- T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Dali Wireless Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 6, 2024 · IPR2023-00820 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–22 are unpatentable as obvious over Wu, alone for claims 1–3, 5–10, 12–14, and 16–21, and with Cannon for claims 4, 11, 15, and 22.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Construction In inter partes reviews, the Board construes claims using the same” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“reasoning belies its conclusion. That Kabemoto and Bauman address the same problem and that Bauman’s cache was a known way to address that problem is precisely the reason that there’s a motivation to combine under KSR and our precedent.” slip op. at 85
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelNot reached
“III. RULE ESTOPPEL Petitioner asserts that estoppel applies under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3) based on a prior adverse judgment with respect to a related patent. See Pet. 2–6. Patent Owner disagrees that rule estoppel applies. PO Resp. 21–22. Based on Petitioner’s showing of obviousness and common law collateral estoppel with respect to the DAU and digital representation of radio resources limitations of the challenged claims as indicated above, we do not reach alleged estoppel under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3).” slip op. at 97
Patent outcomesUS 11,006,343 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,006,343 - T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Dali Wireless Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 6, 2024 · IPR2023-00832 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–22 are unpatentable: claims 1–3, 5–10, 12–14, and 16–21 as obvious over Wu; claims 4, 11, 15, and 22 as obvious over Wu and Cannon.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“digital representation of radio resources. See PO Resp. 30 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 50–51). Nevertheless, whether there is the stated need in Wu does not address Petitioner’s showing that digital sampling via an A/D converter describes the original analog carrier. As further discussed below in connection with claim 4, Dr. Chrissan does not address Wu’s paragraphs 55– 56 in rendering his conclusion that Wu’s RTUs are “pass-through devices,” rendering the testimony conclusory because it does not address this critical evidence. See PO Resp. 30 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 50–51); Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 50–51 (discussing Ex. 1007 ¶ 50)). In addition, as discussed in the previous paragraph, Dr. Chrissan’s deposition testimony shows that Wu sends and receives a digital representation of a carrier, which describes the carrier, because that is the essence of digital sampling.” slip op. at 53
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelNot reached
“based on a prior adverse judgment with respect to a related patent. See Pet. 2–6. Patent Owner disagrees that rule estoppel applies. PO Resp. 21–22. Based on Petitioner’s showing of obviousness and common law collateral estoppel with respect to the DAU and digital representation of radio resources limitations of the challenged claims as indicated above, we do not reach alleged estoppel under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3).” slip op. at 97
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“reasoning belies its conclusion. That Kabemoto and Bauman address the same problem and that Bauman’s cache was a known way to address that problem is precisely the reason that there’s a motivation to combine under KSR and our precedent.” slip op. at 85
Patent outcomesUS 11,006,343 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,006,343 - T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Dali Wireless Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 6, 2024 · IPR2022-01345 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–22 are unpatentable as obvious over Wu, or Wu and Cannon, because Petitioner established unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“digital representation of radio resources. See PO Resp. 30 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 50–51). Nevertheless, whether there is the stated need in Wu does not address Petitioner’s showing that digital sampling via an A/D converter describes the original analog carrier. As further discussed below in connection with claim 4, Dr. Chrissan does not address Wu’s paragraphs 55– 56 in rendering his conclusion that Wu’s RTUs are “pass-through devices,” rendering the testimony conclusory because it does not address this critical evidence. See PO Resp. 30 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 50–51); Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 50–51 (discussing Ex. 1007 ¶ 50)). In addition, as discussed in the previous paragraph, Dr. Chrissan’s deposition testimony shows that Wu sends and receives a digital representation of a carrier, which describes the carrier, because that is the essence of digital sampling.” slip op. at 53
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelNot reached
“based on a prior adverse judgment with respect to a related patent. See Pet. 2–6. Patent Owner disagrees that rule estoppel applies. PO Resp. 21–22. Based on Petitioner’s showing of obviousness and common law collateral estoppel with respect to the DAU and digital representation of radio resources limitations of the challenged claims as indicated above, we do not reach alleged estoppel under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3).” slip op. at 97
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“reasoning belies its conclusion. That Kabemoto and Bauman address the same problem and that Bauman’s cache was a known way to address that problem is precisely the reason that there’s a motivation to combine under KSR and our precedent.” slip op. at 85
