- PTAB · Jul 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00276 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–3, 6, 12, 14, 16, 18, and 19 based on a reasonable likelihood of success on the asserted anticipation and obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review requires that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Determining whether to institute has been delegated to the Board. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one claim. Accordingly, we grant the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“contacting mucosal tissue of the upper airway with the treatment delivery portion, without piercing the mucosal tissue,” as recited in claim 1. Prelim. Resp. 8; see Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.”). As will become apparent from Patent Owner’s arguments, central to the dispute between the parties is Petitioner’s mapping of Baker to limitation [b] and, in particular, to the recited “treatment delivery portion” of the device. In Petitioner’s view, Baker’s inflatable chamber 28 constitutes part of the recited “treatment delivery portion.” See Pet. 28 (“An energy delivery member including an inflatable chamber 28 is located at the distal tip of insertion wand 24.” (citing Ex. 1013, 16:19–26, 17:22–32, 20:35–39, Fig. 5; Ex. 1002 ¶75)). Petitioner further points out, with supporting evidence, that the inflatable chamber contacts mucosal tissue without piercing it. Id. at 34 (citing Ex. 1013, 17:22–36, Fig. 5; Ex. 1002 ¶84). slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“underlying the mucosal tissue, and wherein delivering the energy comprises ablating the nerve tissue.” Ex. 1001, 29:64–67. In challenging claim 6 as obvious, Petitioner relies on Chen for teaching targeting of nerve tissue with radiofrequency energy and on Edwards-535 for teaching targeting of underlying tissue (including nerves) without harming the mucosal surface. Pet. 80–81 (citing 1017, 239–240; 1010, 4:60–67, 6:10–37; Ex. 1002 ¶171). Petitioner explains why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Baker, Edards-535, and Chen and had a reasonable expatiation of success in doing so. Id. at 61–68. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s reliance on Edwards-535 and Chen to reach the additional subject matter recited in claim 6. Nor does Patent Owner dispute Petitioner’s reasons for combining Edwards-535 and Chen with Baker or that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in such an endeavor. Prelim. Resp. 15– 535, and Chen fails to satisfy limitation [b] of claim 1, from which claim 6 ultimately depends. Prelim. Resp. 15. However, as discussed above, we have already determined there is a reasonable likelihood that Baker alone discloses limitation [b] of claim 1. There is a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing on Ground 3 as to both claim 1 and claim 6. We decline, at this time, to address the other claims challenged in Ground 3. SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1356.” slip op. at 17
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,415,194 - PTAB · Jul 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00275 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 9, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22–24, 44, and 46 based on a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted anticipation and obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review requires that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Determining whether to institute has been delegated to the Board. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one claim. Accordingly, we grant the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“argues that we “should exercise . . . discretion to deny institution of Ground 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” Prelim. Resp. 8 (emphasis added). However, we do not institute on a ground-by-ground basis. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); see also SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359 (2018) (holding that the Director’s prior “partial institution practice” was contrary to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)). Even assuming Patent Owner requests that we exercise discretion to deny the entire Petition, its discretionary denial arguments could not support such a request because those arguments are limited to Ground 1. Patent Owner does not argue or present any basis for exercising our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) as to any of the additional grounds. And, as discussed below, there is a reasonable likelihood that the Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in at least one of those additional grounds. For this reason alone, discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) is not warranted.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“step [b], i.e., “contacting a treatment element of the treatment device with mucosal tissue in the patient’s nasal airway,” as recited in claim 9. Prelim. Resp. 17; see Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.”). As will become apparent from Patent Owner’s arguments, central to the dispute between the parties is Petitioner’s mapping of Gertner to limitation [b] and, in particular, to the recited “treatment element.” In Petitioner’s view, Gertner’s distal end 216 and expandable component 218 together form the recited “treatment element.” As Petitioner explains it, Gertner discloses that “the distal end 216 emits light from ‘within’ the expandable component 218, such that the light emitter and expandable component 218 (which together constitute distal end 216) act as a treatment element.” Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1013 ¶¶103, 106, 107; Ex. 1002 ¶64). Petitioner further points out, with supporting evidence, that the expandable component contacts mucosal tissue. Id. (citing Ex. 1013 ¶¶37, 103).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Edwards-535. Pet. 61–64. Claim 16 recites: “A method as in claim 9, wherein adjusting the shape comprises forming at least one bend in a shaft of the treatment device.” For this additional subject matter, Petitioner points us to the bend in the structure that is designated with reference numeral 124 in Edwards-535, as illustrated in Figure 3B. Pet. 61–62. Petitioner also argues, with supporting evidence, that, even absent this disclosure, it would have been obvious to form a bend, as it is well known in the art to provide bendable catheters to facilitate insertion of a medical device. Id. at 62–64 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶130–132). Patent Owner’s sole argument is Edwards-535 fails to disclose limitation [b] of claim 9, from which claim 16 depends. Prelim. Resp 31– 32. That argument is not persuasive for reasons already discussed. Although we have already held that the single-claim threshold of § 314(a) has been met with respect to independent claim 9, we nonetheless further determine that there is a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing in showing that dependent claim 16 would have been obvious over Edwards-535.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,072,597 - PTAB · Jul 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00282 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–4 and 7–9 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3 and 7–9 are obvious over Edwards-’535 and Stern.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons provided below, we determine Petitioner has satisfied the threshold requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims based on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan at the relevant time would have had (1) a Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) or at least a bachelor of science degree in engineering or a related discipline and (2) at least three years of experience in the clinical use, design, development, and/or testing of medical devices, including medical devices that deliver energy to tissue. Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 24–28). Patent Owner does not address the skill level in its Preliminary Response. At this stage, we find Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art sufficiently supported by the record and apply it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner
“Under that standard, the words of a claim “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,” which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner argues that the preamble of claim 1 “to treat rhinitis” is not limiting. Pet. 18. According to Petitioner, the body of claim 1 recites a structurally complete apparatus, and the preamble only states an intended use for the device without limiting the claimed structure. Id. at 18–19. Patent Owner does not propose any claim construction. On this record, we find Petitioner’s argument persuasive and determine that the preamble of claim 1 “to treat rhinitis” is not limiting. On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we see no need to expressly construe any other claim term.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). We still “must further consider the factual questions of whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to combine those references, and whether in making that combination, a person of ordinary skill would have had a reasonable expectation of success.” Dome Patent L.P. v. Lee, 799 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Based on the current record, and for purposes of this Decision, we find Petitioner has shown sufficiently that “a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” See In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 11,766,286 - PTAB · Jul 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00278 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1, 4–6, 9, 10, 12, 13, and 15–17 on all grounds presented in the Petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Considering the arguments and evidence of record, we determine that the Petition demonstrates “a reasonable likelihood that [P]etitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had (1) a Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) or at least a bachelor of science degree in engineering or a related discipline and (2) at least three years of experience in the clinical use, design, development, and/or testing of medical devices, including medical devices that deliver energy to tissue. Pet. 19–20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 24–28). Patent Owner does not respond to Petitioner’s description of a POSITA in its Preliminary Response. At this stage, we find Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art to be sufficiently supported by the record and apply it for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends “the Board need not construe any terms because the Challenged Claims are invalid under any reasonable interpretation.” Pet. 20. At this stage, Patent Owner does not respond to this contention, nor propose any express claim construction of its own. For this decision, and given that neither party seeks any express claim construction, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary. To the extent our consideration of Petitioner’s grounds touches on any implicit issues of claim construction, those are addressed in our analysis below.