PTAB
Advanced fields
180 decisions · 484msnewest first
  • PTAB · Sep 27, 2024 · IPR2024-00649 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–28 on all six asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The Supreme Court has held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). After considering the information presented by the parties, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one of claims 1–28 of the ’187 patent are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “Anticipation is a question of fact, as is the question of what a prior art reference teaches. In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “Because the hallmark of anticipation is prior invention, the prior art reference—in order to anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102—must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements ‘arranged as in the claim.’” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Whether a reference anticipates a claim is assessed from the skilled artisan’s perspective. See Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he dispositive question regarding anticipation [i]s whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the [prior art reference’s] teaching that every claim element was disclosed in that single reference.” (quoting In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1991))).” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “The obviousness inquiry also typically requires an analysis of “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (requiring “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”)). A petitioner cannot prove obviousness with “mere conclusory statements.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Rather, a petitioner must articulate a sufficient reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the prior art references. In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner argues that we need not construe any terms of the challenged claims to resolve the issues presented in the Petition. Pet. 11. We determine that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent further discussion of the meaning any claim term is necessary to our decision, we provide that discussion below in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 8

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,629,187
  • PTAB · Sep 27, 2024 · IPR2024-00647 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–36 because the Petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim across the asserted grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The Supreme Court has held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). After considering the information presented in the Petition, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving the unpatentability of at least one of claims 1–36 of the ’287 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “summarized above, we are persuaded by Petitioner that the MSI-H Study Record teaches treating colorectal cancer patients after they were determined to be microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient with pembrolizumab. See MSI-H Study Record, Ex, 1005, 4 (Arms and Interventions); see also id., 2 (Study Identification), 3 (Study Description), 4–5 (Outcome Measures), 5–6 (Eligibility); Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 58–62. We are also persuaded that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that there is a reasonable likelihood of a causal relationship in the MSI-H Study Record between treatment of colorectal cancer patients and the determination of their MSI status — all colorectal cancer patients determined to be microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient were treated with pembrolizumab. Whether or not other patients were treated or enrolled in the study does not detract from this teaching.3 Accordingly, we are persuaded by Petitioner that, on this record, the MSI-H Study Record discloses each element of claim 1. In view of the above, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood of establishing that the MSI-H Study Record anticipates claim 1. Patent Owner at this stage does not offer any arguments addressing Petitioner’s substantive showing.” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “not disclose the limitation of “in response to determining that the colorectal cancer is microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient, treating a human patient having colorectal cancer that is microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient with a therapeutically effective amount of pembrolizumab,” the record before us supports this limitation being rendered obvious by Pernot and the MSI-H Study Record. Specifically, because Pernot teaches that colorectal cancer patients are good candidates for immunotherapy, the evidence of the current record shows that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to use to PD-1 inhibitors to treat colorectal cancers. Ex. 1006, 3741; Ex. 1003 ¶ 136. Additionally, the focus in the MSI-H Study Record on a clinical study treating colorectal cancer patients who had been determined to be MSI-H with pembrolizumab indicates that it would have been obvious to test for this condition before treatment. The additional references discussed by Petitioner contribute further to a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail. For example, Libson reports the successful treatment of a colorectal cancer patient having MSI-H status with a PD-1 inhibitor (Ex. 1057, 463-64) and Champiat discusses evaluating the clinical activity of PD-1 agents in DNA mismatch repair, such as MSI+, colorectal cancer (Ex. 1032, e27817-5). Pet. 44 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 49). Thus, based on the current record, we determine that Petitioner presents a reasonable likelihood that the method of claim 1 would have been considered obvious by one of ordinary skill in the art. Accordingly, in view of the above, we are persuaded that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one claim challenged under Ground 2 in the Petition.” slip op. at 21

