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  • PTAB · Sep 27, 2024 · IPR2024-00650 · APJ Deborah Katz · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–38 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). We determine whether to institute an inter partes review on behalf of the Director. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a).” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “determined to be microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient were placed into a study arm and then treated with pembrolizumab. (See Ex. 1005, Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–73.) Because treatment of the patients was performed only after MSI-H status was determined, the MSI-H Study Record teaches treating the patients “in response to” determining their MSI- H status.” slip op. at 15

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted

      “have been expected, Petitioner cites to Brown as teaching that PD-1 inhibitors are inherently more effective when treating tumors comprised of cells that are easy for immune cells to recognize. (See Pet. 41 (citing Ex. 1034, 747).) Petitioner argues further that Duval teaches that MSI-H cancers have cells that are easy for immune cells to recognize. (See Pet. 41 (citing Ex. 1087, 5002).) Dr. Neugut’s testimony supports Petitioner’s argument that the cited teachings of Brown and Duval, as well as other references, would have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to obtain the results of the MSI-H Study Record. (See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 124, 130, 132; see Pet. 41.) Petitioner argues further that Brown and Duval would have motivated one of ordinary skill in the art to obtain the results of the MSI-H Study Record by treating patients with common types of MSI-H cancers, including endometrial, small bowel, and gastric cancers. (See Pet. 41 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 130).) Petitioner argues further that the state of the art, as demonstrated by Brown and Duval, as well as other references, would have provided one of ordinary skill in the art with a reasonable expectation of success because physicians were successfully treating patients with cancers that were known to be MSI-H with PD-1 inhibitors. (See Pet. 42 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 131, 132).)” slip op. at 18

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’219 patent would have been a medical doctor or a professional in a related field with at least five years of experience with treating cancer. (See Pet. 11 (citing Neugut Decl., Ex. 1003 ¶19).) Petitioner argues further that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have experience in or access to a person with knowledge of clinical studies for therapeutics and how they work and to a pathologist with comparable experience. (See id.) Dr. Neugut’s testimony supports Petitioner’s arguments regarding the level of skill that an ordinarily skilled artisan in the relevant field would have. (See Ex. 1003 ¶ 19.) Accordingly, in the analysis below, and in the absence of argument by Patent Owner to the contrary, we apply the level of skill set forth by Petitioner and refer to Dr. Neugut’s testimony of what one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood at the time the application that became the ’491 patent was filed, which does not appear to be inconsistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 8

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,634,491
  • PTAB · Sep 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00623 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–7 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The Supreme Court has held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). After considering the information presented by the parties, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one of claims 1–7 of the ’974 patent is unpatentable, and we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. Id.” slip op. at 2

    • BurdenInstituted

      “reference—in order to anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102—must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements ‘arranged as in the claim.’” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Whether a reference anticipates a claim is assessed from the skilled artisan’s perspective. See Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he dispositive question regarding anticipation [i]s whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the [prior art reference’s] teaching that every claim element was disclosed in that single reference.” (quoting In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1991))).” slip op. at 10

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “2. The Parties’ Contentions The parties agree that the MSI-H Study Record was publicly available by June 12, 2013. (See Pet. 7; see Prelim. Resp. 19 (“JHU submitted the MSI-H Study Record on June 10, 2013, and it was posted on clinicaltrials.gov on approximately June 12, 2013”). In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s argument (see Pet. 8) that the MSI-H Study Record is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and is not covered by an exception under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). See Prelim. Resp.” slip op. at 12

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInstituted

      “22. Our research group eventually approached Merck. Merck agreed in early 2013 to supply its then-unapproved anti-PD-1 antibody, MK-3475 (pembrolizumab) for use in the study. It was, however, the research team at Hopkins who secured IRB approval, conducted, and paid for the study. On June 12, 2013, the solicitation for patients was first posted on clinicaltrials.gov (Exhibit D). In my mind, the four arms allowed us to try to get at an answer to a question to which we did not know the answer-specifically whether or not patients with MSI-high or MMR deficient tumors would exhibit an improved response when treated with MK-3475, compared with the more common MSS [microsatellite stable] or MMR proficient colon cancers. Thus, the trial covered all patients with colon cancer, MSI and MSS, but separated into two groups. 23. The preliminary results of this study demonstrated clinical responses at an unexpectedly high rate (>50% objective response rate) in the MSI-high (MMR deficient) arm but not in the MSS (MMR proficient) arm. (Ex. 1002, 270–271.) This affidavit, submitted during prosecution of the ’974 patent, supports the argument that an improved outcome of treating a patient with a tumor exhibiting an MSI-high or a MMR deficiency status with pembrolizumab compared to similarly treating a patient without an MSI-high or a MMR deficiency status, a recited in claim 1, is an inherent result. Patent Owner does not dispute this result in the Preliminary Response. See Prelim. Resp. 7 (“The ’974 Patent reports that mismatch repair-deficient colorectal cancers (i.e., MSI-H CRC) had an immune-related objective response rate and immune-related progression-free survival rate of 40% and 78%, respectively—a huge improvement compared to the 0% and 11% rates found in mismatch repair-proficient colorectal cancers (i.e., MSI negative CRC).”).” slip op. at 17

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,325,974
  • PTAB · Sep 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00625 · APJ Deborah Katz · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–8 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable and declining discretionary denial under §§ 314(a) and 325(d).

