- Kohler Co. v. Delta Faucet Co.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 18, 2026 · IPR2024-00700 · APJ Jane E Inglese · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claims 1–24 unpatentable as obvious over the asserted prior-art grounds, including Tseng’s disclosure of side-emitted light under the Director’s construction.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision on Remand from Director Review is entered pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). Having reviewed the complete trial record pursuant to the Director Review Order, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. Petitioner’s witness (Mr. Cook) qualifies as a POSITA under this definition, and, therefore, is qualified to opine from the perspective of a POSITA on technical matters included within the areas of expertise prescribed by the definition. As indicated above, Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA does not require education in the field of optics and professional experience designing or analyzing optical apparatus, unlike Patent Owner’s definition. We are aware, however, that Patent Owner’s witness (Dr. Klopp) has more extensive experience with optical systems and methods than Petitioner’s witness (Mr. Cook). Compare Ex 1003 ¶¶ 8–14, Ex. 2005, 39:21–59:17, with Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 3–20, Ex. 2004, 1–2, Ex. 1015, 10:22–13:25. Although Mr. Cook possesses excellent credentials in the field of mechanical engineering, his experience in the design and analysis of optical systems and methods is sparse and insubstantial compared to that of Dr. Klopp. Id. Due to this difference in experience levels, in instances where the witnesses express differing views on factual issues related to optical systems and methods, we accord more weight to Dr. Klopp’s testimony than to Mr. Cook’s.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“The Director’s Order instructs us to adopt its interpretation of the recitation in claim 10 of “an outer illumination surface extending perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the housing” (“the disputed limitation”) as being “satisfied by any amount of light emitted from the side surface.” Order 3. We, accordingly, construe the disputed limitation of claim 10 as a surface extending perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the housing through which any amount of light is emitted from the side surface.” slip op. at 10
Patent outcomesUS 10,393,363 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,393,363 - Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 17, 2026 · IPR2024-01187 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 8–11, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over Ingle and Hasei; claims 3, 5, and 6 were not shown unpatentable because the Hanamura-based grounds lack the claimed trench.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“isolation, rather than in the claims’ context, and in light of the ’492 patent’s specification. In the trench/layers context of the ’492 patent, the word in requires more than it does in the circle/square context.” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Physics, or a comparable field of study, and at least three years of research or industrial experience with semiconductor (organic or inorganic) optoelectronic devices and/or lighting or displays. An individual with additional education could have less research or industrial experience and vice-versa. Pet. 9. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed definition because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“rather than the combination of Ingle’s capacitor and Hasei’s droplet discharge application that Petitioner asserts. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Even if Ingle falls short of teaching structured application for its capacitor’s cathode, as Patent Owner argues, that does not undermine Petitioner’s challenge because Petitioner proposes using Hasei’s structured application (i.e., a droplet discharge device) to form the cathode of Ingle’s capacitor. See Pet. 24–25. Patent Owner’s additional argument that “Hasei contains no discussion of forming capacitors” (PO Resp. 36; see PO Sur-reply 17–18) is similarly flawed—it attacks Hasei individually, while ignoring Ingle’s capacitor teaching. We agree with Petitioner—the combination of Ingle and Hasei teaches structured application of the capacitor’s cathode. In addition, we disagree with Patent Owner that “Petitioner provides no reason why a POSITA would have extended Hasei’s method for producing its OLED to a capacitor.” PO Resp. 36; see PO Sur-reply 17 (asserting “pure conjecture”). To the contrary, as noted above, Petitioner explains, with relevant support from Hasei, that its structured application method reduced electrode-material waste and shortened manufacturing times as compared to photolithography. Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 5, 7). Given those benefits, Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support that its proffered combination would have been obvious. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).” slip op. at 13
Patent outcomesUS 9,257,492 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 9,257,492 - Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2024-01119 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 27, 37, 58, 60-64, 67-79, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 197, 199-204, 208-216, 223, 225, and 230 were not proven unpatentable over the asserted combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner “does not agree with all aspects of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill” but did not propose an alternative definition. PO Resp. 10–11. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Rosenberg, adopted Dr. Terveen’s definition for the purposes of his declaration. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 32–33. We again adopt the main portion of Dr. Terveen’s definition, and determine that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience working with graphical user interfaces and applications for computers.” This definition is commensurate with the problems and solutions in the ’754 patent and prior art of record and is supported by declarant testimony.” slip op. at 9
