) received from control panel 200 of the remote operator control. See Ex. 1006, 4:29–33, 5:23–25, 5:36–38. Further, in the operator reference mode, the orientation of the operator/remote control upon activation of the operator mode is used as the reference axis (i.e., operator’s coordinate system). Additionally, as noted in the Petition (see Pet. 30–31), Thornberg ’983 teaches a variable operator reference mode in which the operator reference changes based on changes in the orientation of the operator control panel. Ex. 1006, 7:32–35. Based on the disclosure discussed above, we find that the pitch and roll commands received at lines 405, 415 in the operator mode teach command data in “a first coordinate system from a perspective of the remote control device” as recited in claim 1. Moreover, we find that Thornberg ’983 teaches that the received pitch/roll command data is transformed into control data in “a second coordinate system that is from a perspective of the RC aircraft.” Specifically, Thornberg ’983 teaches that the transformation equations 1 and 2 transform the pitch command and roll command based on the difference between the aircraft heading and the reference heading. See Ex. 1066, 7:9–11, 7:19–24. Further, Dr. Hansman testifies that TPSS and TRSS control data control the vehicle in the vehicle’s coordinate system, which is from the perspective of the vehicle. Ex. 1003 ¶ 411. We credit Dr. Hansman’s undisputed testimony in this regard because this testimony is consistent with the disclosure of Thornberg ’983, which teaches, among other things, that “[t]he system provides for the referencing of vehicle commands based on an operator frame of reference so that control commands provided by the operator remain intuitive and independent of the orientation of the vehicle with respect to the operator.” Ex. 1006, 3:41–44.” slip op. at 19

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableUnpatentable

      “[a] POSITA would have been motivated to modify Thornberg’s control panel 200 to “control” the UAV 100 in a hovering state, i.e., by sending appropriate lift command data to the vehicle when the operator releases the input controls as Karem teaches, in order to facilitate aerial tasks that may involve a hovering state, such as airborne surveillance, inspection, maintenance, and repair, that Thornberg teaches were “well known” uses of UAVs. Ex. 1006, 1:15-24; Ex. 1003, ¶443. Pet. 45. We are persuaded that Petitioner’s rationale and evidence demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 7, and 12 would have been obvious in view of Thornberg ’983 and Karem. For example, Petitioner’s arguments are supported by the disclosure of Karem, which teaches a remotely-operated vehicle in a hovering state (Ex. 1008, 7:13–23, 32–39, and Thornberg ’983 teaches remotely operated vehicles include helicopters (Ex. 1006, 1:14–17). Further, Petitioner’s arguments are supported by Dr. Hansman’s undisputed testimony that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Thornberg ’983’s control panel 200 to control UAV 100 in a hovering state, i.e., by sending appropriate lift command data to the vehicle when the operator releases the input controls as Karem teaches, in order to facilitate aerial tasks that may involve a hovering state, such as airborne surveillance, inspection, maintenance, and repair. Ex. 1003 ¶ 443. This testimony is supported by Thornberg ’983’s teaching that (1) airborne surveillance, inspection, maintenance, and repair were well known uses of UAVs; and (2) remote operation of UAVs apply to remotely operated helicopters. See Ex. 1006, 1:15–24.” slip op. at 29

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther

      “In the same manner described in the ’116 patent, we find that the orientation of the control panel in Thornberg ’983 indicates the angular displacement (i.e., position data) of the vehicle relative to the operator mode reference axis because the control panel is directed toward the vehicle. Thornberg ’983’s Figure 2 discloses that the control panel is directly facing the remotely operated vehicle, which is nearly identical to placement of the remote control device and RC aircraft in Figure 5 of the ’116 patent. Ex. 1001, 3:67–4:2, Fig. 5; Ex. 1006, Fig. 2.” slip op. at 50

    Patent outcomesUS 9,079,116 unpatentable
    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,079,116
  • PTAB · May 29, 2019 · IPR2018-00206 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–18 are unpatentable, principally because Thornberg ’983 anticipates them or renders them obvious; the contingent motion to amend is denied.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “would have an equivalent of a Bachelor’s degree from an accredited institution in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, aeronautical or astronautical engineering, robotics, computer science, or any other discipline covering principles of design, operation, and/or control of unmanned aerial vehicles, including remote-controlled vehicles, and would have a working knowledge of the design, development, implementation, or deployment of such technologies. Additional education could substitute for experience, and significant experience could substitute for formal education. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. See Tr. 77:1–6; see also Ex. 2005 ¶ 48 (Patent Owner’s declarant adopting this definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of declaration testimony).” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “The only question, then, is whether orientation data can suffice by itself to qualify as “motion data,” as Petitioner contends, or whether data indicating a change in the vehicle’s position is essential, as Patent Owner argues. On that question, we agree with Petitioner that orientation data is sufficient. The Specification describes that motion sensing module 122 generates motion data 124 based on the motion of the aircraft and that motion sensing module 122 includes one or more axes of accelerometers or gyroscopes or other devices that alone, or with further processing by processing module 126, can generate data that represents θ, φ3, and/or other motion parameters such as R, Z, etc., that can be used in transforming the command data 104 to control data 128. Ex. 1001, 5:6–11 (emphases added). This disclosure supports a broad understanding of “motion data” as any data generated by the sensing module that represents a position, orientation, or motion parameter.” slip op. at 17