Patent outcomesUS 11,006,343 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,006,343 - Textron Specialized Vehicles, Inc. v. SZ Dji Technology Co. Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 23, 2024 · IPR2023-01198 · APJ John R Kenny · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–17 were unpatentable over the asserted Takashi, Onishi, and Kim grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented in the Petition does not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute inter partes review. A. Related Matters The parties identify the following related district court litigation” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or equivalent training or job experience, along with 1–2 years of experience in any of the fields of power electronics, motor control systems, and battery systems for electric motor applications. Pet. 8. Further, Petitioner asserts that additional education could compensate for less practical experience and vice versa. Id. Patent Owner has not challenged Petitioner’s definition for an ordinarily skilled artisan. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage, Petitioner’s 2 JP 1994253415 A (Ex. 1005). Certified Translation of which is Ex. 1004. All cites to Takashi are to its certified translation (Ex. 1004) unless otherwise noted. 3 JP201193653A (Ex. 1007). Certified Translation of which is Ex. 1006. All cites to Onishi are to its certified translation (Ex. 1006) unless otherwise noted. 4 US 8,330,419 B2 (Ex. 1008). definition appears consistent with the level of skill reflected in the Specification and in the asserted prior art references. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Construction The Petition and the Preliminary Response do not request that we expressly construe any claim term. Pet. 15; Prelim. Resp. 5–6. Further, on this record, we determine that no claim term requires an express construction for the purpose of determining whether to institute inter partes review. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As mentioned, Petitioner argues that Takashi’s use of duty setting means to read pre-calculated command duties stored in memory discloses “calculating a compensation amount.” Pet. 19. Petitioner, however, does not explain why reading pre-calculated command duties stored in memory constitutes calculating command duties based on a present electrical parameter. Id. at 19–21. Dr. Zane similarly does not provide such an explanation. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 64–69. The term “pre-calculated,” given its ordinary usage, indicates that the duty cycles have been calculated before they have been read from memory, which means they are not calculated based on a present electrical parameter. Thus, Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that reading pre-calculated command duties stored in memory constitutes calculating command duties based on a present electrical parameter.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,640,224 - PTAB · Jan 23, 2024 · IPR2023-01217 · APJ John R Kenny · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all asserted grounds challenging claims 1–23, finding a reasonable likelihood of proving at least one challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“The Petition, to justify institution of review, must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Preliminary Reply, the Preliminary Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, we determine that the Petition has met this standard and institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or equivalent training or job experience, along with 1–2 years of experience in the field of GPS, location-based-services, and/or geofencing. Pet. 11. Further, Petitioner asserts that additional education could compensate for less practical experience and vice versa. Id. Patent Owner has not challenged Petitioner’s definition for an ordinarily skilled artisan. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage, Petitioner’s definition appears consistent with the level of skill reflected in the Specification and in the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“On this preliminary record, we determine that the term “vehicle restriction region” is not limited to regions that have an area where a vehicle is excluded from entry or warned upon transgression. The dispute between the parties regarding “vehicle restriction region” specifically concerns the meaning of the word “restriction,” in particular whether “restriction” requires the exclusion of vehicles from entry or a warning upon transgression. Pet. 18–37; Prelim. Resp. 5–24. The parties are not disputing whether the asserted prior art discloses vehicles or regions. Pet. 18–37; Prelim. Resp. 5– 24. The Specification teaches that the term “restriction” is not so limited. For example, the Specification discloses that the term “flight restriction zone” “may refer to any region in which it is possible to limit or affect operation of an aerial vehicle.” Ex. 1001, 4:8–11 (emphasis added). This disclosure does not require the exclusion of entry of an aerial vehicle or a warning upon transgression. Further, the Specification teaches that flight restriction strip 2104 in region 2100 in Figure 21 may permit flight of the UAV while other flight restriction strips may prevent flight of the UAV. Id. at 29:20–22. This disclosure further does not require the exclusion of entry of a vehicle or a warning upon transgression. To the contrary, the Specification describes the latter (an alert) as an optional addition, and, as described above, flight restriction strip 2104 can expressly permit flights. Id. at 29:26–31. In light of the Specification’s definition of a “flight restriction zone” as “any region in which it is possible to limit or affect operation of an aerial vehicle,” it would appear that the proper construction of “vehicle restriction zone” is “any region in which it is possible to limit or affect operation of a vehicle.” Ex. 1001, 4:8–11.