• Dell Inc. / Riverbed Technology, Inc. et al. v. Realtime Data LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 15, 2018 · IPR2017-00365 · APJ Per Curiam · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 9–12, 14, 18, 19, and 24 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 because Petitioner failed to establish a specific combination with a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We do not observe a meaningful difference between the parties’ assessments of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We further note that either assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in the instant proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Moreover, Dr. Creusere appears to satisfy either assessment. Our analysis in this Decision is supported by either assessment, but, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The parties do not argue a claim construction for any terms. See generally PO Resp.; Reply. In the Decision to Institute, we did not construe any terms. Dec. 5–6. We determine that no terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only those claim terms or phrases that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed

    “the art would have a reasonable expectation of success (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 168– 69), on this record, we cannot reconcile these portions of his declaration Dr. Creusere’s his own testimony on cross-examination to the contrary, such as his acknowledgement of “unlimited” permutations that were “impossible” to address. E.g., Ex. 2015, 81:21–83:24, 84:13–24, 143:20–144:3. Stated differently, in his initial position, Dr. Creusere testifies that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have a reasonable expectation of success (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 168–69), while his later testimony vacillates to a stance that makes it difficult to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of success–– i.e., the existence of “unlimited” permutations that were “impossible” to address. Ex. 2015, 81:21–83:24, 84:13–24, 143:20–144:3. We find this testimony contradictory. In summary, neither the Petition, nor Dr. Creusere’s declaration, nor his deposition testimony, provide any indication as to how a person having ordinary skill in the art would select among the countless permutations or further narrow the set of choices.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Put another way, we do not find that Petitioner demonstrates a “reasonable expectation of success” when Dr. Creusere acknowledges that a person having ordinary skill in the art did not specify whether to discard or keep Franaszek’s sampling approach, or would use only Franaszek’s teachings of compression algorithms, or incorporate other such algorithms, or what data type or data types an intended system teaches would be created to compress, or what specific goals and objectives the person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to achieve. Compare id. at 75:18–76:19, 126:20–127:1, 76:24–78:6, 94:4–12, 96:4–98:14 with Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 154–71; Ex. 2017 ¶¶ 187–89.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 7,415,530 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,415,530
• Skechers USA, Inc. v. Adidas AGNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 25, 2018 · IPR2017-00127 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 were not shown unpatentable under §103 because the proposed prior-art modifications lacked adequate support and rational underpinning.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The basis of disagreement boils down to an evaluation of a skilled artisan’s experience. In that respect, Petitioner urges that the artisan generally has “substantial experience in the structural design of flexible elements and plastic polymers,” whereas Patent Owner characterizes the experience as directed to “biomechanical systems.” The ’079 patent is clearly directed to matters of shoe construction, and takes note, for instance, of the desirability of “cushioning and biomechanically supporting the foot.” Ex. 1001, 1:27–29. It is also apparent that an overarching focus of the ’079 patent is concern with “balance” and “support” of a “foot against misorientations such as pronation and supination (i.e. a tilting movement of the forefoot part to the medial and the lateral side, respectively).” Id. at 2:34–39. Such concerns, in our view, go beyond general experience in the design of flexible elements and plastic polymers. In that regard, we credit the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Hinrichs, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have experience with biomechanical systems, such as shoes. See Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 14–15. We have considered the respective opinions of the parties when it comes to the level of ordinary skill in the art. In reaching our decision as to the merits of this proceeding, for the reasons discussed above, we are persuaded by Patent Owner’s evidence as to the ordinary skill of an artisan.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “substantial dissection and modification of Luthi ’202’s Figure 17. That dissection is premised on Mr. Ganaja’s assessment of what a person of ordinary skill in the art would take from the record at hand. Yet, in our view, neither Mr. Ganaja nor Petitioner explains adequately how the teachings of the prior art would have led one down the path that they advocate. For instance, it is decidedly unclear from the record that any “longitudinal groove” as advanced in Petitioner’s annotated illustrations of Luthi ’202’s Figure 17 reproduced herein exists in the configuration proposed by Petitioner. Although Petitioner and Mr. Ganaja postulate that it does exist, Luthi ’202’s teachings are less than determinative in that respect. We credit the testimony of Dr. Hinrichs and Dr. Luthi, that no such groove or “gap” exists as proposed by Petitioner. PO Resp. 21–25 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 32–35, 42–43; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 6, 8–13).” slip op. at 22

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We observe that Patent Owner relies on content of the ’079 patent at column 11, lines 31–34 to support the meaning of “leaf spring[s]” and “leaf spring element[s]” that it advances. That portion of the ’079 patent describes embodiments of the invention appearing in Figures 19 to 25. Referencing particular leaf spring elements 22 and 23 of those embodiments, the ’079 patent states that “[t]ypically the restoring force exerts a force that has a component orthogonal to the sole plate (e.g., for cushioning) and a component parallel to the sole in the rearward direction (e.g., for acceleration).” Ex. 1001, 11:31–34. While that language mirrors the meaning of “leaf spring[s]” and “leaf spring element[s]” proposed by Patent Owner, we discern that the noted clause also begins with the term “[t]ypically.” That leaf spring elements may “typically” include a component parallel to the sole in the rearward direction does not lend itself to the conclusion that a “leaf spring” necessarily includes such a component. Rather, it conveys the opposite. In that respect, the plain understanding of the pertinent content of the ’079 patent is that, while, perhaps, not typical, the ’079 patent contemplates other component arrangements, logically including those in which the parallel component is not in the rearward direction.” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “substantial dissection and modification of Luthi ’202’s Figure 17. That dissection is premised on Mr. Ganaja’s assessment of what a person of ordinary skill in the art would take from the record at hand. Yet, in our view, neither Mr. Ganaja nor Petitioner explains adequately how the teachings of the prior art would have led one down the path that they advocate. For instance, it is decidedly unclear from the record that any “longitudinal groove” as advanced in Petitioner’s annotated illustrations of Luthi ’202’s Figure 17 reproduced herein exists in the configuration proposed by Petitioner. Although Petitioner and Mr. Ganaja postulate that it does exist, Luthi ’202’s teachings are less than determinative in that respect. We credit the testimony of Dr. Hinrichs and Dr. Luthi, that no such groove or “gap” exists as proposed by Petitioner. PO Resp. 21–25 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 32–35, 42–43; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 6, 8–13). Moreover, even if such groove does exist, neither Petitioner nor Mr. Ganaja adequately explains why the presence of such groove would create at least two leaf springs or leaf spring elements that are “integrally joined to form a single end not directly connected to the sole plate,” as required by all the claims involved in this proceeding. We agree with, and credit, the testimony of Dr. Hinrichs that “Luthi ’202 consistently discloses that the strut elements run the entire width of the shoe.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 32 (citing Ex. 1005, 3:47–50 (“the strut elements 22 extend substantially from the medial edge of the lateral edge of lower plate 26 . . .”)). In extending the entire width of the shoe, strut elements 22 (and 222) are more appropriately viewed as a single element (e.g., a spring element) rather than multiple spring elements that come together integrally. Petitioner and Mr. Ganaja also inadequately explain why combination of Luthi ’202’s teachings with those of either Luthi ’800 or Chan would result in the above-noted “central cavity” as a part of the directional element of Luthi ’202’s Figure 17. Although Luthi ’800 and Chan may show spaces or cavities in components of their shoes, there appear substantial differences in the designs of those shoes, and in particular the cushioning aspects, as compared with Luthi ’202’s Figure 17. We credit Dr. Hinrichs’s and Dr. Luthi’s testimony that the presence of such a cavity as shown in Luthi ’800 and Chan would prove detrimental to the medial-lateral stability of Luthi ’202’s shoe, and specifically the directional element of such a shoe that is depicted in Luthi ’202’s Figure 17. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 42; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 11–13. To that end, we also find inadequate Petitioner’s general position that combining the teachings of Luthi ’202, Luthi ’800, and Chan would result simply in a “combination of familiar elements according to known methods that would yield predictable results,” and “well within the knowledge and skill of persons of ordinary skill in the art . . .” Pet. 35. We are not persuaded that any such combination would yield the “predictable results” advanced by Petitioner, or that “well within the knowledge and skill” of an artisan cited by Petitioner constitutes rational underpinning to support an obviousness conclusion. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (An assertion of unpatentability based on “obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”)” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 9,339,079 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,339,079
• Skechers USA, Inc. v. Adidas AGNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 25, 2018 · IPR2017-00125 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 20–32 were not shown unpatentable under §103 because the proposed modifications to Luthi ’202 were unsupported and relied on hindsight.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “artisan’s experience. In that respect, Petitioner urges that the artisan generally has “substantial experience in the structural design of flexible elements and plastic polymers,” whereas Patent Owner characterizes the experience as directed to “biomechanical systems.” The ’285 patent is clearly directed to matters of shoe construction, and takes note, for instance, of the desirability of “cushioning and biomechanically supporting the foot.” Ex. 1001, 1:19–21. It is also apparent that an overarching focus of the ’285 patent is concern with “balance” and “support” of a “foot against misorientations such as pronation and supination (i.e. a tilting movement of the forefoot part to the medial and the lateral side, respectively.” Id. at 2:28– 31. Such concerns, in our view, go beyond general experience in the design of flexible elements and plastic polymers. In that regard, we credit the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Hinrichs, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have experience with biomechanical systems, such as shoes. See Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 14–15. In crediting Dr. Hinrichs’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art we observe that, although Petitioner makes reference to the testimony of its declarant Mr. Ganaja (see Pet. 6 (citing 1002 ¶¶ 39–43)), Mr. Ganaja makes no evaluation of his own in that testimony in connection with the level of ordinary skill. We have considered the respective opinions of the parties when it comes to the level of ordinary skill in the art. In reaching our decision as to the merits of this proceeding, for the reasons discussed above, we are persuaded by Patent Owner’s evidence as to the ordinary skill of an artisan.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “substantial dissection and modification of Luthi ’202’s Figure 17. That dissection is premised on Mr. Ganaja’s assessment of what a person of ordinary skill in the art would take from the record at hand. Yet, in our view, neither Mr. Ganaja nor Petitioner explains adequately how the teachings of the prior art would have led one down the path that they advocate. For instance, it is decidedly unclear from the record that any “longitudinal groove” as advanced in Petitioner’s annotated illustrations of Luthi ’202’s Figure 17 reproduced herein exists in the configuration proposed by Petitioner. Although Petitioner and Mr. Ganaja postulate that it does exist, Luthi ’202’s teachings are less than determinative in that respect. We credit the testimony of Dr. Hinrichs and Dr. Luthi, that no such groove or “gap” exists as proposed by Petitioner. PO Resp. 18–21 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 32–35, 42–43; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 8 and 11–13). Moreover, even if such groove does exist, neither Petitioner nor Mr. Ganaja adequately explains why the presence of such groove would create at least two leaf springs or leaf spring elements that “come together integrally to form a single end not directly connected to the sole plate,” as required by all the claims involved in this proceeding. We agree with, and credit, the testimony of Dr. Hinrichs that “Luthi ’202 consistently disclosed that the strut elements run the entire width of the shoe.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 32 (citing Ex. 1005, 3:47–50 (“the strut elements 22 extend substantially from the medial edge of the lateral edge of lower plate 26 . . .”)). In extending the entire width of the shoe, strut elements 22 (and 222) are more appropriately viewed as a single element (e.g., a spring element) rather than multiple spring elements that come together integrally.” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “column 11, lines 23–26 to support the meaning of “leaf spring[s]” and “leaf spring element[s]” that it advances. That portion of the ’285 patent describes embodiments of the invention appearing in Figures 19 to 25. Referencing particular leaf spring elements 22 and 23 of those embodiments, the ’285 patent states that “[t]ypically the restoring force exerts a force that has a component orthogonal to the sole plate (e.g., for cushioning) and a component parallel to the sole in the rearward direction (e.g., for acceleration).” Ex. 1001, 11:23–26. While that language mirrors the meaning of “leaf spring[s]” and “leaf spring element[s]” proposed by Patent Owner, we discern that the noted clause also begins with the term “[t]ypically.” That leaf spring elements may “typically” include a component parallel to the sole in the rearward direction does not lend itself to the conclusion that a “leaf spring” or “leaf spring element” necessarily includes such a component. Rather, it conveys the opposite. In that respect, the plain understanding of the pertinent content of the ’285 patent is that, while, perhaps, not typical, the ’285 patent contemplates other component arrangements, logically including those in which the parallel component is not in the rearward direction. Indeed, our above-noted understanding is also consistent with other embodiments described in the ’285 patent. For instance, embodiments depicted in Figures 13–16 show elements 23 extending in a forward direction with respect to the sole. The elements 23 of those figures are described as “leaf spring elements.” Id. at 10:15–50. Moreover, the ‘285 patent makes explicit that those leaf spring elements “are either forwardly or rearwardly directed.” Id. at 10:49–50. Patent Owner’s position that the claimed “leaf springs” or “leaf spring elements” require a parallel component extending in the rearward direction is inconsistent with these particular figures and the accompanying description in the ’285 patent. To that end, Patent Owner does not explain persuasively why the meaning of the term “leaf spring” encompasses only a parallel component in the rearward direction, yet the ’285 patent clearly provides that leaf springs may also have components that extend in the forward direction. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we again conclude that “leaf spring[s]” and “leaf spring element[s]” mean “a flexible member that deflects and provides a restoring force with an orthogonal and a parallel component in response to a load applied to the sole.” We discern that it is unnecessary to construe expressly any other claim term of the ’285 patent. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “substantial dissection and modification of Luthi ’202’s Figure 17. That dissection is premised on Mr. Ganaja’s assessment of what a person of ordinary skill in the art would take from the record at hand. Yet, in our view, neither Mr. Ganaja nor Petitioner explains adequately how the teachings of the prior art would have led one down the path that they advocate. For instance, it is decidedly unclear from the record that any “longitudinal groove” as advanced in Petitioner’s annotated illustrations of Luthi ’202’s Figure 17 reproduced herein exists in the configuration proposed by Petitioner. Although Petitioner and Mr. Ganaja postulate that it does exist, Luthi ’202’s teachings are less than determinative in that respect. We credit the testimony of Dr. Hinrichs and Dr. Luthi, that no such groove or “gap” exists as proposed by Petitioner. PO Resp. 18–21 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 32–35, 42–43; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 8 and 11–13). Moreover, even if such groove does exist, neither Petitioner nor Mr. Ganaja adequately explains why the presence of such groove would create at least two leaf springs or leaf spring elements that “come together integrally to form a single end not directly connected to the sole plate,” as required by all the claims involved in this proceeding. We agree with, and credit, the testimony of Dr. Hinrichs that “Luthi ’202 consistently disclosed that the strut elements run the entire width of the shoe.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 32 (citing Ex. 1005, 3:47–50 (“the strut elements 22 extend substantially from the medial edge of the lateral edge of lower plate 26 . . .”)). In extending the entire width of the shoe, strut elements 22 (and 222) are more appropriately viewed as a single element (e.g., a spring element) rather than multiple spring elements that come together integrally.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 9,345,285 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,345,285
• Pungkuk Edm Wire Manufacturing Company v. Seong, Ki ChulNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 16, 2017 · IPR2016-00764 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board entered adverse judgment against claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 9; Petitioner did not prove claims 2, 5, 7, 8, and 10 anticipated by Mukherjee because cracks were not shown to be necessarily …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

    “and instead only addresses the patentability of claims 2, 5, 7, 8, and 10 of the ’036 patent over Mukherjee. See PO Resp. 2–3, 9–28. We asked Patent Owner during the hearing whether it was conceding the unpatentability of the claims that it did not address in the Patent Owner Response (i.e., claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 9). Tr. 55:20–56:4 (“[W]e instituted on a number of grounds that you did not -- and on a number of claims that you did not address in your patent owner response. Are you conceding unpatentability of those claims on those grounds?”). Patent Owner’s counsel responded that Patent Owner was conceding the unpatentability of those claims. Id. at 55:20– 56:10 (“JUDGE KOKOSKI: You're conceding that they're [claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 9] not patentable? MR. SUTTON: That they're not patentable, that's correct.”). The Board’s rules permit a party to “request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). The Board construes a party’s “[a]bandonment of the contest” as a request for adverse judgment. Id. § 42.73(b)(4). Accordingly, we construe Patent Owner’s concession that claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 9 are unpatentable to be an “abandonment of the contest” and a request for adverse judgment as to those claims. Therefore, we enter adverse judgment against claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 9 of the ’036 patent. C.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner contends that the term “cracks,” which, for purposes of the Decision on Institution, we determined did not require an explicit construction (Dec. on Inst. 11), should be construed to be mean “narrow breaks.” PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner did not address Patent Owner’s proposed construction in its Reply, but when asked during the hearing if it disagreed with it, Petitioner indicated that Patent Owner’s construction was “fine.” Tr. 18:3–21. Based on the record developed at trial, and in the absence of controversy about the construction of the term, we construe “cracks” to mean “narrow breaks.” B.” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureNot shown unpatentableInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Inherency requires that the claim limitation in question is necessarily present in the reference. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[A] prior art reference may anticipate without disclosing a feature of the claimed invention if that missing characteristic is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.”); see also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (patent challenger must demonstrate “that ‘the disclosure [of the prior art] is sufficient to show that the natural result flowing from the operation as taught [in the prior art] would result in’ the claimed product.”) (citations omitted). “Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). “If, however, the disclosure is sufficient to show that the natural result flowing from the operation as taught would result in the performance of the questioned function, it seems to be well settled that the disclosure should be regarded as sufficient.” Cont’l Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Petitioner, therefore, must show that cracks in the alloy layer and the coating layer are necessarily present in Mukherjee.” slip op. at 10