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA” or “POSITA”) at the time of the invention would be a medical doctor or a professional in a related field with at least five years of experience with treating cancer. . . . The POSA would also have experience in or access to a person with knowledge of clinical studies for therapeutics and how they work and a pathologist with comparable experience. . . . The inherent anticipation and obviousness grounds discussed herein would not change due to a modestly lesser or greater level of experience. Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 19). For this Decision, we adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposal above, which does not appear to be inconsistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,649,287
  • PTAB · Sep 27, 2024 · IPR2024-00650 · APJ Deborah Katz · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–38 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). We determine whether to institute an inter partes review on behalf of the Director. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a).” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “determined to be microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient were placed into a study arm and then treated with pembrolizumab. (See Ex. 1005, Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–73.) Because treatment of the patients was performed only after MSI-H status was determined, the MSI-H Study Record teaches treating the patients “in response to” determining their MSI- H status.” slip op. at 15

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted

      “have been expected, Petitioner cites to Brown as teaching that PD-1 inhibitors are inherently more effective when treating tumors comprised of cells that are easy for immune cells to recognize. (See Pet. 41 (citing Ex. 1034, 747).) Petitioner argues further that Duval teaches that MSI-H cancers have cells that are easy for immune cells to recognize. (See Pet. 41 (citing Ex. 1087, 5002).) Dr. Neugut’s testimony supports Petitioner’s argument that the cited teachings of Brown and Duval, as well as other references, would have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to obtain the results of the MSI-H Study Record. (See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 124, 130, 132; see Pet. 41.) Petitioner argues further that Brown and Duval would have motivated one of ordinary skill in the art to obtain the results of the MSI-H Study Record by treating patients with common types of MSI-H cancers, including endometrial, small bowel, and gastric cancers. (See Pet. 41 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 130).) Petitioner argues further that the state of the art, as demonstrated by Brown and Duval, as well as other references, would have provided one of ordinary skill in the art with a reasonable expectation of success because physicians were successfully treating patients with cancers that were known to be MSI-H with PD-1 inhibitors. (See Pet. 42 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 131, 132).)” slip op. at 18

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’219 patent would have been a medical doctor or a professional in a related field with at least five years of experience with treating cancer. (See Pet. 11 (citing Neugut Decl., Ex. 1003 ¶19).) Petitioner argues further that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have experience in or access to a person with knowledge of clinical studies for therapeutics and how they work and to a pathologist with comparable experience. (See id.) Dr. Neugut’s testimony supports Petitioner’s arguments regarding the level of skill that an ordinarily skilled artisan in the relevant field would have. (See Ex. 1003 ¶ 19.) Accordingly, in the analysis below, and in the absence of argument by Patent Owner to the contrary, we apply the level of skill set forth by Petitioner and refer to Dr. Neugut’s testimony of what one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood at the time the application that became the ’491 patent was filed, which does not appear to be inconsistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 8

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,634,491
  • PTAB · Sep 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00623 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–7 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The Supreme Court has held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). After considering the information presented by the parties, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one of claims 1–7 of the ’974 patent is unpatentable, and we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. Id.” slip op. at 2

    • BurdenInstituted

      “reference—in order to anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102—must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements ‘arranged as in the claim.’” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Whether a reference anticipates a claim is assessed from the skilled artisan’s perspective. See Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he dispositive question regarding anticipation [i]s whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the [prior art reference’s] teaching that every claim element was disclosed in that single reference.” (quoting In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1991))).” slip op. at 10

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “2. The Parties’ Contentions The parties agree that the MSI-H Study Record was publicly available by June 12, 2013. (See Pet. 7; see Prelim. Resp. 19 (“JHU submitted the MSI-H Study Record on June 10, 2013, and it was posted on clinicaltrials.gov on approximately June 12, 2013”). In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s argument (see Pet. 8) that the MSI-H Study Record is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and is not covered by an exception under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). See Prelim. Resp.” slip op. at 12