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “Based on the complete record, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention. Although Thornberg ’983 does not state explicitly that the signals transmitted from the control panel to the vehicle are RF signals, we agree that a skilled artisan, considering the context of Thornberg ’983’s disclosure, would have recognized that the transmitted signals could comprise RF signals. “What a reference teaches or suggests must be examined in the context of the knowledge, skill, and reasoning ability of a skilled artisan,” and “is not . . . limited to what a reference specifically ‘talks about’ or what is specifically ‘mentioned’ or ‘written’ in the reference.” Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2144.01 (“[I]n considering the disclosure of a reference, it is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw therefrom.”) (quoting In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968)). Furthermore, we credit Dr. Hansman’s testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would understand Thornberg ’983’s disclosure to mean that the transmitted control signals “are radio frequency (RF) signals, as antennas are most commonly used for.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 295.” slip op. at 25

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “We are persuaded by Petitioner’s assertion that Thornberg ’983’s flight control computer 38 corresponds to the claimed processing module. As discussed above (see supra § III.D.1), flight control computer 38 is provided with transformation function 400. Ex. 1006, 5:9–12. Transformation function 400 receives an input of command data (the pitch command and the roll command) from the control panel through antenna 42 and an input of the transformation angle, θ, which is based on the true heading of the vehicle provided by navigation system 36. Id. at 5:19–31, Fig. 6. Transformation function 400 (via pitch axis transformation function 410 and roll axis transformation function 412) transforms the pitch command and the roll command into a transformed pitch stick signal (TPSS) and a transformed roll stick signal (TRSS) using equations that are based on the transformation angle. Id. at 6:17–28. When the system is in the operator reference mode, the TPSS and TRSS (i.e., control data) are in accordance with a second coordinate system that is from a perspective of the vehicle. Id. at 6:8–11 (“In an operator reference mode, the orientation of the operator upon activation of the operator mode is used as the reference axis.”). Patent Owner argues that Thornberg ’983 does not disclose transforming command data into control data based on motion data. PO Resp. 8–13; Sur-Reply 6–8. Patent Owner agrees that, in Thornberg ’983, transformation uses transformation angle θ, which is determined based on the vehicle’s true heading. PO Resp. 8. But Patent Owner contends that transformation angle θ is not “motion data” because it is solely an indication of orientation. Id. (citing Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 74–75). The distinction Patent Owner urges between Thornberg ’983 and the claimed subject matter is based on Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “motion data” as requiring data indicative of a change in position. See id. at 8–9; see also Tr. 103:1–8. For the reasons discussed in Section III.C., we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Under the construction we have adopted, Thornberg ’983’s transformation angle θ is motion data because, as both parties agree, it indicates the vehicle’s orientation.” slip op. at 28

    Patent outcomesUS 8,649,918 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 8,649,918
  • PTAB · May 23, 2019 · IPR2018-00205 · APJ Timothy J Goodson · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–18 are unpatentable, principally because Thornberg-983 anticipates or renders them obvious; the contingent motion to amend is denied for lack of written-description support.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “itself to qualify as “motion data,” as Petitioner contends, or whether data indicating a change in the vehicle’s position is essential, as Patent Owner argues. On that question, we agree with Petitioner that orientation data is sufficient. The Specification describes that motion sensing module 122 generates motion data 124 based on the motion of the aircraft and that motion sensing module 122 includes one or more axes of accelerometers or gyroscopes or other devices that alone, or with further processing by processing module 126, can generate data that represents θ, φ3, and/or other motion parameters such as R, Z, etc., that can be used in transforming the command data 104 to control data 128. Ex. 1001, 4:66–5:4 (emphasis added). This disclosure supports a broad understanding of “motion data” as any data generated by the sensing module that represents a position, orientation, or motion parameter.” slip op. at 12

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “For the purposes of our Decision on Institution, and based on the record at that preliminary stage, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal that an ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of the invention of the ’368 patent would have had the following education and experience: [A] Bachelor’s degree from an accredited institution in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, aeronautical or astronautical engineering, robotics, computer science, or any other discipline covering principles of design, operation, and/or control of unmanned aerial vehicles, including remote-controlled vehicles, and would have a working knowledge of the design, development, implementation, or deployment of such technologies. Additional education could substitute for experience, and significant experience could substitute for formal education. Dec. on Inst. 9 (citing Pet. 12; Ex. 1003 ¶ 28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. See Tr. 77:3– 6. Based on our review of the complete record, we find that the evidence supports the level of ordinary skill in the art set forth above. Thus, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 15