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). To be anticipated, each and every element of the claim must be found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. See Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When claim elements are inherently taught, the result must be a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, but the prior art need not demonstrate that the authors appreciated the results. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 7

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

      “invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). To be anticipated, each and every element of the claim must be found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. See Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When claim elements are inherently taught, the result must be a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, but the prior art need not demonstrate that the authors appreciated the results. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 7

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency foundDecided for petitioner

      “invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). To be anticipated, each and every element of the claim must be found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. See Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When claim elements are inherently taught, the result must be a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, but the prior art need not demonstrate that the authors appreciated the results. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 7

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “Petitioner argues that Pernot teaches treating colorectal cancer and that, therefore, because the MSI-H Study Record is directed to a clinical study treating colorectal cancer in a patient whose cancers are MSI-H with pembrolizumab, which is an anti-PD-1 antibody, one of ordinary skill in the art knowing the teachings of the MSI-H Study Record would have considered the teachings of Pernot. (See Pet. 36.) Petitioner argues that Pernot teaches that colorectal cancer patients that are MSI-H are “good candidates for immunotherapy,” such as PD-1 inhibitors. (See Pet. 36 (quoting Ex. 1006, 3741 (“[Colorectal cancer] associated with MSI could lead to a more intense immune response, but also to specific immunoregulatory phenomena, making [patients with colorectal cancer] good candidates for immunotherapy.”)).) Petitioner cites further to Dr. Neugut’s testimony to argue that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the disclosure of Pernot with the methods taught in the MSI-H Study Record in order to obtain the results of the MSI-H Study Record’s study. (See Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 93).)” slip op. at 17

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,339,219
  • PTAB · Sep 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00624 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 6–10, and 12–15 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenge and declining Fintiv denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The Supreme Court has held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). After considering the information presented by the parties, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one of claims 1–4, 6–10, and 12–15 of the ’975 patent are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). To be anticipated, each and every element of the claim must be found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. See Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When claim elements are inherently taught, the result must be a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, but the prior art need not demonstrate that the authors appreciated the results. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “Obviousness is determined by looking to the scope and content of the prior art, differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). “[T]he analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “pending Maryland litigation has been stayed in its entirety pending resolution of IPR2024-00240, which involves a related patent that is also involved in the litigation. Reply, 1 (citing Order in Maryland litigation, dated June 29, 2024, Ex. 1100, 1); see Sur-Reply, 1 (acknowledging “the recent stay of the parties’ co-pending litigation involving the ’975 Patent.”). In its Memorandum Opinion, the court acknowledged that inter partes reviews of additional patents involved in the litigation could be instituted. See Ex. 1101, 3. Accordingly, the first Fintiv factor weighs heavily in favor of not exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. Because of the stay, the second and third Fintiv factors also weigh heavily in favor of not exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. The stay indicates that the court’s trial date will not be close to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision and that neither the court nor the parties will invest further in the parallel proceeding. See Fintiv, at 6 (“A district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts. This fact has strongly weighed against exercising the authority to deny institution under NHK.”); see also Memorandum Opinion in Maryland litigation issued June 29, 2024, Ex. 1101, 2 (noting that the” slip op. at 32

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,325,975
  • PTAB · Sep 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00622 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 6–11, 13–20, 22–24, and 26–28 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success and declining discretionary denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “the . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). To be anticipated, each and every element of the claim must be found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. See Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When claim elements are inherently taught, the result must be a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, but the prior art need not demonstrate that the authors appreciated the results. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 11

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “the . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). To be anticipated, each and every element of the claim must be found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. See Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When claim elements are inherently taught, the result must be a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, but the prior art need not demonstrate that the authors appreciated the results. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 11

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that the MSI-H Study Record is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and is not covered by an exception under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 8. The parties agree that the MSI-H Study Record was publicly available by June 12, 2013. Id. at 7; Prelim. Resp. 19 (“JHU submitted the MSI-H Study Record on June 10, 2013, and it was posted on clinicaltrials.gov on approximately June 12, 2013”).” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “summarized above, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes that Petitioner has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that claim 1 would have been obvious in view of the MSI-H Study Record. We are persuaded that the MSI-H Study Record discloses the limitations of claim 1. Pet. 16–24. We are further persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify the MSI-H Study Record with Pernot and Benson to benefit from the improved outcomes in treating MSI-H colorectal patients with the drug therapeutic. Id. at 41–44. We are also persuaded that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to test patients to determine their MSI-H status as such testing was routine in the art. Id. at 44–45. We are also persuaded that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the MSI-H Study Record and Benson to treat patients with metastatic and advanced disease. Id. at 46–47.” slip op. at 27

