- Hilti, Inc. / Snap-On Incorporated v. Milwaukee Electric Tool CorporationNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 14, 2016 · IPR2015-01164 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–11 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 over Takano and Yanai because the evidence did not establish the 20 Amp Limitation or a sufficient reason to combine the teachings.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“¶ 40). This wide variance in the surface areas disclosed by Adachi suggests that the working examples are specific embodiments and not indicative of “common knowledge” in the field. Moreover, we are not persuaded that the range of 400– 680 cm2 is an industry standard surface area for 18650-size cells or that one of ordinary skill in the art necessarily would consider a value in this range to be a typical or likely choice of surface area for any 18650-size cell. Accordingly, the only basis to assert that it would have been obvious to select a positive electrode surface area of 540 cm2 for Yanai’s cell 1-4 would be to rely on the disclosure of Adachi; that is, to assert that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the combination of Takano and Yanai with the teaching of Adachi. Petitioner, however, has repeatedly argued that this is not what it proposes. Reply 3; Tr. 22:22–23:4. Furthermore, we agree with Patent Owner that the Petition does not provide an adequate reason to combine Adachi with Takano and Yanai.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Takano, however, discloses a battery having a plurality of cells connected in series. Ex. 1072 ¶¶ 4, 11, 26. Although we do not question that connecting battery cells in series and/or parallel is known generally in the art, Petitioner does not provide adequate specific reasoning as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to modify Takano to connect cells in parallel when Takano clearly discloses a series connection. Dr. Abraham’s testimony that the type of connection would be chosen “as needed to provide whatever target voltage and amperage is desired for a particular application,” by itself, does not provide a sufficient reason to modify Takano’s series connection. Petitioner does not explain how the prior art discloses a desired voltage or amperage that would cause one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Takano in the manner proposed. In this case, the only teaching of a desired amperage comes from the ’290 patent itself. Furthermore, Dr. Abraham’s reliance on the disclosure at column 5, lines 57–61, of the ’290 patent as supporting the alleged obviousness of combining two cells in parallel is improper. This passage of the ’290 patent describes alternative configurations of the patentees’ own invention; it is not describing prior art. Relying on knowledge gleaned only from the challenged patent’s disclosure is impermissible hindsight. Cf. In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (As long as a judgment on obviousness “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.”).” slip op. at 18
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Third, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s argument that “three Yanai-based 18650 cells in parallel” would satisfy the 20 Amp Limitation is a new argument. Paper 60, 2. In our view, this argument does more than merely address Patent Owner’s argument regarding Dr. Abraham’s addition error. Rather, by relying on three cells instead of two, Petitioner attempts to provide a new theory as to why the combination of Takano and Yanai renders the challenged claims obvious that was not set forth clearly in the Petition. Because Petitioner waited until the Reply to make this argument, Patent Owner did not have an opportunity to respond to Petitioner’s new argument. We thus decline to consider Petitioner’s new argument as it is an improper reply. Furthermore, Petitioner’s assertion that Patent Owner made no attempt to explain why using three cells would have been just as obvious as using two cells is an improper attempt to shift the burden of proof with respect to obviousness to Patent Owner.” slip op. at 17
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“Dr. Abraham’s statement regarding 15 micrometers having been a common foil thickness, however, is not supported adequately. Furthermore, Dr. Blomgren’s testimony that Dr. Abraham picked “a known foil thickness, maybe not the most common one, but a known foil thickness” (Ex. 1118, 72:5–8) and “[g]iven cell chemistry, cell geometry, and cell size, all other individual cell design considerations would be well within the skill level of a person of ordinary skill in the art” (id. at 94:25–95:15) does not establish that one of ordinary skill in the art would have a reason to choose a foil thickness of 15 micrometers for Yanai’s cell 1-4. Therefore, we are not persuaded that a sufficient rationale is given for why one of ordinary skill in the art would select this value for Yanai’s cell 1-4.” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 7,554,290 not shown unpatentable§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,554,290 - Snap-On Inc. v. Milwaukee Electric Tool CorporationNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 14, 2016 · IPR2015-01244 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8, 10, and 11 of the ’290 patent, claims 1–8 and 10–13 of the ’173 patent, and claims 1–6 and 8–19 of the ’510 patent were not shown unpatentable under § 103 over Fohr, …
