- Samsung Bioepis Co., Ltd. v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 2, 2025 · IPR2025-00176 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on all challenged claims under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors—particularly investment, overlap, and merits—weighed against review.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“raised by this overlap, but given the circumstances, it does not effectively mitigate them. First, the disputed issues for Petitioner’s ODP defense are the same or substantially similar to those for the obviousness grounds in the Petition, but the Sotera stipulation does not prevent Petitioner from litigating those issues before both the district court (as part of its ODP defense) and here in the event an IPR is instituted.19 Second, the MDL proceeding 19 ODP or nonstatutory double patenting is, as the name implies, not premised on any statute. See, e.g., Ostuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Nonstatutory double patenting is a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy.”). Accordingly, it is not a ground Petitioner reasonably could have raised in this IPR. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (inter partes review may be requested “only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103”). includes other biosimilar applicant defendants who are similarly motivated to try to invalidate the ’865 patent claims, but who are not subject to any Sotera stipulation. Even if we institute review on Petitioner’s grounds here, those other defendants remain free to litigate the same grounds in the consolidated MDL proceeding. For these reasons and given the particular circumstances of this case, Petitioner’s Sotera stipulation does not sufficiently mitigate the risks of duplicated efforts or inconsistent decisions by making this IPR a “true alternative” to resolution of these issues by the district court. See Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Stellar, LLC, IPR2024-01205, Paper 19, 3–4 (PTAB Mar. 28, 2005) (determining on Director Review that a Sotera stipulation did not ensure IPR would be a “true alternative” because Petitioner’s invalidity arguments “include combinations of the prior art asserted in these proceedings with unpublished system prior art, which Petitioner’s stipulation is not likely to moot” and thus the same or similar issues would remain in the parallel proceeding); SAP America, Inc. v. Cyandia, Inc., IPR2024-01496, Paper 13, 8–9 (PTAB Apr. 7, 2025) (similar).” slip op. at 19
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,084,865 - Digital Global Systems, Inc. v. Deepsig Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 28, 2025 · IPR2025-00194 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution under § 314(a), finding no reasonable likelihood for the remaining claims except claim 13, whose potential success did not justify instituting trial.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or equivalent and at least two years of experience working with radio communication systems and machine learning.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 33–34). Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Zhi Ding. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 33–34. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description at this stage of the proceeding. We adopt Petitioner’s description for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“the same standard used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Neither party proposes an express construction for any claim terms. Pet. 13; Prelim. Resp. 16. We determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that claims 4–6, 12, 14, and 16–22 would have been obvious over Jüschke and Holt. Petitioner may satisfy its burden for claim 13, but, as discussed below, that would not impact our decision to exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution. See Section II.F.” slip op. at 16
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“inter partes review. SAS Inst. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 366 (2018). Specifically, “[i]f a panel determines that a petition meets the standards for institution in relation to fewer than all the challenges presented, . . . the panel will evaluate all the challenges and determine whether, in the interests of efficient administration of the Office and integrity of the patent system, the entire petition should be denied.” See Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 64 (Nov. 2019), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/tpgnov.pdf. Here, thirteen challenged claims remain after Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer. Petitioner at most demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing for one dependent claim, which has no claims depending therefrom. See Sections II.C–II.E. Thus, based on the particular facts of this case, we find that instituting trial would not be an efficient use of the Board’s time and resources, and we exercise our discretion to deny institution under § 314(a). See Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018- 01310, Paper 7 at 41–43 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (informative); Chevron Oronite Co. LLC v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018-00923, Paper 9 at 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative).” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,777,540 - Cipla Limited v. Gilead Sciences, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00033 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–13 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored denial and the petition did not present compelling merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“We determine that this factor weighs heavily in favor of exercising discretion to deny the Petition. The trial date in the district court litigation is scheduled for October 6, 2025. See Prelim. Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2010). This date is at least six months before our projected statutory deadline should we go forward in this case. Patent Owner points out that this trial date is nine months later than the median time to trial in the District of Delaware, and in Patent Owner’s view, the parties are on track to satisfy the current schedule. Id. at 16–17 (citing Ex. 2011).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“1 Patent Owner also asserts that the Petition should be denied under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), but we need not reach this issue because we are exercising discretion under Section 314(a) to deny the Petition. See Prelim. Resp. 2–3.