• Google LLC v. Geoscope Technologies Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 14, 2025 · IPR2023-01212 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 7, 9, 32, 38, and 40 are unpatentable as anticipated by Spain and obvious over Spain as evidenced by Agiwal.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art: would have been someone knowledgeable in wireless networks, cellular radio systems, mobile communication devices and radio navigation systems. That person would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, with a background in radio frequency communications and/or navigation system technology as well as approximately two years of industry experience working on radio communication and/or navigation systems. Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 44). Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 13. 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, effective March 16, 2013. Because the application and provisional application for the ’753 patent were filed before this date, the pre-AIA version of §§ 102, 103 apply. See Ex. 1001, codes (22), (60). Petitioner does not dispute that the filing date of the provisional application filing date applies. See Pet. 6; see generally Pet. Reply. 2 US 2003/0064735 A1, published April 3, 2003 (Ex. 1006). 3 Ankur Agiwal, LOCATOR – Location Estimation System For Wireless LANs, WMASH 2004: Proceedings of the Second ACM International Workshop on Wireless Mobile Applications and Services on WLAN Hotspots, 102–109 (2004) (Ex. 1005). For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner as it is consistent with the ’753 patent and the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s additional requirements of evaluating the calibration data to determine the boundaries of the area should not be included in the construction of “grid point.” Instead, based on the full record, and for the reasons explained below, we discern no reason to alter our prior construction in the Institution Decision of “grid point” as “a point associated with representative calibration data for an area.” Dec. 22– 23.” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “The evidence supports that Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated that Spain teaches “generating one or more sets of grid points for said calibration data,” as recited in limitation [1.2]. Spain states that: In another embodiment, the database is built by taking fingerprint measurements at predetermined locations and using intelligent algorithms that interpolate the fingerprints at all locations in between the sampled locations. Ex. 1006 ¶ 101. Relevant to this disclosure, Mr. Williams testifies that “Spain discloses generation of sets of grid points wherein each set includes newly interpolated grid points” because “the two grid points used to interpolate an additional grid point or points and the generated additional grid point or points are collectively a generated ‘set’ of grid points (i.e., a ‘set’ which includes the two calibrated grid points and the associated interpolated grid points).” Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 76–77 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 54, 55, 101). It is not disputed that Spain’s “fingerprints” are calibration data having characterizing parameters, such as observed signal strength, observed at calibration points. See Ex. 1006 ¶ 35. We find that this evidence demonstrates that Spain discloses generating one or more grid points, where the grid points are associated with calibration data.10 Accordingly, the evidence provides support that Spain’s interpolation of fingerprints at different locations discloses generation of one or more sets of grid points, where the grid points are associated with calibration data. Spain also discloses that: . . . the fingerprint corresponds not to one exact spot on the surface of the earth, but instead to a small area. The Lat and Long fields in this embodiment indicate a position inside the area, preferably the center point.” slip op. at 33

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “2. Discussion Petitioner refers to Agiwal to note that, like Spain, “Agiwal discloses an initial approximate location-based search of its database using live measurement data transmitted from a mobile device.” Pet. 18. Petitioner, however, relies only on Spain for its obviousness assertions. Id. at 22–38. The above discussion and Petitioner’s showing related to anticipation by Spain also equally apply to the obviousness showing over Spain as presented by Petitioner. See Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Patent Owner presents no additional arguments specifically directed to Petitioner’s showing as to obviousness under Spain that we have not already addressed. See generally PO Resp. Patent Owner also presents no evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. See generally PO Resp. Weighing the record as a whole in view of the findings and analysis above, we conclude that Petitioner has met its burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 7, 9, 32, 38, and 40 would have been obvious over Spain as evidenced by Agiwal.” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 8,406,753 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,406,753
• Google LLC v. Geoscope Technologies Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 14, 2025 · IPR2023-01211 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 4 and 26 are unpatentable: claim 4 is anticipated by Shkedi, and claims 4 and 26 are obvious over Zhu and Spain.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “requirement of evaluating the calibration data to determine the boundaries of the area represented by a grid point should not be included in the construction of either “grid point” or “non-uniform grid point.” Instead, based on the full record, we discern no reason to alter our prior construction of “grid point” as “a point associated with representative calibration data for an area” and maintain that construction for this Final Written Decision. The construction of “grid point” we adopt is supported by the Specification of the ’494 patent. Namely, the ’494 patent discloses that “[i]n general, a non-uniform grid point (NUG) may represent the signal characteristics and/or calibration data over a given region,” and “NUGs represent an area of collected calibration data.”9 Ex. 1001, 3:58–4:2. The district court identified the second quoted passage, which is identically recited in the ’104 patent (see Ex. 1018, 3:50–60) as “provid[ing] a clear indication of the meaning of ‘grid point.’” Ex. 1028, 19 (emphasis added). We agree with the district court’s analysis. Although the ’494 patent does not explain how a generic “grid point” might differ from the described “nonuniform grid point,” we do not find this distinction pertinent to construing “grid point” in this case because neither party raises this issue. Also, based on the claim words “non-uniform grid point,” a “non-uniform grid point” is a type of grid point. Furthermore, the district court construed “grid point” only, not “non-uniform grid point.” Id. at 18–20.” slip op. at 19