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Given our determination of how Ahn consistently describes the “touch and drag” gesture and “dragged” to mean the movement of a finger (or other object external to the touch screen), and in the absence of persuasive evidence in the figures or in other portions of Ahn to support the movement or appearance of a menu during a user input gesture, we determine that the present record does not support a conclusion that Ahn teaches or suggests a menu sliding onto a display or appearing during an input gesture such as a touch and drag gesture, as opposed to being displayed after such a gesture is completed.” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Given our determination of how Ahn consistently describes the “touch and drag” gesture and “dragged” to mean the movement of a finger (or other object external to the touch screen), and in the absence of persuasive evidence in the figures or in other portions of Ahn to support the movement or appearance of a menu during a user input gesture, we determine that the present record does not support a conclusion that Ahn teaches or suggests a menu sliding onto a display or appearing during an input gesture such as a touch and drag gesture, as opposed to being displayed after such a gesture is completed.” slip op. at 27
- Expert testimonyDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner argues that “even under [this] interpretation of Ahn, the only difference between Ahn and the claims is whether the animation occurs in direct correspondence with a user’s dragging gesture or after the dragging gesture is complete – a straightforward design choice if ever there was one.” Pet. Reply 3–4 (citing Ex. 1024, 99:16–108:20; Ex. 1023 ¶ 12). However, as Patent Owner argues (PO Sur-reply 7–8) this argument is presented in Reply and is an improper shift of theory from the Petition. Nevertheless, were we to consider it, we would not find it compelling; Dr. Terveen’s cited testimony repeats this bare statement and is not supported by any evidence or additional explanation. Ex. 1023 ¶ 12; see 37 CFR § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (assigning little weight to opinion testimony that “merely repeats” conclusory statements in a brief, without “cit[ing] any additional supporting evidence or provid[ing] any technical reasoning to support [the declarant’s] statement”).” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 10,656,754 not shown unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,656,754 - Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2024-01116 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision
Petitioner did not prove claims 1, 2, 27, 37, 58, 60–64, 67–79, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 197, 199–204, 208–216, 223, 225, or 230 unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the claimed blurring …
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“(Ex. 1003), that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had “a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience in the design and development of graphical user interfaces (GUIs), human-computer interfaces, or equivalents thereof,” and that “[a]dditional years of experience could substitute for an advanced-level degree (and vice-versa).” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 29–30).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction In these proceedings, there is no controversy that would require us to decide any claim construction issue. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Obviousness of Claims 2, 27, 37, 58, 60–64, 67–79, 186, 187, 189, 191,” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“obviousness of the menus in the Ahn-Chaudhri combination following a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture to open the menu.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing 01119-Petition, 26–33, substantially identical to Pet. 32– 40). However, again, the Petition does not explain an alternative theory in which Chaudhri supplements Ahn’s menu functionality to move that menu onto the screen, as opposed to teaching visual cues provided by gradual changes of the display during a gesture or the visual cue that an unlock image may provide during the unlock gesture. See Pet. 14–18 (describing Chaudhri teaching “visual differentiation” or “transitioning an optical intensity” between a user-interface object and the background, based on, e.g., transparency), 35–40 (same). In Reply, Petitioner adds evidence to attempt to support its contention that the combination teaches a menu following a user’s finger during a dragging gesture, involving references to Chaudhri’s discussion of a visual cue, further discussing Chaudhri’s unlock image. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 54, 62, 74–79, Figs. 5A-5C (cited at Pet. Reply 4–5). With respect to these citations and arguments, even if they had been timely presented in the Petition, we agree with Patent Owner that they do not articulate a modification of Ahn with Chaudhri or a motivation to combine. PO Sur-reply 6. Additionally, we agree that these embodiments of Chaudhri are distinct from the cited portions of Chaudhri discussed with respect to this theory in the Petition, which relate not to the movement of displayed graphics, but to variations of optical intensity and visual cues. Id. at 6–7. We evaluate the Petition’s arguments in light of Petitioner’s statement in Reply that they require a teaching regarding “menus . . . following a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture.” Pet. Reply 2. To the extent that the Petition shows that the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri would show visual changes as the user performs a dragging gesture, these do not relate to the movement of a menu, but rather to other optical effects. Thus, as we do not find that the Petition supports an Ahn-Chaudhri combination in which a menu follows a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture to open the menu, as Petitioner argues, we determine that Petitioner has not shown limitation 2.d of claim 2 taught or suggested by the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri according to this theory.” slip op. at 31