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“several reasons. First, Petitioner’s reasoning for combining Edwards-535 and Stern is supported by testimony from Dr. Martin who identifies multiple, specific reasons for the combination. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 103–122, 129–148. This testimony is not conclusory and is supported with numerous citations to other evidence of record. Id. Patent Owner does not offer any countervailing testimony with its Preliminary Response, electing instead to rely on attorney argument at this stage. Second, Patent Owner’s assertions that Petitioner’s reasoning is insufficient because Stern describes treating the endometrium and ablating different tissue, i.e., surface versus underlying tissue, are undermined by Edwards-535’s citation to Baker. As Petitioner points out, “Edwards-’535 points a POSITA” to, and incorporates teachings from, Baker. Pet. 47. This is true even though Baker, like Stern, is largely focused on treating the uterus and describes preferred embodiments for delivering RF energy to the endometrium. See, e.g., Ex. 1011, Abstr., 3:5–9, 5:50–65. Moreover, Petitioner offers evidence to show that Baker and Stern depict similar devices, including the figure from Dr. Martin’s declaration reproduced below. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 117–119, 144–147. Dr. Martin’s figure above is a side-by-side comparison of Figure 8 of Baker and Figure 4a of Stern, depicting devices that, at least on their face, appear to share a similar shape and configuration. See id. ¶¶ 119, 146 (testifying that the comparison above shows “Baker and Stern both depict very similar devices”). At this stage, Patent Owner does not dispute that Petitioner’s comparison is apt, nor otherwise address Petitioner’s reliance on Baker as evidence of a motivation to combine Stern. Thus, on the current record, we agree with Petitioner that Edwards-535’s express citation to Baker suggests that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the similar teachings Petitioner identifies in Stern. Third, Stern also contradicts Patent Owner’s assertion that a POSITA would have considered its teachings to be inapplicable to treating the nasal concha as taught in Edwards-535. While Stern is primarily concerned with endometrial ablation applications, that does not mean its teachings are limited to such. Indeed, Stern explains that its “electrode partitioning structure” may be used to treat “other body organs or tissues either externally or internally” and that its “principles with respect to the delivery of controlled RF energy” can be applied “not only for controlled destruction of tissue but also for controlled heat treatment of tissue.” Id. Such teachings further support the testimony of Dr. Martin that “[a] POSITA would have known that technology from ablation devices for one part of the body would be applicable to devices used in other areas of the body.” Pet. 41 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 117–121; Ex. 1033, 18:27–40). We also disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that “Edwards-535 and Stern are so in conflict with one another that they rise to the level of teaching away.” Prelim. Resp. 21. A teaching away requires that the reference “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed.” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). But Patent Owner has not shown that any of the references cited here discourage the articulated combination of Stern’s electrode configuration, i.e., multiple pairs of bipolar electrodes connected to separate radiofrequency output channels, with Edwards-535’s device. To the contrary, Stern expressly states that its “electrode partitioning structure” can be used for other applications (see Ex. 1033, 18:27–40), which on the current record would seem to include Edwards-535’s device for ablating nasal tissue.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,033,318 - PTAB · Jul 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00277 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–4, 6–12, and 16 on all asserted grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Edwards-535, Kong, and Stern obviousness challenge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Considering the arguments and evidence of record, we determine that the Petition demonstrates “a reasonable likelihood that [P]etitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had (1) a Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) or at least a bachelor of science degree in engineering or a related discipline and (2) at least three years of experience in the clinical use, design, development, and/or testing of medical devices, including medical devices that deliver energy to tissue. Pet. 20–21 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27–29; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 24–28). Patent Owner does not respond to Petitioner’s description of a POSITA in its Preliminary Response. At this stage, we find Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art to be sufficiently supported by the record and apply it for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends “the Board need not construe any terms because the Challenged Claims are invalid under any reasonable interpretation.” Pet. 21. At this stage, Patent Owner does not respond to this contention, nor propose any express claim construction of its own. For this decision, and given that neither party seeks any express claim construction, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary. To the extent our consideration of Petitioner’s grounds touches on any implicit issues of claim construction, those are addressed in our analysis below.