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “at the time the application was filed, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the critical time. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. The resolution of this question is important because it allows us to “maintain[] objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu–Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). Generally, it is easier to establish obviousness under a higher level of ordinary skill in the art. Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“A less sophisticated level of skill generally favors a determination of nonobviousness . . . while a higher level of skill favors the reverse.”). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have been someone knowledgeable in wireless networks, cellular radio systems, mobile communication devices and radio navigation systems, having at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, with a background in radio frequency communications and/or navigation system technology as well as approximately two years of industry experience working on radio communication and/or navigation systems. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 30). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 11–12. We adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’494 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We also credit Mr. Williams’s testimony that determining which calibration data is representative of an area “would not require analysis” because “[i]t could be just the actual measurement,” and “analysis could be part of it, but it doesn’t have to be.” Ex. 2023, 37:10–22. Patent Owner’s argument that this testimony is not instructive because Mr. Williams limited his responses to the construction of calibration data and avoided responding to the question asked is not persuasive. See Sur-reply 8–9. Although Mr. Williams did refer to “the calibration data construction” in his response, we disagree that he avoided responding to the question asked. He was asked: “To determine which of that calibration data is representative of an area would require analyzing that set of collected calibration data, right?” and directly responded: “It would not require analysis. It could be just the actual measurement.” Ex. 2023, 37:10–16. This testimony responded to the question asked. He then stated: “I believe that is an issue as part of the calibration data construction,” before concluding: “So analysis could be part of it, but it doesn’t have to be.” Ex. 2023, 37:17–22. Merely expressing a belief that the issue or question asked relates to the calibration data construction does not equate to his response being limited to the calibration data construction.” slip op. at 23

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Thus, “grid points” and “calibration points” in the ’494 patent are distinct elements that can overlap. Specifically, a “grid point” is a point associated with representative calibration data for an area, and a “calibration point” is a point at which calibration data is collected. These points can occupy the same physical location (i.e., the same longitude/latitude coordinates) but still be a “grid point” and a “calibration point.” For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the overlap between “grid points” and “calibration points” in Shkedi undermines Petitioner’s position and evidentiary showing. Petitioner, thus, has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Shkedi teaches each element of claim 4 including non-uniform grid points. We determine that the preponderance of the evidence establishes that claim 4 is anticipated by Shkedi.” slip op. at 42

  Patent outcomesUS 8,786,494 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,786,494
• Google LLC v. Geoscope Technologies Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 10, 2025 · IPR2023-01213 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 10, 12, 13, 21, and 22 are unpatentable as obvious over Crane and Spain; claim 11 is dismissed as moot.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “at the time the application was filed, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the critical time. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. The resolution of this question is important because it allows us to “maintain[] objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu–Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). Generally, it is easier to establish obviousness under a higher level of ordinary skill in the art. Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“A less sophisticated level of skill generally favors a determination of nonobviousness . . . while a higher level of skill favors the reverse.”).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “after November 13, 2018, a patent claim shall be construed using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (as amended Oct. 11, 2018). This rule adopts the same claim construction standard used by Article III federal courts, which follow Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), and its progeny. Under this standard, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13.” slip op. at 10