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We hold that the prior art references asserted in the Petition are representative of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (absence of specific findings on “level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error ‘where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown’” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). To the extent that a more specific definition is required, we hold that an ordinary artisan would include one holding a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical Engineering with two or three years of experience in battery design. That definition comports with the very similar definitions advanced by the parties. In that regard, Petitioner asserts that an ordinary artisan would encompass a person holding a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical Engineering with three years of experience in battery design. Pet. 8; Ex. 1007 ¶ 9. Patent Owner similarly asserts that an ordinary artisan would include a person holding a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical Engineering with two years of battery design experience. Resp. 8; Ex. 2105 ¶ 24.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard). Under the broadest reasonable construction standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definition for a claim term must be set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In our Decisions to Institute, we construed the 20 Amp Limitation to require that “the battery cells, when configured together in a battery pack, are capable of producing reasonably close to 20 amps of discharge current or greater over the course of delivering their entire rated capacity.” Dec. 5. Neither party disputes that construction, which we adopt for the purposes of this Final Written Decision. To the extent that any other claim term requires express construction, we discuss the construction in our analysis below. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only claim terms in controversy need be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy). The following facts are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Not reached
“D. Fohr as Prior Art As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether Fohr qualifies as prior art. Resp. 10–15; Reply 2–8; Sur-Reply 1–5. Specifically, Patent Owner seeks to antedate Fohr based on inventor testimony. Resp. 10–15; Sur- Reply 1–5. Petitioner responds that the named inventors are not true inventors with standing to establish facts sufficient to antedate Fohr. Reply 2–8. We decline to reach the antedating issue because it is not necessary to our ultimate conclusion on the question of obviousness. Specifically, even if we accept Petitioner’s view that Fohr qualifies as prior art, we ultimately hold that Petitioner fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that any challenged claim would have been obvious over the combined disclosures of Fohr, Sato, and Hallaj. That is so because, as explained below, Petitioner fails to establish that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to combine Fohr with Sato and Hallaj in the manner claimed.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We recognize that it may be necessary “to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents . . . in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed.” KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 418. Petitioner in these proceedings, however, directs us to no persuasive reason why an ordinary artisan would have turned to the heat-retaining battery module of Hallaj when working to implement a plurality of Sato’s cells in a pack to replace the capacitors in Fohr. Pet. 36–38 (nowhere addressing that critical point); Reply 13 (devoting four sentences to rebuttal of Patent Owner’s persuasive evidence that one would not have combined the disclosures of Hallaj, Fohr, and Sato in the manner claimed); see Ex. 1033, 15 (Examiner’s observation, in confirming the patentability of the challenged claims during reexamination, that Sato contains “no information as to how Sato’s cells would be implemented in a pack”). We view Petitioner’s unexplained leap from the single battery cell of Sato to the heat-retaining battery module of Hallaj as a classic example of impermissible hindsight reconstruction driven not by any teaching in the prior art, but by the claim requirement of a “plurality” of cells implemented in a battery pack. Pet. 36–38; Reply 13. Patent Owner, by contrast, comes forward with persuasive evidence, which we credit, showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been led to arrange a plurality of Sato’s cells in the heat-retaining battery module of Hallaj because such a modified battery pack would have been unsuitable for use as a replacement for the capacitors in Fohr. Specifically, we credit the testimony of Dr. Blomgren, who cogently explains why a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been led to the proposed modification. Ex. 2147 ¶¶ 79–85. Dr. Blomgren explains that the proposed modified battery pack “would not have adequate heat dissipation and the Joule heating naturally occurring during operation” of such a pack “would lead to overheating and cell failure” in a power tool application. Resp. 24 (citing Ex. 2147 ¶ 84). That testimony is consistent with the Examiner’s observation, made during reexamination, that “the discharge rates described in Sato are abnormally high” for a power tool cell and “would lead to overheating of the cells.” Ex. 1033, 14. That testimony also is consistent with information provided by Petitioner’s own witness, Dr. Riley, who acknowledged on cross-examination that the battery pack of Fohr, as modified by Sato and Hallaj, would provide “the heat back to the system after a discharge” and, accordingly, would have no “practical applicability” in a power tool application. Resp. 24 (quoting Ex. 2169, 127:13–18, 131:12–24); see Ex. 2169, 127:9–128:2 (Petitioner’s own witness, Dr. Riley, further explaining that Hallaj is concerned with finding “a way of managing heat generation” in a power supply so that “heat can be used, pulled back into the batteries”). We credit Dr. Blomgren’s testimony that the “storing of heat” in Hallaj would have been “antithetical to” Sato’s lithium-based chemistry cells for use as the energy store in Fohr’s hand held power tool. Ex. 2147 ¶ 83. Petitioner’s own witness, Dr. Riley, provides testimony consistent with that view. Resp. 24 (citing Ex. 2169, 12713–18, 131:12–24) (Dr. Riley’s testimony on cross-examination); see Ex. 2147 ¶¶ 81–85 (Dr. Blomgren’s declaration testimony). That view is reinforced by evidence that the discharge rates supported by Hallaj are orders of magnitude lower than what would have been expected for a battery cell meeting the 20 Amp Limitation. Resp. 25; Pet. 38; Ex. 1015, 5:41-44; Ex. 2147 ¶¶ 79–80; see Ex. 1015, 5:41–44 (Hallaj, describing temperature profiles for discharge rates). We are persuaded that the heat-retaining battery module of Hallaj was not designed to handle, in a power tool application, the discharge currents disclosed for Sato’s individual lithium-based battery cell—much less the discharge currents that would be supplied by a plurality of Sato’s cells. Resp. 25 (citing Ex. 2147 ¶¶ 81, 84); see also Ex. 2147 ¶¶ 62–85 (testimony explaining why one of ordinary skill in the art would not have applied a plurality of Sato’s cells in the battery pack configuration of Hallaj to power Fohr’s hand held power tool). We further find that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been led to replace the capacitors in Fohr’s power tool with Hallaj’s battery module, modified to include a plurality of Sato’s lithium-based cells. Ex. 2147 ¶¶ 62–85. That combination would have presented a serious risk of overheating and, in light of that risk, an ordinary artisan would not have expected the modified battery pack of Hallaj to successfully power Fohr’s hand held power tool. Id.