- PTAB · Jul 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00191 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review on all challenged grounds for non-disclaimed claims 3, 6, 8–20; it found a reasonable likelihood of success for claims 8–12 and 19.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail as to the unpatentability of claims 8–12 and 19 of the ’322 patent but has not sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail as to the unpatentability as to claims 3, 6, 13–17, and 20. Because Petitioner has sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood that at” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“B. Patent Owner’s Disclaimer of Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 As indicated above, Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 of the ’322 patent. See Ex. 2006. In view of Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer, we treat claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 as having never been part of the ’322 patent. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This court has interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in [35 U.S.C.] § 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”). Because inter partes review cannot be instituted based on disclaimed claims, claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 are outside the scope of this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017- 00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution in view of a statutory disclaimer of all the challenged claims). Thus, we confine our analysis in this Decision to claims 3, 6, and 8–20, the challenged claims that have not been disclaimed.” slip op. at 3
- Other 314aDenied
“Patent Owner filed a Brief on Discretionary Denial, and Petitioner filed a brief in opposition. Papers 10 and 18. The Director considered the briefing and determined that discretionary denial was not warranted. Paper 21.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“at the critical time “would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34–38). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, how it is manufactured, and its component parts.” Id. Patent Owner does not provide any such assessment in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 8; Ex. 2007 ¶ 22 (reserving the right to opine as to an alternative level of a POSITA). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’322 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,581,322 - PTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2025-00190 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on all challenged claims and grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 5 would have been obvious over Dong.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“§ 42.4(a), we may only institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). Based upon our review of the present record, Petitioner has sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood it will prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had a had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND memory devices (including issues relating to the operation, e.g., programming, of said devices), or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience). Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 40–42). Petitioner also asserts that a POSITA would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about NAND memory’s structure and fabrication, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled. Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 41). Patent Owner does not take a position on the level of ordinary skill in the art at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 12–13; see also Ex. 2006 ¶ 35 (applying Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA to the opinions set forth in the declaration but reserving the right to opine to an alternative level of a POSITA). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA as it appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art that is reflected by the prior art of record.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner
“Because the preambles of independent claims 5 and 11 provide antecedent basis for the word line limitations recited in the body of their respective claim, we treat the preambles of claims 5 and 11 as limiting. See Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, 703 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (stating “a preamble phrase that provides antecedent basis for a claim limitation generally limits the scope of the claim”). The parties are invited to address whether the preamble is limiting if they so choose, to the extent permitted by our rules.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“one memory portion above or below another portion establishes a relative top and bottom. For example, claim 5 is directed to a “program method of memory” that requires a second portion formed above the first portion. A second memory portion that is formed above a first memory portion would be on top of the first portion. Given that the claims themselves identify relative vertical locations of the memory portions (i.e., second memory portion is above the first portion), it follows that claim terms referring to the top and bottom of word lines within the memory portions also refer to relative vertical locations of the word lines within the memory portions. Thus, we understand the plain and ordinary meaning of claim language referring to first and second memory portions that comprise word lines “from bottom to top” to mean that the word lines of the memory portions are arranged vertically from the bottom end of the memory portion