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,934,356
  • PTAB · Sep 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00631 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–10 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability, and granted Apotex’s motion to join the Mylan IPR.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). In Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential), the Board set forth six non-exclusive factors for determining “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. at 6. These factors are as follows: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Id. at 5–6. In evaluating these factors, we take a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review. Id. at 6. The Director has also issued interim guidance to the Board on applying the factors. See Katherine K. Vidal, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b), we “may waive or suspend a requirement of [part 42 of the Board’s rules] and may place conditions on the waiver or suspension.” Here, we agree with Petitioner that it has shown sufficient reason for us to waive the one-month from institution joinder motion deadline. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). Petitioner waited until it had a sufficient business reason to file this Petition, and subsequently promptly filed its Petition and Motion for Joinder. Most critically, Petitioner raises no new unpatentability grounds, the trial schedule for the Mylan IPR need not be adjusted, and Petitioner agrees to serve in a silent understudy role. We determine that joinder with the Mylan IPR is appropriate under the circumstances. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 13

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,335,462
  • PTAB · Sep 5, 2024 · IPR2023-01300 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The Board determines whether to institute a trial on behalf of the Director. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). A decision to institute is “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition.” PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “would have possessed a strong understanding in the use and development of genetics and genomics approaches for detecting or monitoring human diseases, such as spatial detection of a target analyte (e.g., mRNA or DNA) in a tissue, and would typically have a Ph.D. in a relevant field (e.g., molecular biology, genetics, and bioinformatics) with two years of experience. Pet. 21–22 (citing Ex. 1044 ¶¶ 24–36). For the purposes of its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not provide its own proposed level of skill. Prelim. Resp. 7. For purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s unchallenged definition as it is consistent with the cited prior art and disclosure of the ’142 patent.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “Thus, according to claim 1, to synthesize a first/second plurality of DNA products by performing a synthesis reaction, the “DNA products” must 1) use the oligonucleotides collected in steps (a) and (b) as templates from which the DNA is synthesized, and 2) incorporate a source location-identifying nucleic acid sequence.” slip op. at 20

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “(2) Analysis Neither party has offered a construction for “collecting oligonucleotides under conditions that release them” in claim 1. We note that, in the related litigation, the district court determined that “under conditions that release” should have its plain and ordinary meaning. Ex. 1052, 38. For purposes of institution, we also apply the plain and ordinary meaning of this claim phrase and do not need to expressly construe the claim phrase for purposes of institution. On this record, for the reasons explained by Petitioner and as supported by its declarant testimony, we conclude Petitioner has sufficiently shown that So-456 discloses the “collecting oligonucleotides under conditions that release them” limitation recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 42

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,473,142
  • PTAB · Aug 30, 2024 · IPR2022-01531 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Remand

    On remand, the Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–17, 20–21, 24–26, and 29–34 on all grounds stated in the Petition.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • Director reviewOther

      “Petition did not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims, and did not institute inter partes review. Paper 17 (“Inst. Dec.”). Petitioner requested Director review of our decision denying institution (Paper 18 (“Request”)). The Director delegated review of the decision to a Delegated Rehearing Panel. Paper 19. Patent Owner was granted the option to file a response to Petitioner’s Request (Paper 22 (“Request Resp.”)). The Director Review Panel (“DRP”) vacated our decision and remanded the case to this panel with a revised construction for claim 1. Paper 23 (“DRP Dec.”).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect (2018). Upon reconsideration of the briefing and the evidence of record in light of the DRP’s claim construction, we conclude that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we grant institution of inter partes review of claims 1–17, 20–21, 24–26, and 29–34 of the ’682 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “We find that Petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office in the prior consideration of Morales-Sanfrutos, Straus, Singh, and Lees. For instance, under the second prong of Advanced Bionics, we consider “(c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during “(e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art.” Becton, Dickinson, 17–18. We agree with Petitioner that the Office overlooked Morales- Sanfrutos’ and Singh’s teachings during examination and reexamination. Pet. 79. Although Morales-Sanfrutos, Straus, and Singh were listed on an IDS, they were not the subject of a rejection during examination or reexamination. Moreover, for the reasons discussed below at this stage with regard to Petitioner’s grounds over Morales-Sanfrutos, as evidenced by Straus, and over Singh, Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates that the Office materially erred in overlooking Morales-Sanfrutos’s and Singh’s teachings regarding their linker structures. Id. Further, to the extent the Lees’ teachings were considered during examination and reexamination, Lees’ disclosure of a homobifunctional sulfone linker was overlooked. Lees’ homobifunctional linker, which Patent Owner argues is substantially similar to Harris’ homobifunctional linker, which Petitioner chiefly relies upon in Grounds 2–5, was not the subject of a rejection during examination. Pet. Resp. Brief 1; Prelim. Resp. 25–26. We agree with Petitioner that only Lees’ heterobifunctional linker was applied in a rejection during examination. Pet. Resp. Brief 1; Ex. 1018, 42–43, 62. 4. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we decline to exercise discretion to deny institution under § 325(d).” slip op. at 27

