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  • PTAB · Aug 2, 2023 · IPR2023-00360 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the asserted obviousness challenges and declining Fintiv denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021) (permitting the Board to institute trial on behalf of the Director). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the current record, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “On balance, we determine that Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor discretionary denial of institution. Specifically, we determine that Petitioner’s stipulation and the parties’ minimal investment in the District Court Litigation as to issues of unpatentability outweigh the projected trial date. As a result, we need not decide whether Petitioner presents a compelling unpatentability challenge. See CommScope Techs. LLC v. Dali Wireless, Inc., IPR2022-01242, Paper 23 at 4–5 (PTAB Feb. 27, 2023) (decision on Director review) (precedential) (“[I]n circumstances where the Board determines that the other Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor discretionary denial, the Board shall decline to discretionarily deny under Fintiv without reaching the compelling merits analysis.”). 7. Summary Based on our holistic view of the Fintiv factors, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 38

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “evidence, we determine Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated, at this stage of the proceeding, that the combination of Backhaus and Logan teaches the subject matter of limitation 1.b of claim 1. Also, on the current record, we determine that Petitioner provides reasons, with rational underpinnings, why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Backhaus and Logan. Cf. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418 (stating that, to facilitate the analysis of an obviousness position, the proponent should provide “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”).” slip op. at 19

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). To the extent that the scope of any particular claim term requires discussion, however, we provide it in our assessment of the challenges, which we turn to next.” slip op. at 14

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,667,770
  • PTAB · Jul 31, 2023 · IPR2023-00358 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Institution

    Instituted IPR of claims 1–4 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “evidence that specifically addresses a stay of the District Court Litigation pending this proceeding. See Pet. 58–59; Prelim. Resp. 25–26; Reply 1; Sur-reply 1. We decline to speculate based on the record in this case whether the District Court would grant a stay of the District Court Litigation. See Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 15 at 12 (PTAB May 13, 2020) (informative) (“Fintiv II”). As a result, we determine that the first Fintiv factor is neutral.” slip op. at 8

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “had “an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field along with two years of work experience in the field of telecommunication.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17–18). Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Bill Lin. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17–18. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 5. We adopt Petitioner’s description for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “the same standard used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Neither party proposes an express construction for any claim terms. Pet. 7; Prelim. Resp. 6. We determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 13

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “On this record, Patent Owner’s argument is unavailing. The portion of Backhaus cited by Petitioner discloses “that certain relationship numbers may be used for a plurality of subscriber number and third party number combinations, i.e., in certain embodiments a given relationship number may not be unique to a given subscriber number and third party number combination.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 47 (emphasis added); see Pet. 22–23. Patent Owner appears to interpret the phrase “plurality of subscriber number and third party number combinations” in Backhaus as indicating that a relationship number may be associated with “two or more . . . subscriber” numbers, but “not two or more [third party] numbers.” See Prelim. Resp. 15 (emphasis omitted). We disagree. On this record, we see no reason to interpret the phrase “plurality of subscriber number and third party number combinations” in Backhaus as excluding combinations of one subscriber number with two or more third party numbers. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 47.” slip op. at 16

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,334,094
  • PTAB · Jul 31, 2023 · IPR2023-00357 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–4 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 2, and 4 are anticipated by Backhaus.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “have invested only some resources in the District Court Litigation as to issues of unpatentability involving the ’585 patent. The District Court issued a claim construction order that addresses two terms in the ’585 patent, but the District Court stated only that those terms have their “[p]lain and ordinary meaning.” Ex. 1016, 2. And the evidence of record indicates that fact discovery is ongoing, expert discovery has not begun, and the deadline for dispositive motions is not until October 2023. Ex. 2003, 1–2. Thus, we determine that the third Fintiv factor weighs slightly against discretionary denial of institution.” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Further, a decision to institute may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Here, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on all the grounds of unpatentability in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “had “an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field along with two years of work experience in the field of telecommunication.” Pet. 4–5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17–18). Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Bill Lin. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17–18. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 5. We adopt Petitioner’s description for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

      “C. Claim Construction In an inter partes review proceeding, a patent claim is construed using the same standard used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Neither party proposes an express construction for any claim terms. Pet. 7–8; Prelim. Resp. 5. We determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 11,218,585
  • PTAB · Jul 31, 2023 · IPR2023-00359 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Institution