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInstituted

      “22. Our research group eventually approached Merck. Merck agreed in early 2013 to supply its then-unapproved anti-PD-1 antibody, MK-3475 (pembrolizumab) for use in the study. It was, however, the research team at Hopkins who secured IRB approval, conducted, and paid for the study. On June 12, 2013, the solicitation for patients was first posted on clinicaltrials.gov (Exhibit D). In my mind, the four arms allowed us to try to get at an answer to a question to which we did not know the answer-specifically whether or not patients with MSI-high or MMR deficient tumors would exhibit an improved response when treated with MK-3475, compared with the more common MSS [microsatellite stable] or MMR proficient colon cancers. Thus, the trial covered all patients with colon cancer, MSI and MSS, but separated into two groups. 23. The preliminary results of this study demonstrated clinical responses at an unexpectedly high rate (>50% objective response rate) in the MSI-high (MMR deficient) arm but not in the MSS (MMR proficient) arm. (Ex. 1002, 270–271.) This affidavit, submitted during prosecution of the ’974 patent, supports the argument that an improved outcome of treating a patient with a tumor exhibiting an MSI-high or a MMR deficiency status with pembrolizumab compared to similarly treating a patient without an MSI-high or a MMR deficiency status, a recited in claim 1, is an inherent result. Patent Owner does not dispute this result in the Preliminary Response. See Prelim. Resp. 7 (“The ’974 Patent reports that mismatch repair-deficient colorectal cancers (i.e., MSI-H CRC) had an immune-related objective response rate and immune-related progression-free survival rate of 40% and 78%, respectively—a huge improvement compared to the 0% and 11% rates found in mismatch repair-proficient colorectal cancers (i.e., MSI negative CRC).”).” slip op. at 17

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,325,974
  • PTAB · Sep 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00625 · APJ Deborah Katz · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–8 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable and declining discretionary denial under §§ 314(a) and 325(d).

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). To be anticipated, each and every element of the claim must be found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. See Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When claim elements are inherently taught, the result must be a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, but the prior art need not demonstrate that the authors appreciated the results. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 7

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

      “invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). To be anticipated, each and every element of the claim must be found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. See Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When claim elements are inherently taught, the result must be a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, but the prior art need not demonstrate that the authors appreciated the results. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 7

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency foundDecided for petitioner

      “invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). To be anticipated, each and every element of the claim must be found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. See Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When claim elements are inherently taught, the result must be a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, but the prior art need not demonstrate that the authors appreciated the results. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 7

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “Petitioner argues that Pernot teaches treating colorectal cancer and that, therefore, because the MSI-H Study Record is directed to a clinical study treating colorectal cancer in a patient whose cancers are MSI-H with pembrolizumab, which is an anti-PD-1 antibody, one of ordinary skill in the art knowing the teachings of the MSI-H Study Record would have considered the teachings of Pernot. (See Pet. 36.) Petitioner argues that Pernot teaches that colorectal cancer patients that are MSI-H are “good candidates for immunotherapy,” such as PD-1 inhibitors. (See Pet. 36 (quoting Ex. 1006, 3741 (“[Colorectal cancer] associated with MSI could lead to a more intense immune response, but also to specific immunoregulatory phenomena, making [patients with colorectal cancer] good candidates for immunotherapy.”)).) Petitioner cites further to Dr. Neugut’s testimony to argue that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the disclosure of Pernot with the methods taught in the MSI-H Study Record in order to obtain the results of the MSI-H Study Record’s study. (See Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 93).)” slip op. at 17

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,339,219
  • PTAB · Sep 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00624 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 6–10, and 12–15 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenge and declining Fintiv denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The Supreme Court has held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). After considering the information presented by the parties, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one of claims 1–4, 6–10, and 12–15 of the ’975 patent are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). To be anticipated, each and every element of the claim must be found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. See Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When claim elements are inherently taught, the result must be a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, but the prior art need not demonstrate that the authors appreciated the results. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “Obviousness is determined by looking to the scope and content of the prior art, differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). “[T]he analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “pending Maryland litigation has been stayed in its entirety pending resolution of IPR2024-00240, which involves a related patent that is also involved in the litigation. Reply, 1 (citing Order in Maryland litigation, dated June 29, 2024, Ex. 1100, 1); see Sur-Reply, 1 (acknowledging “the recent stay of the parties’ co-pending litigation involving the ’975 Patent.”). In its Memorandum Opinion, the court acknowledged that inter partes reviews of additional patents involved in the litigation could be instituted. See Ex. 1101, 3. Accordingly, the first Fintiv factor weighs heavily in favor of not exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. Because of the stay, the second and third Fintiv factors also weigh heavily in favor of not exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. The stay indicates that the court’s trial date will not be close to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision and that neither the court nor the parties will invest further in the parallel proceeding. See Fintiv, at 6 (“A district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts. This fact has strongly weighed against exercising the authority to deny institution under NHK.”); see also Memorandum Opinion in Maryland litigation issued June 29, 2024, Ex. 1101, 2 (noting that the” slip op. at 32

