- PTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00745 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 2, 11, and 13 of the ’582 patent and claims 1–3 of the ’151 patent on all asserted Levine obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We determine Petitioner has satisfied the threshold requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Because Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim of the ’582 patent and at least one claim of the ’151 patent are unpatentable, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims based on all grounds raised in the instant Petitions. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill, would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with two years combined experience in designing and/or developing interactive location-based computer systems/software, such as video games or other simulations incorporating location information. A person could also have qualified as a person of ordinary skill in the art with some combination of (1) more formal education (such as a master’s of science degree) and less technical experience, or (2) less formal education and more technical or professional experience. 745 Pet. 4−5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 21−25); 746 Pet. 4−5. Patent Owner does not propose a level of ordinary skill. As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- BurdenInstituted
“We are persuaded by Petitioner’s showing at this juncture, that Levine teaches the “location-based game” by describing the use of Locales in the grid system to show the “virtual playfield” in which the games are played, and that the “first character” in Levine is an “avatar” controlled by a user as described by Petitioner and summarized above. We are also persuaded by Petitioner’s showing at this juncture (and as summarized above) that Levine teaches a “first character in said virtual playfield is displayed on a display” because in the example described as the “sniper” game, Levine renders a graphical representation (depicted in Figure 47) of the Locale in which the “sniper” is located and the relative position of other game characters in nearby areas. In addition, it is reasonable to conclude, based on the argument and evidence in the present record, that it would have been obvious to show the required location in the “monster” game given that the users roam around Wall Street with the objective of finding “monsters” to “kill” and as such, it would have been obvious to display, on whichever device users are using to play, the location of the “avatar” and the “monsters.” And currently there is no evidence in the record showing that displaying locations of the “avatars,” “monsters,” or any other character’s locations would have been uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art. Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)).” slip op. at 10
NonePatents in suitUS 9,662,582 - PTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00743 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 8, 16, and 18 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review may not be authorized by statute “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of claims 1, 8, 16, and 18 of the ’716 patent. Accordingly, we institute the requested inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“On this record, we agree with Petitioner that Claim 16 does not require the virtual object to be displayed and controlled simultaneously. We highlight that claims 1, 14, 16, and 18 use the word “simultaneously” when requiring certain actions to occur at the same time. The fact that patentee used the word “simultaneously” to require certain claimed actions to occur at the same time, but did not use the word “simultaneously” in the claim term “a virtual object is operable to be displayed . . . and controlled” indicates that the patentee did not intend that the actions of displaying the virtual object and controlling of the virtual object are required to occur simultaneously. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Differences among claims can also be a useful guide in understanding the meaning of particular claim terms.”). Further, the Specification discloses that a user can manually purge an unseen virtual email located in a virtual trash can, which shows that in at least this embodiment, the user can manually control a virtual object while the virtual object is not being displayed. Patent Owner’s contention that the user is telling the virtual trash can to act does not address the fact that the user’s manual input controls the unseen virtual email by purging the unseen virtual email from the virtual trash can. This embodiment of purging an unseen virtual object further indicates that the scope of this claim term does not require displaying the virtual object and controlling the virtual object simultaneously. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that interpreting a claim to exclude an embodiment disclosed in the written description “is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support, which is wholly absent in this case.”). We do not construe “wherein a first virtual object is operable to be displayed on said head-mounted display and controlled with manual input,” as recited in claim 16, to require controlling the virtual object “while it is being displayed,” as proposed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“A reference qualifies as prior art for an obviousness determination under § 103 only when it is analogous to the claimed invention. Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. . . . A reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem. If a reference disclosure has the same purpose as the claimed invention, the reference relates to the same problem, and that fact supports use of that reference in an obviousness rejection. In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The ’716 patent “relates to improved portable devices” such as head-mounted displays. Ex. 1001, 1:30, Fig. 9. Ronzani “relates generally to systems and methods for mounting display . . . systems to the human body” such as head-mounted displays. Ex. 1003 ¶ 5. Ohshima “relates to a game apparatus” such as a head-mounted display. Ex. 1005, 1:9, 5:34–36, Fig. 4. We are sufficiently persuaded that Ronzani, Ohshima, and the ’716 patent are from the same field of endeavor of head-mounted displays. Also, the ’716 patent discloses a camera that addresses the problem of providing video information “of the environment in the user’s field of vision” (Ex. 1001, 14:53–64), which is the same problem addressed by Ohshima’s camera (Ex. 1005, 6:48–49; 7:24–25, 7:64–65, Figs. 4, 5, 8, 9, 11). We are sufficiently persuaded that Ronzani and Ohshima are analogous to the ’716 patent, and that a person of ordinary skill would have had sufficient basis to turn to both Ronzani and Ohshima.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Ronzani and Ohshima. Petitioner relies on Ronzani to teach a head-mounted display device for entertainment applications that display virtual images. Pet. 40 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 2, 5, 170). Petitioner relies on Ohshima to teach implementation details of a specific entertainment application that displays virtual images. Id. at 40–41. Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Ronzani’s head-mounted display device to include Ohshima’s virtual reality game for the benefit of achieving Ronzani’s goal of entertainment. Id. (citing Ex. 2:33–38, 6:57–59, 11:22– 26, 11:66–12:2; Ex. 1002 ¶ 135). Petitioner also contends that applying Ohshima’s technique of playing a game using a head-mounted display device to Ronzani’s head-mounted display device would improve Ronzani’s head-mounted display device in the same way. Pet. 41–42. We are sufficiently persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have used Ronzani’s head-mounted device to run Ohshima’s virtual reality game for the benefit of providing the user of the device with entertainment. We are also sufficiently persuaded that the combination of Ronzani and Ohshima “simply arranges old elements [of a head-mounted display device and a virtual reality game] with each performing the same function it had been known to perform and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007)).” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,947,716 - PTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00744 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
Instituted inter partes review of claims 21, 23, 31, 37, 41, and 42 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 21 is obvious over Fager and Martins.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’791 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’791 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with two years combined experience in designing and/or developing interactive location-based computer systems/software, such as video games or other simulations incorporating location information (such as GPS information associated with a user’s physical location), and in designing and/or developing computer systems/software involving graphical virtual and/or augmented reality. A person could also have qualified as a person of ordinary skill in the art with some combination of (1) more formal education (such as a master’s of science degree) and less technical experience, or (2) less formal education and more technical or professional experience. Pet. 4 (citing Cooperstock Decl. ¶¶ 21–25). Patent Owner, at this stage, does not disagree or propose a different definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that “[t]he prior art cited herein . . . renders the challenged claims obvious under any reasonable construction,” and “Petitioner therefore respectfully submits that, for purposes of this IPR, express constructions are not required.” Pet. 7. Patent Owner contends that “no express claim construction is necessary for the purposes of this Preliminary Response,” and “[t]he challenged claims should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, consistent with the specification and as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 7. On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“It is our understanding that Petitioner’s obviousness theory merely relies on Martins’ teaching of using camera images to detect a surface of physical objects. See Pet. 21 (“It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine Martins’ teachings regarding using camera images to detect a surface of a physical object with Fager’s augmented reality and head-mounted display system.” (citing Cooperstock Decl. ¶ 84). The proposed resulting combination is “using the camera of Fager’s head-mounted display to capture images used to detecting physical surfaces of a play area, such as the floor, ceiling, and walls of a room in which a user wishes to play a game of, for example, virtual tennis.” Id. at 21–22 (citing Cooperstock Decl. ¶ 84). According to Petitioner, the combination would use images to detect wall surfaces, and that it would have been obvious “to apply the same functionality to detect the surfaces of other objects in Fager’s game, such as the ‘suspended lamp’ described in Fager and other objects, given that Fager’s system models the behavior and movement of virtual objects (such as a ‘fictitious ball’) based on the determined surfaces of real-world objects.” Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 80, 83, 85). Petitioner contends, inter alia, that the proposed combination would have been obvious as “the combination of prior art elements, with no change in their respective functions, according to known methods—i.e., simply using the camera of the user’s head-mounted display for performing surface detection in connection with modeling the user’s physical environment.” Id. at 21 (citing Cooperstock Decl. ¶ 84). Petitioner also contends that Fager provides a motivation in explaining that its system is primarily applied indoors, where there are surfaces such as floors, ceilings, and walls, and that physical objects may be incorporated into game play. Id. at 22–23. Petitioner’s contentions are supported by the testimony of Dr. Cooperstock, which, at this stage, is unrebutted. We determine that Petitioner has shown adequately for purposes of institution that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a motivation to make the proposed combination and that the proposed combination would result in the claimed subject matter.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,019,791 - PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00739 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 3, and 6–8 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Jaszlics and Rallison.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review may not be authorized by statute “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the record before us, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of claims 1, 8, 13, and 20 of the ’277 patent. Accordingly, we institute the requested inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with two years combined experience in designing and/or developing interactive location-based computer systems/software, such as video games or other simulations incorporating location information (such as GPS information associated with a user’s physical location), and in designing and/or developing computer systems/software involving graphical virtual and/or augmented reality. A person could also have qualified as a person of ordinary skill in the art with some combination of (1) more formal education (such as a master’s of science degree) and less technical experience, or (2) less formal education and more technical or professional experience. (EX1002, ¶¶21-25.) Pet. 4. Patent Owner at this stage does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. As Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“persuasive for several reasons. The claim does not recite “a defined physical playfield.” Rather, the claim recites “a physical playfield.” The Specification’s discussions of “playfield” cited by Patent Owner use non-limiting language such as “for example” and “may” in describing the playfield. See Ex. 1001, 2:37–41, 2:61–67, 3:21–23, 8:50–64. The disclosed examples of “a physical playfield” include “the physical world, a physical environment, or a defined physical playfield” (Ex. 1001, 1:56–58), which indicates that the applicant intended “a physical playfield” as claimed to encompass more than a defined or “bounded” physical playfield. This indication is consistent with the Specification’s disclosure that “the game world corresponds to an actual area of the physical world (such as the planet Earth or New York City).” Ex. 1001, 11:12–14. Thus, in one disclosed embodiment, the physical playfield is the entire (unbounded) world. We are persuaded that the Specification’s descriptions of various embodiments with defined playfields and undefined playfields support construing the scope of a “physical playfield” as encompassing defined boundaries, or a “bounded” playfield, as well as a “physical playfield” with undefined boundaries, or an “unbounded” playfield. Limiting the claim term to only “bounded” play spaces would read out broader embodiments from the claim scope. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that interpreting a claim to exclude an embodiment disclosed in the written description “is rarely, if ever, correct and would” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Even if we were to accept Patent Owner’s unsupported contention that the location of Jaszlics’s image processor is outside of the display device, this would result in only two identified, predictable locations of the image processor. The image processor would either be located outside of the display device or inside of the display device. We are persuaded that substituting Rallison’s location of inside the display device instead of outside the display device provides sufficient reason to combine the teachings of Jaszlics and Rallison. See Uber Techs., Inc. v. X One, Inc., 957 F.3d 1334, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (reversing the Board’s determination of lack of motivation “because Okubo’s terminal-side plotting and Konishi’s server-side plotting were both well known in the art, and were the only two identified, predictable solutions for transmitting a map and plotting locations, it would have been obvious to substitute server-side plotting for terminal-side plotting in a combination of Okubo and Konishi”) (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007)).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,179,277 - PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00738 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 3, and 6–8 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review may not be authorized by statute “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the record before us, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of claims 1, 3, and 6–8 of the ’448 patent. Accordingly, we institute the requested inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with two years combined experience in designing and/or developing interactive location-based computer systems/software, such as video games or other simulations incorporating location information (such as GPS information associated with a user’s physical location), and in designing and/or developing computer systems/software involving graphical virtual and/or augmented reality. A person could also have qualified as a person of ordinary skill in the art with some 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (Sept. 16, 2011), includes revisions to Section 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the challenged claims issued from an application claiming the benefit of the filing date of an application filed before March 16, 2013, we apply pre-AIA law. 2 U.S. Patent No. 6,166,744 issued Dec. 20, 2000 (Ex. 1003). 