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner argues that “even under [this] interpretation of Ahn, the only difference between Ahn and the claims is whether the animation occurs in direct correspondence with a user’s dragging gesture or after the dragging gesture is complete – a straightforward design choice if ever there was one.” Pet. Reply 3–4 (citing Ex. 1024, 99:16–108:20; Ex. 1023 ¶ 12). However, as Patent Owner argues (PO Sur-reply 7–8) this argument is presented in Reply and is an improper shift of theory from the Petition. Nevertheless, were we to consider it, we would not find it compelling; Dr. Terveen’s cited testimony repeats this bare statement and is not supported by any evidence or additional explanation. Ex. 1023 ¶ 12; see 37 CFR § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (assigning little weight to opinion testimony that “merely repeats” conclusory statements in a brief, without “cit[ing] any additional supporting evidence or provid[ing] any technical reasoning to support [the declarant’s] statement”).” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 10,656,754 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,656,754 - Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2024-01115 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision
Apple did not prove claims 1, 2, 27, 37, 58, 60–64, 67–79, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 197, 199–204, 208–216, 223, 225, and 230 unpatentable over the asserted Ahn combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“In the Decision on Institution in each proceeding, we noted that Petitioner’s definition left it unclear whether the bachelor’s degree in the proposed definition would be considered by Petitioner to be “an advancedlevel degree,” and did not adopt the portion of the definition relating to the substitution of years of experience for a degree. Dec. on Inst. 15–16. Patent Owner “does not agree with all aspects of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill” but did not propose an alternative definition. PO Resp. 10–11. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Rosenberg, adopted Dr. Terveen’s definition for the purposes of his declaration. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 32–33. We again adopt the main portion of Dr. Terveen’s definition, and determine that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience working with graphical user interfaces and applications for computers.” This definition is commensurate with the problems and solutions in the ’754 patent and prior art of record and is supported by declarant testimony.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction In these proceedings, there is no controversy that would require us to decide any claim construction issue. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Obviousness of Claims 2, 27, 37, 58, 60–64, 67–79, 186, 187, 189, 191,” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“obviousness of the menus in the Ahn-Chaudhri combination following a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture to open the menu.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing 01119-Petition, 26–33, substantially identical to Pet. 32– 40). However, again, the Petition does not explain an alternative theory in which Chaudhri supplements Ahn’s menu functionality to move that menu onto the screen, as opposed to teaching visual cues provided by gradual changes of the display during a gesture or the visual cue that an unlock image may provide during the unlock gesture. See Pet. 14–18 (describing Chaudhri teaching “visual differentiation” or “transitioning an optical intensity” between a user-interface object and the background, based on, e.g., transparency), 35–40 (same). In Reply, Petitioner adds evidence to attempt to support its contention that the combination teaches a menu following a user’s finger during a dragging gesture, involving references to Chaudhri’s discussion of a visual cue, further discussing Chaudhri’s unlock image. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 54, 62, 74–79, Figs. 5A-5C (cited at Pet. Reply 4–5). With respect to these citations and arguments, even if they had been timely presented in the Petition, we agree with Patent Owner that they do not articulate a modification of Ahn with Chaudhri or a motivation to combine. PO Sur-reply 6. Additionally, we agree that these embodiments of Chaudhri are distinct from the cited portions of Chaudhri discussed with respect to this theory in the Petition, which relate not to the movement of displayed graphics, but to variations of optical intensity and visual cues. Id. at 6–7. We evaluate the Petition’s arguments in light of Petitioner’s statement in Reply that they require a teaching regarding “menus . . . following a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture.” Pet. Reply 2. To the extent that the Petition shows that the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri would show visual changes as the user performs a dragging gesture, these do not relate to the movement of a menu, but rather to other optical effects. Thus, as we do not find that the Petition supports an Ahn-Chaudhri combination in which a menu follows a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture to open the menu, as Petitioner argues, we determine that Petitioner has not shown limitation 2.d of claim 2 taught or suggested by the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri according to this theory.” slip op. at 31