    Instituted IPR on claims 1–4 based on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing and declining Fintiv denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021) (permitting the Board to institute trial on behalf of the Director). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the current record, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “On balance, we determine that Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor discretionary denial of institution. Specifically, we determine that Petitioner’s stipulation and the parties’ minimal investment in the District Court Litigation as to issues of unpatentability outweigh the projected trial date. As a result, we need not decide whether Petitioner presents a compelling unpatentability challenge. See CommScope Techs. LLC v. Dali Wireless, Inc., IPR2022-01242, Paper 23 at 4–5 (PTAB Feb. 27, 2023) (decision on Director review) (precedential) (“[I]n circumstances where the Board determines that the other Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor discretionary denial, the Board shall decline to discretionarily deny under Fintiv without reaching the compelling merits analysis.”). 7. Summary Based on our holistic view of the Fintiv factors, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 33

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner states that “the Board need not construe any terms of the challenged claims to resolve the underlying controversy.” Pet. 8. “Patent Owner agrees claim construction is unnecessary at this stage” of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 5. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). To the extent that the scope of any particular claim term requires discussion, however, we provide it in our assessment of the challenges, which we turn to next.” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “Saksena render obvious the subject matter of claim 3. Pet. 3, 43–47. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions and citations to the evidence and determine that Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates, at this stage of the proceeding, that dependent claim 3 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Backhaus and Saksena. As part of this review, we determine, on the current record, that Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Backhaus and Saksena to arrive at the subject matter of claim 3, with a reasonable expectation of success. See Pet. 43–47.” slip op. at 25

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,012,554
  • PTAB · Jul 31, 2023 · IPR2023-00361 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–11 under all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 2 would have been obvious over the cited combinations.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “On balance, we determine that Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor discretionary denial of institution. Specifically, we determine that Petitioner’s stipulation and the parties’ minimal investment in the District Court Litigation as to issues of unpatentability outweigh the projected trial date. As a result, we need not decide whether Petitioner presents a compelling unpatentability challenge. See CommScope Techs. LLC v. Dali Wireless, Inc., IPR2022-01242, Paper 23 at 4–5 (PTAB Feb. 27, 2023) (decision on Director review) (precedential) (“[I]n circumstances where the Board determines that the other Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor discretionary denial, the Board shall decline to discretionarily deny under Fintiv without reaching the compelling merits analysis.”). 7. Summary Based on our holistic view of the Fintiv factors, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 12

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “III. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, we conclude Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to claims 1 and 2 of the ’105 patent. We determine that the record supports institution. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims under all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 35

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “Here, Petitioner contends that no claims require construction at this time. Pet. 5. Patent Owner agrees. Prelim. Resp. 6. However, the parties disagree whether “pre-call” information is information prior to the entire call, or prior to a voice connection during a call. Petitioner asserts that information is the claimed ‘pre-call information” if it is “transmitted before connecting the voice call between the calling and called parties.” Pet. 33. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner “relies on a transmission that is part of the call itself.” Prelim. Resp. 1, 7. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner instead focuses its arguments on “when a voice path” for an incoming call is connected. Id. at 8. Although Patent Owner presents these arguments to distinguish the “via a data channel” limitations, the disagreement necessarily involves the question of when the claimed “call” begins. For purposes of institution, we need not reach a firm construction of the term because Petitioner provides a “second way” of meeting the “pre-call” limitation in which a prior outgoing call has provided the pre-call information that is stored, and then later used when an incoming call is received from the same number. However, because Patent Owner also” slip op. at 14

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “time “would have had an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with two years of work experience in the field of telecommunication. . . . More education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Pet. 4–5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17–18). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill for the purposes of institution. Prelim. Resp. 9. Determining the level of ordinary skill in the art involves various factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The prior art of record also reflects the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Institution Decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner, as it is consistent with the ’105 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,051,105
  • PTAB · Jul 28, 2023 · IPR2022-01515 · APJ Tina E Hulse · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–8 are unpatentable: claims 1–2 as anticipated by Foley, claims 1–2, 5, and 8 as obvious over Foley, and claims 3–4, 6–7 as obvious over Foley and Plosker.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “We find Petitioner has the better position. We agree with Petitioner and Dr. Zusman that an M.D. with experience treating patients who worked in consultation with a team of specialists would include the qualifications recited by Patent Owner. Ex. 1037 ¶¶ 7–11. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSA, which indicates a high level of skill in the relevant art and is consistent with the prior art’s demonstration of the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “construction and determine that the term “clinically proven effective” is nonlimiting, as Petitioner asserts. See Pet. 11; Pet. Reply 8–9, 16. We begin our analysis with the language of the claims, which recite administering rivaroxaban and aspirin in amounts that are “clinically proven effective,” “wherein rivaroxaban is administered in an amount of 2.5 mg twice daily and aspirin is administered in an amount of 75–100 mg daily.” Ex. 1001, claims 1 and 5. We are persuaded that a POSA would have understood from a plain reading of the claims that the specific recited “amounts” of 8 We also noted in our Institution Decision that in the Delaware MDL, the parties stipulated that claim 1 “does not require FDA approval.” Dec. Inst. 15 n.6 (quoting Ex. 2019, 2). That is, the independent claims expressly recite that the rivaroxaban is administered in an amount of 2.5 mg twice daily, and that aspirin is administered in an amount of 75–100 mg daily. Ex. 1001, claims 1 and 5. Because the claims expressly recite the amounts of rivaroxaban and aspirin, further identifying these amounts as “clinically proven effective” is redundant and unnecessary, and does nothing to alter the method steps of administering the pharmaceutical, as otherwise recited by these claims. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding claim term “antineoplastically effective” not limiting where express dosage amounts are material claim limitations that do not change based on the intended result).” slip op. at 13

