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  • PTAB · Aug 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00467 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims based on the asserted obviousness ground over Gil, Norden, Dean, Alphagan, and Federal Register.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

      “Advanced Bionics, 8. As explained above, during prosecution of the ’245 patent, the examiner issued a nonstatutory double patenting rejection because the claims were “not patentably distinct from” the ’742 patent claims.13 See supra Section I.H (citing Ex. 1010, 96). Petitioner argues that “[i]t was material error for the Examiner to both acknowledge that the ’245 claims were patentably indistinct from the ’742 claims and yet ignore the FWD and allow the claims despite the Board’s prior findings.” We find Petitioner’s argument persuasive. To determine whether Petitioner has sufficiently shown material error, we look at, for example, “the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection.” Advanced Bionics, 9 (citing Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8, 10–11 (Dec. 15, 2017)). Petitioner asserts Gil, Norden, Dean, Alphagan, and Federal Register in this” slip op. at 18

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “previously denied its motion to stay. Ex. 2029. Thus, factor 1 weighs in favor of denying institution.” slip op. at 21

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “We agree with Patent Owner. Claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011). On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we see no need to expressly construe any claim term. Patent Owner appears to suggest, although it does not explicitly argue, that the claims require “a single drop of [0].025% brimonidine.” See Prelim. Resp. 6; see also id. at 27 (arguing Gil is “with multi-dosed 0.03% brimonidine”); id. at 28 (arguing Dean is with “multi-dosed concentrations”). To the extent our understanding is correct, Patent Owner should expressly discuss at trial any construction that would so limit the claim. Such discussion should be set forth in a separate section of a response, if filed, designated for claim construction; claim construction positions should not be merely included in arguments over the merits on patentability.” slip op. at 24

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) would have been a composite person (or team) that included a medical doctor and pharmaceutical formulator. EX-1014, ¶¶60-61; EX-1013, ¶¶16, 22-24. The medical doctor would be an ophthalmologist with at least three to four years of experience in clinical trials and FDA regulation of eye products and would have experience in the use of topical brimonidine and apraclonidine and topical vasoconstrictors such as naphazoline and tetrahydrozoline. EX-1014, ¶60. The pharmaceutical formulator would have a doctorate in pharmaceutics or a related degree and at least three to five years of experience developing eye drop formulations for clinical trial and regulatory approval. EX-1013, ¶16. Pet. 16–17. Patent Owner does not, at this point, dispute this proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art as it appears consistent with the skill level reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’245 patent.” slip op. at 24

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 11,833,245
  • PTAB · Jul 30, 2024 · IPR2024-00201 · APJ John G New · IPR · Adverse judgment

    After Patent Owner disclaimed all challenged claims, the Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b).

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: … (2) Cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). According to our reviewing court, 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) gives the Board authority to construe a patent owner’s actions in disclaiming all challenged claims in an instituted trial as a request for an adverse judgment. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In the present inter partes review, Patent Owner has disclaimed all challenged claims of the ’601 patent, such that there are none left to be contested by the Petition. We consequently view Patent Owner’s filing of the Disclaimer, removing the last of the challenged claims from this inter partes review, and its request for termination of the proceeding, as a constructive request for adverse judgment against itself under § 42.73(b). Arthrex, 880 F.3d at 1349. Because there are no challenged claims left for the Petition to contest in this proceeding, adverse judgment against Patent Owner is granted.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 10,888,601
  • PTAB · Jul 30, 2024 · IPR2023-00739 · APJ John G New · IPR · Adverse judgment

    The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner after it disclaimed all challenged claims of the ’601 patent.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: … (2) Cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). According to our reviewing court, 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) gives the Board authority to construe a patent owner’s actions in disclaiming all challenged claims in an instituted trial as a request for an adverse judgment. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In the present inter partes review, Patent Owner has disclaimed all challenged claims of the ’601 patent, such that there are none left to be contested by the Petition. We consequently view Patent Owner’s filing of the Disclaimer, removing the last of the challenged claims from this inter partes review, and its request for termination of the proceeding, as a constructive request for adverse judgment against itself under § 42.73(b). Arthrex, 880 F.3d at 1349. Because there are no challenged claims left for the Petition to contest in this proceeding, adverse judgment against Patent Owner is granted.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 10,888,601
  • PTAB · Jul 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00465 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Irwin renders at least one challenged claim obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied

      “Even assuming Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner and assuming we may exercise our discretion to deny institution based on unclean hands (see Kavo Dental Techs, LLC v. Osseo Imaging, Inc., IPR2020-00659, Paper 10 at 19 (PTAB June 10, 2020)), Patent Owner essentially asks us to resolve multiple factual issues related to its contract dispute with Linq3 to justify denial of institution. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 1– 26. Many, if not all, of these issues appear to be involved in the contract dispute, which will be resolved by the Arizona state court. We are not in a good position to make determinations about these particular issues at this stage of the proceeding, on the limited record before us. Rather, we find that the state court is better suited to address the conduct of Linq3 of which Patent Owner complains. Accordingly, we leave these matters for the state court. To the extent Patent Owner seeks to pursue its argument that Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner, even though no time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) has been asserted, Patent Owner may raise the issue of real party in interest again in its Patent Owner Response, and the parties may brief and argue the issue during trial.” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied

      “We disagree. First, we agree with Patent Owner that the fact pattern presented here is not the typical situation in which the factors from General Plastic are considered. In particular, this proceeding challenges claims of a different patent than the patents at issue in PGR2020-00084 and IPR2023- 01235. Challenging claims of different patents significantly distinguishes the facts here from those in General Plastic, and we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to extend General Plastic in this regard. Accordingly, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 11

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached

      “Even assuming Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner and assuming we may exercise our discretion to deny institution based on unclean hands (see Kavo Dental Techs, LLC v. Osseo Imaging, Inc., IPR2020-00659, Paper 10 at 19 (PTAB June 10, 2020)), Patent Owner essentially asks us to resolve multiple factual issues related to its contract dispute with Linq3 to justify denial of institution. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 1– 26. Many, if not all, of these issues appear to be involved in the contract dispute, which will be resolved by the Arizona state court. We are not in a good position to make determinations about these particular issues at this stage of the proceeding, on the limited record before us. Rather, we find that the state court is better suited to address the conduct of Linq3 of which Patent Owner complains. Accordingly, we leave these matters for the state court. To the extent Patent Owner seeks to pursue its argument that Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner, even though no time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) has been asserted, Patent Owner may raise the issue of real party in interest again in its Patent Owner Response, and the parties may brief and argue the issue during trial.” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “5. Weighing the Graham Factors “Once all relevant facts are found, the ultimate legal determination [of obviousness] involves the weighing of the fact findings to conclude whether the claimed combination would have been obvious to an ordinary artisan.” Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1361. On balance, considering the record presently before us, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that Irwin would have rendered the subject matter of claims 1–9 and 11–24 of the ’451 patent obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 38

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,488,451
  • PTAB · Jul 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00298 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Adverse judgment

    The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1–30 after it disclaimed every challenged claim, terminating the proceeding.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72, “[t]he Board may terminate a trial without rendering a final written decision, where appropriate . . . .” Further, 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(1) and (2) together state that, “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent [and] [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Thus, in disclaiming every claim in the ’572 patent, Patent Owner has constructively requested adverse judgement. Ex. 3005.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,253,572
  • PTAB · Jul 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00260 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Adverse judgment

    Adverse judgment was entered against Patent Owner as to claims 1–30 after it disclaimed all challenged claims, and the proceeding was terminated.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72, “[t]he Board may terminate a trial without rendering a final written decision, where appropriate . . . .” Further, 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(1) and (2) together state that, “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent [and] [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Thus, in disclaiming every claim in the ’572 patent, Patent Owner has constructively requested adverse judgement. Ex. 3005. We grant Patent Owner’s request. Several exhibits filed in this proceeding were done so under seal as” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,253,572
  • PTAB · Jul 23, 2024 · IPR2023-00884 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Adverse judgment