3 Int’l Patent Appl. Pub. No. WO 2003/107039 A2 published Dec. 24, 2003 (Ex. 1008). 4 U.S. Appl. Pub. No. 2002/0163486 Al published Nov. 7, 2002 (Ex. 1009) 5 U.S. Patent No. 6,361,438 B1 issued Mar. 26, 2002 (Ex. 1006). 6 U.S. Appl. Pub. No. 2004/0002843 A1 published Jan. 1, 2004) (Ex. 1007). combination of (1) more formal education (such as a master’s of science degree) and less technical experience, or (2) less formal education and more technical or professional experience. (EX1002, ¶¶21-25.) Pet. 5. Patent Owner at this stage does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. As Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“persuasive for several reasons. The claim does not recite “a defined physical playfield.” Rather, the claim recites “a physical playfield.” The Specification’s discussions of “playfield” cited by Patent Owner use non-limiting language such as “for example” and “may” in describing the playfield. Ex. 1001, 2:32–36, 2:55–61, 3:14–16, 5:63–65, 6:30–32, 8:31–45, 9:4–9, 19:60–20:22, 22:5–6. The disclosed examples of “a physical playfield” include “the physical world, a physical environment, or a defined physical playfield” (Ex. 1001, 1:56–58), which indicates that the applicant intended “a physical playfield” as claimed to encompass more than a defined or “bounded” physical playfield. This indication is consistent with the Specification’s disclosure that “the game world corresponds to an actual area of the physical world (such as the planet Earth or New York City).” Ex. 1001, 11:12–14. Thus, in one disclosed embodiment, the physical playfield is the entire (unbounded) world. We are persuaded that the Specification’s descriptions of various embodiments with defined playfields and undefined playfields support construing the scope of a “physical playfield” as encompassing defined boundaries, or a “bounded” playfield, as well as a “physical playfield” with undefined boundaries, or an “unbounded” playfield. Limiting the claim term to only “bounded” play spaces would read out broader embodiments from the claim scope. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that interpreting a claim to exclude an embodiment disclosed in the written description “is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support, which is wholly absent in this case”).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“A reference qualifies as prior art for an obviousness determination under § 103 only when it is analogous to the claimed invention. Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. . . . A reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem. If a reference disclosure has the same purpose as the claimed invention, the reference relates to the same problem, and that fact supports use of that reference in an obviousness rejection. In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Jaszlics discloses that the “invention relates . . . to systems for combining virtual images with real-world scenes” to provide applications such as virtual reality games (Ex. 1003, 1:13–21), which is the same field as the ’448 patent’s field of “location-based games and augmented reality systems” (Ex. 1001, Title). Turning to Sofer, the purpose of the detector of Sofer is to detect the location of objects in the user’s surrounding environment (Ex. 1008, Abstract; see id. at 2, 6, 11), which is the same purpose as the detector of the ’448 patent (Ex. 1001, 15:4–5; see id. at 1:28–31, 2:5, 16:11–18, 19:54–57). Therefore, Sofer’s detector is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem of detecting the location of objects in the user’s surrounding environment. We are sufficiently persuaded that Jaszlics and Sofer are analogous to the claimed invention.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,744,448 - PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00742 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 6-10, 14, 17, 24-28, and 30 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Director may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’243 patent on all grounds of unpatentability asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAOther
“portable device 100 as “portable” even when components of that “device” are integrated in a “non-portable” device, such as a car. Examples of such portable devices are provided as wireless telephones, PDAs, laptops; handheld devices, and music players. Ex. 1009 ¶ 22; See Ex. 1001, 4:22−28 (describing a visor as a portable gaming system); 7:21−27 (listing additionally Blackberries, Personal Electronic Devices, IPODs and any other portable electronic device, to be configured as a gaming system). Taking these disclosures together, the ’243 patent does not define the degree of the “portability” of the claimed device to require that the “portable device” must be completely “free of encumbering external connections.” If “portability” can include integrating a component of the “portable device” into a “non-portable device,” then there is support for holding that the recited “portable device” could be tethered to a non-portable device.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“rotation sensors are found not to be positioned on Levesque’s display, it would have been obvious to do so in light of Ronzani because Ronzani teaches equipping the head-mounted device with external and internal sensors). Petitioner’s arguments and evidence regarding motivation to combine amount to showing that “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). The inquiry at this juncture is whether Petitioner has shown sufficiently that an ordinarily skilled artisan is “able to recognize, based on her background knowledge, [a technique’s] potential to improve the device and be able to apply the technique.” Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 995, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artInstituted