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“(3) Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has not shown limitation 2.d to be taught, suggested, or otherwise rendered obvious by Ahn and Chaudhri. Thus, we determine that Petitioner does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 2 would have been obvious over the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri.” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 10,656,754 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,656,754 - Google LLC v. DH International Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2024-01322 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Mooney; the Board also found Mooney combined with Lee renders the disputed limitations obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the alleged invention of the ’294 patent would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in design, development, and/or testing of network-enabled consumer devices, and familiarity with payment cards, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa. Pet. 2 (citing Lipoff Decl. Ex. 1003 ¶ 57). “Patent Owner agrees with the Petitioner on the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Resp. 4. Patent Owner adds that a POSITA would have had “at least three years of relevant industry or research experience in wireless communication between devices.” Id. (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 26–29). Mr. Zaheer testifies that a POSITA “would” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“The claim language and specification define and describe an “activation cue” in functional terms: a data communication from an external source is received by the cell phone and recognized as an activation cue if it causes the switching element to be assigned its first (activated) state. Ex. 1001, 9:28–31, 9:42–46, 10:14–16, 13:55–60, 14:53–59, 15:4–6, 19:20–26. Patent Owner agrees that “upon an activation cue being received by portable electronic device 10, switching element 44b switches to its activated state.” Resp. 19 (quoting Ex. 1001, 10:14–16). The activation cue may be a predetermined bit sequence, a predetermined contactless data transmission, continuously emitted, pulsed, or punctual, but these are unclaimed non-limiting embodiments of the preferred form of data transmission. Id. at 9:25–26 (“for example a predetermined bit sequence”), 11:20–22 (“One example . . . emit an activation cue in the form of a predetermined contactless data transmission”), 14:65–15:3 (continuously emitted, pulsed or punctual cue). We will not read such preferred embodiments from the specification into claim language that is not so limited. See SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (care should be taken “not to import into a claim limitations that are not part of the claim”); see also In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“limitations are not to be read into the claims from the specification”); see also IQRIS Techns. LLC v. Point Blank Enterprises, Inc., 2025 WL 727717, *4 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (“It is the claims, not the preferred embodiments, that” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner
“operatively linked to said electronic circuit” under 35 U.S.C. Section 112, sixth paragraph or not, the result is the same. We note there is no presumption of applying means-plus-function analysis to the switching element, because the limitation does not use the words “means for” that would mandate such claim construction treatment, and “switching” may invoke structure as well as function. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349–1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that “use of the word ‘means’ creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies”). Regardless, we look to the meaning of the claim phrase at issue in view of the specification. We determine that the ’294 patent provides a clear, concise meaning for the switching element upon which both parties rely for construction. Patent Owner’s express agreement with Petitioner, that the claimed switching element is described in the ’294 patent as “any type of device allowing data to be conveyed according to alternate data conveyance operations in response to an activation cue being received by transceiver 18 or not,’” is particularly telling because it is not consistent with Patent Owner’s argument that the switching element means “switching of the data.” Resp. 7, 31 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:28–318). The claim language does not recite, and the specification does not describe, the switching element as a device that switches the data. Therefore, we determine the claimed “data conveyance switching element” means any type of switching device that allows data to be 8 We presume Patent Owner’s citation to “Exh. 2001, 9:28-31” on page 7 was intended to be a citation to the ’294 patent (Ex. 1001), as cited on page 31. whether or not an “activation cue” is received by the cell phone “cue receiver.”” slip op. at 21