  • ExcludeOther

    “III. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner moves to exclude Exhibits 1014–1017, 1019, and 1020. Paper 59. We do not consider the merits of Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude because, as explained above, even if the disputed evidence is considered, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 5, 7, 8, and 10 of the ’036 patent are unpatentable as anticipated by Mukherjee. Accordingly, we dismiss Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude as moot.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 6,492,036 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 6,492,036
• Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. / Mylan Laboratories Limited v. Ucb Pharma GmbHNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 19, 2017 · IPR2016-00517 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 4, and 6–8 were held not unpatentable because Petitioner did not prove either obviousness ground by a preponderance of the evidence.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “For the purpose of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s undisputed contention that: [a] person of ordinary skill in the art would have a Ph.D. in chemistry, medicinal chemistry, pharmacology, or a related field, and at least one year of industrial exposure to drug discovery, drug design, and synthesis. In lieu of an advanced degree, the individual may have additional years of industry experience, including, for example, in drug discovery, drug synthesis, and structure-activity work. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 20); see Prelim. Resp. 9; PO Resp. 6. Based on our review of the ’772 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’772 patent and cited prior art, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention. We note that the applied prior art also reflects the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard); 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, and absent any special definitions, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Only those terms which are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner submits that the “claims in the ʼ772 patent are presumed to take on their ordinary and customary meaning based on the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim language.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s position that no claim terms require construction, which the Board also accepted for purposes of institution.” PO Resp. 7 (citing Pet. 6; Inst. Dec. 7). In our Decision on Institution, we determined that “for purposes of this Decision, none of the terms in the challenged claims require express construction at this time.” Inst. Dec. 7. As in the Decision on Institution, we apply the broadest reasonable interpretation standard here, and see no reason to construe explicitly any claim term. B. Principles of Law” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner, however, fails to point to any evidence that 5-HMT is metabolized through the CYP2D6 pathway, or that administering 5-HMT would have resulted in the same risks of drug interaction and adverse effects that Petitioner contends are the result of administering tolterodine. See Pet. 22–24 (describing alleged problems associated with tolterodine, not 5 HMT); Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 95–100 (Dr. Patterson’s testimony regarding the drawbacks of tolterodine). Indeed, such an argument appears to undermine Petitioner’s position, discussed in Section III.D.1 supra, that one of ordinary skill in the art would have selected 5-HMT as a lead compound over tolterodine to avoid the CYP2D6 metabolic pathway, and Dr. Patterson’s testimony that the prior art collectively “indicated to a skilled drug designer interested in overactive bladder treatment that 5-HMT would avoid the issues associated with dosing [] tolterodine.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 101. Petitioner’s argument also is contradicted by Dr. Patterson’s testimony that “5-HMT is not metabolized by both CYP2D6 and CYP3A4, but only by CYP3A4.” Id. ¶ 111; see also Ex. 1010, 289 (Postlind indicating that 5-HMT is not a CYP2D6 substrate).” slip op. at 25

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Following our weighing of the experts’ testimony, we find that Dr. Roush’s testimony better addresses the issue at hand and we credit that testimony over Dr. Patterson’s testimony. Dr. Patterson opines generally that the “presence of two hydroxyl groups around the left most aromatic ring (shown above in blue) would have created a product likely to have decreased oral bioavailability compared to tolterodine because of its hydrophilicity and thus lower than acceptable lipophilicity” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 112), and that it “would [have been] a matter of routine experimentation” to confirm that 5-HMT could have significantly less bioavailability than its parent, tolterodine” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 115). Dr. Patterson, however, did not perform any experiments to confirm 5-HMT’s oral bioavailability, and cites to no further evidence to support his opinions. See Ex. 2022 ¶ 92; compare Brynne (Ex.1011) discussed supra § III.C.2. Dr. Roush, on the other hand, conducts an analysis of the compound under the “Rule of 5” to determine that “5-HMT does not meet a single factor, much less two, of the rule” thus teaching the skilled artisan “away from concluding that 5-HMT had an oral absorption problem.” PO Resp. 26– 27 (citing Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 56–58, 87, 92). At oral hearing, Patent Owner restated that the analysis under the Rule of 5 indicates that 5-HMT was “not even close to being a problem . . . for all four of these properties, 5-HMT says there’s no red flags; there’s no problem,” and that “Dr. Patterson admitted in his deposition, 5-HMT does not violate the Rule of Five.” Tr. 67:35–68:3; 68:17–21; see Ex. 2020 180:14–181:14.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 7,985,772 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,985,772
• Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. / Mylan Laboratories Limited v. Ucb Pharma GmbHNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 19, 2017 · IPR2016-01665 · APJ Michelle N Ankenbrand · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 and 21–24 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because the petitioner did not establish the motivation and reasonable expectation of success needed to reach the claimed compounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “art. For the purpose of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s undisputed contention that: [a] person of ordinary skill in the art would have a Ph.D. in chemistry, medicinal chemistry, pharmacology, or a related field, and at least one year of industrial exposure to drug discovery, drug design, and synthesis. In lieu of an advanced degree, the individual may have additional years of industry experience, including, for example, in drug discovery, drug synthesis, and structure-activity work. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 23); see Resp. 6. Based on our review of the ’650 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’650 patent and cited prior art, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention. We note that the applied prior art also reflects the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard); 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, and absent any special definitions, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Only those terms which are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner submits that the “claims in the ʼ650 patent are presumed to take on their ordinary and customary meaning based on the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim language.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s position that no claim terms require construction, which the Board also accepted for purposes of institution.” Resp. 7 (citing Pet. 6; Inst. Dec. 7). In our Institution Decision, we determined that “no claim term requires express construction.” Inst. Dec. 7. After reviewing the entire record developed during trial, we affirm our determination from the Institution Decision that no claim term requires express construction to resolve the parties’ dispute.” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Following our weighing of the experts’ testimony, we find that Dr. Roush’s testimony better addresses the issue at hand and we credit that testimony over Dr. Patterson’s testimony. Dr. Patterson opines generally that the “presence of two hydroxyl groups around the left most aromatic ring . . . would have created a product likely to have decreased oral bioavailability compared to tolterodine because of its hydrophilicity and thus lower than acceptable lipophilicity” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 112), and that it “would [have been] a matter of routine experimentation” to confirm that 5-HMT could have significantly less bioavailability than its parent, tolterodine” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 115). Dr. Patterson, however, did not perform any experiments to confirm 5-HMT’s oral bioavailability, and cites to no further evidence to support his opinions. See Ex. 2022 ¶ 92; compare Brynne (Ex. 1011) discussed supra § II.D.1. Dr. Roush, on the other hand, conducts an analysis of the compound under the “Rule of 5” to determine that “5-HMT does not meet a single factor, much less two, of the rule” thus teaching the skilled artisan “away from concluding that 5-HMT had an oral absorption problem.” Resp. 28–29 (citing Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 56–58, 87, 92). At oral hearing, Patent Owner restated that the analysis under the Rule of 5 indicates that 5-HMT was “not even close to being a problem . . . for all four of these properties, 5-HMT says there’s no red flags; there’s no problem,” and that “Dr. Patterson admitted in his deposition, 5-HMT does not violate the Rule of Five.” Tr. 67:35–68:3; 68:17–21; see Ex. 2020, 180:14–181:14. Regarding Petitioner’s reliance on the statement in Brynne that “[t]olterodine is tenfold more lipophilic than 5-HM[T], and consequently tolterodine penetrates membranes more rapidly,” Patent Owner does not appear to dispute the substance of that statement. Although such a statement illustrates a relative relationship between the lipophilicity of 5-HMT and tolterodine, it does not demonstrate that the lipophilicity of 5-HMT would have presented an absorption problem that would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to modify 5-HMT. Even if 5-HMT were considered by one of ordinary skill in the art to be less lipophilic than tolterodine, and thereby less rapidly absorbed, the record lacks sufficient evidence regarding the actual properties of 5-HMT for us to conclude that 5-HMT’s lipophilicity would have presented a bioavailability problem.21 For these reasons, Petitioner’s assertion that 5-HMT “may have bioavailability concerns” that would have prompted one of ordinary skill in the art to modify 5-HMT is unpersuasive. Reply 13.” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “On the complete record before us, we are unpersuaded that Petitioner carries its burden of demonstrating that 5-HMT has a bioavailability problem that would have motivated one of ordinary skill in the art to modify its structure. Regarding the lipophilicity profile of 5-HMT, Petitioner does not provide, or attempt to provide, any actual (as opposed to relative) data concerning the bioavailability of 5-HMT. Cf. supra § II.D.2 (Brynne comparing lipophilicity of tolterodine to lipophilicity of 5-HMT). Although data is not required, and although we do not find that absence of data alone to be fatal to Petitioner’s position on this issue, the absence of any data concerning the actual bioavailability of 5-HMT leaves Petitioner’s argument solely supported by expert testimony. We now turn to the contradictory statements of the parties’ experts. Following our weighing of the experts’ testimony, we find that Dr. Roush’s testimony better addresses the issue at hand and we credit that testimony over Dr. Patterson’s testimony. Dr. Patterson opines generally that the “presence of two hydroxyl groups around the left most aromatic ring . . . would have created a product likely to have decreased oral bioavailability compared to tolterodine because of its hydrophilicity and thus lower than acceptable lipophilicity” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 112), and that it “would [have been] a matter of routine experimentation” to confirm that 5-HMT could have significantly less bioavailability than its parent, tolterodine” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 115). Dr. Patterson, however, did not perform any experiments to confirm 5-HMT’s oral bioavailability, and cites to no further evidence to support his opinions. See Ex. 2022 ¶ 92; compare Brynne (Ex. 1011) discussed supra § II.D.1.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 6,858,650 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,858,650
• Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. / Mylan Laboratories Limited v. Ucb Pharma GmbHNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 19, 2017 · IPR2016-01636 · APJ Michelle N Ankenbrand · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 and 21–24 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because the evidence did not establish a reason to make the claimed modifications with a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “art. For the purpose of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s undisputed contention that: [a] person of ordinary skill in the art would have a Ph.D. in chemistry, medicinal chemistry, pharmacology, or a related field, and at least one year of industrial exposure to drug discovery, drug design, and synthesis. In lieu of an advanced degree, the individual may have additional years of industry experience, including, for example, in drug discovery, drug synthesis, and structure-activity work. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 23); see Resp. 6. Based on our review of the ’650 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’650 patent and cited prior art, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention. We note that the applied prior art also reflects the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard); 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, and absent any special definitions, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Only those terms which are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner submits that the “claims in the ʼ650 patent are presumed to take on their ordinary and customary meaning based on the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim language.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s position that no claim terms require construction, which the Board also accepted for purposes of institution.” Resp. 7 (citing Pet. 6; Inst. Dec. 7). In our Institution Decision, we determined that “no claim term requires express construction.” Inst. Dec. 7. After reviewing the entire record developed during trial, we affirm our determination from the Institution Decision that no claim term requires express construction to resolve the parties’ dispute.” slip op. at 8

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “II. DISCUSSION Petitioner bears the burden of proving unpatentability of the challenged claims, and that burden never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). To prevail, Petitioner must establish the facts supporting its challenge by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). Below, we explain why Petitioner has not met its burden with respect to the challenged claims.” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “On the complete record before us, we are unpersuaded that Petitioner carries its burden of demonstrating that 5-HMT has a bioavailability problem that would have motivated one of ordinary skill in the art to modify its structure. Regarding the lipophilicity profile of 5-HMT, Petitioner does not provide, or attempt to provide, any actual (as opposed to relative) data concerning the bioavailability of 5-HMT. Cf. supra § II.D.2 (Brynne comparing lipophilicity of tolterodine to lipophilicity of 5-HMT). Although data is not required, and although we do not find that absence of data alone to be fatal to Petitioner’s position on this issue, the absence of any data concerning the actual bioavailability of 5-HMT leaves Petitioner’s argument solely supported by expert testimony. We now turn to the contradictory statements of the parties’ experts. Following our weighing of the experts’ testimony, we find that Dr. Roush’s testimony better addresses the issue at hand and we credit that testimony over Dr. Patterson’s testimony. Dr. Patterson opines generally that the “presence of two hydroxyl groups around the left most aromatic ring . . . would have created a product likely to have decreased oral bioavailability compared to tolterodine because of its hydrophilicity and thus lower than acceptable lipophilicity” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 112), and that it “would [have been] a matter of routine experimentation” to confirm that 5-HMT could have significantly less bioavailability than its parent, tolterodine” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 115). Dr. Patterson, however, did not perform any experiments to confirm 5-HMT’s oral bioavailability, and cites to no further evidence to support his opinions. See Ex. 2022 ¶ 92; compare Brynne (Ex. 1011) discussed supra § II.D.1.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 6,858,650 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,858,650
• Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. / Mylan Laboratories Limited et al. v. Ucb Pharma GmbHNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 19, 2017 · IPR2016-01596 · APJ Michelle N Ankenbrand · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 and 21–24 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because the evidence did not establish a reason to make the claimed modifications with a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “art. For the purpose of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s undisputed contention that: [a] person of ordinary skill in the art would have a Ph.D. in chemistry, medicinal chemistry, pharmacology, or a related field, and at least one year of industrial exposure to drug discovery, drug design, and synthesis. In lieu of an advanced degree, the individual may have additional years of industry experience, including, for example, in drug discovery, drug synthesis, and structure-activity work. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 23); see Resp. 6. Based on our review of the ’650 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’650 patent and cited prior art, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention. We note that the applied prior art also reflects the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard); 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, and absent any special definitions, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Only those terms which are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner submits that the “claims in the ʼ650 patent are presumed to take on their ordinary and customary meaning based on the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim language.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s position that no claim terms require construction, which the Board also accepted for purposes of institution.” Resp. 7 (citing Pet. 6; Inst. Dec. 7). In our Institution Decision, we determined that “no claim term requires express construction.” Inst. Dec. 7. After reviewing the entire record developed during trial, we affirm our determination from the Institution Decision that no claim term requires express construction to resolve the parties’ dispute.” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Following our weighing of the experts’ testimony, we find that Dr. Roush’s testimony better addresses the issue at hand and we credit that testimony over Dr. Patterson’s testimony. Dr. Patterson opines generally that the “presence of two hydroxyl groups around the left most aromatic ring . . . would have created a product likely to have decreased oral bioavailability compared to tolterodine because of its hydrophilicity and thus lower than acceptable lipophilicity” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 112), and that it “would [have been] a matter of routine experimentation” to confirm that 5-HMT could have significantly less bioavailability than its parent, tolterodine” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 115). Dr. Patterson, however, did not perform any experiments to confirm 5-HMT’s oral bioavailability, and cites to no further evidence to support his opinions. See Ex. 2022 ¶ 92; compare Brynne (Ex. 1011) discussed supra § II.D.1. Dr. Roush, on the other hand, conducts an analysis of the compound under the “Rule of 5” to determine that “5-HMT does not meet a single factor, much less two, of the rule” thus teaching the skilled artisan “away from concluding that 5-HMT had an oral absorption problem.” Resp. 28–29 (citing Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 56–58, 87, 92). At oral hearing, Patent Owner restated that the analysis under the Rule of 5 indicates that 5-HMT was “not even close to being a problem . . . for all four of these properties, 5-HMT says there’s no red flags; there’s no problem,” and that “Dr. Patterson admitted in his deposition, 5-HMT does not violate the Rule of Five.” Tr. 67:35–68:3; 68:17–21; see Ex. 2020, 180:14–181:14. Regarding Petitioner’s reliance on the statement in Brynne that “[t]olterodine is tenfold more lipophilic than 5-HM[T], and consequently tolterodine penetrates membranes more rapidly,” Patent Owner does not appear to dispute the substance of that statement. Although such a statement illustrates a relative relationship between the lipophilicity of 5-HMT and tolterodine, it does not demonstrate that the lipophilicity of 5-HMT would have presented an absorption problem that would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to modify 5-HMT. Even if 5-HMT were considered by one of ordinary skill in the art to be less lipophilic than tolterodine, and thereby less rapidly absorbed, the record lacks sufficient evidence regarding the actual properties of 5-HMT for us to conclude that 5-HMT’s lipophilicity would have presented a bioavailability problem.21 For these reasons, Petitioner’s assertion that 5-HMT “may have bioavailability concerns” that would have prompted one of ordinary skill in the art to modify 5-HMT is unpersuasive. Reply 13.” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “On the complete record before us, we are unpersuaded that Petitioner carries its burden of demonstrating that 5-HMT has a bioavailability problem that would have motivated one of ordinary skill in the art to modify its structure. Regarding the lipophilicity profile of 5-HMT, Petitioner does not provide, or attempt to provide, any actual (as opposed to relative) data concerning the bioavailability of 5-HMT. Cf. supra § II.D.2 (Brynne comparing lipophilicity of tolterodine to lipophilicity of 5-HMT). Although data is not required, and although we do not find that absence of data alone to be fatal to Petitioner’s position on this issue, the absence of any data concerning the actual bioavailability of 5-HMT leaves Petitioner’s argument solely supported by expert testimony. We now turn to the contradictory statements of the parties’ experts. Following our weighing of the experts’ testimony, we find that Dr. Roush’s testimony better addresses the issue at hand and we credit that testimony over Dr. Patterson’s testimony. Dr. Patterson opines generally that the “presence of two hydroxyl groups around the left most aromatic ring . . . would have created a product likely to have decreased oral bioavailability compared to tolterodine because of its hydrophilicity and thus lower than acceptable lipophilicity” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 112), and that it “would [have been] a matter of routine experimentation” to confirm that 5-HMT could have significantly less bioavailability than its parent, tolterodine” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 115). Dr. Patterson, however, did not perform any experiments to confirm 5-HMT’s oral bioavailability, and cites to no further evidence to support his opinions. See Ex. 2022 ¶ 92; compare Brynne (Ex. 1011) discussed supra § II.D.1.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 6,858,650 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,858,650
• Elekta, Inc. v. Varian Medical Systems, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 5, 2017 · IPR2016-00380 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 4–9 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground; claims 13 and 18 were canceled after Patent Owner’s motion to amend was granted.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner

    “Although a claim term that does not include the word “means” is presumed not to invoke a means-plus-function analysis, that presumption may be overcome if the limitation does not “recite sufficiently definite structure” or recites a “function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 2 Section 4(c) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) redesignated 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, as 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Pub. L. No. 112- 29, 125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011). Because the ’703 patent has a filing date before September 16, 2012 (effective date of § 4(c)), we refer to the pre-AIA version of § 112. 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Petitioner’s expert, Russell J. Hamilton, Ph.D., testifies that “the term ‘logic’ would not be recognized by one of ordinary skill in the art as providing sufficiently definite structure for performing the claimed functions,” and that “[l]ogic can be implemented in software, in hardware, and in combinations of hardware and software.” Ex. 1021 ¶ 122. The parties provide sufficient reasoning to overcome the presumption against a means-plus-function construction, and we accordingly construe “first logic” and “second logic” in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “untenable because its broad identification only of “computer software and/or computer hardware” as structure for performing the recited function is too generic. The law regarding construction of means-plus-function limitations as applied to computer-implemented elements is well-established: For computer-implemented means-plus-function claims where the disclosed structure is a computer programmed to implement an algorithm, “the disclosed structure is not the general purpose computer, but rather the special purpose computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm.” . . . This court permits a patentee to express that algorithm in any understandable terms including as a mathematical formula, in prose, . . . , or as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure. Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Patent Owner’s proposed construction is superior because it identifies the algorithm through explicit reference to the flow chart of Figure 4 and related disclosure in the Specification. Patent Owner’s position is supported by testimony of its expert, Sasa Mutic, Ph.D., who refers to those disclosures in opining that “the [’703] patent describes a process of steps for obtaining the result of properly positioning a patient to begin a treatment” and that “Fig. 4 of the [’703] patent provides a flowchart of a process for use of an embodiment of the invention.” Ex. 2012 ¶ 69. Petitioner takes the position that the ultimate scope of the corresponding algorithm “does not matter” because Petitioner contends that the challenged claims are unpatentable even under Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Pet. Reply 315, 3. Nevertheless, Petitioner attacks Patent Owner’s proposed construction as “implicitly adopt[ing]” two “additional but unreasonable limitations.” Id. First, Petitioner contends that “the claims do not require the performance of the function of the second logic to be fully automated and instead permit human interaction with the second logic.” Id. Second, Petitioner contends that blocks 520 (“Position Patient”), 525 (“Register Treatment Image Data with Simulator/Reference Image Data and Reposition Patient”), and 530 (“Position Clinical Treatment Machine”) of Figure 4 “need not be performed in their entirety by logic so long as the second logic is used for some step in each block.” Id. at 4. We find no inconsistency in these positions with Patent Owner’s proposed construction. In light of the foregoing considerations, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 14

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner contends that the claims canceled in IPR2016-00341 “were directed to methods that recited the function performed by the second logic,” and that “Patent Owner is now estopped from arguing the subject matter of the same scope is patentable.” Pet. Reply 315, 1. Petitioner cites no authority to support this position, which improperly focuses on only one limitation of the claims, divorced from the claims’ other limitations. We reject Petitioner’s contention because the method claims canceled in IPR2016-00341 do not constitute “subject matter of the same scope” as the apparatus claims challenged in these proceedings.” slip op. at 16