toward the top of the memory portion (i.e., from bottom to top). Our understanding that the term “from bottom to top” refers to the vertical arrangement of word lines in the memory portions from bottom to top and not from source end to drain end is supported by the ’941 patent Specification, which does not refer to source or drain side of the word lines. See generally Ex. 1001. Rather, the ’941 patent illustrates and describes figures of memory devices having word lines arranged vertically from bottom to top. For example, Figures 1–11 each depict “a memory” having vertically arranged word lines. See id. at 2:37–55, Figs. 1–11. The Specification describes embodiments with first, second, and/or third memory portions as including various word lines “from bottom to top” and that the memory portions are formed above or below each other, thus supporting that the claim term “from bottom to top” is used according to its plain and ordinary meaning of from bottom to top and not from source side to drain side. See, e.g., id. at 1:45–50, 1:55–60, 2:1–7, 2:14–18, 2:64–3:3, 3:46–48.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,568,941 - PTAB · Jun 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00099 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 5, 7–9, and 17–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Fukuzumi.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Anticipation “requires that every element and limitation of the claim was previously described in a single prior art reference, either expressly or inherently, so as to place a person of ordinary skill in possession of the invention.” Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Anticipation also requires that a reference discloses “all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008).” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached
“Even assuming, arguendo, that the “Chinese government” or YMTC Holding constitute an unnamed RPI, Patent Owner does not sufficiently show that the failure identify the RPI is a reason to decline to institute this proceeding. Patent Owner has not asserted that a statutory bar or other estoppel would apply to either the Chinese government or YMTC Holding in this proceeding. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b); SharkNinja Operating LLC v. iRobot Corp., IPR2020-00734, Paper 11, 18 (PTAB Oct. 6, 2020) (precedential); Lumentum Holdings, Inc. v. Capella Photonics, Inc., IPR2015-00739, Paper 38 at 6 (PTAB Mar. 4, 2016) (precedential) (stating that a petition may be corrected, including adding a real party-in-interest, without assigning a new filing date); see also Paper 9 (granting Petitioner’s unopposed motion to amend its mandatory notices to add a subsidiary of YMTI as an RPI without changing the filing date). Indeed, in Unified Patents, LLC v. MemoryWeb, LLC, the Director instructed that the precedential SharkNinja decision held that it “best serves the Office’s interests in cost and efficiency to not resolve an RPI issue when it would not create a time bar or estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315 in that proceeding.” Unified Patents, LLC v. MemoryWeb, LLC, IPR2021-01413, Paper 76 at 4 (PTAB May 22, 2023) (“Unified Patents”) (vacating the Board’s RPI determination in the Final Written Decision as not necessary to resolve the proceeding, such as a time bar under § 315(b) or estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)). Here, as neither the Chinese government nor YMTC Prelim. Resp. 7 (citing Ex. 2021 (“YMTC’s Corporate Disclosure Statement), 2). Holding have been sued for patent infringement, Patent Owner has not shown that a determination of whether the Chinese government or YMTC Holding are an RPI, or are in privity with Petitioner, would impact the underlying proceeding or would result in a time bar or estoppel. As such, we do not address Patent Owner’s RPI argument.” slip op. at 23
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDecided for petitioner
“We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. To date, the Director has not provided any guidance as to when a panel should deny institution based on foreign policy or national security implications, applicable to the facts presented here. To the contrary, the USPTO has expressly determined that Board panels, in considering discretionary denial sought in a Preliminary Response filed on or before March 26, 2025, may not consider such factors. FAQs for Interim Processes for PTAB Workload Management, FAQ 5, https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/faqs/interim-processes-workload-management (stating, “The panel will not address any new factors outlined in the Process Memorandum”). Accordingly, we decline to exercise discretion to deny institution for this requested reason.” slip op. at 25
Discretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,872,903 - PTAB · Jun 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00098 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 6–10, 12–13, 16–18, 23–26, 28, 30, and 32 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Chae.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“1. Legal Standards “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (requiring a petition for inter partes review to identify how the challenged claim is to be construed and where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon). Anticipation “requires that every element and limitation of the claim was previously described in a single prior art reference, either expressly or inherently, so as to place a person of ordinary skill in possession of the invention.” Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Anticipation also requires that a reference discloses “all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDecided for petitioner