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “2. Analysis “A claim is anticipated if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently, in a single prior art reference.” Arbutus Biopharma Corp. v. ModernaTX, Inc., 65 F. 4th 656, 662 (Fed. Cir. 2023). The Federal Circuit explains that “[a]nticipation by inherent disclosure is appropriate only when the reference discloses prior art that must necessarily include the unstated limitation.” Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Inherent anticipation requires “merely that the disclosure of the prior art is sufficient to show that the natural result flowing from the operation as taught in the prior art would result in the claimed product.” SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal quotes omitted).” slip op. at 23

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “In analyzing the obviousness of a combination of prior art elements, it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted one of skill in the art “to combine . . . known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. A precise teaching directed to the specific subject matter of a challenged claim is not necessary to establish obviousness. Id. Rather, “any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.” Id. at 420. Accordingly, Petitioner must show that “a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quotations and citations omitted).” slip op. at 28

    Patent outcomesUS 10,828,310 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,828,310
  • PTAB · Jul 26, 2023 · IPR2022-00802 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · IPR · Final written decision

    Claim 59 is unpatentable as anticipated by Brumfield, Marcus, and Chandran; the motion to amend proposing substitute claim 62 is denied because claim 62 is unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “We find this argument unpersuasive. As Patent Owner notes, Petitioner’s expert provides a definition of POSITA that is very similar to that recited by Patent Owner in its Motion to Amend, substantively differing only in the number of years of experience of the engineer at issue. This congruity supports the conclusion that the level of ordinary skill in the art may be recognized in the prior art itself. Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (“the absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error ‘where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown’”).” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

      “In our Institution Decision, we agreed with Petitioner that the “portion of the preamble reciting ‘for compressing bone’ is not limiting to the claim” and found that other terms did not require construction. Dec. 8–9. We agreed with Petitioner that “[t]he phrase ‘for compressing bone’ merely identifies an intended use.” Pet. 20; Dec. 9. Patent Owner does not dispute this interpretation. See generally PO Resp. We agree with Petitioner that “the patentability of apparatus or composition claims depends on the claimed structure, not on the use or purpose of that structure.” Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Therefore, having considered the entire record developed during trial, we adhere to the preliminary construction that the limitation “for compressing bone” does not impose a structural limitation on claim 59 and that the other terms do not require construction.” slip op. at 11

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “Patent Owner disputes the Petition generally but Patent Owner does not identify any error in Petitioner’s foregoing arguments. Accordingly, we adopt the factual statements regarding the specific teachings of the references as findings of fact. See generally In re NuVasive, 841 F.3d 966, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that the Board need not make specific findings as to claim limitations that Patent Owner does not dispute are disclosed in the prior art). We have reviewed Petitioner’s analysis and the underlying evidence cited in support and conclude that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the limitations of claim 59 are disclosed by Brumfield.” slip op. at 26

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied

      “For the reasons discussed below, Patent Owner has shown that proposed substitute claim 62 meets the statutory and regulatory requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121. For the reasons discussed below, however, Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claim 62 is unpatentable over prior art. Therefore, we deny Patent Owner’s Revised Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 38

    Patent outcomesUS 8,303,589 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Nautilus
    Patents in suitUS 8,303,589
  • PTAB · Jul 19, 2023 · IPR2023-00442 · APJ John G New · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Dixon, CATT, MACTEL, and PIER.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314, the Board “may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless … the information presented in the petition … and any response … shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition, Preliminary Response, Reply, Sur-Reply, and the evidence of record, we determine that the evidence presented demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’681 patent. We therefore institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied