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Based on the information presented, we find that the asserted prior art itself is sufficient to demonstrate the level of skill in the art at the time of the (prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). To the extent a more precise definition is required, we apply Petitioner’s unopposed definition for purposes of determining whether to institute review because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art references.” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,131,682
  • PTAB · Aug 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00580 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1, 3–6, and 8 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least claim 1 would be shown obvious over the ’772 Publication and Snowdy.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Beginning with independent claim 1, we determine that Petitioner has met its burden for institution. Based on the current record, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of succeeding in establishing that the combination of the ’772 Publication and Snowdy renders at least claim 1 obvious.” slip op. at 18

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 111–115). Patent Owner states that it does not dispute this definition for purposes of the Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 16. On the current record, and for the purposes of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s proposed definition, as it appears consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’462 Patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” as evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Having considered the record, we determine that no express claim construction of any claim term is necessary to reach our decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd. v. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803)).” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundOther

      “We agree with Patent Owner on the record before us that Petitioner does not appear to offer sufficient evidence and reasoning as to why a POSA would have modified AAVrh.10 at position 665 as described as opposed to other modifications based solely on the disclosure of the ’772 Publication. We do agree with Petitioner, however, that on the record before us, Snowdy provides such sufficient evidence and reasoning. See Pet. 47–52.” slip op. at 26

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,680,274
  • PTAB · Jul 26, 2024 · PGR2023-00017 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · PGR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–10 are unpatentable: claims 1, 3–5, 7, 9, and 10 are anticipated by Godoy; claims 1–10 are anticipated by Tobler; other grounds were not reached.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “record (Ex. 1022, Attachments 5, 6) and the ResearchGate page (id., Attachments 7–10), to further support her opinion that the Godoy report was publicly available before November 4, 2016. Id. ¶¶ 31–38, 42–48. She testifies that “ResearchGate contains many search features which would allow an interested POSA to find the Godoy report, e.g., key word searching.” Id. ¶ 48. Dr. Jacobsen, who has personally used the service, agrees that in ResearchGate, “you can start to search for publications using keywords and things like that, authors.” Ex. 1043, 66:1–67:10. For these reasons, we again find Dr. Hall-Ellis’s testimony credible.” slip op. at 32

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “record (Ex. 1022, Attachments 5, 6) and the ResearchGate page (id., Attachments 7–10), to further support her opinion that the Godoy report was publicly available before November 4, 2016. Id. ¶¶ 31–38, 42–48. She testifies that “ResearchGate contains many search features which would allow an interested POSA to find the Godoy report, e.g., key word searching.” Id. ¶ 48. Dr. Jacobsen, who has personally used the service, agrees that in ResearchGate, “you can start to search for publications using keywords and things like that, authors.” Ex. 1043, 66:1–67:10. For these reasons, we again find Dr. Hall-Ellis’s testimony credible.” slip op. at 32

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “several lists, Petitioner has met its burden in showing that an ordinarily skilled artisan would at once envisage the fungicidal combination of claim 1 from its disclosure. Accordingly, Tobler anticipates claim 1. We address Patent Owner’s arguments below.” slip op. at 44

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached

      “28 Because Petitioner has shown that asserted prior art references anticipate claims 1 and 3–10, we do not address whether these claims would have been obvious over De Oliveira, either alone or in view of Wiglesworth, Tobler, and Godoy. 29 Having determined that Petitioner has shown all challenged claims are unpatentable under other grounds, we do not address this obvious ground. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359 (2018) (holding a petitioner “is entitled to a final written decision addressing all of the claims it has challenged”); Bos. Sci. Scimed, Inc. v. Cook Grp. Inc., 809 F. App’x 984, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (recognizing that the “Board need not address issues that are not necessary to the resolution of the proceeding” and, thus, agreeing that the Board has “discretion to decline to decide additional instituted grounds once the petitioner has prevailed on all its challenged claims”).” slip op. at 81

    Patent outcomesUS 11,445,727 unpatentable
    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,445,727

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.