“Even assuming, arguendo, that the “Chinese government” or YMTC Holding constitute an unnamed RPI, Patent Owner does not sufficiently show that the failure identify the RPI is a reason to decline to institute this proceeding. Patent Owner has not asserted that a statutory bar or other 7 Patent Owner refers to the “Chinese government” as an unnamed RPI but does not identify what the “Chinese government” is. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 3–5 (referring to “China’s State Council”), 6 (municipal governments), 7–8 (identifying the seven shareholders of YMTC Holding as “state-owned enterprises”), 8 (stating the actual controller of the Yangtze River Industrial Investment Group is the “administration of Wuhan East Lake High-tech Development Zone”), 8 (stating the actual controller of the Yangtze River Industrial Group is the “Hubei Provincial State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission”). 8 More particularly, Patent Owner identifies YMTC’s parent as Yangtze Memory Technologies Holding Co., Ltd. (“YMTC Holding” or “YMTH”). Prelim. Resp. 7 (citing Ex. 2021 (“YMTC’s Corporate Disclosure Statement), 2). estoppel would apply to either the Chinese government or YMTC Holding in this proceeding. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b); SharkNinja Operating LLC v. iRobot Corp., IPR2020-00734, Paper 11, 18 (PTAB Oct. 6, 2020) (precedential); Lumentum Holdings, Inc. v. Capella Photonics, Inc., IPR2015-00739, Paper 38 at 6 (PTAB Mar. 4, 2016) (precedential) (stating that a petition may be corrected, including adding a real party in interest, without assigning a new filing date); see also Paper 9 (granting Petitioner’s unopposed motion to amend its mandatory notices to add a subsidiary of YMTI as an RPI without changing the filing date). Indeed, in Unified Patents, LLC v. MemoryWeb, LLC, the Director instructed that the precedential SharkNinja decision held that it “best serves the Office’s interests in cost and efficiency to not resolve an RPI issue when it would not create a time bar or estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315 in that proceeding.” Unified Patents, LLC v. MemoryWeb, LLC, IPR2021-01413, Paper 76 at 4 (PTAB May 22, 2023) (“Unified Patents”) (vacating the Board’s RPI determination in the Final Written Decision as not necessary to resolve the proceeding, such as a time bar under § 315(b) or estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)). Here, as neither the Chinese government nor YMTC Holding have been sued for patent infringement, Patent Owner has not shown that a determination of whether the Chinese government or YMTC Holding are an RPI, or are in privity with Petitioner, would impact the underlying proceeding or result in a time bar or estoppel. As such, we do not address Patent Owner’s RPI argument. We have also considered Patent Owner’s contention that the Chinese government may file additional IPR proceedings through other Chinese semiconductor companies, such as Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuit Co., Ltd., if this petition is denied or unsuccessful and that real party in interest provisions seek to protect patent owners from harassment via “successive petitions by the same or related parties.” Prelim. Resp. 25; see also Unified Patents¸ Paper 76 at 5 (noting Petitioner’s argument that a non-binding advisory opinion on RPI would prejudice the asserted RPI parties by prejudging the issue without their participation). Concerns that future petitions may be filed by parties that are the same or related to Petitioner may be addressed in any such future proceeding. See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019)9 (“Consolidated TPG”), 55–63; General Plastic Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 at 15–18 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential) (recognizing the “potential for abuse of the review process by repeated attacks on patents” and setting forth factors to consider in exercising discretion on instituting inter partes review as to “follow-on” petitions challenging the same patent previously challenged in an inter partes review proceeding). As such, we do not deny institution for Petitioner’s alleged failure to list all RPIs.” slip op. at 19
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. To date, the Director has not provided any guidance as to when a panel should deny institution based on foreign policy or national security implications, applicable to the facts presented here. To the contrary, the USPTO has expressly determined that Board panels, in considering discretionary denial sought in a Preliminary Response filed on or before March 26, 2025, may not consider such factors. FAQs for Interim Processes for PTAB Workload Management, FAQ 5, https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/faqs/interim-processes-workload-management (stating, “The panel will not address any new factors outlined in the Process Memorandum”). Accordingly, we decline to exercise discretion to deny institution for this requested reason.” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, materials science, or physics, or a closely related field, along with at least two years of experience in semiconductor fabrication and that a higher level of education might make up for less experience, and vice versa. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 57–58). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner neither responds to Petitioner's proposed definition, nor provides a definition of its own. See Prelim. Resp. Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and the disclosure of the ’996 patent, and we adopt it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,945,996 - PTAB · Jun 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00189 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claim 19 on all asserted grounds because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing; it declined discretionary denial based on the parallel district court case.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“proceeding was temporarily stayed pending consideration of Petitioner’s motion for a stay in light of the filed inter partes review proceedings. Prelim. Resp. 32 (citing Ex. 2001; Ex. 2003). Subsequently, Patent Owner notified the Board that the parallel proceeding “was stayed pending resolution of related IPR proceedings.” Paper 10, 1; see also Ex. 3001 (district court order granting motion to stay case). Accordingly, we determine that Fintiv factor 1 weighs strongly against exercising our authority to deny institution. See Snap, Inc. v. SRK Technology, Inc., IPR2020-00820, Paper 15 at 9 (PTAB Oct. 21, 2020) (precedential) (“The granting of a stay pending inter partes review has weighed strongly against exercising discretion to deny institution under NHK.”).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“POSITA”) “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) 3D memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may substitute for professional experience).” Pet. 24–25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34–37). Petitioner further contends that the “POSITA would also have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D memory’s structure, its component parts, and how it operates.” Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34–37). Patent Owner “takes no position on the level of ordinary skill in the art” as this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 6. Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and the disclosure of the ’666 patent, and we adopt it” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction We construe each claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Based on the record before us, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of claim 19. We also determine that the arguments and evidence of record do not support discretionary denial of the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claim 19 of the ’666 patent.” slip op. at 2
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,145,666 - PTAB · Jun 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00118 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–14 on all asserted obviousness grounds based on Yoshinaga, Saint, and Haralabidis.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2023). For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’164 patent. We also determine that the arguments and evidence of record do not support discretionary denial of the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–14 of the ’164 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“At this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner, with supporting testimony from Dr. Foty, provides adequate reasons why using the pads immediately next to the saved areas in Yoshinaga’s Figure 6 as reference pads would have been a “predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401 (2007); see Pet. 30–34 (and evidence cited therein). We acknowledge that Patent Owner disagrees, but find that Patent Owner’s disagreement raises issues of fact that are best resolved on a full trial record.” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“(district court order granting motion to stay case). Accordingly, we determine that Fintiv factor 1 weighs strongly against exercising our authority to deny institution. See Snap, Inc. v. SRK Technology, Inc., IPR2020-00820, Paper 15 at 9 (PTAB Oct. 21, 2020) (precedential) (“The granting of a stay pending inter partes review has weighed strongly against exercising discretion to deny institution under NHK.”)” slip op. at 36
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“§ 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019).” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,879,164 - Njoy, LLC / Njoy Holdings, Inc. v. Juul Labs, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 10, 2025 · IPR2024-00231 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 14–16, 18, 27–29, 31, and 32 were not proven unpatentable because the asserted references failed to establish the claimed airflow path or a reason to make the proposed combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed levels of skill are similar and differ in that Petitioner’s relevant degrees and corresponding two years of experience additionally includes “industrial design” and “product design” and familiarity with “electrically powered vaporizing articles, their components or the underlying technologies” where Patent Owner requires two years of experience “designing electro-mechanical consumer products or an advanced degree.” Compare Pet. 7, with PO Resp. 2. Patent Owner alleges that “Petitioner has failed to establish unpatentability under either standard,” indicating that the level of skill in the art is not a dispositive issue. PO Resp. 3. In light of the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’123 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’123 patent and the prior art. We note that the outcome of this Decision would be the same under Patent Owner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“In this case, Mr. McAlexander meets both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed level of skill in the art. As a result, we are persuaded Mr. McAlexander has the requisite skill and relevant expertise to offer testimony in this matter. For example, Mr. McAlexander has a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical Engineering and far more than 2 years of experience in the electrical engineering field. Ex. 1027, 3–6, 7. In addition, Mr. McAlexander has provided expert consulting services in a wide range of technology areas involving the process and design of electro-mechanical consumer products. Ex. 1003 ¶ 5. Through one of Mr. McAlexander’s business ventures, his laboratory has “performed detailed airflow analyses, designing and constructing specialized apparatuses to emulate human breath, allowing for precise activation testing of ENDS devices.” Ex. 1043 ¶ 16. That said, a declarant’s expertise, even clothed as a skilled artisan, does not entitle a naked opinion persuasive weight. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Here, Patent Owner had the opportunity to, and in fact did, thoroughly cross examine Mr. McAlexander about the purported deficiencies in his testimony. See, e.g., Exs. 2052, 2054; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (“Vigorous cross examination [and] presentation of contrary evidence . . . are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”). Therefore, to the extent Patent Owner credibly identifies deficiencies in Mr. McAlexander’s testimony or that testimony lacks factual support or is based on broad, conclusory assertions, we will assign appropriate weight. See Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that it is within the Board’s discretion, as the trier of fact, to accord appropriate weight to the evidence presented).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner contends that the parties proposed a construction for “pressure valve,” a limitation appearing in claims 18 and 31, during the ITC investigation. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1001, 41:58–65). Patent Owner contends that the terms of the ’123 patent should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. PO Resp. 4. Because resolution of the issues presented in this case do not require construction of the term “pressure valve,” we do not expressly construe this claim term. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner. To anticipate a claim, a reference “must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements ‘arranged as in the claim.’” Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1369. “The requirement that the prior art elements themselves be arranged as in the claim means that the claims cannot be treated . . . as mere catalogs of separate parts, in disregard of the part-to-part relationships set forth in the claims.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Indeed, the prior art reference “must clearly and unequivocally disclose the claimed [invention] or direct those skilled in the art to the [invention] without any need for picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the teachings of the cited reference.” Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1371 (citation omitted). “[D]ifferences between the prior art reference and the claimed invention, however slight, invoke the question of obviousness, not anticipation.” Id.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 10,130,123 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,130,123 - Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 4, 2025 · IPR2025-00119 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 2–4, 7–15, 17, 18, and 20 under § 314(a), finding a second petition unnecessary because its issues overlapped materially with the prior petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“The issue of multiple petitions resolves against Petitioner because Petitioner, not Patent Owner, bears the burden to show that an additional petition is “necessary.” See Consolidated Trial Practice Guide at 59. Institution of a second petition may be avoided where differences between the issues in two petitions are “not material or in dispute.” Id. at 60–61. In view of the overlap of assertions that are at issue in the prior-instituted trial and in the Petition in this proceeding, discussed above, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not explained why the issues in this second-filed petition differ from those in the prior-instituted proceeding in a material manner such that a second petition is necessary. Consequently, the factual record supports exercising our discretion to deny the second-filed petition under consideration in this proceeding.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,879,254 - PTAB · Jun 4, 2025 · IPR2025-00117 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–19, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the asserted obviousness grounds and declining discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’711 patent. We also determine that the arguments and evidence of record do not support discretionary denial of the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–19 of the ’711 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“at the critical time “would have had a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND flash memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 42). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party proposes any express claim construction at this stage of the proceeding. Pet. 26; Prelim. Resp. 8. Based on the record before us, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“Petitioner’s assertions as to claim 1. Patent Owner contests Petitioner’s assertion that Kim in view of the knowledge of the prior art teaches “wherein each step comprises a gate stack disposed over a dielectric layer,” Prelim. Resp. 9. We first focus on this disputed limitation.” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,672,711 - Juul Labs, Inc. v. Njoy, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · May 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00160 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–48 not shown unpatentable on any of six § 103 grounds because the asserted references did not teach the required housing aperture and the proposed combinations lacked adequate support.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelDecided for patent owner