      “deny a Petitioner successive attacks on the claims of a single patent, and profiting from those prior attempts by altering a petition’s strategy in response to Patent Owner’s and the Board’s responses. General Plastic, Paper 19 at 9–10. Patent Owner is quite correct, however, that, under Valve Corp., we can consider the relationship between different parties bringing successive challenges to a given patent. Valve Corp., Paper 11, at 2, 9. However, the facts of the present Petition render this present situation readily distinguishable from the facts in Valve Corp. In Valve Corp., we found that the parties bringing successive challenges to the patent-in-suit were “named as co-defendants in that lawsuit and were accused of infringing the ’934 patent based on [co-defendant] HTC’s VIVE devices that incorporate Valve’s technology.” Valve Corp., Paper 11, at 9–10. Furthermore, in that litigation, Valve represented that “HTC’s VIVE devices incorporate certain Valve technologies under a technology license from Valve,” and that “Valve employees did provide HTC with technical assistance during the development of the accused VIVE devices.” Id. at 10. The Board consequently concluded that “there is a significant relationship between Valve and HTC with respect to Patent Owner’s assertion of the ’934 patent. The complete overlap in the challenged claims and the significant relationship between Valve and HTC favor denying institution.” Id. No such facts obtain in the present instance. Petitioner is not a co- defendant with Mylan in the district court infringement action, Regeneron Pharms., Inc. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 1:22-cv-00061-TSK (N.D.W. Va.).11 There is no credible evidence of record that Petitioner and Mylan, potential business competitors, have developed any significant relationship, as in Valve Corp. Petitioner has joined the -01226 inter partes review as a “silent” slip op. at 44

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “skill in the art would have been motivated to adopt the exclusion criteria when administering aflibercept via intravitreal injection to minimize the risks of intravitreal infection and complications such as endophthalmitis and that adoption of these criteria reflected basic safety precautions developed to address the risks associated with intravitreal injections generally, regardless of the specific anti-VEGF agent injected. See Pet. 48–52. Petitioner has shown sufficient support on the record before us for such a view. Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner: (1) has not shown motivation to modify the exclusion criteria of PIER by adding the third exclusion criterion; and (2) has not shown motivation to modify the exclusion criteria of CATT and/or MACTEL. We disagree. We have explained above why we conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have found exclusion criterion three to be obvious over not CATT and MACTEL individually and together. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. Moreover, Petitioner has, as we have also explained, asserted a persuasive reason why a skilled artisan would have been motivated to adopt the teachings of MACTEL and CATT to reduce the risk of intravitreal infection subsequent to injection of a VEGF receptor antagonist, such as aflibercept. Furthermore, Petitioner has persuasively argued that a person of ordinary skill in the art would also have had a reasonable expectation of success in adopting the exclusion criteria to the studies disclosed by Dixon, viz., that a person of ordinary skill in the art would therefore have reasonably expected that the exclusion criteria developed for prior art VEGF receptor antagonists could be successfully applied to aflibercept. Pet. 53 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 156–158).” slip op. at 39

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, arguing that the skilled artisan is an ophthalmologist experienced in treating angiogenic eye disorders, including with VEGF antagonists. Prelim. Resp. 11. Patent Owner acknowledges, however, that the parties’ differing definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art do not affect any argument presented with respect to our present Decision to Institute. Id. As we explain below, with the exception of the exclusion criteria, claim 1 of the ’681 patent is identical to claim 1 of the ’388 patent in the -00881 IPR. We again determine that our definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable and consistent with the prior art of record at this stage of the proceeding. For the purposes of this decision, and for the sake of consistency, we adopt our prior definition, quoted above, as the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10

    § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,130,681
  • PTAB · Jul 3, 2023 · PGR2023-00014 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · PGR · Institution

    The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–5 and all asserted challenges, finding written description and enablement challenges met the threshold but the Harris–Xing obviousness challenge did not.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “Patent Owner’s argument is unpersuasive because the combination of Harris with Xing is not cumulative of Pavlakis, Harris-2015, and Damsky. Here the combination of Harris with Xing is argued in different ways compared to what was made to the Examiner. Additionally, we agree with Petitioner that Xing discloses information the Examiner indicated were absent from the prior art. See Ex. 1010, 14–15. For example, Xing teaches administering a therapeutically effective amount of an inhibitor of IL-15 or the IL-15 receptor is administered to the subject. Compare id. at 15, with Ex. 1007, 3. Xing also teaches that TM-β1-mediated blockade of CD122 prevented disease development and progression and that inhibiting IFN-γ production downstream of IL-15 through topical administration of JAK inhibitors effectively eliminated existing lesions. Thus, we do not find that the same or substantially the same arguments were presented previously to the Office, nor do we find that the same or substantially the same art was previously presented to the Office. Thus, the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework is not satisfied for Petitioner’s § 103 challenge, and we decline to exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny institution of a trial proceeding on this challenge.” slip op. at 12