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,325,975
  • PTAB · Sep 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00622 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 6–11, 13–20, 22–24, and 26–28 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success and declining discretionary denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “the . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). To be anticipated, each and every element of the claim must be found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. See Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When claim elements are inherently taught, the result must be a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, but the prior art need not demonstrate that the authors appreciated the results. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 11

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “the . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). To be anticipated, each and every element of the claim must be found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. See Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When claim elements are inherently taught, the result must be a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, but the prior art need not demonstrate that the authors appreciated the results. See Mehl/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 11

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that the MSI-H Study Record is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and is not covered by an exception under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 8. The parties agree that the MSI-H Study Record was publicly available by June 12, 2013. Id. at 7; Prelim. Resp. 19 (“JHU submitted the MSI-H Study Record on June 10, 2013, and it was posted on clinicaltrials.gov on approximately June 12, 2013”).” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “summarized above, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes that Petitioner has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that claim 1 would have been obvious in view of the MSI-H Study Record. We are persuaded that the MSI-H Study Record discloses the limitations of claim 1. Pet. 16–24. We are further persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify the MSI-H Study Record with Pernot and Benson to benefit from the improved outcomes in treating MSI-H colorectal patients with the drug therapeutic. Id. at 41–44. We are also persuaded that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to test patients to determine their MSI-H status as such testing was routine in the art. Id. at 44–45. We are also persuaded that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the MSI-H Study Record and Benson to treat patients with metastatic and advanced disease. Id. at 46–47.” slip op. at 27

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,934,356
  • PTAB · Sep 17, 2024 · IPR2023-00876 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–6 are unpatentable: claims 1–4 and 6 as obvious over Linnarsson and McCloskey, and claim 5 as obvious over those references and ordinary skill.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

      “Clearly, the second Hall-Ellis declaration is offered to prove that McCloskey is a prior art printed publication. See, e.g., Ex. 1065 ¶50 (“In view of the foregoing, it is my opinion that [McCloskey] was publicly available no later than [January 3, 2008].”). Thus, the second Hall-Ellis declaration should have been served within ten business days of Patent Owner’s October, 27, 2023, objection to the admissibility of McCloskey. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2) (“The party relying on evidence to which an objection is timely served may respond to the objection by serving supplemental evidence within ten business days of service of the objection.”). Because it was not filed until March 29, 2024, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is granted with respect to the second Hall-Ellis declaration. In its Opposition to the Motion to Exclude, Petitioner argues that, under Hulu LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, No. IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), it was allowed to wait until its Reply to file the second Hall-Ellis declaration. Paper 37, 1–2. The Board in Hulu does state that, “if the patent owner challenges a reference’s status as a printed publication, a petitioner may submit a supporting declaration with its reply to further support its argument that a reference qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, at 15 (37 C.F.R. § 42.23). However, the Board’s statement was referring to the scope of permissible reply arguments under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). See Hulu at 14 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)’s requirement that “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, or patent owner response”). The Board in Hulu does not purport to interpret 37 C.F.R. § 42.64 or even discuss supplemental evidence. Petitioner clearly missed the deadline imposed by 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2), which was triggered by Patent Owner’s October 27, 2023, objection to McCloskey. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is granted with respect to the second Hall-Ellis declaration (i.e., Ex. 1065).” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “We find that both references are analogous art to the ’981 patent, as there is ample supporting evidence in the record, including that to which the Reply cites (citations identified in the immediately preceding paragraph). Indeed, Patent Owner does not dispute the merits of either argument. PO Sur-Reply 27–28. Rather, Patent Owner, argues that we “should not now permit Petitioner to rewrite its clearly-deficient Petition.” Id. at 28. Petitioner’s Reply does not re-write its Petition. What Petitioner’s Reply does, in response to Patent Owner’s arguments, is precisely what Sanofi-Aventis contemplates as being proper in a reply brief. Indeed, in ruling against the petitioner in Sanofi-Aventis, the Federal Circuit specifically noted that the petitioner could have used its reply brief “to explain how [the prior art reference] is analogous to the [challenged] patent” but did not do so. 66 F.4th at 1379–1380. Here, in contrast, Petitioner used its Reply brief to explain how Linnarsson and McCloskey are analogous to the ’981 patent. Petitioner’s explanation in its Reply brief was both proper and persuasive.” slip op. at 14