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Pet. 15–18. Petitioner’s proposed constructions are consistent with the claim construction decision from related litigation or the parties’ prior stipulations regarding claim construction. Id.; Ex. 1023 (parties’ stipulation); Ex. 1027 (parties’ stipulation); Ex. 1028, pp. 24–32 (District Court order). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed claim construction. PO Resp. passim. We note that, the District Court held, in a non-final order, that claims 1 and 12 were indefinite because of the term “in proximity.” Ex. 1028, 24– 28. The District Court, however, did not issue a final ruling with respect to claims 1 and 12 because the parties narrowed the dispute concerning the ’784 Patent to only claim 11. Ex. 2018, ¶ 3. We also note that we do not need to assess whether or not the term “in proximity” renders claims 1 and 12 indefinite to assess the Petition. Rather, we agree with Petitioner that the “in proximity” language is at least broad enough to “encompass” the matter set forth in Petitioner’s claim construction. See Pet. 17, 37–41. This is sufficient definition to make it logically possible to reach the merits of Petitioner’s challenge. See Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 801, 813 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (holding that indefiniteness only precludes a patentability determination 102 or 103 if the indefiniteness makes it “logically impossible” to reach such a decision).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious to implement Spain’s location determination system as part of Crane’s system and that such an implementation would have a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 111–112). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contentions regarding this recitation. Based on the entire trial record, we agree with Petitioner’s analysis and credit Mr. William’s testimony supporting Petitioner’s position. Thus, in view of the evidence of record, we find that Crane and Spain disclose the preamble of recitation 1.1.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 9,097,784 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,097,784
• Parse Biosciences, Inc. v. 10x Genomics, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 3, 2025 · IPR2023-00958 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–28 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1–12 and 19–28 over Linnarsson, McCloskey, and ordinary skill; claims 13–18 over those references plus McCloskey II.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “Clearly, the second Hall-Ellis declaration is offered to prove that McCloskey is a prior art printed publication. See, e.g., Ex. 1085 ¶50 (“In view of the foregoing, it is my opinion that [McCloskey] was publicly available no later than [January 3, 2008].”). Thus, the second Hall-Ellis declaration should have been served within ten business days of Patent Owner’s February 15, 2024, objection to the admissibility of McCloskey. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2) (“The party relying on evidence to which an objection is timely served may respond to the objection by serving supplemental evidence within ten business days of service of the objection.”). In its Opposition to the Motion to Exclude, Petitioner argues that, under Hulu LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, No. IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), it was allowed to wait until its Reply to file the second Hall-Ellis declaration. Paper 37, 2. The Board in Hulu does state that, “if the patent owner challenges a reference’s status as a printed publication, a petitioner may submit a supporting declaration with its reply to further support its argument that a reference qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, at 15 (37 C.F.R. § 42.23). However, the Board’s statement was referring to the scope of permissible reply arguments under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). See Hulu at 14 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)’s requirement that “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, or patent owner response”). The Board in Hulu does not purport to interpret 37 C.F.R. § 42.64 or even discuss supplemental evidence. Petitioner clearly missed the deadline imposed by 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2), which was triggered by Patent Owner’s February 15, 2024, objection to McCloskey (i.e., Ex. 1004). Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is granted with respect to the second Hall-Ellis declaration (i.e., Ex. 1085).” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner is correct that, under Sanofi-Aventis, a petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to establish that an asserted prior art reference is analogous art to the claimed invention. See Sanofi-Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1377 (“We agree with [the patent owner] that [the petitioner] did not carry its burden to argue that de Gennes is analogous to the [challenged] patent.”); id. (“In evaluating whether a reference is analogous, we have consistently held that a patent challenger must compare the reference to the challenged patent.”); id. at 1378–79 (“We have routinely held that the petitioner has the burden of proving unpatentability.”). However, as we noted when instituting this proceeding, “Sanofi-Aventis further held: ‘A petitioner is not required to anticipate and raise analogous art arguments in its petition; instead a petitioner can use its reply to “respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, patent owner response, or decision on institution.”’” Dec. on Reh’g 16 (quoting Sanofi- Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1379 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23)).” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Clearly, the second Hall-Ellis declaration is offered to prove that McCloskey is a prior art printed publication. See, e.g., Ex. 1085 ¶50 (“In view of the foregoing, it is my opinion that [McCloskey] was publicly available no later than [January 3, 2008].”). Thus, the second Hall-Ellis declaration should have been served within ten business days of Patent Owner’s February 15, 2024, objection to the admissibility of McCloskey. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2) (“The party relying on evidence to which an objection is timely served may respond to the objection by serving supplemental evidence within ten business days of service of the objection.”). In its Opposition to the Motion to Exclude, Petitioner argues that, under Hulu LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, No. IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), it was allowed to wait until its Reply to file the second Hall-Ellis declaration. Paper 37, 2. The Board in Hulu does state that, “if the patent owner challenges a reference’s status as a printed publication, a petitioner may submit a supporting declaration with its reply to further support its argument that a reference qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, at 15 (37 C.F.R. § 42.23). However, the Board’s statement was referring to the scope of permissible reply arguments under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). See Hulu at 14 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)’s requirement that “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, or patent owner response”). The Board in Hulu does not purport to interpret 37 C.F.R. § 42.64 or even discuss supplemental evidence. Petitioner clearly missed the deadline imposed by 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2), which was triggered by Patent Owner’s February 15, 2024, objection to McCloskey (i.e., Ex. 1004). Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is granted with respect to the second Hall-Ellis declaration (i.e., Ex. 1085). Despite the exclusion of the second Hall-Ellis declaration, there is ample evidence in the record demonstrating that McCloskey is a prior art printed publication. McCloskey itself states: “Received: 31 January 2007 / Accepted: 29 May 2007 / Published online: 23 October 2007.” Ex. 1004, 1. McCloskey additionally states that it was published in a 2007 print issue of “Biochem Genet,” with Petitioner adding that the full name of the journal is BIOCHEMICAL GENETICS and that McCloskey was published in a December 2007 volume of the journal. Id.; Pet. 22. McCloskey also includes a copyright notice by “Springer Science+Business Media, LLC” with a date of 2007. Ex. 1004, 1. Patent Owner argues that this is unreliable hearsay that should be excluded. PO Mot. To Exclude 4 (citing Neste Oil Oyj v. REG Synthetic Fuels, LLC, No. IPR2013-00578, Paper 53 at 5–7 (Mar. 12, 2015); Standard Innovation Corp. v. Lelo, Inc., No. IPR2014-00148, Paper 429 at 13–18, 21–22 (Apr. 23, 2015)). We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument or its reliance on these cases. The facts before us are different.” slip op. at 18