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not assert a different level of skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention and uses Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. Prelim. Resp. 16. For the purposes of this Decision, we too adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’505 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther

      “Both parties state that express claim construction is unnecessary at this stage of the proceeding and that all terms are to given their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 23; Prelim. Resp. 17. We agree. Construction is needed only for those terms “that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 terms for purposes of institution.” slip op. at 7

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review under 35 U.S.C. § 324 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. A post-grant review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 321, if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2022) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The “more likely than not” standard requires greater than 50% chance of prevailing. Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 58 (Nov. 2019), available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. We decline to deny the Petition on a discretionary basis as requested by Patent Owner. Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of the ’505 patent and all of the asserted challenges to patentability.” slip op. at 2

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,278,505
  • PTAB · Jun 16, 2023 · PGR2021-00085 · APJ Barry L Grossman · PGR · Final written decision

    The Board granted the motion to amend but held amended claim 64 unpatentable as anticipated by NanoCool 98596-type products and obvious over the cited combinations; all other amended claims were not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part

      “VI. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that amended claim 64 is unpatentable; FURTHER ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Non-Contingent Motion to Amend is granted for claims 64 and denied for all other amended claims; and” slip op. at 77

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

      “A. Status as Prior Art Is a Substantive Issue, Not an Evidentiary Issue. A motion to exclude is not an appropriate mechanism for challenging the sufficiency of evidence, such as whether a reference qualifies as prior art, or the proper weight that should be afforded an argument. See Flir Systems, Inc. v. Leak Surveys, Inc., IPR2014-00411, Paper 113, 4, 8–9 (PTAB September 3, 2015); PTAB Consol. Trial Practice Guide 79 (Nov. 30 Mr. Zumwalt testifies that other NanoCool products, designated by product number 85430 and 98630, also have the same configuration as the 98830 product and are made by the same process. Thus, “the 98830, 85430, and 98630 products can be collectively referred to as ‘98830-type’ products all having the same relevant design.” Ex. 1030 ¶ 17. 2019) (“A motion to exclude . . . may not be used to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove a particular fact. A motion to exclude is not a vehicle for addressing the weight to be given evidence—arguments regarding weight should appear only in the merits documents.”); Caterpillar Inc. v. Wirtgen Am., Inc., IPR2017-02187, Paper 42,17 (PTAB May 21, 2019) (status as prior art “is a substantive issue, not an evidentiary issue.”) Thus, whether the NanoCool 98830 product is prior art is not the proper basis for Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude evidence concerning the NanoCool 98830 product.” slip op. at 29

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “Neither Petitioner nor Mr. Harber provide any analysis of the factors pertinent to a determination of the level of ordinary skill, identified above, to support their conclusory statements. We give Mr. Harber’s conclusory testimony minimal probative weight. 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Moreover, there is no persuasive evidence to which we have been directed of the need for specific education or experience in biological or chemical technologies related to the claimed containers and inserts.” slip op. at 26

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “With regard to the level of ordinary skill in the art, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill would have had “a bachelor’s degree or higher degree in biological, chemical or mechanical engineering, or related sciences, and at least two to five years of experience in designing and testing ISCs [insulated shipping containers] depending on education level.” Pet. 9 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 23–24). Exhibit 1002 is the Declaration testimony of Mr. Paul Haber. Mr. Harber actually states a slightly different level of ordinary skill. Mr. Harber testifies: The hypothetical POSITA would have: (i) at least a bachelor’s degree in biological, chemical or mechanical engineering, or related sciences, and have at least three to five years of experience in designing and testing ISCs [Insulated Shipping Containers][29]. Such a person may also have (ii) a higher level degree, such as a PhD and/or Master’s degree in engineering, or related sciences, and have at least two to three years of experience in designing and testing ISCs. 29 See Ex. 1002 ¶ 23. Ex. 1002 ¶ 24 (emphasis added). Mr. Harber also testifies that “[t]hese descriptions are approximate, and a higher level of education or specific skill might make up for less experience, and vice-versa.” Id.” slip op. at 25

    Patent outcomesUS 10,766,685 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,766,685

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.