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

      “That McCloskey is what it purports to be (a journal article) and that it was published in 2007 are corroborated by multiple pieces of evidence. McCloskey names four authors, all four of whom are named inventors of US 2007/0020640 A1, published Jan. 25, 2007 (“McCloskey ’640”). Ex. 1004, 1, Ex. 2001, code (76). Patent Owner concedes that McCloskey and McCloskey ’640 involve the same subject matter, having argued that the consideration of McCloskey ’640 supported discretionary denial of the Petition based on McCloskey. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 22 (“Petitioner’s secondary reference, an article by McCloskey, is at best cumulative of the far more detailed McCloskey ’640, which was raised by the Office and substantively discussed as the basis for a potential rejection using its asserted disclosure of a polynucleotide-specific tag—the same purported teaching for which Petitioner relies on McCloskey here.”). Notably, McCloskey ’640 was published on January 25, 2007. Ex. 2001, code (43). That is just days before McCloskey was received by BIOCHEMICAL GENETICS on January 31, 2007. See EX. 1004, 1 (“Received: 31 January 2007 / Accepted: 29 May 2007 / Published online: 23 October 2007”). In other words, it appears that the authors sought to have their research published in a scientific journal promptly after the subject matter of their research had been published by the Office. Further, the existence of McCloskey and its publication year of 2007 is confirmed by other sources in the record. See Ex. 1029, code (56) (United States Patent identifying as a cited reference: “McCloskey, et al. Encoding Pcr products with batch-stamps and barcodes. Biochem Genet. Dec. 2007;45(11-12):761-7. Epub Oct. 23, 2007.”); Ex. 1053, code (56) (same); Ex. 1060 (article’s bibliography citing “McCloskey ML, Stöger R, Hansen RS, Laird CD. Encoding PCR products with batch-stamps and barcodes. Biochem. Genet 2007;45:761–767. [PubMed: 17955361]”). Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is denied with respect to” slip op. at 19

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

      “The Petition states that “Petitioner does not believe that any terms require explicit construction in view of the prior art being presented.” Pet. 36. Despite this stated position, Petitioner proposed constructions for “multiplex-identifier (MID)” and “providing a sample.” Id. Patent Owner, in its Preliminary Response, stated that it “agrees that at this time, solely for purposes of an institution decision on the Petition, no terms require explicit construction.” Prelim. Resp. 45. In instituting the IPR, we found no need to provide an express construction of any claim term. Inst. Dec. 6. In the Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner repeats that it “does not believe any term needs construction,” but nonetheless “applies the Petition’s definitions for ‘MID’ and ‘sample.’” PO Resp. 19. The Petition defines MID as “‘a tag or combination of tags associated with a polynucleotide whose identity (e.g., the tag DNA sequence) can be used to differentiate polynucleotides in a sample.’” Pet. 36 (quoting Ex. 1001, 6:33–38). The Petition defines sample as “‘a quantity of material from a biological, environmental medical, or patient source in which detection, measurement, or labeling of target nucleic acids is sought.’” Id. (quoting Ex. 1001, 12:7– 10). We apply these same definitions in our analysis.” slip op. at 6