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“[external] data exchange device” as a device with a data transceiver coupled to a circuit that carries out the function of exchanging data. Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:14–17, 4:7–14, 9:3–6; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 67–68). As above, whether we construe the “[external] data exchange device” under 35 U.S.C. Section 112, sixth paragraph or not, the result is the same. Patent Owner, quoting the description of a data exchange device in the ’294 patent, contends that a “[external] data exchange device” “can be any sort of data exchange device comprising an electronic circuit (not shown) therein and a data transceiver 9a.” Resp. 8 (quoting Ex. 1001, 9:4–6). Patent Owner also responds to the Petition by clarifying that “[a]n external data exchange device is not a transceiver but a device with a transceiver.” Id. (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 48). Petitioner argues in reply that Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s mappings of Mooney’s “cordless telephone base unit” or “cellular network infrastructure” to the claimed data exchange devices, such that no construction is necessary to resolve the dispute. Reply 5 (citing Resp. 16–37; Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Limitations [1.c] and [1.d] recite “a first [second] data transceiver operatively linked to said electronic circuit [in the cell phone],” both of which are defined functionally as “for exchanging data between said electronic circuit [in the cell phone] and a first [second] external data exchange device over a first [second] communication link.” Nothing in the the other independent claims, further limits the form or function of the “[external] data exchange device,” although a device external to the cell phone may invoke additional structure. We determine the plain meaning of “[external] data exchange device” as claimed and described in the ’294 patent governs: any [external] device that comprises an electronic circuit and data transceiver for exchanging data with the electronic circuit in the cell phone over a communication link. slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 9,022,294 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,022,294 - PTAB · Feb 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00933 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–12 on all three §103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would prevail.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition and the Preliminary Response, as well as the evidence of record, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–12 of the ’595 patent.3” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that [A] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least 3 years of experience in the research, design or development of wireless communication devices, systems, and/or networks, or the equivalent. Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 26). Petitioner further contends that “[i]ncreased educational experience can make up for less work experience, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner objects to Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art only “[t]o the extent that Petitioner requires [] the required experience and/or education level to be acquired by December 24, 2015.” Prelim. Resp. 8. Determining the level of ordinary skill in the art involves various factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The prior art of record also reflects the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this institution decision, with the exception of the openended language “at least,” we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner.11 11 No matter how designated in this decision, any determination (except our determination to institute trial) is preliminary and non-binding. We wish to have the full record as developed during trial before rendering any binding determination, finding, or conclusion. It is not materially disputed by the Patent Owner and is consistent with the ’595 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingOther
“[7.pre] A wireless communication method of a wireless communication terminal, the method comprising:13 Petitioner relies on Josiam “disclos[ing] ‘methods for efficient signaling and addressing in WLAN [wireless local area network] systems.’” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 112; Ex. 1005 ¶ 4).14 The Petition states that “Josiam’s methods describe at least one station (i.e., a wireless communication terminal).” Id. 13 Petitioner does not address whether the preamble of claim 7 is limiting. See Pet. 1. We determine that the preamble of claim 7 is not limiting because it does not recite essential steps or structure and is not necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim. See Shoes by Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Children’s Group, LLC, 962 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 14 Petitioner provides parallel citations to Exhibit 1006, the earliest provisional application to which Josiam claims priority (see Ex. 1005, code (60), in order to show that “the relevant subject matter relied upon herein is fully supported by respective provisional applications filed before the [filing date (December 24, 2015) of the earliest foreign application to which the ’595 patent claims priority (see Ex. 1001, code (30)].” Pet. 2. At least at this stage, there is no dispute between the parties as to whether Josiam or the ’595 patent are entitled to the claimed priority. See Prelim. Resp. 1 fn.1, 12 fn. 2. Therefore, unless deemed necessary to Petitioner’s showing, we do not include references to the Petition’s citations to Exhibit 1006 or discussion of Exhibit 1006 in our analysis. However, if Petitioner cites to Exhibit 1006 in a passage that we quote, we maintain these citations so that our quotation is accurate and complete.