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner does not directly dispute Petitioner’s proposal but does offer its own proposal. PO Resp. 21. Patent Owner proposes that the skilled artisan “would have had a Ph.D. in molecular biology, molecular genetics, biochemistry, physics, mechanical engineering, or a related discipline, with 7 Exhibit 1002 is a declaration by Petitioner’s witness, Gregory Cooper, Ph.D. two years of academic, research, or industry experience in the field of genomic or transcriptome sequencing.” Id. (citing Ex. 2013 ¶¶25–268). Both of the parties’ proposals as to the level of ordinary skill in the art are consistent with the disclosure of the ’013 patent and the asserted prior art. The distinction between the parties’ proposals would not change the outcome of this Decision. Thus, we adopt and apply Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 10,697,013 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,697,013
• Parse Biosciences, Inc. v. 10x Genomics, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 31, 2025 · IPR2023-00955 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–26 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1–4, 6–11, 20, and 23–25 over Linnarsson and McCloskey; claims 5, 12, 21, 22, and 26 with ordinary-skill knowledge; claims 13–19 with McCloskey II.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted in part

    “Clearly, the second Hall-Ellis declaration is offered to prove that McCloskey is a prior art printed publication. See, e.g., Ex. 1085 ¶50 (“In view of the foregoing, it is my opinion that [McCloskey] was publicly available no later than [January 3, 2008].”). Thus, the second Hall-Ellis declaration should have been served within ten business days of Patent Owner’s February 15, 2024, objection to the admissibility of McCloskey. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2) (“The party relying on evidence to which an objection is timely served may respond to the objection by serving supplemental evidence within ten business days of service of the objection.”). In its Opposition to the Motion to Exclude, Petitioner argues that, under Hulu LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, No. IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), it was allowed to wait until its Reply to file the second Hall-Ellis declaration. Paper 37, 2. The Board in Hulu does state that, “if the patent owner challenges a reference’s status as a printed publication, a petitioner may submit a supporting declaration with its reply to further support its argument that a reference qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu at 15 (37 C.F.R. § 42.23). However, the Board’s statement was referring to the scope of permissible reply arguments under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). See Hulu at 14 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)’s in the prior sentence and in the subtitle to the relevant portion of its Objection. Id. requirement that “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, or patent owner response”). The Board in Hulu does not purport to interpret 37 C.F.R. § 42.64 or even discuss supplemental evidence. Petitioner clearly missed the deadline imposed by 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2), which was triggered by Patent Owner’s February 15, 2024, objection to McCloskey. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is granted with respect to the second Hall-Ellis declaration (i.e., Ex. 1085). Despite the exclusion of the second Hall-Ellis declaration, there is ample evidence in the record demonstrating that McCloskey is a prior art printed publication. McCloskey itself states: “Received: 31 January 2007 / Accepted: 29 May 2007 / Published online: 23 October 2007.” Ex. 1004, 1. McCloskey additionally states that it was published in a 2007 print issue of “Biochem Genet,” with Petitioner adding that the full name of the journal is BIOCHEMICAL GENETICS and that McCloskey was published in a December 2007 volume of the journal. Id.; Pet. 29. McCloskey also includes a copyright notice by “Springer Science+Business Media, LLC” with a date of date of 2007. Ex. 1004, 1. Patent Owner argues that this is unreliable hearsay that should be excluded. PO Mot. To Exclude 4 (citing Neste Oil Oyj v. REG Synthetic Fuels, LLC, No. IPR2013-00578, Paper 53 at 5–7 (Mar. 12, 2015); Standard Innovation Corp. v. Lelo, Inc., No. IPR2014- 00148, Paper 4210 at 13–18, 21–22 (Apr. 23, 2015)). We are not persuaded 10 Patent Owner actually cited to “Pap.41” of Standard Innovation. PO Mot. To Exclude 4. There is no Paper 41 in the record of that case. We presume Patent Owner intended to cite Paper 42, which is the final written decision in that case. by Patent Owner’s argument or its reliance on these cases. The facts before us are different. In Neste Oil, the Board “note[d] that the alleged ‘stamps’ of Exhibits 1125 and 1132 are actually handwritten dates, added to the documents by an unknown person at an unknown time.” Neste Oil, Paper 53 at 6. In contrast, the dates relied upon by Petitioner are printed, appear to have been included at the time of printing, and appear to have been printed by, or at the direction of, the journal and/or copyright holder, both of which are identified by McCloskey. Ex. 1004, 1. In Standard Innovation, the alleged prior art exhibits were “printouts of … webpages” bearing a copyright indication of “© 2003-2013,” which the petitioner argued was proof of subset of the webpages being disseminated publicly in 2003. Standard Innovation, Paper 42 at 13. This is a far cry from McCloskey, which is a journal article and which includes specific date information, not only of publishing, but also of when the journal received and accepted the article for publication as well as when it was copyrighted. Ex. 1004, 1.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner is correct that, under Sanofi-Aventis, a petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to establish that an asserted prior art reference is analogous art to the claimed invention. See Sanofi-Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1377 (“We agree with [the patent owner] that [the petitioner] did not carry its burden to argue that de Gennes is analogous to the [challenged] patent.”); id. (“In evaluating whether a reference is analogous, we have consistently held that a patent challenger must compare the reference to the challenged patent.”); id. at 1378–79 (“We have routinely held that the petitioner has the burden of proving unpatentability.”). However, as we noted when instituting this proceeding, “Sanofi-Aventis further held: ‘A petitioner is not required to anticipate and raise analogous art arguments in its petition; instead a petitioner can use its reply to “respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, patent owner response, or decision on institution.”’” Dec. on Reh’g 15 (quoting Sanofi- Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1379 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23)).” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “by Patent Owner’s argument or its reliance on these cases. The facts before us are different. In Neste Oil, the Board “note[d] that the alleged ‘stamps’ of Exhibits 1125 and 1132 are actually handwritten dates, added to the documents by an unknown person at an unknown time.” Neste Oil, Paper 53 at 6. In contrast, the dates relied upon by Petitioner are printed, appear to have been included at the time of printing, and appear to have been printed by, or at the direction of, the journal and/or copyright holder, both of which are identified by McCloskey. Ex. 1004, 1. In Standard Innovation, the alleged prior art exhibits were “printouts of … webpages” bearing a copyright indication of “© 2003-2013,” which the petitioner argued was proof of subset of the webpages being disseminated publicly in 2003. Standard Innovation, Paper 42 at 13. This is a far cry from McCloskey, which is a journal article and which includes specific date information, not only of publishing, but also of when the journal received and accepted the article for publication as well as when it was copyrighted. Ex. 1004, 1. That McCloskey is what it purports to be (a journal article) and that it was published in 2007 are corroborated by multiple pieces of evidence.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “In sum, we find Petitioner’s rationale that a skilled artisan would have made the proposed combination to solve the problem of amplification bias persuasive.” slip op. at 44