“A reference that is in the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention is analogous art,5 and such a qualification means that one of ordinary skill in the art is presumed to have been aware of the reference and thus the refence properly may be considered if it predates the claimed invention. See Circuit Check Inc. v. QXQ Inc., 795 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Petitioner contends that the field of endeavor of the claims of the ’243 patent is “the field of portable user-worn devices for providing location based-entertainment.” Pet. 19−20. According to that description of the relevant field of endeavor, Petitioner argues that both Levesque and Ronzani are analogous to the ’243 patent. Id. Patent Owner appears to argue that the field of endeavor is “video games.” Prelim. Resp. 29−30. This is not the correct field of endeavor because although the claim recites a location based game system, the claims considerably focus on the head-mounted device. Indeed, for claim 1 all the structural elements claimed involve or are placed in the head-mounted device. Thus, “video games” generally is not an appropriate field of endeavor, as it is too broad and ignores the significant focus of the claims of the ’243 patent. Petitioner’s statement of the field of endeavor is, therefore, more indicative of the correct field of endeavor involved here. And as such, it is unpersuasive to argue that Ronzani does not belong to the field merely because it is not solely focused on video” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 11,904,243 - Ericsson Inc. / Nokia Of America Corporation v. XR Communications LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 3, 2025 · IPR2024-00613 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 8–12, and 15–19 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not sufficiently show that Agee alone or with Butler teaches the claimed signal information and weighting-value determinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“including the design of beamforming using multiple antennas.” Pet. 6. Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have at least a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering or equivalent, and at least two years of work experience. Id. at 6–7. Petitioner adds that “[a] more advanced degree can substitute for some work experience.” Id. at 7 (referencing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–39). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s proposed definition. PO Resp. 8. In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed definition, finding it to be consistent with the prior art of record and the skill reflected in the Specification of the ’235 patent, and previous proceedings concerning the ’235 patent. Inst. Dec. 13 (citing IPR2022-00367, Paper 10 at 24 (PTAB July 14, 2022); IPR2022-01155, Paper 11 at 13–14 (PTAB Jan. 5, 2023)). We continue to do so here.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction The parties agree that the claims of the ’235 patent should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 6; PO Resp. 8. Patent Owner also provides claim constructions adopted in related district court litigations for certain terms. PO Resp. 9–10. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). To the extent that the scope of any particular claim term requires discussion, however, we provide it in our assessment of the challenges, which we turn to next.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“each antenna” and “Agee’s Butler matrix measures a different signal strength for each of the 32 OFDM tones (channels) on each antenna” (Pet. 62), Agee does not describe that its Butler Forming Mode circuitry determines (or measures) signal strength. Rather, Petitioner relies on unsupported testimony from Dr. Mahon. Pet. 61 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 513– 536). Although Dr. Mahon affirmatively states that Agee discloses measuring the “signal strength” for limitations [1.4] and [1.5], he only quotes Agee’s column 45, lines 4–28 to conclude that “such measurements are detecting and processing the signal strength in the passages regarding the OFDM vector receiver receiving and detecting data induced on each antenna.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 524. However, the testimony provides no further explanation as to why this is the case other than quoting the paragraph. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). Agee is not self-explanatory on this point. See Personal Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Consequently, assessing the probative value of the testimony, we find that the bare, unintelligible statements regarding Agee and how it allegedly teaches “signal strength” are entitled to little weight.14 14 We recognize that at the Decision on Institution stage, the panel credited Dr. Mahon’s testimony with respect to how the Butler matrix detects different phased signals at the antenna for limitations [1.3]−[1.5]. Inst. Dec. 24–28. Upon review of the full record, and in consideration of the preponderance of the evidence standard, however, we no longer view the testimony sufficiently supported. The “Board has an obligation to assess the question anew after trial based on a totality of the record, particularly where Further, it is unclear from both Petitioner’s contentions and Dr. Mahon’s testimony whether Petitioner is arguing that such functionality is