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“On the current record, Patent Owner’s arguments are unavailing for several reasons. First, Petitioner’s reasoning for combining Edwards-535 and Stern is supported by testimony from its declarants who identify multiple, specific reasons for the combination. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 93–94; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 75–97. This testimony is not conclusory and is supported with numerous citations to other evidence of record. Id. Patent Owner does not offer any countervailing testimony with its Preliminary Response, electing instead to rely on attorney argument at this stage. Second, Patent Owner’s assertions that Petitioner’s reasoning is insufficient because Stern describes treating the endometrium and ablating a different tissue, i.e., surface versus underlying tissue, are undermined by Edwards-535’s citation to Baker. As Petitioner points out, “Edwards-’535 instructs a POSITA to look to Baker for how to dispose electrodes on the surface of a membrane.” Pet. 47. This is true even though Baker, like Stern, is largely focused on treating the uterus and describes preferred embodiments for delivering RF energy to the endometrium. See, e.g., Ex. 1011, Abstr., 3:5–9, 5:50–65. Moreover, Petitioner offers evidence, including the figure reproduced below, to show that “Baker and Stern depict similar devices for ablating tissue.” Pet. 46. Petitioner’s figure above is a side-by-side comparison of Figure 8 of Baker and Figure 4a of Stern, depicting devices that, at least on their face, appear to share a similar shape and configuration. Petitioner offers a similar figure showing that both Baker and Stern teach the arrangement of “electrodes in rows.” See id. at 47 (showing side-by-side comparison of Figure 8 of Baker to Figure 19 of Stern). At this stage, Patent Owner does not dispute that Petitioner’s comparisons are apt, nor otherwise address Petitioner’s reliance on Baker as evidence of a motivation to combine Stern. Thus, on the current record, we agree with Petitioner that Edwards-535’s express citation to Baker suggests that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the similar teachings Petitioner identifies in Stern.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,241,271 - Nespresso USA, Inc. v. K-Fee System GmbHInstitutedPTAB · Jun 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00299 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–8 based on a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Yoakim, Jarisch ’929, Rossi, and Rapparini.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023) (permitting the Board to institute trial on behalf of the Director). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, and evidence of record, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in engineering plus five years of experience in design of mechanical beverage systems, or similar products, and experience with sensors for recognizing an identifier.” Pet. 16 (referencing Ex. 1003 ¶ 40; IPR2022-01574, Paper 12, 15). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art of the ’910 patent. For purposes of this Decision, based on the prior art, the sophistication of the technology at issue, and Mr. Jobin’s Declaration testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the level of ordinary skill. The ’901 patent, as well as the prior art of record, includes systems that use identifiers on a capsule to control the operation of a beverage machine. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:28–34 (“[T]he present invention . . . has an identifier, which allows to individualize the respective portion capsule.”); Ex. 1004 ¶ 25 (discussing the system’s “identification means”); Ex. 1006 ¶ 1 (“The present invention relates in particular to coding supports adapted to store information related to a capsule, capsules associated with/for embedding coding supports, reading and processing arrangements for reading and using such information for preparing a beverage.”); Ex. 1041, code (57) (“The process for controlling the operation of an edible-product making machine [includes] . . . recogni[zing] an” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“We have frequently stated that the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’” (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artOther