  Patent outcomesUS 10,240,197 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,240,197
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd v. Mojo Mobility Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 2, 2025 · IPR2023-01090 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 8, 13, and 15–18 are unpatentable under § 103 over the Fells-based combinations set out in the grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “at least a master’s degree in electrical engineering, or a similar discipline, and two or more years of experience with wireless charging systems, including, for example, inductive power transfer systems.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 20–21). Petitioner further asserts that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner has not proposed a level of ordinary skill in the art. Because nothing in the record persuades us that our preliminary finding in the Institution Decision (Dec. 13) adopting Petitioner’s proposal was incorrect, we maintain our adoption of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “charger surface, to inductively transfer power to the receiver [of the first mobile device],” as recited in limitation 1(k). Pet. 5 (bolding omitted). Petitioner contends this term should be construed as a means-plus-function term, and that the underlined portion identified above identifies the function. Id. at 5–6. Petitioner contends that the corresponding structure is described in the Specification and in dependent claims 24 and 25. Id. at 6 (citing Ex. 1001, 14:35–38 (“[T]he charger and or receiver can include means to provide more precise alignment between the charger and receiver coils and antennas. These can include visual, physical, or magnetic means to assist the user in alignment of parts.”); 25:56–63 (claim 24: “the means for position includes one or more magnets to position the receiver in the power transfer position”, claim 25: “means for positioning includes one or more members of a group consistent of visual, physical, or magnetic means to assist in the positioning the receiver in the power transfer position.”)). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s position on this term. See PO Resp. Our Decision does not require an express construction of any particular claim terms. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 15

  • BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable

    “Final Written Decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) as to the patentability of the claims on which we instituted trial. Petitioner has the burden of proving unpatentability of a claim by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). As stated above, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s contentions. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions and conclude that they show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 8, 13, and 15–18 of the ’349 patent are unpatentable.” slip op. at 3

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “[T]he compelling merits standard is a higher standard than the standard for institution set by statute.” Commscope at 3 (referring to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)). “[W]hen determining whether there is a compelling unpatentability challenge, the Board evaluates whether the Petition presents challenges in which the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (emphasis added). This is the standard I previously applied to Petitioner’s Ground 1 challenge to claim 17. Inst. Dec. (Fitzpatrick, J., concurring at 2). During trial, all of Petitioner’s challenges went unrebutted, including Petitioner’s Ground 1 challenge to claim 17. See PO Resp. 1 (Patent Owner “elects to not proffer additional argument on the papers or through any hearings that may occur in this proceeding.”). Thus, because I previously determined Petitioner’s Ground 1 challenge to claim 17 presented compelling merits and because Patent Owner did not rebut that challenge during trial, I conclude that Petitioner has necessarily met its burden of proving claim 17 unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence. slip op. at 46