inherent in Agee’s Butler matrix, common knowledge, how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand Agee in light of general Butler matrix functionality, or something else entirely. See Netflix, 84 F.4th at 1377 (stating that “the Board should . . . not have to decode a petition to locate additional arguments beyond the ones clearly made”). Petitioner also does not provide sufficient support for these contentions from Butler. In sum, Petitioner relies on Dr. Mahon’s testimony for the contentions in limitations [1.4] and [1.5], at least with regard to determining “signal strength” as the recited determining first and second “signal information.” As explained in our Consolidated Trial Practice Guide15 (Nov. 2019) at 36: Expert testimony, however, cannot take the place of a disclosure in a prior art reference, when that disclosure is required as part of the unpatentability analysis . . . Similarly, in an obviousness analysis, conclusory assertions from a third party about general knowledge in the art cannot, without supporting evidence of record, supply a limitation that is not evidently and indisputably within the common knowledge of those skilled in the art. K/S Himpp v. Hear-Wear Techs., LLC, 751 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Furthermore, because an inter partes review may only be requested “on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications,” 35 the standard changes.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “[T]he Board is not bound by any findings made in its Institution Decision. At that point, the Board is considering the matter preliminarily without the benefit of a full record. The Board is free to change its view of the merits after further development of the record, and should do so if convinced its initial inclinations were wrong.” TriVascular, 812 F.3d at 1068. 15 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ tpgnov.pdf U.S.C. § 311(b), expert testimony cannot take the place of disclosure from patents or printed publications. In other words, expert testimony may explain “patents and printed publications,” but is not a substitute for disclosure in a prior art reference itself.” slip op. at 26
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“To that end, we find Petitioner’s contentions and evidence are insufficient as to limitations [1.4] and [1.5]. However, even assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner’s reliance on Dr. Mahon’s testimony is sufficient to show that limitations [1.4] and [1.5] are taught by Agee, i.e., that it is “evidently and indisputably within the common knowledge of those skilled in the art,” Petitioner still must show that the set of weighting values is determined based upon the signal strength, as recited in limitation [1.6]. As we discuss below, Petitioner’s contentions and evidence are insufficient for limitation [1.6].” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 10,715,235 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,715,235 - Røde Microphones, LLC / Freedman Electronics Pty Ltd. v. Zaxcom, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 30, 2025 · IPR2025-00557 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Based on the record before us, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that Strub teaches or suggests “a remote receiver, the remote receiver configured to create at least one master timecode and to receive audio data,” as recited in claim 1. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that claim 1 is unpatentable over Strub and Woo.” slip op. at 26
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the “master timecode generator” produces a signal that “controls” another timecode generator. See Prelim. Resp. 19 (citing a dictionary definition of “master” as “[one] that has control over another or others,” Ex. 2019, 3). We see no basis, however, to limit the claim term to a particular type of control. Patent Owner points to Figure 6 of the ’444 patent where “the master timecode generator creates master timecodes that are used to control the speed of the local timecode generator to ensure the two timecode generators are synchronized.” See Prelim. Resp. 19‒20 (citing Ex. 1001, col. 17, ll. 9‒16, Fig. 6). But Figure 6 merely depicts an exemplary “process for recording audio and for replaying and re-recording segments of missed audio in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.” See Ex. 1001, col. 3, ll. 15‒17. Further, the Specification describes the exemplary embodiment of Figure 6 as a master unit providing master timecodes to a local audio device, which “synchronizes (e.g., jam syncs) its respective on board local timecode generator with the master timecodes,” but does not specify exactly how the master unit exercises control. Id. at col. 17, ll. 9‒17. Thus, we do not include any particular control mechanism (e.g., changing the speed of the local timecode generator) in our interpretation at this time. Based on the record presented, we interpret “master timecode generator” as “a producer of a master time reference signal that controls at least one other timecode generator” and “master timecode” as “a time reference signal used to synchronize at least one device.”” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that Strub teaches or suggests limitation 1[A]. Petitioner relies on Strub’s disclosure of a “master” recording unit as the claimed “remote receiver.” Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1003, col. 38, ll. 29‒39). The cited portion of Strub is reproduced below: Data other than recording data can also be exchanged between recording units. For example, it may be desirable to coordinate the recordings obtained by recording units so that frames of visual recording data obtained by different recording units are temporally synchronized (e.g., so that a frame begins at the same time for each recording unit). This can be done by transmitting a synchronization pulse from a “master” recording unit to each of the other recording units (“slave” recording units). (Synchronizing analog visual data acquisition devices in this way is referred to as “genlocking.”) Ex. 1003, col. 38, ll. 29‒39. As argued by Patent Owner (see Prelim. Resp. 36), the cited procedure involves synchronizing frames of visual recording data, not audio recording data. Petitioner has not disputed Patent Owner’s assertions that the described “genlocking” technique is a video synchronization technique that does not apply to or affect the synchronization of system clocks or audio timestamps and has no bearing on audio synchronization. Nor does Petitioner explain in the Petition or the Preliminary Reply how or why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have applied this teaching to audio data recorded by an audio device. Petitioner cites this visual recording data synchronization passage as a solution to a problem that Strub identifies in clocks not being adequately synchronized to enable use of time-stamps associated with recordings to be used to synchronize the recordings. See Prelim. Reply 1‒2 (citing Ex. 1003, col. 38, ll. 29‒37, col. 79, l. 63‒col. 80, l. 2). However, immediately following the cited portion that identifies this problem, Strub further explains that “[i]f recording units according to the invention each include a GPS receiver, such mis-synchronization will only exist to an appreciable degree if one or more recording units are shielded from a GPS transmitter system for an extended period of time, e.g., several hours.” Ex. 1003, col. 80, ll. 2–27. Thus, Strub suggests that the solution to this problem is for the recording units to receive their timecodes not from a master recording unit, as argued by Petitioner, but from a GPS satellite.4 Petitioner does not address this teaching.” slip op. at 22
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition does not rely on Woo as teaching or suggesting limitation 1[A]; Petitioner relies solely on the teachings of Strub. See Pet. 33–35 (arguing that “Strub teaches this element”). Petitioner references Strub’s teachings as being “consistent with and reinforced by the Woo reference” in the Preliminary Reply (Prelim. Reply 2), but this is not sufficient to rely on Woo, alone or in combination with Strub, as teaching this limitation. We also agree that the Lectrosonics IPRs’ findings regarding Woo teaching the “master timecode generator” limitation recited in those challenged claims are inapplicable here, where claim 1 recites additional limitations not present in those challenged claims. Compare Ex. 1001, col. 43, ll. 26‒27 (claim 1 of the ’444 patent: “a remote receiver, the remote receiver configured to create at least one master timecode and to receive audio data”) with Ex. 1028, col. 23, ll. 20‒21 (claim 1 of the ’814 patent: “at least one master timecode generator for generating a plurality of master timecodes”) and Ex. 1030, col. 23, ll. 38‒39 (claim 1 of the ’902 patent: “at least one master timecode generator for generating a plurality of master timecodes”). Based on the record before us, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that Strub teaches or suggests “a remote receiver, the remote receiver configured to create at least one master timecode and to receive audio data,” as recited in claim 1. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that claim 1 is unpatentable over Strub and Woo.” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,051,444 - Cradlepoint, Inc. / Honeywell International, Inc. et al. v. Sisvel S.P.A.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 29, 2025 · IPR2021-00580 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claims 1–10 not shown unpatentable under the Sachs anticipation and obviousness grounds because Sachs did not disclose the required timer stopping, and the new theories were not considered.
RulingsRemand decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Whether Mr. Bates is a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art In the Final Written Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition because “there does not appear to be a dispute that needs to be resolved.” FWD 8. Here, where Mr. Bates’ qualifications are challenged, we have reviewed the complete record including the parties’ arguments on remand and we find that Mr. Bates does not meet the requirements for a person of ordinary skill in the art according to Petitioner’s definition for level of ordinary skill in the art, which we adopted (see FWD 8). Notably, the panel adopted Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the Institution Decision (Paper 16, 8), and neither party challenged that determination during the trial, although Patent Owner did offer its own definition (PO Resp. 9). Mr. Bates has one degree: “a bachelor’s degree in Business Management.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 7. A degree in Business Management is not “a degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline.” Pet. 35 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we disregard the testimony of Mr. Bates in rendering our findings and conclusions in this Decision. We note that, even if we did consider Mr. Bates’s testimony, the findings and conclusions rendered in this Decision would not change.