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“We determine that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing for the preamble of claim 1. First, on this preliminary record, we agree with Petitioner that Humphries’s geofenced area constitutes a vehicle restriction region because it is a region in which it is possible to limit or affect operation of a vehicle. Pet. 19. Humphries describes the geofenced regions as areas in which tracked objects are to be confined. Ex. 1004, 1:44–50.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,462,116 - PTAB · Jan 2, 2024 · IPR2023-00856 · APJ John R Kenny · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1–20 after it requested to abandon the contest, and terminated the three related IPR proceedings.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Thus, we grant Patent Owner’s Request. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that judgment is entered under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4) against Patent Owner with respect to claims 1–20 of U.S. Patent No. 11,026,232 B2; and slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,026,232 - AT&T Corp., AT&T Communications LLC, AT&T Mobility LLC, AT&T Mobility II LLC, AT&T Services Inc., And T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Dali Wireless, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 2, 2024 · IPR2023-00844 · APJ John R Kenny · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Dali Wireless on claims 1–20 after it requested to abandon the contest, and terminated the three related IPR proceedings.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Thus, we grant Patent Owner’s Request. slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,026,232 - PTAB · Jan 2, 2024 · IPR2022-01242 · APJ John R Kenny · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1–20 after it requested to abandon the contest, and terminated the related IPR proceedings.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Thus, we grant Patent Owner’s Request. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that judgment is entered under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4) against Patent Owner with respect to claims 1–20 of U.S. Patent No. 11,026,232 B2; and slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,026,232 - Google LLC v. Mira Advanced Technology Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 20, 2023 · IPR2022-00742 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103(a) over Dunton, Barchi, and Bedingfield.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Here, Petitioner asserts that a person having ordinary skill in the art “in the technology field of the ’854 Patent had a bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, or Electrical Engineering, or an equivalent course of study, as well as 2 or more years of academic or industry experience in the field of wireless communication devices and location-based services.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 65). Patent Owner “generally agrees with Petitioner” as to the level of ordinary skill in the art and does not propose any changes to Petitioner’s definition. PO Resp. 8. Petitioner’s description is consistent with the prior art and patent specification currently before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For purposes of our Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s description.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Construction In an inter partes review proceeding, a patent claim shall be construed using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (as amended Oct. 11, 2018). Our rule adopts the same claim construction standard used by Article III federal courts, which follow Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), and its progeny. Under this standard, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. Petitioner “interpret[s] all claim terms in accordance with their ordinary and customary meaning.” Pet. 12. Patent Owner has not put forth any arguments in its papers related to claim construction.13 See PO Resp. 2. We determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. 13 At the oral hearing, Patent Owner’s counsel indicated that a formal claim construction would be useful, but he also stated that “it’s too late to do anything like claim construction.” Tr. 43:1–6, 34:8–12. Notwithstanding Patent Owner’s comments at the oral hearing, we find that the issues in the case are amenable to resolution without an express claim construction.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s assertions. We find Petitioner’s rationale for the combination to be well supported. Petitioner points out that “Dunton itself states that ‘[t]echniques to improve management of [] tasks may result in more productivity and better time management’ and that ‘[a]ccordingly, there may be a need for such techniques in a device or network.’” Reply 17 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 1; Ex. 1003 ¶ 133) (alternations in original). Mr. Schmandt supports Petitioner’s arguments by opining that “[a person of ordinary skill in the art] looking to obtain additional information regarding where and when to perform tasks to improve management of tasks (as discussed in Dunton) would be motivated to look to references like Barchi that teach methods to obtain additional contact information using techniques like the reverse phone number lookup or use of other databases.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 135. Thus, we agree with Petitioner and find that Dunton provides a rationale for looking to the other cited references to provide techniques to improve task management. As such, we find Petitioner’s rationale for the combination to be persuasive and well supported.” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 10,594,854 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,594,854 - Google LLC v. Touchstream Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 2, 2023 · IPR2022-00794 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, and 6–8 were not shown unpatentable because the prior art combinations did not establish the claimed messaging through the server system.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“Tr. 78:6–10. Patent Owner responded “I don’t think it makes any difference for this panel’s determination.” Tr. 78:13–14. We agree and determine that the differences in the level of skill offered by the parties are not so significant as to warrant any changes to the definition set forth in the Decision to Institute. Therefore, we maintain our determination that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science (or equivalent experience) and two years of experience designing or implementing interactive systems with networked media or media playback systems.” See Inst. Dec. 10. We determine this level of skill comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ʼ289 Patent and the prior art of record. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“1. media player Patent Owner contends that, based on the “intrinsic record . . . an ordinary artisan would have understood the ordinary and customary meaning of ‘media player’ in the ’289 patent refers to application software and does not encompass hardware devices.” PO Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 92–93). Petitioner asserts that it “has not alleged any hardware device is a ‘media player’” and thus, “the Board need not resolve whether ‘hardware devices’ are encompassed by ‘media player.’” Pet. Reply 1. Rather, Petitioner states the media players relied upon in the Petition are all application software. Pet. Reply 1–2. Petitioner specifically states, “Petitioner has identified three ‘media players’ in the prior art. Two of these—Muthukumarasamy’s ‘Video Player[s]’ and Hayward’s ‘media players’ (Petition, 24–27)—are application software. The third ‘media player’ is likewise not a hardware device.” Pet. Reply 2 (alteration in original). Thus, the parties agree that the term “media player” refers to software and not to a hardware device, and we apply this interpretation in our patentability analysis.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Muthukumarasamy “controls delivery of selected media content and selects and controls the media devices that deliver the selected media content according to a media type of the selected media content.” Because Muthukumarasamy teaches that the media device displays media content from various disparate sources depending on the media type and media source, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood the media device loads an appropriate media player depending on the media type and source. Pet. 23–24 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 47; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 66–67). Petitioner, however, proffers insufficient evidence or argument that the content choices described in paragraph 47 of Muthukumarasamy would have led an ordinarily skilled artisan to understand a media player is obtained and loaded in the content presentation device. Rather, Dr. Bederson makes conclusory statements without providing evidence to support the assertions (Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 66–67).” slip op. at 33
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Muthukumarasamy discussed above. In particular, Petitioner has not explained how Hayward teaches receiving the one or more messages in a system server. Rather, Petitioner relies on Hayward to teach “identify a particular media player for playing content from the file,” and “identify a location of the particular media player.” Pet. 41–45. More specifically, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated by and found it obvious from Hayward to implement the DBCS (e.g., the RCIBS) to facilitate control of internet content presented at the content presentation device using any number of media players through embedded media player pages, as described in Hayward.” Pet. 65. However, to the extent Petitioner’s assertions rely on “implement[ing] the DBCS (e.g., the RCIBS) to facilitate presentation of internet content at the content presentation device” (Pet. Reply 22), we determine Petitioner has not shown the combined process of Muthukumarasamy and Hayward would include the required messages being received by the server (e.g., zHub/zNode), as opposed to directly by the RCIBS as discussed above. Additionally, Petitioner has not shown, for the zHub/zNode process, that Hayward cures the deficiencies of Muthukumarasamy as set forth above. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Muthukumarasamy and Hayward teaches “receiving, in a server system, one or more messages from a personal computing device . . . wherein the one or more messages, . . . identify a particular media player for playing content from the file wherein the media player is a computer application operable to present content and control presentation of the content,” as recited in claim 1 and commensurately recited in independent claim 6. Additionally, because claim 2 depends from claim 1 and claims 7 and 8 depend from claim 6, we conclude that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of evidence that the subject matter of claims 2, 7, and 8 would have been obvious over the combination of Muthukumarasamy and Hayward.” slip op. at 37
Patent outcomesUS 8,904,289 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,904,289
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.