  Patent outcomesUS 11,292,349 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,292,349
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd v. Mojo Mobility Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 2, 2025 · IPR2023-01089 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4, 5, 7, 10–12, and 26 are unpatentable as obvious over the Fells-based grounds; the Board adopted the unrebutted petition analyses.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a master’s degree in electrical engineering, or a similar discipline, and two or more years of experience with wireless charging systems, including, for example, inductive power transfer systems.” Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 20–21). Petitioner further asserts that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner has not proposed a level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. Because nothing in the record persuades us that our preliminary finding in the Institution Decision (Dec. 12) adopting Petitioner’s proposal was incorrect, we maintain our adoption of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s position on this term. See PO Resp. Our decision does not require an express construction of any particular claim terms. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther

    “obvious over Fells. Pet. 7–76. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contentions. See PO Resp. Having considered the arguments and evidence before us, we find that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 5, 7, 10–12, and 26 would have been obvious over Fells. We agree with and adopt Petitioner’s contentions as our own.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “A patent claim “is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. An obviousness determination requires finding “both ‘that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.’” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367– 68 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Further, an assertion of obviousness “cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (a finding of a motivation to combine “must be supported by a ‘reasoned explanation’”).” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 11,292,349 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,292,349
• Parse Biosciences, Inc. v. 10x Genomics, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 17, 2024 · IPR2023-00876 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 are unpatentable: claims 1–4 and 6 as obvious over Linnarsson and McCloskey, and claim 5 as obvious over those references and ordinary skill.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “Clearly, the second Hall-Ellis declaration is offered to prove that McCloskey is a prior art printed publication. See, e.g., Ex. 1065 ¶50 (“In view of the foregoing, it is my opinion that [McCloskey] was publicly available no later than [January 3, 2008].”). Thus, the second Hall-Ellis declaration should have been served within ten business days of Patent Owner’s October, 27, 2023, objection to the admissibility of McCloskey. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2) (“The party relying on evidence to which an objection is timely served may respond to the objection by serving supplemental evidence within ten business days of service of the objection.”). Because it was not filed until March 29, 2024, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is granted with respect to the second Hall-Ellis declaration. In its Opposition to the Motion to Exclude, Petitioner argues that, under Hulu LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, No. IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), it was allowed to wait until its Reply to file the second Hall-Ellis declaration. Paper 37, 1–2. The Board in Hulu does state that, “if the patent owner challenges a reference’s status as a printed publication, a petitioner may submit a supporting declaration with its reply to further support its argument that a reference qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, at 15 (37 C.F.R. § 42.23). However, the Board’s statement was referring to the scope of permissible reply arguments under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). See Hulu at 14 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)’s requirement that “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, or patent owner response”). The Board in Hulu does not purport to interpret 37 C.F.R. § 42.64 or even discuss supplemental evidence. Petitioner clearly missed the deadline imposed by 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2), which was triggered by Patent Owner’s October 27, 2023, objection to McCloskey. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is granted with respect to the second Hall-Ellis declaration (i.e., Ex. 1065).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “We find that both references are analogous art to the ’981 patent, as there is ample supporting evidence in the record, including that to which the Reply cites (citations identified in the immediately preceding paragraph). Indeed, Patent Owner does not dispute the merits of either argument. PO Sur-Reply 27–28. Rather, Patent Owner, argues that we “should not now permit Petitioner to rewrite its clearly-deficient Petition.” Id. at 28. Petitioner’s Reply does not re-write its Petition. What Petitioner’s Reply does, in response to Patent Owner’s arguments, is precisely what Sanofi-Aventis contemplates as being proper in a reply brief. Indeed, in ruling against the petitioner in Sanofi-Aventis, the Federal Circuit specifically noted that the petitioner could have used its reply brief “to explain how [the prior art reference] is analogous to the [challenged] patent” but did not do so. 66 F.4th at 1379–1380. Here, in contrast, Petitioner used its Reply brief to explain how Linnarsson and McCloskey are analogous to the ’981 patent. Petitioner’s explanation in its Reply brief was both proper and persuasive.” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “That McCloskey is what it purports to be (a journal article) and that it was published in 2007 are corroborated by multiple pieces of evidence. McCloskey names four authors, all four of whom are named inventors of US 2007/0020640 A1, published Jan. 25, 2007 (“McCloskey ’640”). Ex. 1004, 1, Ex. 2001, code (76). Patent Owner concedes that McCloskey and McCloskey ’640 involve the same subject matter, having argued that the consideration of McCloskey ’640 supported discretionary denial of the Petition based on McCloskey. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 22 (“Petitioner’s secondary reference, an article by McCloskey, is at best cumulative of the far more detailed McCloskey ’640, which was raised by the Office and substantively discussed as the basis for a potential rejection using its asserted disclosure of a polynucleotide-specific tag—the same purported teaching for which Petitioner relies on McCloskey here.”). Notably, McCloskey ’640 was published on January 25, 2007. Ex. 2001, code (43). That is just days before McCloskey was received by BIOCHEMICAL GENETICS on January 31, 2007. See EX. 1004, 1 (“Received: 31 January 2007 / Accepted: 29 May 2007 / Published online: 23 October 2007”). In other words, it appears that the authors sought to have their research published in a scientific journal promptly after the subject matter of their research had been published by the Office. Further, the existence of McCloskey and its publication year of 2007 is confirmed by other sources in the record. See Ex. 1029, code (56) (United States Patent identifying as a cited reference: “McCloskey, et al. Encoding Pcr products with batch-stamps and barcodes. Biochem Genet. Dec. 2007;45(11-12):761-7. Epub Oct. 23, 2007.”); Ex. 1053, code (56) (same); Ex. 1060 (article’s bibliography citing “McCloskey ML, Stöger R, Hansen RS, Laird CD. Encoding PCR products with batch-stamps and barcodes. Biochem. Genet 2007;45:761–767. [PubMed: 17955361]”). Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is denied with respect to” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “The Petition states that “Petitioner does not believe that any terms require explicit construction in view of the prior art being presented.” Pet. 36. Despite this stated position, Petitioner proposed constructions for “multiplex-identifier (MID)” and “providing a sample.” Id. Patent Owner, in its Preliminary Response, stated that it “agrees that at this time, solely for purposes of an institution decision on the Petition, no terms require explicit construction.” Prelim. Resp. 45. In instituting the IPR, we found no need to provide an express construction of any claim term. Inst. Dec. 6. In the Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner repeats that it “does not believe any term needs construction,” but nonetheless “applies the Petition’s definitions for ‘MID’ and ‘sample.’” PO Resp. 19. The Petition defines MID as “‘a tag or combination of tags associated with a polynucleotide whose identity (e.g., the tag DNA sequence) can be used to differentiate polynucleotides in a sample.’” Pet. 36 (quoting Ex. 1001, 6:33–38). The Petition defines sample as “‘a quantity of material from a biological, environmental medical, or patient source in which detection, measurement, or labeling of target nucleic acids is sought.’” Id. (quoting Ex. 1001, 12:7– 10). We apply these same definitions in our analysis.” slip op. at 6