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“cover for his lack of education.” Pet. Remand Br. 4. Patent Owner disagrees and argues, inter alia, that “Mr. Bates was a pioneer in the cellular telecommunications field with more than five decades of practical and teaching experience.” PO Remand Resp. 5 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 8–23) (emphasis omitted); see id. at 3–4, 6. Whether Mr. Bates is a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art In the Final Written Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition because “there does not appear to be a dispute that needs to be resolved.” FWD 8. Here, where Mr. Bates’ qualifications are challenged, we have reviewed the complete record including the parties’ arguments on remand and we find that Mr. Bates does not meet the requirements for a person of ordinary skill in the art according to Petitioner’s definition for level of ordinary skill in the art, which we adopted (see FWD 8). Notably, the panel adopted Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the Institution Decision (Paper 16, 8), and neither party challenged that determination during the trial, although Patent Owner did offer its own definition (PO Resp. 9). Mr. Bates has one degree: “a bachelor’s degree in Business Management.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 7. A degree in Business Management is not “a degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline.” Pet. 35 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we disregard the testimony of Mr. Bates in rendering our findings and conclusions in this Decision. We note that, even if we did consider Mr. Bates’s testimony, the findings and conclusions rendered in this Decision would not change.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“C. Claim Construction The Federal Circuit determined that “the plain and unambiguous language of claim 1 requires that a method, to come within the claim, must perform both limitations 1[c] and 1[d] where their preconditions apply.” Sierra Wireless, 130 F.4th at 1022. We interpret the claims and analyze Petitioner’s unpatentability arguments under the Federal Circuit’s determination.” slip op. at 13
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner was on notice, when Patent Owner’s Response was filed at the latest, that claim 1 could be construed as unconditionally requiring both limitations 1[c] and 1[d]. Indeed, Petitioner contended that it had shown both limitations “in single references.” Pet. Reply 5. Petitioner now seeks to shift its unpatentability contentions for limitation 1[c] from Figure 5 of Sachs to Figures 6 and 7. Petitioner’s new reliance on Figures 6 and 7 of Sachs is “a meaningfully distinct contention” from its position in both the Petition and the Reply. See Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Health, Inc., 805 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We therefore find that Petitioner impermissibly presents new theories of unpatentability on remand. 3. Independent Claim 1 We decline to address Petitioner’s new theories of unpatentability proposed on remand concerning Sachs’s Figure 7. See Pet. Remand Br. 15– 20. Although Petitioner cites pages 59–61 of the Petition as discussing Figure 7 of Sachs (see Pet. Remand Br. 15), the cited discussion concerns dependent claims 5 and 10, not independent claims 1 and 8.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 7,869,396 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,869,396 - PTAB · Sep 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00741 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 12, 17, and 20 of the ’493 patent on all asserted §103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its contentions of obviousness for claim 1 of the ’559 patent and claim 1 of the ’493 patent.” slip op. at 22
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“persuasive for several reasons. The claim does not recite “a defined physical playfield.” Rather, the claim recites “a physical playfield.” The” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Rallison is evidence of the knowledge that a head-mounted display would include a processor—provides sufficient rational underpinning for the combination of teachings. Petitioner proffers that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that including a processor in a head-mounted display is a known technique to improve a similar device (Jaszlics’s visor) in the same way and predictably. 740 Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1004, 10:4−14; 740 Cooperstock Decl. ¶ 80). We do not find at this juncture that this argument is unsupported or speculative, as Patent Owner argues. Additionally, we understand Patent Owner’s arguments—that Jaszlics system would have no need for incorporating a processor in the visor as taught by Rallison—as contentions that Jaszlics either teaches away from such a combination or the benefits of such a configuration are outweighed by significant drawbacks. These contentions are underdeveloped and unsupported. Petitioner’s argument and evidence, at this juncture, reasonably explain the reasons to combine under precedent that there is a motivation to combine when “a known technique ‘has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way.’” See Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007)). The location of the processor in the head-mounted display of Jaszlics does not need to be the best option, so long as it is a suitable option. See PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1197-98 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Finally, as for Rallison and Jaszlics’s alleged incompatibility, we are not persuaded that more evidence is needed at this juncture for details on the modification of Jaszlics to include the processor of Rallison. Such argument amounts to a bodily incorporation argument, and our analysis focuses rather on whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the “teachings” as alleged. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Indeed, we note the evidence presented by Petitioner that a head-mounted display’s use of electronics to generate the displayed video images was well known. 740 Cooperstock Decl. ¶ 82; Ex. 1004, 10:4−14.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 11,376,493
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.