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 7,999,510 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,999,510 - Snap-On Inc. v. Milwaukee Electric Tool CorporationNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 14, 2016 · IPR2015-01242 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision
Petitioner did not prove claims 1–8, 10, and 11 of the ’290 patent, claims 1–8 and 10–13 of the ’173 patent, or claims 1–6 and 8–19 of the ’510 patent obvious over Fohr, Sato, and …
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We hold that the prior art references asserted in the Petition are representative of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (absence of specific findings on “level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error ‘where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown’” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). To the extent that a more specific definition is required, we hold that an ordinary artisan would include one holding a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical Engineering with two or three years of experience in battery design. That definition comports with the very similar definitions advanced by the parties. In that regard, Petitioner asserts that an ordinary artisan would encompass a person holding a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical Engineering with three years of experience in battery design. Pet. 8; Ex. 1007 ¶ 9. Patent Owner similarly asserts that an ordinary artisan would include a person holding a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical Engineering with two years of battery design experience. Resp. 8; Ex. 2105 ¶ 24.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“In our Decisions to Institute, we construed the 20 Amp Limitation to require that “the battery cells, when configured together in a battery pack, are capable of producing reasonably close to 20 amps of discharge current or greater over the course of delivering their entire rated capacity.” Dec. 5. Neither party disputes that construction, which we adopt for the purposes of this Final Written Decision. To the extent that any other claim term requires express construction, we discuss the construction in our analysis below. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only claim terms in controversy need be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy). The following facts are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportNot reached
“D. Fohr as Prior Art As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether Fohr qualifies as prior art. Resp. 10–15; Reply 2–8; Sur-Reply 1–5. Specifically, Patent Owner seeks to antedate Fohr based on inventor testimony. Resp. 10–15; Sur- Reply 1–5. Petitioner responds that the named inventors are not true inventors with standing to establish facts sufficient to antedate Fohr. Reply 2–8. We decline to reach the antedating issue because it is not necessary to our ultimate conclusion on the question of obviousness. Specifically, even if we accept Petitioner’s view that Fohr qualifies as prior art, we ultimately hold that Petitioner fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that any challenged claim would have been obvious over the combined disclosures of Fohr, Sato, and Hallaj. That is so because, as explained below, Petitioner fails to establish that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to combine Fohr with Sato and Hallaj in the manner claimed.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“1. Fohr Does Not Disclose or Suggest the 20 Amp Limitation We find that Fohr suggests a plurality of capacitors or battery cells as the energy store. Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 9, 17. Fohr discloses that a plurality of capacitors would have been capable of achieving a continuous current capacity from 20 to 30 amps. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 19. Although Fohr teaches that the capacitors “can advantageously alternatively be replaced by an energy store comprising rechargeable cells,” such as “Li rechargeable batteries,” Fohr does not disclose or suggest an energy store capacity for such batteries, much less establish that lithium batteries, available at the time of the invention, would have been suitable for use in a hand held power tool, or capable of achieving the 20 Amp Limitation of the challenged claims. Id. at ¶ 9. Critical to our analysis, Fohr never states what discharge currents can be achieved when lithium battery cells are used instead of capacitors as the energy source in a hand held power tool. Ex. 2147 ¶¶ 42, 58; see generally Ex. 1014 (Fohr). The Examiner, during reexamination, came to that exact same conclusion regarding Fohr’s disclosure, remarking that “there is nothing whatsoever in the reference that indicates the current produced by any lithium-based cells.” Ex. 1033, 11;5 Resp. 17.” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 7,554,290 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,554,290 - TRW Automotive US LLC v. Magna Electronics IncorporatedNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 25, 2015 · IPR2014-00251 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 8, 9, 18, 29, 30, 54, 62–64, and 70 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted references did not establish required control limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“These contentions by Dr. Miller, however, are conclusory statements not supported sufficiently by any objective evidence or analysis and, thus, are not persuasive. See Perreira v. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 33 F.3d 1375, 1377 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“An expert opinion is no better than the soundness of the reasons supporting it.”). Dr. Miller does not point to any specific disclosure in Yanagawa indicating that use of a microprocessor (as opposed to another type of device) is “crystal clear.” Moreover, there is no explanation why digital processing necessarily requires the use of a microprocessor. Instead, we are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Yanagawa provides insufficient detail as to the structure and functionality of its image signal processor 14 and executing part 15, and that the two components “could be analog circuitry-based or digital circuitry-based without necessarily employing or being based upon a microprocessor.” PO Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 41). Generally, microprocessors are distinguished from other processors in that they are contained on an integrated chip. See, e.g., DICTIONARY OF COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY: TERMS, DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS, WILEY (John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 1998), available at http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/wileycommtech/microproces sor/0 (last visited June 17, 2015) (defining “microprocessor” as “[a]n electronic circuit on the surface of a small silicon chip which can be programmed to perform a wide variety of functions within the computer system or terminal”).5 Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Miller addresses how Yanagawa’s image signal processor 14 and/or executing part 15 constitute a microprocessor-based control in this sense.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments. In instituting trial on this ground, we found that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that Yanagawa’s image signal processor 14 is the same or equivalent to the corresponding structure of the “control means” in the ’023 patent, i.e., digital signal processor 13 performing the algorithm identified in our claim construction. Dec. on Inst. 15. In view of the entire record, however, we now are persuaded Petitioner fails to show that image signal processor 14 performs an algorithm equivalent to the algorithm implemented by digital signal processor 13 of the ’023 patent. Petitioner’s assertions of similarities in how the controls of Yanagawa and the ’023 patent operate are insufficient to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Yanagawa’s processor implements an equivalent algorithm, particularly given that there is no evidence that Yanagawa processes image data pixel-by-pixel or uses counters, as required by multiple steps of the disclosed algorithm, such as steps 2 through 6. See Dec. on Inst. 9–10. In that regard, we have reviewed the disclosure of Yanagawa and credit Dr. Turk’s explanation as to why the reference does not disclose steps 2 through 6 specifically, or even pixel light thresholds, pixel light counters, or comparing adjacent pixel light levels generally. See Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 62–64. Absent some comparison between the algorithm of Yanagawa and the steps of the algorithm disclosed in the ’023 patent, we cannot say that Yanagawa discloses structure equivalent to the “control means” in claim 1. It is not enough to show merely that Yanagawa, at a high level, operates in “substantially the same way” as the ’023 patent to identify headlights and taillights, as Petitioner suggests. See Reply 9. After considering Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s positions, as well as their supporting evidence, we determine that Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 1, or claims 8 and 9 depending therefrom, are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Yanagawa, AAPA, Bendell, and Koshizawa.” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“These contentions by Dr. Miller, however, are conclusory statements not supported sufficiently by any objective evidence or analysis and, thus, are not persuasive. See Perreira v. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 33 F.3d 1375, 1377 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“An expert opinion is no better than the soundness of the reasons supporting it.”). Dr. Miller does not point to any specific disclosure in Yanagawa indicating that use of a microprocessor (as opposed to another type of device) is “crystal clear.” Moreover, there is no explanation why digital processing necessarily requires the use of a microprocessor. Instead, we are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Yanagawa provides insufficient detail as to the structure and functionality of its image signal processor 14 and executing part 15, and that the two components “could be analog circuitry-based or digital circuitry-based without necessarily employing or being based upon a microprocessor.” PO Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 41).” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). In the Petition, Petitioner proposed that a person having ordinary skill in the art of the ’023 patent at the time of the invention would have had at least the qualifications of, or equivalent to, either (1) a master’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science, with course work or research in vision systems, or (2) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering or computer science with at least two years of work making optical vision systems. Pet. 25. Patent Owner argued that this definition was incorrect because it failed to make any mention of expertise in vehicle technologies. Prelim. Resp. 16. In our Decision on Institution, we found Patent Owner’s argument unpersuasive because Patent Owner did not explain how the allegedly incorrect definition led to an incorrect obviousness analysis. Dec. on Inst. 17–18. The parties have not disputed this definition further, and we see no reason to modify it in light of the record developed during trial. Therefore, we adopt the above-mentioned definition of a person having ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of this Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 13
Patent outcomesUS 6,097,023 not shown unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 6,097,023
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.