“a) Petitioner’s contentions Petitioner contends that Yoakim, Jarisch ’929, Rossi, and Rapparini are “analogous art in the field of portion capsule beverage extraction, each disclosing an invention that may be applied in automatic coffee/expresso machines.” Pet. 37 (referencing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 2, 3; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 1, 2; Ex. 1008 ¶ 1; Ex. 1041, 3; Ex. 1003 ¶ 220); cf. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“References within the statutory terms of 35 U.S.C. § 102 qualify as prior art for an obviousness determination only when analogous to the claimed invention.”). Patent Owner does not dispute this contention at this stage of the proceeding.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,554,910 - PTAB · Apr 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00028 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–19 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Flusberg, Flusberg ’338, and PacBio-BAM.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“In assessing whether to exercise the Board’s authority to deny institution under § 325(d), the Board considers a two-part analysis. Advanced Bionics at 8–9. First, the Board considers whether “the same or substantially the same” art or arguments were previously presented to the Office. Id. at 8. If so, the Board then considers whether the petition demonstrates that the Office “erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims.” Id. In applying the two-part framework, the Board considers several nonexclusive factors set forth in Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, No. IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to § III.C.5, first paragraph).” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“G. Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge to claim 1 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 due to obviousness over Flusberg, Flusberg ’338, and PacBio-BAM. H. Remaining Claims of Ground 1 and Grounds 2–4 Patent Owner does not present any arguments specific to any claim beyond claim 1. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 1 (“Because all other asserted Grounds rely upon prevailing on Ground 1 for claim 1, all other grounds fail for the same reasons.”). In any event, the threshold for institution is a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing as to any single claim. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “Once that single claim threshold is satisfied, it doesn’t matter whether the [P]etitioner is likely to prevail on any additional claims.” SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018). Thus, because we have decided to grant review of claim 1, we do the same for all claims challenged and all grounds raised. Id.; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). III. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the Petition is granted and inter partes review is hereby instituted as to claims 1–19 of U.S. Patent No. 11,091,794 B2 on the grounds presented; and” slip op. at 35
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Other
“Petitioner argues that an input data structure having the recited combination of properties would have been obvious, in part, because all such properties were identified and could be measured in the prior art. For example, according to Petitioner, “[i]n addition to encoding the identity and relative locations of each nucleotide, PacBio-BAM encodes the PW and IPD of each nucleotide as integer arrays.” Pet. 43 (citing Ex. 1011, 8). This argument is supported by the cited evidence. Under a section titled “Encoding of kinetics pulse features,” PacBio-BAM states: “Interpulse duration (IPD) and pulsewidth are measured in frames [and] . . . may be encoded in BAM read tags” and further states such information relates to “base modification detection.” Ex. 1011, 8. Petitioner also notes that Flusberg and Flusberg ’338 teach that PW and IPD are affected by nucleotide modifications. Pet. 43–44 (citing Ex. 1007, 66:46–67:4, 9:41–46; 22:49–54; Figs. 12, 13, and 15–19; Ex. 1006, 462, Fig. 3). For example, Flusberg ’338 teaches: In certain aspects, the invention provides a general-purpose approach to discriminating between Me+ and Me- using features in a real-time sequencing-by-synthesis trace comprising signals emitted during the incorporation of optically detectable nucleotides into a nascent strand by a polymerase enzyme. . . . A first stage of this approach includes the development of a classifier for distinguishing methylated from unmethylated cytosines in a nucleic acid template. A set of features is measured for every pulse (discrete event or signal) in the trace. For example, a set of measurable features might be {pulse width, pulse duration, pulse height, pulse amplitude variability}. Ex. 1007, 64:46–59 (emphasis added). Similarly, Flusberg states: Fluorescence pulses in SMRT sequencing are characterized not only by their emission spectra but also by their duration and by the interval between successive pulses. These metrics, defined here as pulse width and interpulse duration (IPD), add valuable information about DNA polymerase kinetics. Pulse width is a function of all kinetic steps after nucleotide binding and up to fluorophore release, and IPD is determined by the kinetics of nucleotide binding and polymerase translocation. We have previously demonstrated that SMRT sequencing polymerase synthesis rates are sensitive to DNA primary and secondary structure. Therefore, we hypothesized that methylated bases in a DNA template might be detected directly on the principle that their presence affects polymerase kinetics during SMRT sequencing. Ex. 1006, 462 (emphasis added; end notes omitted). Petitioner argues that “PacBio-BAM teaches creating an input data” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“4. Reason To Combine Petitioner points out that (1) each of Flusberg and Flusberg ’338 teach methods of detecting nucleotide modifications using SMRT sequencing, and (2) PacBio-BAM teaches a BAM file containing values for all claimed properties generated in the course of SMRT sequencing. Pet. 29. Petitioner argues with supporting evidence, that it would have been obvious “to use PacBio’s BAM file containing the recited properties as an input data structure, as expressly suggested in PacBio-BAM.” Id. at 29–30; see also Ex. 1002 ¶82 (Dr. Dessimoz providing his opinion in support of the combination); Pet. 30–33 (providing additional arguments and evidence to support the combination). Patent Owner argues that “Petitioner fails to provide motivation to combine Flusberg with the other two references of Ground 1 to arrive at the claimed invention.” Prelim. Resp. 45. According to Patent Owner, “Petitioner makes no argument for why Flusberg and the ’338 patent would be combined, let alone why a POSITA would selectively combine various aspects of each reference and include features not used in either reference to arrive.” Id. Patent Owner premises its argument on a purported failure by Flusberg ’338 to incorporate by reference the entire Flusberg reference as opposed to limited aspects of its. Id. at 45–46. Flusberg ’338 patent twice states that Flusberg is “incorporated herein by reference in its entirety for all purposes.” Ex. 1007, 77:30–24, 78:58–66. Patent Owner argues that what is incorporated by reference is only the specific content of Flusberg that is mentioned by Flusberg ’338. Prelim. Resp. 46. Patent Owner cites Nautilus, Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness Inc., No. IPR2017-01407, 2018 WL 6321395, at *18–19 (PTAB Dec. 3, 2018) in support. Id. Patent Owner additionally points out that, if either incorporation by reference successfully incorporated the entire Flusberg disclosure, then the other incorporation by reference would be superfluous. Prelim. Resp. 46–47. This last point is logical, but the totality of the facts, as discussed below, better support Petitioner’s position. In Nautilus, the Board interpreted the following incorporation by reference language: “The ’088 Application provides ‘One example of customizing a work-out that may be utilized in conjunction with the exercise apparatus described herein is set forth in U.S. Patent Application No. 13/754,361, filed on Jan. 30, 2013, the disclosure of which is incorporated by reference herein in its entirety.’” Nautilus, 2018 WL 6321395, at *19. The Board found that the word “disclosure” could refer to either the example being discussed or the entire disclosure of the ’088 Application, and the Board ultimately held that what was incorporated by reference was the example of customizing a work-out only and not the entirety of the ’088 Application. Id. Nautilus is not precedential. Moreover, its facts are different. Here, we have statements that Flusberg is incorporated by reference both “in its entirety” and “for all purposes.” Ex. 1007, 77:30–24, 78:58–66. Further, the Board’s holding in Nautilus explicitly hinged on its understanding of the word “disclosure” in the following phrase: “the disclosure of which is incorporated by reference herein in its entirety.” Nautilus, 2018 WL 6321395, at *19. The Board held that, “as a matter of grammar, the antecedent of the ‘disclosure’ being incorporated could be either the application or ‘one example’ that is described in the application.” Id. Here, the rules of grammar contradict Patent Owner’s position, rather than support it. For example, the first incorporation by reference states: “Further details on the detection of N6-MeA, as well as other modifications within a template nucleic acid, are provided in Flusberg, et al. (2010) Nature Methods 7(6):461–465, incorporated herein by reference in its entirety for all purposes.” Ex. 1007, 77:30–24 (emphasis added). The word “its” can refer to only one thing, Flusberg itself, as the alternative would be plural nouns, namely “details” and “other modifications,” and thus inconsistent with the singular “its.” In sum, we find that, on the current record, Petitioner has sufficiently shown a motivation to combine Flusberg and Flusberg ’338 with PacBio- BAM.” slip op. at 25
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 11,091,794 - PTAB · Mar 26, 2024 · IPR2023-01382 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–3 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would be unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons set forth below, we determine the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’347 patent on all grounds asserted in the Petition. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018); PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (stating that a decision to institute is “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, chemical engineering, physics, or material science or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design and/or fabrication, including the processing of semiconductor materials, analysis of device operation, or the development of new device topologies.” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–53). Petitioner also contends that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 19. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition or offer its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’347 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’347 patent and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”)” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“type gate material of independent claim 1 requires that the “bottom of the ptype gate material is more than 10% wider than the top of the material.” Pet. 19. We begin our analysis with the language of the claims themselves. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. Here, the claims do not recite any numerical degree of horizontal extension, let alone a requirement that the bottom of the p-type gate material must be more than 10% wider than the top of the material. Thus, the plain language of the claims themselves do not support Petitioner’s proposed construction. Of course, the claims do not stand alone, but rather, must be read in view of the specification, of which they are part. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. Petitioner relies on a numerical value for horizontal extension disclosed in Lidow, which is incorporated by reference in the ’347 patent. Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 41–42, Fig. 8; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70–74). But Lidow’s disclosure of a numerical value (10%) is made in the context of discussing a single embodiment. Ex. 1011 ¶ 41. Lidow does not include a numerical value in its disclosure of other embodiments. See, e.g., Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 43–51.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Again, Patent Owner’s arguments raise issues that are best resolved on a full record. While we do have some concern’s regarding Petitioner’s asserted reasons to combine all of the prior art references, Petitioner has provided sufficient argument and evidence for purposes of institution that a POSITA would have had reason to manufacture the modified Figure 1A of Saxler by using Beach’s self-aligned technique with Shenoy’s isotropic etching process, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–62, 93; Ex. 1014 (Xu); Ex. 1021 (Sheppard); Ex. 1015 (Smith); Ex. 1018 (Hu); Ex. 1009 (Shenoy); Widmann (Ex. 1023); Ahn (Ex. 1010); see also Pet. 31–35. For example, Dr. Shealy testifies that a POSITA would have recognized that using Beach’s self-aligned techniques and Shenoy’s isotropic etching process to arrive at Saxler’s non-recessed gate structure would have been a simple and predictable combination in view of Smith’s use of self-alignment techniques to create its stacked gate structure and would have done so to reduce steps and costs while improving reproducibility. Ex. 1003 ¶ 93. We also note that we understand Petitioner’s proposed combination uses a single photomask when etching both the gate metal and the p-type gate material layer, including when etching the gate metal to form a pair of ledges on the p-type gate material below the gate metal. See, e.g., Pet. 48 (stating that it would have been obvious to use one mask to etch the gate metal and cap layer and further stating that using Shenoy’s method of isotropically etching the gate metal would form symmetric undercuts of the photomask). To the extent, the Board’s understanding of Petitioner’s argument is not correct, the parties are urged to address this issue. Finally, Patent Owner asserts that Shenoy is non-analogous art and may not be combined with Saxler or Beach because Shenoy involves electrochemical etching, a highly specialized etching method with little relevance to the process described in the ’347 patent or Saxler. Prelim. Resp. 27.” slip op. at 32
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,748,347 - PTAB · Mar 26, 2024 · IPR2023-01384 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–7 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 3, and 4 are unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“III. CONCLUSION Because Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim of the ’335 patent is unpatentable over the prior art of record, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims. And because we find some grounds sufficient for institution, we institute on all grounds in the petition. See SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1353 (2018); PGS Geophysical, 891 F.3d at 1360. determination with respect to the patentability of any challenged claim or any underlying factual or legal issue, including claim construction. IV. ORDER For the reasons given, it is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review of claims 1–7 of the ’335 patent is instituted with respect to all grounds of unpatentability asserted in the Petition, commencing on the entry date of this Decision; and FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of trial.” slip op. at 54