    Patent outcomesUS 10,155,981 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,155,981
  • PTAB · Sep 5, 2024 · IPR2023-01300 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The Board determines whether to institute a trial on behalf of the Director. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). A decision to institute is “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition.” PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “would have possessed a strong understanding in the use and development of genetics and genomics approaches for detecting or monitoring human diseases, such as spatial detection of a target analyte (e.g., mRNA or DNA) in a tissue, and would typically have a Ph.D. in a relevant field (e.g., molecular biology, genetics, and bioinformatics) with two years of experience. Pet. 21–22 (citing Ex. 1044 ¶¶ 24–36). For the purposes of its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not provide its own proposed level of skill. Prelim. Resp. 7. For purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s unchallenged definition as it is consistent with the cited prior art and disclosure of the ’142 patent.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “Thus, according to claim 1, to synthesize a first/second plurality of DNA products by performing a synthesis reaction, the “DNA products” must 1) use the oligonucleotides collected in steps (a) and (b) as templates from which the DNA is synthesized, and 2) incorporate a source location-identifying nucleic acid sequence.” slip op. at 20

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “(2) Analysis Neither party has offered a construction for “collecting oligonucleotides under conditions that release them” in claim 1. We note that, in the related litigation, the district court determined that “under conditions that release” should have its plain and ordinary meaning. Ex. 1052, 38. For purposes of institution, we also apply the plain and ordinary meaning of this claim phrase and do not need to expressly construe the claim phrase for purposes of institution. On this record, for the reasons explained by Petitioner and as supported by its declarant testimony, we conclude Petitioner has sufficiently shown that So-456 discloses the “collecting oligonucleotides under conditions that release them” limitation recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 42

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,473,142
  • PTAB · Aug 30, 2024 · IPR2022-01531 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Remand

    On remand, the Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–17, 20–21, 24–26, and 29–34 on all grounds stated in the Petition.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • Director reviewOther

      “Petition did not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims, and did not institute inter partes review. Paper 17 (“Inst. Dec.”). Petitioner requested Director review of our decision denying institution (Paper 18 (“Request”)). The Director delegated review of the decision to a Delegated Rehearing Panel. Paper 19. Patent Owner was granted the option to file a response to Petitioner’s Request (Paper 22 (“Request Resp.”)). The Director Review Panel (“DRP”) vacated our decision and remanded the case to this panel with a revised construction for claim 1. Paper 23 (“DRP Dec.”).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect (2018). Upon reconsideration of the briefing and the evidence of record in light of the DRP’s claim construction, we conclude that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we grant institution of inter partes review of claims 1–17, 20–21, 24–26, and 29–34 of the ’682 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “We find that Petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office in the prior consideration of Morales-Sanfrutos, Straus, Singh, and Lees. For instance, under the second prong of Advanced Bionics, we consider “(c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during “(e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art.” Becton, Dickinson, 17–18. We agree with Petitioner that the Office overlooked Morales- Sanfrutos’ and Singh’s teachings during examination and reexamination. Pet. 79. Although Morales-Sanfrutos, Straus, and Singh were listed on an IDS, they were not the subject of a rejection during examination or reexamination. Moreover, for the reasons discussed below at this stage with regard to Petitioner’s grounds over Morales-Sanfrutos, as evidenced by Straus, and over Singh, Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates that the Office materially erred in overlooking Morales-Sanfrutos’s and Singh’s teachings regarding their linker structures. Id. Further, to the extent the Lees’ teachings were considered during examination and reexamination, Lees’ disclosure of a homobifunctional sulfone linker was overlooked. Lees’ homobifunctional linker, which Patent Owner argues is substantially similar to Harris’ homobifunctional linker, which Petitioner chiefly relies upon in Grounds 2–5, was not the subject of a rejection during examination. Pet. Resp. Brief 1; Prelim. Resp. 25–26. We agree with Petitioner that only Lees’ heterobifunctional linker was applied in a rejection during examination. Pet. Resp. Brief 1; Ex. 1018, 42–43, 62. 4. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we decline to exercise discretion to deny institution under § 325(d).” slip op. at 27

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Based on the information presented, we find that the asserted prior art itself is sufficient to demonstrate the level of skill in the art at the time of the (prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). To the extent a more precise definition is required, we apply Petitioner’s unopposed definition for purposes of determining whether to institute review because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art references.” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,131,682

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.