    The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1–30 after their disclaimer and terminated the proceeding.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72, “[t]he Board may terminate a trial without rendering a final written decision, where appropriate . . . .” Further, 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(1) and (2) together state that, “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent [and] [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Thus, in disclaiming every claim in the ’572 patent, Patent Owner has constructively requested adverse judgement. Ex. 3005. We grant Patent Owner’s request. Several exhibits filed in this proceeding were done so under seal as” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,253,572
  • PTAB · Jul 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00374 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–10 and all asserted grounds because the petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “petition for inter partes review. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016). In determining whether to exercise that discretion on behalf of the Director, the Board considers an early trial date in related litigation, among other factors, as part of an assessment of all relevant circumstances of the case—including the merits—to balance considerations such as system efficiency, fairness, and patent quality. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 5. When the same prior art is submitted in district court and to the Board, there are “concerns of inefficiency and the possibility of conflicting decisions.” Id. at 12. Petitioner can mitigate those concerns by presenting a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that” slip op. at 7

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

      “(2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. If a condition in the first part of the framework is satisfied and the petitioner fails to make a showing of material error, the Director generally will exercise discretion not to institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of industry experience in digital video processing, or a related field.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 10035 ¶¶ 76–78). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner uses the same skill level in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 21. We also apply Petitioner’s proposed skill level in this Decision. Pet. 3.” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 8,090,025
  • PTAB · Jul 18, 2024 · IPR2024-00327 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1 and 2 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Demircin renders claim 1 obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Upon consideration of the evidence currently of record, we conclude that the information presented shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’303 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “III. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL Patent Owner argues that we should exercise our discretion to deny the Petition based on the parallel district court litigation. Prelim. Resp. 33– 39 (citing Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential)). Petitioner, however, presented a Sotera stipulation.8 Pet. 76 (citing Ex. 1029). Thus, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution here. See Katherine K. Vidal, Interim” slip op. at 17

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “3. Preliminary Analysis Regarding Claim 1 At this stage, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s contentions that the teachings of Demircin satisfy each limitation of claim 1. On the current record, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments that Demircin does not satisfy the parties’ agreed construction. As cited by Petitioner (see, e.g., Pet. 33, 43), Demircin teaches that when additional bandwidth becomes available, NAL units that were previously discarded or only partially transmitted may be transmitted in a delayed manner (Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 34, 104– 128, Fig. 13, 14). We are currently persuaded that Demircin teaches or reasonably suggests that such delayed NAL units could be received out of order and would be rearranged, as claimed.” slip op. at 16

    § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,986,303
  • PTAB · Jul 18, 2024 · IPR2024-00372 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 2–4 and 11 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would show them unpatentable as obvious over Phek, Segall, Martins, and He.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “such as system efficiency, fairness, and patent quality. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 5. When the same prior art is submitted in district court and to the Board, there are “concerns of inefficiency and the possibility of conflicting decisions.” Id. at 12. Petitioner can mitigate those concerns by presenting a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the Board. Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential). Here, Petitioner has presented such a stipulation: if the Board grants institution, Petitioner “agrees not to pursue any grounds raised in the petition, or any grounds [Petitioner] could have reasonably raised in the petition, in [the] district court litigation or any parallel proceeding” Ex. 1028, 1. “Consistent with [Sotera], the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Katherine K. Vidal, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (USPTO June 21, 2022).5 Thus, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 7

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “present arguments specifically directed to the subject matter recited in the rest of the claim. See Prelim. Resp. Even so, Petitioner has the burden to show that the challenged claims are unpatentable. Thus, we have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence submitted in connection with the remaining limitations and find them to be sufficient at this stage and on this record. From the current record, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in demonstrating that claim 2 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 25

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “digital video processing, or a related field.” Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 10036 ¶¶ 123–125). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Id. at 4. Patent Owner uses the same skill level in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 13. We also apply Petitioner’s proposed skill level in this Decision.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Patent Owner’s arguments, however, are based on an implicit construction for the second resolution converter. See § II.D.5.c supra. For the reasons discussed below, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments and the implicit construction. See id. Apart from rejecting the implicit construction of the second resolution converter, we agree with the parties that no claim term needs to be construed in this Decision.” slip op. at 9

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 10,218,995

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.