  Patent outcomesUS 10,155,981 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,155,981
• Microsoft Corporation / Affirmed Networks, Inc. v. Lemko CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 10, 2024 · IPR2023-00531 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–9, and 20 are unpatentable as anticipated by Flore under § 102.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable

    “Petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate unpatentability, and that burden never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). To show anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102, each and every claim element, arranged as in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The prior art need not, however, use the same words as the claims. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The anticipation inquiry takes into account the literal teachings of the prior art reference and inferences the ordinarily skilled person would draw from it. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Los Angeles Biomedical Res. Inst. at Harbor-UCLA Med. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1073, 1074–75 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 6

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner defines the person of ordinary skill in the art as follows: “As of 2008, a person of ordinary skill in the art [POSA or POSITA] . . . of the ’988 patent’s field would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering or an equivalent, as well as two years of industry experience related to telecommunications networks.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 56). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional graduate education . . . could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Id. Patent Owner “applies this definition of a POSITA for its analysis.” PO Resp. 18. Based on the complete record now before us, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art and the ’988 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner also does not persuasively explain why we should disregard the ’988 patent’s exception to peer-to-peer connections, that is, “in not all cases will the DMA servers 406 be able to participate as peers in an IP network.” Id. at 9:12–13. Patent Owner’s assertions that when “DMA servers are able to connect as peers with an existing DMA network, they do so,” and that the “new DMA server is just the initial node in a new peer-to-peer network,” do not find support in the specification. See PO Resp. 23–24 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:9–24, Fig. 6). Instead, Patent Owner cites a portion of the specification that explains “in not all cases will the DMA servers 406 be able to participate as peers,” such as in rural areas, in which case “DMA gateways . . . enable DMA servers to communicate with one another when one or more of the DMA serves cannot participate directly in the IP network.” Ex. 1001, 9:12–21. Nothing in this passage suggests that a DMA server not acting as a peer would merely be a temporary condition and that once able to connect as a peer, it would do so. Such reasoning is gloss added by Patent Owner and Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Cooklev, whose testimony on this point mirrors the Response. Ex. 2021 ¶ 69. We do not find Dr. Cooklev’s testimony credible on this point because the testimony does not align with the ’988 patent specification.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Our reviewing court “has repeatedly cautioned against limiting the claimed invention to preferred embodiments or specific examples in the specification.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “Absent disclaimer or lexicography, the plain meaning of the claim controls.” Toshiba Corp. v. Imation Corp., 681 F.3d 1358, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012). There is no disclaimer or lexicography in the specification that requires us to limit the claims as Patent Owner wishes. We agree with Petitioner that the passages upon which Patent Owner relies use non-limiting, exemplary language. See Reply 6. For example, Patent Owner relies heavily on Figure 4 and its accompanying description, but Figure 4 “illustrates a non-limiting, exemplary embodiment.” PO Resp. 19–25; Ex. 1001, 6:31. Thus, Figure 4’s references to a “peer-to-peer connection,” “switch and route call[]” functionality, that “controlling logic can be distributed,” and “self-healing and redundant” wireless coverage, for example, do not limit the claim. See Ex. 1001, 6:48, 52, 64, 66 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 7,855,988 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 7,855,988
• Philip Morris Products, S.A. v. Rai Strategic Holdings, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 31, 2024 · PGR2020-00071 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · PGR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held claims 10 and 27 unpatentable as obvious over Robinson, Greim, and Adams because skilled artisans would have optimized heater length through routine experimentation.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “Standard Operating Procedure 3 communicating the parties’ positions on submitting additional briefing on remand. Ex. 3001.2 We responded on April 15, 2024, authorizing the parties to file additional briefs limited to the question of “whether the Federal Circuit’s determinations on written description are applicable to an obviousness analysis, and if so, how they should be applied.” Ex. 3001. Petitioner filed its Supplemental Brief on Remand on April 29, 2024 (Paper 41, “Pet. Supp. Br.”), and Patent Owner filed its Supplemental Reply Brief on Remand on May 13, 2024 (Paper 42, “PO Supp. Reply”). B. The Issue on Remand As part of our Final Written Decision, we determined that Petitioner established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 10 and 27 lack adequate written description support. FWD 38–41. In view of this, we declined to address Petitioner’s arguments that claims 10 and 27 are unpatentable as obvious in view of Robinson,3 Greim,4 and Adams.5” slip op. at 4