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,744,802 - PTAB · May 7, 2025 · IPR2024-01468 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 11–15 based on the asserted obviousness ground over Jarvinen and Fox.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Applying those standards, and upon consideration of the information presented in the Petition, Preliminary Response, and supplemental briefing, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all Challenged Claims of the ’868 patent on all relevant grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Neither party argues, at least at this stage of the proceeding, that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Considering the subject matter of the ’868 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s proposed and unopposed definition of the skilled artisan (Ex. 1012 ¶ 20), we apply the level of skill set forth above.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Petitioner submits that “all claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning” (Pet. 10–11), and “Patent Owner agrees” (Prelim. Resp. 4). In determining at this stage of the proceeding that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of establishing unpatentability of at least one challenged claim (namely dependent claim 11 in this case), we need not and do not construe expressly any claim terms. Nevertheless, we encourage the parties to submit proposed constructions for the limitation “determining a UE [i.e., User Equipment] environment information,” as recited in dependent claim 11. See Ex. 1001, 49:12–15, 1:40–42 (emphasis added). To the extent that a party proposes that this limitation should have its ordinary and customary meaning, the party should submit and explicitly identify such meaning. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A determination that a claim term ‘needs no construction’ or has the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ may be inadequate when a term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or when reliance on a term’s ‘ordinary’ meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute.”). For example, the parties should discuss (a) the meaning and scope of “determining” as used in the subject limitation; (b) the meaning and scope of “environment information” as used in the subject limitation; (c) any relationship or overlap between “environment information” and “link quality positioning information,” as recited in dependent claims 7 and 11 (see Ex. 1001, 48:62–65, 49:12–15); and (d) whether UE “environment information” includes location or orientation of the UE.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner contends the skilled artisan would have had rational reasons to combine the teachings of Jarvinen and Fox to arrive at the invention of dependent claim 11 (which includes the features of independent claim 1 and dependent claim 7) and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. Pet. 37–41; see, e.g., id. at 38 (“[The skilled artisan] faced with the problem of estimating a UE’s future link quality at a location would have looked to Fox because Fox solves the problem of estimating future link quality with the exact same information available to Jarvinen.”); Ex. 1012 ¶ 70 (Dr. McClellan testifying that “[a]ll of the data upon which Fox relies is already disclosed and linked together in Jarvinen’s database, and it would have been obvious for [the skilled artisan] to combine Fox’s method of looking up previous link quality to estimate future link quality with Jarvinen’s teachings.”); ¶ 72 (Dr. McClellan testifying that “modifying Jarvinen to perform Fox’s link quality estimation would have constituted a simple substitution of a known element to yield predictable results.”). Patent Owner does not dispute such reasons or expectations at this stage of the proceeding. For the reasons and evidence set forth in pages 37–41 of the Petition, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s cited evidence provides sufficient rational reasons for purposes of institution to combine Jarvinen and Fox to arrive at the invention of claim 11, and to do so with a reasonable expectation of success. c) Summary At this stage of the proceeding and based on the record before us, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s cited evidence provides sufficient rational reasons for purposes of institution to combine Jarvinen and Fox with a reasonable expectation of success, and sufficiently supports Petitioner’s contention that dependent claim 11 would have been unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Jarvinen and Fox. Thus, for the foregoing reasons and those stated in Petitioner’s preliminary briefing (Pet. 17–47, 50–51, 54), we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that claim 11 would have been unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Jarvinen and Fox.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,094,868 - Arthrex, Inc. v. Medshape, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00053 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–10, exercising § 314(a) discretion because the Fintiv factors, considered holistically, favored denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). However, institution of inter partes review is discretionary. Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Preliminary Reply, the Preliminary Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, we exercise our discretion to deny institution of inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) in view of the co-pending district court litigation.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“7. Balancing the Fintiv Factors As discussed above, factors 1 and 3–5 each favor denial. Factor 2 is the only factor that favors institution because there is no trial date in the Parallel Proceeding and the evidence presented of a median time-to-trial for civil trials in that district suggests a potential trial date after the statutory deadline for a final written decision in this proceeding. However, Patent Owner also shows that discovery and any dispositive motions will be completed in the Parallel Proceeding well before the statutory deadline for a final written decision in this proceeding, which presents a risk of duplicated efforts given the unmitigated overlap in issues between proceedings. On balance, considerations concerning an uncertain trial date in the Parallel Proceeding under Factor 2 do not outweigh the more substantial reasons identified under the other Fintiv Factors. Thus, considering all of the factors holistically, we find on balance that the factors on this unique record weigh in favor of discretionary denial of the Petition. Accordingly, we exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 15