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “skill in the art relevant to the ’703 patent “would be a person with a graduate degree (MS or PhD) in medical physics or a related field (e.g. Physics, Engineering) and three years of experience in radiation oncology beyond the completion date of their degree.” Ex. 1021 ¶ 17. Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Mutic, expresses a level of ordinary skill that is generally similar to Petitioner’s expert, but accounts for the possibility of a medical education instead of a medical-physics education: [A] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . would be a medical physicist with a Ph.D. (or similar advanced degree) in physics, medical physics, or a related field, and two or more years of experience in radiation oncology physics and image processing/computer programming related to radiation oncology applications. Alternatively, one of ordinary skill in the art might have an M.D. degree in the same relevant fields and two or more years of practical experience with image processing and the use of computer systems that is related to medical applications. Ex. 2012 ¶ 36. The similarity in the experts’ opinions is reinforced by Dr. Mutic’s assertion that he has “considered Dr. Hamilton’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and determined that it does not differ from [his] own expressions of this concept in any way that is relevant to the opinions” he expresses in his Declaration. Id. ¶ 38. Based on the expert testimony in the record, we agree with and adopt the level of skill expressed by Dr. Hamilton.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 8,867,703 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,867,703
• Elekta, Inc. v. Varian Medical Systems, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 5, 2017 · IPR2016-00315 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 4–9 were not shown unpatentable under either §103 ground because the references did not disclose the claimed second logic; claims 13 and 18 were canceled by motion.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner

    “Although a claim term that does not include the word “means” is presumed not to invoke a means-plus-function analysis, that presumption may be overcome if the limitation does not “recite sufficiently definite structure” or recites a “function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 2 Section 4(c) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) redesignated 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, as 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Pub. L. No. 112- 29, 125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011). Because the ’703 patent has a filing date before September 16, 2012 (effective date of § 4(c)), we refer to the pre-AIA version of § 112. 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Petitioner’s expert, Russell J. Hamilton, Ph.D., testifies that “the term ‘logic’ would not be recognized by one of ordinary skill in the art as providing sufficiently definite structure for performing the claimed functions,” and that “[l]ogic can be implemented in software, in hardware, and in combinations of hardware and software.” Ex. 1021 ¶ 122. The parties provide sufficient reasoning to overcome the presumption against a means-plus-function construction, and we accordingly construe “first logic” and “second logic” in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “untenable because its broad identification only of “computer software and/or computer hardware” as structure for performing the recited function is too generic. The law regarding construction of means-plus-function limitations as applied to computer-implemented elements is well-established: For computer-implemented means-plus-function claims where the disclosed structure is a computer programmed to implement an algorithm, “the disclosed structure is not the general purpose computer, but rather the special purpose computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm.” . . . This court permits a patentee to express that algorithm in any understandable terms including as a mathematical formula, in prose, . . . , or as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure. Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Patent Owner’s proposed construction is superior because it identifies the algorithm through explicit reference to the flow chart of Figure 4 and related disclosure in the Specification. Patent Owner’s position is supported by testimony of its expert, Sasa Mutic, Ph.D., who refers to those disclosures in opining that “the [’703] patent describes a process of steps for obtaining the result of properly positioning a patient to begin a treatment” and that “Fig. 4 of the [’703] patent provides a flowchart of a process for use of an embodiment of the invention.” Ex. 2012 ¶ 69.” slip op. at 14

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner contends that the claims canceled in IPR2016-00341 “were directed to methods that recited the function performed by the second logic,” and that “Patent Owner is now estopped from arguing the subject matter of the same scope is patentable.” Pet. Reply 315, 1. Petitioner cites no authority to support this position, which improperly focuses on only one limitation of the claims, divorced from the claims’ other limitations. We reject Petitioner’s contention because the method claims canceled in IPR2016-00341 do not constitute “subject matter of the same scope” as the apparatus claims challenged in these proceedings.” slip op. at 16

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “skill in the art relevant to the ’703 patent “would be a person with a graduate degree (MS or PhD) in medical physics or a related field (e.g. Physics, Engineering) and three years of experience in radiation oncology beyond the completion date of their degree.” Ex. 1021 ¶ 17. Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Mutic, expresses a level of ordinary skill that is generally similar to Petitioner’s expert, but accounts for the possibility of a medical education instead of a medical-physics education: [A] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . would be a medical physicist with a Ph.D. (or similar advanced degree) in physics, medical physics, or a related field, and two or more years of experience in radiation oncology physics and image processing/computer programming related to radiation oncology applications. Alternatively, one of ordinary skill in the art might have an M.D. degree in the same relevant fields and two or more years of practical experience with image processing and the use of computer systems that is related to medical applications. Ex. 2012 ¶ 36. The similarity in the experts’ opinions is reinforced by Dr. Mutic’s assertion that he has “considered Dr. Hamilton’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and determined that it does not differ from [his] own expressions of this concept in any way that is relevant to the opinions” he expresses in his Declaration. Id. ¶ 38. Based on the expert testimony in the record, we agree with and adopt the level of skill expressed by Dr. Hamilton.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 8,867,703 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,867,703

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.