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther

      “Looking at the first portion of the block quote, as Dr. Hansman observes, “[m]otion sensing module 122 is not limited to any specific technology and can therefore include gyroscopes that measure changes in orientation or accelerometers used to measure change in position.” Ex. 1023 ¶ 32. The Specification’s description that the “motion sensing module 122 includes one or more axes of accelerometers or gyroscopes or other devices” indicates that some embodiments include only gyroscopes, which are devices that provide information about orientation. Ex. 1001, 4:66–67 (emphasis added). Turning to the second portion of the passage block quoted above — i.e., that motion sensing module 122 includes devices that “can generate data that represents θ, φ3, and/or other motion parameters such as R, Z, etc., that can be used in transforming the command data 104 to control data 128” (Ex. 1001, 5:1–4) — we find persuasive Dr. Hansman’s testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would understand this passage to signify that “the motion data generated by motion sensing module 122 can be data reflecting any one, or several, or all of the mentioned parameters.” Ex. 1023 ¶ 32. Because φ3, which represents the aircraft’s orientation, is one of the mentioned parameters, this means that motion data can reflect orientation data alone. Ex. 1001, 3:46–47, 3:30–31, 5:2. We also note that Dr. Murphy’s testimony was in accord when he testified during cross-examination that “[m]otion data could be position data, it could be orientation data, or it could be a combination of position and orientation” and that he understands his own declaration to “say[] the same thing.” Ex. 1019, 96:12–15; see also id. at 61:18–19 (“Motion could be a change in only Phi 3. Yes. That’s correct.”).” slip op. at 12

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “d. Limitation [d]: “a processing module, coupled to the motion sensing module and the receiver, that transforms the command data into control data, based on the motion data, and in accordance with a second coordinate system, wherein the second coordinate system is from a perspective of the RC aircraft” We are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that Thornberg-983’s flight control computer 38 discloses the claimed “processing module.” See Pet. 31–33. Thornberg-983’s flight control computer 38 is coupled to navigation system 36 and communications equipment 40. Ex. 1006, 4:12– 16, Figs. 5–6. Flight control computer 38 receives roll and pitch commands from communications equipment 40 and transforms those commands into transformed pitch stick signal (TPSS) and transformed roll stick signal (TRSS). Id. at 4:44–52, 5:9–12, 5:20–23, 6:17–28. These transformations are “based on the motion data” as claimed because they use the transformation angle θ determined from the true heading measured by navigation system 36. Id. at 5:30–35, 6:22, 6:27. Thornberg-983 also discloses that the control data can be in a coordinate system that is from the aircraft’s perspective, as claimed, because in one mode of operation, “the vehicle reference for purposes of vehicle control is the forward reference position on the aircraft.” Id. at 5:56–59; Ex. 1003 ¶ 201. Patent Owner argues that Thornberg-983 does not disclose transforming command data into control data based on motion data. PO Resp. 8–13; Sur-Reply 6–8. Patent Owner agrees that in Thornberg-983, transformation uses transformation angle θ, which is determined based on the vehicle’s true heading. PO Resp. 8. But Patent Owner contends that transformation angle θ is not “motion data” because it is solely an indication of orientation. Id. (citing Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 74–75). The distinction Patent Owner urges between Thornberg-983 and the claimed subject matter is based on Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “motion data” as requiring data indicative of a change in position. See id. at 8–9; see also Tr. 103:1–8. For the reasons discussed in Section II.A., we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Under the construction we have adopted, Thornberg- 983’s transformation angle θ is motion data because, as both parties agree, it indicates the vehicle’s orientation. e. Limitation [e]: “a plurality of control devices, coupled to the processing module, that control the motion of the RC aircraft based on the control data” We are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that Thornberg-983’s pitch flight control system and roll flight control system disclose the claimed “control devices” because they are coupled to flight control computer 38 and they control the pitch and roll motion of the vehicle based on the transformed TPSS and TRSS data. See Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1006, 6:16–28; Ex. 1003 ¶ 203). f. Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 We determine that Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the” slip op. at 22

    Patent outcomesUS 8,380,368 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,380,368
  • PTAB · Mar 5, 2019 · IPR2018-01474 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution on claim 4 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that Bender and Piret rendered it obvious; claim 3 had been statutorily disclaimed.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

      “For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that claim 4 would have been obvious over Bender and Piret. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (To prevail in an inter partes review that has been instituted, “the petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.”). III. CONCLUSION We conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim of the ’587 patent challenged in the Petition. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied as to all challenged claims of the ’587 patent, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 17