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,985,222 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics, America, Inc. v. Truesight Communications LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Apr 22, 2025 · IPR2025-00123 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of inter partes review of claims 1–8 and 13–25 under § 314(a), finding the trial date and district court investment outweighed Petitioner’s stipulation.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“The District Court recently denied Petitioner’s motion to stay without prejudice. Ex. 2003, 3. The District Court stated that Petitioner’s motion “is premature” because the Board has not decided “whether or not to institute inter partes review.” Id. We decline to speculate based on the record in this case whether the District Court would grant a renewed motion to stay the District Court Litigation. See Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 15 at 12 (PTAB May 13, 2020) (informative) (“Fintiv II”). As a result, we determine that the first Fintiv factor is neutral.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“G. Summary On balance, we determine that Fintiv factors 1–6 favor discretionary denial of institution. Specifically, as discussed above, factors 2, 3, and 5 each weigh in favor of discretionary denial, factor 4 weighs strongly against discretionary denial, and factors 1 and 6 are neutral. We determine that the projected trial date (at least six months before the projected statutory deadline for a final written decision) and the parties’ significant investment in the District Court Litigation outweigh Petitioner’s stipulation. Thus, based on our holistic view of the Fintiv factors, we exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny the Petition. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, we exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny the Petition. IV. ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,745,749 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Truesight Communications LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Apr 21, 2025 · IPR2024-01477 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–14 under § 314(a), finding that the Fintiv factors favoring denial outweighed the stipulation against denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“Statutory Deadline We weigh this factor as favoring the exercise of discretionary denial. The parties agree that the projected statutory deadline for issuing our Final Written Decision (April 23, 2026) is a little more than six months after trial is currently scheduled in the District Court litigation (October 6, 2025). Supp. Br. 4; Prelim. Resp. 19–20. Because the currently scheduled District Court trial is set to begin six months before our deadline to reach a final decision, this factor favors discretionary denial in this case. See Fintiv, Paper 11 at 9. C. Factor 3 – Investment in the Parallel Proceeding We weigh this factor as favoring the exercise of discretionary denial. Showing substantial investment in the District Court litigation, document production is substantially complete and fact discovery will be completed within two weeks of this Decision on Institution. Ex. 2001, 4–5 (Second Amended Docket Control Order). Further, a hearing on claim construction and associated briefing is complete. Id. And, the deadline to serve Institution. Id. at 4. These actions show that there has been notable investment by the parties in the District Court litigation. Furthermore, we must consider this parallel work in relation to the October 6, 2025 District Court litigation trial date, which is six months before the projected statutory deadline of our Final Written Decision. See Fintiv, Paper 11 at 10. As work in the District Court litigation has moved beyond preliminary stages into more advanced stages, instituting at this time implicates at least some duplicative costs. See id. On the matter of petition timing, it is often reasonable for a petitioner to wait to file its petition until it learns which claims are being asserted against it in the parallel proceeding. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 11. Here, Petitioner filed its petition on September 27, 2024, which is four months after receiving Patent Owner’s May 29, 2024 disclosure of asserted claims and infringement contentions and nine months after it was served Patent Owner’s December 29, 2023 infringement complaint. Ex. 1017; Ex. 1018, 1. Further, Petitioner served its amended invalidity contentions in the District Court litigation on December 17, 2024, i.e., after it filed its Petition.5 We do not find the timing of the Petition in this case to outweigh the significant investment in the District Court litigation. Considering the substantial investment in the District Court litigation and the rapidly advancing District Court litigation trial date balanced against the timing of the Petition, we determine this factor weighs in favor of discretionary denial.” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,898,803 - PTAB · Apr 17, 2025 · IPR2024-01473 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 6, 7, 17, and 22–25 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim, including its Cai-based grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Considering the arguments and evidence currently of record, we determine the Petition demonstrates “a reasonable likelihood that [P]etitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute inter partes review of claims 1–4, 6, 7, 17, and 22–25 of the ’360 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At this stage, we find Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art to be sufficient. According to the ’360 patent, “[t]he field of the invention is related to sensor arrays for the detection and diagnosis of disease states.” Ex. 1001, 1:28–29. The Specification describes accomplishing such by analysis of protein coronas using techniques such as LC-MS/MS. See id. at 4:43–5:2 (describing Figure 1). The prior art cited by Petitioner also describes the analysis of protein coronas using similar analytical techniques. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, 584; Ex. 1007, 1870; Ex. 1008, 355–356. Accordingly, the present record supports that a POSA would have an understanding of both proteins and the analytical techniques, e.g., mass spectrometry, that can be used to characterize them. We understand Petitioner’s definition of a POSA to encompass these elements. It requires a formal degree in chemistry,5 which itself entails some knowledge of proteins and related analytical techniques, along with several years’ additional experience in proteomics, protein analysis, or mass spectrometry. Moreover, Petitioner’s definition is flexible in that it allows higher education or skill with, e.g., mass spectrometry, to make up for a lack of specific experience with proteomics assay and protein coronas. This explanation is reasonable and supported on the current record.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Third, and perhaps most importantly, there is “no requirement for perfect match between an expert’s experience and the relevant field.” See Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019) 34, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf (“CTPG”). (citing SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). A person need not be a person of ordinary skill in the art to testify as an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, but rather must be “qualified in the pertinent art.” Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, there is no dispute that Dr. Vargas is qualified in the art of mass spectrometry and, on the current record, we discern no reason why she is not qualified to offer the testimony in her declaration. At most, Patent Owner’s argument that Dr. Vargas lacks experience “perform[ing] mass spectrometry techniques specifically for protein analysis,” goes to the weight we should afford her testimony at trial. See Prelim. Resp. 28–29. It is not a sufficient reason to deny institution, particularly given that Dr. Vargas’s testimony is only part of the showing offered in support of the Petition. 6 Patent Owner’s narrow characterization of Dr. Vargas’s experience (see Prelim. Resp. 28–29) is arguably inconsistent with the description in her CV (Ex. 1004). In any event, Patent Owner will have an opportunity to examine Dr. Vargas regarding her qualifications.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner “submits that no express construction of terms is necessary.” Pet. 15. Patent Owner agrees no construction is needed at this stage. See Prelim. Resp. 26. We agree that no formal claim construction is necessary for this decision. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). To the extent we have concerns regarding the parties’ apparent interpretation of the claim language, or in some instances Patent Owner’s attempt to read-in unrecited limitations, we address those arguments below.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,435,360 - Tesla, Inc. v. Autonomous Devices, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 11, 2025 · IPR2023-01055 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claim 12 unpatentable over Grotmol and Hickman and denied the motion to amend because proposed substitute claims 21–29 were unpatentable.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“Director Review and remanding for further proceedings. Paper 49 (“Acting Director’s Decision” or “DR Dec.”). That Decision states agreement “that the Board’s analysis of claim 12 did not make separate factual findings.” DR Dec. 2. The Decision instructs us on remand “to consider Patent Owner’s arguments as to claim 12 and as to proposed substitute claim 21” and “[r]egardless of the Board’s disposition on remand, the Board should explain more fully its findings as to claim 12 and proposed substitute claim 21.” Id.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Written Decision regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally DR Req. Upon consideration of the full record including the arguments in Patent Owner’s Request for Director Review, we maintain that determination here. More specifically, considering the subject matter of the ’344 patent, the background technical field, and the asserted prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed qualifications for an ordinary level of skill, except we decline to adopt “at least” as that language is vague and open-ended. See 2024 Final Dec. 10–11. Accordingly, with that exception, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“the differences as compared to claim 1, including those findings and determinations set forth in a section of the 2024 Final Written Decision titled “Overview—Claims 6, 11, and 12” (id. at 65–67) and in the sections titled “Claim 12” and “Conclusion—Claims 6, 11, and 12” (id. at 83–86). Further, based on the complete record now before us, including Patent Owner’s Request for Director Review, for the reasons given in our 2024 Final Written Decision and our additional reasons given herein, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Grotmol and Hickman combination teaches the limitations of claim 12.” slip op. at 24
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“Director Review and remanding for further proceedings. Paper 49 (“Acting Director’s Decision” or “DR Dec.”). That Decision states agreement “that the Board’s analysis of claim 12 did not make separate factual findings.” DR Dec. 2. The Decision instructs us on remand “to consider Patent Owner’s arguments as to claim 12 and as to proposed substitute claim 21” and “[r]egardless of the Board’s disposition on remand, the Board should explain more fully its findings as to claim 12 and proposed substitute claim 21.” Id.” slip op. at 3
Patent outcomesUS 11,238,344 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,238,344 - Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Monarch Networking Solutions LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Apr 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00565 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s unopposed motion for adverse judgment after claims 1 and 5-8 were cancelled in reexamination, and terminated the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“When all claims at issue in an IPR are cancelled in a concurrent reexamination, the Board “construe[s] [the] cancellation of all claims . . . as a request for adverse judgment.” Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Signal IP, Inc., IPR2015-00941, Paper 21 at 2-3 (PTAB Apr. 14, 2016). ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Motion for Adverse Judgment is GRANTED; FURTHER ORDERED that Adverse Judgment is entered; and FURTHER ORDERED that this inter partes review is terminated.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,451,845
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.