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, chemical engineering, physics, or material science or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design and/or 1 The relevant sections of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, took effect on March 16, 2013. Because the ’335 patent has an effective filing date prior to the effective date of the applicable AIA amendments, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies. 2 US 2006/0108606 A1, published May 25, 2006 (Ex. 1007). 3 JP H11-261053, published Sept. 24, 1999 (Ex. 1005 (original language); Ex. 1006 (certified English translation)). 4 US 2007/0007547 A1, published Jan. 11, 2007 (Ex. 1008). 5 R.V. Shenoy, et. al, Effect of Mask Wall Angle on Shape Evolution during Through-Mask Electrochemical Micromachining, J. ELECTROCHEM. SOC., Vol. 143, No. 2, 544, Feb. 1996 (Ex. 1013). device operation, or the development of new device topologies.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–53). Petitioner also contends that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 18. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition or offer its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’335 patent and the prior art of record, at this stage of the proceeding we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’335 patent and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“type gate material of independent claims 1 and 5 requires that the “bottom of the p-type gate material is more than 10% wider than the top of the material.” Pet. 19. We begin our analysis with the language of the claims themselves. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. Here, the claims do not recite 7 Patent Owner cites to the Lidow-508 patent itself, instead of the published application included in the record as Ex. 1011, which Petitioner cites to. The parties have not identified any difference between the two references. the bottom of the p-type gate material must be more than 10% wider than the top of the material. Ex. 1001, 5:5–6:30. Thus, the plain language of the claims themselves does not support Petitioner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“As discussed above, however, we are persuaded, at this stage, by Petitioner’s argument that that Saxler teaches or suggests an operable enhancement-mode device. See § II.D.1.a.i, supra. Additionally, Patent Owner’s argument regarding modifications that “could be detrimental” to certain devices is not only speculation, but also comprised entirely of attorney argument. Finally, Patent Owner does not directly address Petitioner’s arguments and accompanying evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Saxler and Yoshida to take advantage of simplified manufacturing steps and reduced costs. Based on the present record, Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Saxler and Yoshida disclose or suggest all of the limitations in claims 1, 3, and 4, and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to combine the teachings of Saxler and Yoshida with a reasonable expectation of success. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge that claims 1, 3, and 4 are unpatentable as obvious in view of Saxler and Yoshida. For the same reasons as noted above, we decline to address Petitioner’s challenge of claims 2 and 5–7 based on Saxler and Yoshida alone at this stage. See § II.D.1.c, supra.” slip op. at 44
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,312,335 - Kinderfarms LLC v. Genexa Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Mar 25, 2024 · PGR2023-00051 · APJ Deborah Katz · PGR · Institution
Instituted PGR of claims 1–24 on all asserted grounds; the Board found the §103 challenges more likely than not to render claim 1 unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” See 35 U.S.C. § 324(a).” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“B. Level of Skill Each party puts forth a characterization of the ordinarily skilled artisan in the field of the claims of the ’795 patent. (See Pet. 13 (citing Crowley Decl., Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 90–91); see Prelim. Resp. 3–4.) The parties’ proposed characterizations of the ordinarily skilled artisan are sufficiently similar that adoption of either would lead to the same result, institution. Thus, for the purposes of this Decision only, we adopt Patent Owner’s characterization of the ordinarily skilled artisan as having a bachelor of science degree in a relevant life sciences field, such as, chemistry, biochemistry, or pharmacy, with at least two years of work or laboratory experience in pharmaceutical formulations, and access to one or more team members having experience in pharmaceutical formulation and pharmaceutical regulatory approvals, or, in the alternative, at least three to four years of work or laboratory experience in pharmaceutical formulations, and access to one or more team members having experience in pharmaceutical formulation and pharmaceutical regulatory approvals. (See Prelim. Resp. 3–4.) We also note that the level of skill of an ordinarily skilled artisan is revealed by the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error “the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown.” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163, 225 USPQ 34, 38 (Fed.Cir.1985)).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction Petitioner puts forth constructions of certain terms used in the claims of the ’795 patent. (See Pet. 14–19.) Patent Owner does not dispute any of these constructions specifically, but at this point, argues that we need not construe any terms “to resolve the present controversy.” (Prelim. Resp. 2.) We agree that an express construction is not required at this point in the proceeding. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Thus, at this point in the proceeding, Patent Owner’s argument is not persuasive because it does not address the teachings in the prior art that Petitioner asserts would render the formulations claimed in the ’795 patent obvious.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSRPatents in suitUS 11,617,795
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.