    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

      “We agree with Patent Owner. “A statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253 has the effect of canceling the claims from the patent and the patent is viewed as though the disclaimed claims had never existed in the patent.” Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri–Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477 (1935)). An inter partes review cannot be instituted on claims that have been disclaimed and no longer exist. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”). This conclusion is consistent with other panel decisions addressing this issue. See, e.g., Intuitive Surgical, Inc. v. Ethicon LLC, Case IPR2018-00935, Paper 9, 9–10 (PTAB Dec. 7, 2018); Vestas-Am. Wind Tech. Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., Case IPR2018-01015, Paper 9, 12–14 (PTAB Nov. 14, 2018). Accordingly, we treat claim 3 as having never been part of the ’587 patent, and do not institute inter partes review on this claim. As discussed above, we regard claim 4 as the only challenged claim. See Sections I.A and I.E.” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundDecided for patent owner

      “Accordingly, a plain reading of the reference does not support a finding that Bender teaches or suggests that the FEC scheme is used to encode the SNR itself. Therefore, we are not persuaded that Bender’s FEC description would have provided reason to look to Piret’s encoding techniques for encoding Bender’s “quality” information. That is, although we agree with the Petitioner that Piret teaches and suggests a method of encoding less significant bits differently from the more significant bits of each data word, wherein the most significant bit of the plurality of bits is encoded to be less susceptible to errors (Ex. 1005, 1:20–33), that alone is insufficient to support a conclusion of obviousness of providing an encoder that encodes Bender’s SNR “quality” information, as required by claim 4. That Piret discloses encoding transmitted information does not address the requirements set forth in KSR to provide articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. That is, the Petitioner’s obviousness position does not explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have encoded the SNR value in Bender, which may not even be transmitted, using Piret’s encoding method. Indeed, Petitioner does not direct us to persuasive evidence that encoding the SNR value would have been expected to provide any advantage, outside the teachings of the ’587 patent. Here, for these reasons discussed above, we conclude that Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence from prior art references or Dr. Singer’s declaration testimony to support its contention that one of ordinary skill in the art would have used Piret’s techniques to encode Bender’s SNR values in the manner required by the claims—such that the most significant bit of the plurality of bits is encoded to be less susceptible to errors. Therefore, Petitioner has not demonstrated articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Instead, we conclude that Petitioner used improper hindsight to reconstruct the claimed subject matter by using the claims as a guide to combine the prior art references. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Care must be taken to avoid hindsight reconstruction by using ‘the patent in suit as a guide through the maze of” slip op. at 15

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” Id. In that regard, Petitioner’s Declarant, Dr. Singer, testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ʼ587 Patent’s invention would have been a person having a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or the equivalent plus three years of experience working with wireless communication systems or a Master’s degree in electrical engineering with an emphasis on communication systems or the equivalent plus one year of experience working with digital communication systems or in network engineering. Pet. 6; Ex. 1003 ¶ 39. At this juncture, Patent Owner does not dispute Dr. Singer’s assessment on the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on the current record, we apply Dr. Singer’s assessment for purposes of this Decision. We also note that the prior art of record currently in the instant proceeding is consistent with this level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that absent evidence to the contrary, “the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

    § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,206,587
  • PTAB · Nov 16, 2018 · IPR2014-00504 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s request for rehearing of the SAS Order, leaving review instituted on all challenged claims and all grounds in the Petition.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). In particular, “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 3

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)New argument disregardedDenied

      “overlooked express statutory requirements that the Board was obligated to assess before considering the Petition for re-institution.” Reh. Req. 10 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)). Specifically, Patent Owner argues “the Petition fails to meet the particularity requirement [of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)] at least with respect to the multiple grounds identified on pages 47–59 of the Petition” because of the “vague formulation” (i.e., Veeck in view of Kellerer, Boehm, and/or Mitchell). Id. at 12. Patent Owner, however, does not identify where this “matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply,” as required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). We could not have misapprehended or overlooked something that was not presented previously. A Request for Rehearing is not an opportunity to raise new arguments against a petition. To the extent Patent Owner believes the grounds newly instituted in the SAS Order lack sufficient particularity under 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3), it can make such arguments in its supplemental briefing.” slip op. at 10

    • Director reviewOther

      “The standard operating procedure exemplifies some of the reasons for which the Chief Judge may expand a panel. PTAB SOP 1, 15 (§ III.M). For example, the Chief Judge may expand a panel “where appropriate, to secure and maintain uniformity of the Board’s decisions, e.g., in related cases ordinarily involving different three judge panels.” Id. (§ III.M.1). In this case, the acting-Chief Judge has considered Patent Owner’s suggestion for an expanded panel, but has determined that an expanded panel is not warranted.” slip op. at 12

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,382,771

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.