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, chemistry, or physics, or a related field, and three to four years of industry experience, or a Master’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, chemistry, or physics, or a related field, and one to two years of industry experience. Such a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have been familiar with electrically powered smoking articles and/or the components and underlying technology used therein. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 26–30). Patent Owner states that “[f]or purposes of the trial in this proceeding, [Patent Owner] accepts Petitioner’s proposed education and experience level of the [person of ordinary skill in the art].” PO Resp. 13. In view of the foregoing, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. The prior art of record reflects this level of ordinary skill. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner contends that “[t]he challenged claims are unpatentable under any reasonable construction,” and, “for purposes of this proceeding . . . adopts the plain meaning of the claims and submits that no claim term requires construction.” Pet. 14. Patent Owner contends it was improper for Petitioner to adopt the plain meaning of the claims without explaining what it considers the plain meaning of each claim term to be. PO Resp. 13. Patent Owner does not offer a construction for any claim term. PO Resp. 13. After considering the full record developed during trial, we determine that no claim limitations need an express construction for purposes of resolving the controversy.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Although Patent Owner is correct that Petitioner does not direct us to any disclosure of a heating member having a length that “falls within the claimed range,” such a disclosure in the art is not required for a showing of obviousness. See, e.g., In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 136 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In Huang, the claim required a racquet grip comprising a textile layer and a polyurethane layer, and that the ratio of their thicknesses be “larger than approximately 0.18.” Id. at 137. The prior art disclosed a textile layer and polyurethane layer in thickness ratios ranging from 0.111–0.142. Id. at 136. Although the prior art did not disclose a ratio in the claimed range, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s obviousness rejection because the evidence showed that “one of ordinary skill in the art would have experimented with various thicknesses to obtain an optimum range.” Id. at 139; see In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454 (CCPA 1955) (affirming an obviousness rejection of a claim to a chemical process reciting use of 25– 70% sulfuric acid at 40–80 degrees when the prior art disclosed the same reaction with 10% sulfuric acid at 100 degrees); In re Hill, 284 F.2d 955 (CCPA 1960) (affirming an obviousness rejection of a claim to a chemical process conducted at 150–250 degrees when the prior art disclosed the same reaction at 300 degrees). The Federal Circuit also noted that “Huang does not contend that he has achieved unexpected results by increasing the thickness of the polyurethane layer.” Huang, 100 F.3d at 139–140. Those principles apply with equal force to the facts in this case. Here, the evidence of record demonstrates that heaters having a length that spans some percentage of the length of the disposable aerosol forming substance were known in the art. For example, Robinson discloses one embodiment wherein heating element 72 has an elongated portion that extends into tobacco segment 89. Ex. 1006, 27:35–39, Fig. 3. Greim likewise discloses a heating element having some length, which may be inserted into a plug of an aerosol-forming substrate. Ex. 1007, 13, Fig. 4. Adams discloses similar information. Ex. 1008 ¶ 45 (“The axial length of the projection 72 is selected so that it does not extend all the way through the tobacco plug.”), Fig. 7. Following the reasoning in Huang, these disclosures of a heater having some length, albeit not necessarily a length in the claimed range, are sufficient to demonstrate obviousness if there is evidence demonstrating “one of ordinary skill in the art would have experimented with various [lengths] to obtain an optimum range” and there is no evidence that the claimed range provides unexpected results. Huang, 100 F.3d at 139.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 10,492,542 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,492,542

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.