“time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Petitioner does not provide its own definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Instead, Petitioner asserts: In previous litigation involving the ’881 patent – the parent patent to the ’864 patent (Fuma International LLC v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Company, Case No. 1:19-cv-260 (M.D.N.C. 2019)) with an identical specification – Patent Owner’s predecessor-in-interest asserted that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the purported invention would have had a mechanical or electrical engineering degree, industrial design degree, or a similar technical degree, or equivalent work experience, and 5 to 10 years of experience in electromechanical devices. Ex. 1007, ¶¶14-17. Pet. 11–12; see also Ex. 1007 ¶ 16 (Mr. Sturges testifying that he meets “that qualification” without affirmatively providing a definition for a POSITA). Before institution, Patent Owner stated it did not challenge this definition (Prelim. Resp. 9), and we adopted Petitioner’s proposed definition in our Decision granting institution. During trial, Patent Owner also adopted this definition. PO Resp. 10–11. Upon a complete record, we see no reason to change and we maintain the agreed upon definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner argues, and Petitioner does not dispute, that an aperture is a “hole” or an “opening.” See, e.g., id. at 21; see generally Reply. Patent Owner asserts that, in the proper context, the plain and ordinary meaning of a housing having an aperture is that the aperture is a hole, or an opening, on the housing structure itself. Id. at 21–22. We agree. In order for an object to have an “aperture” or an “opening,” the aperture or opening must be on the structure itself and not on a separate object that is located in the structure. This construction is in accord with the Specification of the ’864 patent, which refers to apertures in context of the structure on which they are located. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 6:12–18 (referring to a first end comprising a first aperture), 7:11–12, 7:65–67 (stating that the wall of an airflow passageway may have apertures).” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“large obstructions that force the air flow to near the peripheral surface of the housing, render the passageway non-central. During prosecution of the ’864 patent, the Examiner rejected certain claims (i.e., dependent claims 49, 63, and 75) over Han. To overcome this rejection, the applicant argued that Han cannot meet the limitation “wherein the airflow passageway extends centrally and axially from the first aperture to the second aperture.” Ex. 1002, 273. The applicant explained that Han does not meet this limitation because Han’s shell (b) does not include a central airflow passageway and instead places the perforated component for liquid storage (9) in the middle of shell (b), thereby forcing the airflow around the peripheral surface of the perforated component for liquid storage (9). Id. at 273–274. The examiner relied on this argument in determining that the applicant had overcome an earlier rejection. Id. at 195. Thus, some obstructions of a passageway render the passageway non-central; in particular those obstructions that force air to flow near the peripheral surface of the housing are large enough to render the passageway non-central.” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“lacks motivation and is plagued by improper hindsight.” Sur-reply 15–17. On the record developed during trial, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to combine the teachings of Xia with those of Wang to arrive at the claimed limitations. Relying on the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant Dr. Singhose, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have known a central straight path has less airflow resistance than a circuitous one.” Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1035, 127:15–128:9). But the same witness also testified that higher airflow resistance might be desirable and explained that providing more resistance to airflow might result in improved mixing. Ex. 1035, 21:21–22:12, 127:20–24, 170:10–14. In addition, Dr. Singhose testifies that the complicated design of the airflow passageway in Xia “serves important functions,” including “allow[ing] large droplets to be reabsorbed by the liquid-guiding mechanism,” allowing “excessive liquid in the airflow [to] condense,” and “prevent[ing] the chemical liquid from being sucked into the mouth.” Ex. 2022 ¶ 190 (citing Ex. 1004, 11, 13–14, 16). Although Petitioner’s declarant Dr. Sturges testifies that a straight airflow passageway “would provide improved, smoother air flow,” he does not provide any evidence supporting the view that the air flow would be improved. Ex. 1007 ¶ 144. We credit the testimony of Dr. Singhose that using a straight passageway in Xia would have been detrimental rather than beneficial. Ex. 2022 ¶ 190. slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 11,497,864 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,497,864
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.