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“combination of the disclosures of Chen and Wu and articulates reasons why a skilled artisan would be motivated to combine the relevant teachings of Chen and Wu. See Pet. 42–85. This challenge to the patentability of the claims of the ’595 patent (Ground 2 of the Petition) is detailed and supported by the cited evidence. With regard to this ground and the asserted combination of art, Patent Owner argues that “[s]imilar to Grounds 1A and 1B, Chen and Wu do not show that ‘the bandwidth field of HE-SIG-A is used to obtain information of the unassigned resource unit’ as both the bandwidth field in HE-SIG-A and a subfield in HESIG-B need to be used for explicitly indicating the unassigned resource unit.” Prelim. Resp. 15. The quoted passage is limitation 7.5 and the “explicitly indicat[ing]” element is in limitation 7.7.16 See Ex. 1001, 54:3–4, 54:9–12; see also Pet. vii (showing claim 7 with limitations numbered and labeled). Thus, Patent Owner disputes the same limitations with a similar argument as for the earlier grounds in disputing the showing in the Petition for this ground. With regard to the disputed limitations, the Petition provides that, from a combination of the teachings and suggestions of Chen and Wu, a skilled artisan would understand that “the bandwidth field of HE-SIG-A indicates where in the overall bandwidth the non-allocated RU is located by defining the number of 20MHz channels and the arrangement and length of the HE-SIG-B content channels.” Pet. 60 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 178). The Declaration of Dr. Buehrer provides: 16 Limitation 7.7 recites: “the unassigned resource unit is explicitly indicated with the information of the unassigned resource unit based on the bandwidth field and the at least one subfield.” Ex. 1001, 54:9–12; Pet. vii (emphasis added). 178. Chen-Wu renders obvious using the bandwidth field of HE-SIG-A to obtain the information of the unassigned resource unit. As one example, a POSITA would have understood the Chen-Wu combination as rendering obvious that RU non-allocation information in HE-SIG-B indicates the location of a non-allocated RU within a 20MHz channel, while the bandwidth field of HE-SIG-A indicates where in the overall bandwidth the non-allocated RU is located by defining the number of 20MHz channels and the arrangement and length of the HE-SIG-B content channels. SAMSUNG-1008, [0101], [0098]; SAMSUNG-1009, [0036]; SAMSUNG-1010, 10. 179. Chen teaches that “RU allocation may be determined based at least in part on the PAID, channel bandwidth, and the HE-SIG-B.” SAMSUNG-1008, [0101], [0098]. I note that the Applicant did not dispute the Examiner’s finding that Chen teaches this limitation. See SAMSUNG- 1002, 68, 102 (citing SAMSUNG-1008, [0093], [0098], [0103], Fig. 14). 180. Moreover, Wu teaches “a fixed format common field in the HE-SIGB is defined for each operation bandwidth. Therefore, the length and format of the common field are predefined [based on the bandwidth]. In this approach, there is no [additional] indication needed in the HE-SIG-A.” SAMSUNG-1009, [0036]; SAMSUNG-1010, 10. As I explained above for [7.2] and [7.4], a POSITA would have understood Chen’s HE-SIG-A as including a bandwidth field that indicates the operation bandwidth of the PPDU. See [7.2], [7.4]. 181. For example, if the bandwidth field of HE-SIG-A indicates a PPDU bandwidth of 80 MHz, and the resource unit allocation field of the common field of HE-SIG-B indicates that the 20 MHz corresponding to the fourth channel is partitioned into 106, 26, and 106-tone resource units, the resource unit non-allocation information may indicate that the 26-tone resource unit is not assigned to any user through, e.g., a bitmap per Chen. SAMSUNG-1008, [0075], [0089]-[0093], Figs. 4, 12- 14; SAMSUNG-1009, [0035]-[0043], Figs. 2-4; SAMSUNG- 1010, 2-6, 10-14. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 178–181 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted). We determine that this testimony of Dr. Buehrer is supported and reasonable and sufficiently persuasive and credible to support institution. We also note that Patent Owner does not, at least at this stage, provide any contradictory expert testimony.17 We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments relating to the disputed limitations and this ground and found them not to be as well-supported as the Petitioner’s showing for essentially the same reasons as discussed above with regard to Ground 1A. Based on the current record, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to the unpatentability of claims 1–12 of the ’595 patent based on a combination of the teachings and suggestions of Chen and Wu.” slip op. at 29
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,470,595 - Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 9, 2026 · IPR2024-01095 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2, 4, 9–12, and 17 are unpatentable under § 103 because the prior-art combinations teach the claimed features and have adequate motivation and reasonable expectation of success.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry, physics, or a comparable field of study, and at least three years of research or industrial experience with organic optoelectronic light-emitting devices.” Pet. 10. Further, “[a]n individual with additional education could have less research or industrial experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s formulation. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed definition because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, code (57); Ex. 1011, code (57).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“electron-hopping dopant. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from . . . alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed.”). As Petitioner explains, “Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma,” which “increases ETL conductivity.” Pet. Reply 10. Patent Owner does not contest that Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma. See Pet. Reply 30. Thus, Petitioner’s proposed combinations “substitute one known n-dopant for another to further the same goal of improving ETL conductivity.” Pet. Reply 10. Next, Patent Owner faults Petitioner for failing to show that using Ma’s Liq dopant in Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s ETL would result in lower diffusion or higher efficiencies as compared to Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s preferred n-dopants, which included cesium, barium, or lithium fluoride. PO Resp. 31–35; see PO Sur-reply 4–5. We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because Petitioner does not need to show that Ma’s Liq n-dopant “was an improvement in a categorical sense” over Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s n-dopants, so long as Ma’s n-dopant was known and one skilled in the art would understand that implementing it had advantages. See Intel Corp. v. Pact XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted); In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[O]ur case law does not require that a particular combination must be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art.”). Petitioner does not assert skilled artisans would have used Liq because it was a superior to Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s preferred dopants, but because doping ETLs with Liq had known benefits including lower driving voltage and enhanced power efficiency from enhanced carrier injection increased transport conductivity, as compared to an undoped device. Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1010, 813). That other potentially suitable or even superior n-dopants were also known does not make Liq nonobvious. Given Liq’s benefits outlined above, Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion that its proffered combination of Ma’s known dopant in Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s device would have been obvious to one skilled in the art. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“1. Whether Ma Qualifies as a Prior Art Printed Publication First, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner has not demonstrated that Ma was publicly accessible in August 2008 so as to qualify as prior art. PO 11 As Petitioner notes, the district court adopted a claim construction requiring only “one or more wavelengths” in the infrared-to-UV spectrum. PO Resp. 26 (citing Ex. 2031, 47–48). Resp. 16–24. We addressed this same issue in our Final Written Decision in IPR2024-01094. IPR2024-01094, Paper 42 at 9–13. As we explained there, Ma qualifies as prior art printed publication because the record evidence supports what Ma says on its face—that it was published online on August 29, 2008 by an Elsevier, an established publisher, in Synthetic Metals, which is a reputable journal. Id. For the same reason explained in IPR2024-01094, we agree with Petitioner that Ma qualifies as a prior art printed publication.” slip op. at 10
Patent outcomesUS 11,828,425 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,828,425 - Tiktok Inc. v. Ntech Properties, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 6, 2026 · IPR2024-01340 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–12 and 14–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Whitehead, alone or with Marcus ’904; claims 13 and 19–24 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“establishes that the subject matter of independent claim 19 would have been obvious in view of Whitehead. Claim 19 recites “an aggregator having a memory and a processor, the processor adapted for . . . providing an output signal including data indicative of the selection and of user data.” Ex. 1001, 15:51–16:3. As discussed above (Section II.C.2), we construe claim 19 as requiring a signal including both “data indicative of the selection and of user data.” Accordingly, we consider whether Petitioner has shown that Whitehead teaches or suggests that the “aggregator” “provid[e] an output signal including” both “data indicative of the selection and of user data.”” slip op. at 46
- Expert testimonyOther
“Cristofalo’s “user identifiers” represent data about users that Cristofalo’s system uses to “select a specific media object” (advertisements) from received “multi-object programming data.” Cristofalo at ¶ [0048]. For example, a user identifier may indicate that a given user is a Coca-Cola drinker, and when the receiving system receives the multi-object programming data it can select a particular media object out of several possible media objects (e.g., a Pepsi advertisement) to push to the user. Id. This user data exists independently of, and does not relate to, any particular media stream or streams. See Goodrich PO Resp. Decl. at ¶ 135. Petitioner seems to recognize this when tersely referring to “user identifiers” as “data,” not “data relating to a plurality of streams.” Pet. at 71. Accordingly, Cristofalo’s “user identifiers” are not the claimed “data related to the plurality of media streams.” Goodrich PO Resp. Decl. at ¶ 136.” slip op. at 73
Patent outcomesUS 8,145,704 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,145,704 - PTAB · Feb 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00988 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–14 and all petition grounds; it found a reasonable likelihood of success on the Josiam-based grounds, while the Bharadwaj grounds lacked established prior-art status.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition and the Preliminary Response, as well as the evidence of record, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–14 of the ’281 patent.3” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Determining the level of ordinary skill in the art involves various factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The prior art of record also reflects the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this institution decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner.11 It is not materially disputed by the Patent Owner and is consistent with the ’281 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner asserts “that no formal claim constructions are necessary.” Pet. 3. “Patent Owner applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the challenged claims.” Prelim. Resp 11. At this stage, no need exists to expressly construe any claim terms to resolve any dispute between the parties.12 See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“contention that either of the cited documents alone discloses all the elements of these limitations. And, the disclosure relied on in Exhibit 1007 is not alleged to be found in Exhibit 1009 and vice-versa. Patent Owner has not shown that any of the pre-May 14, 2016, Korean applications from which the ’281 claims priority includes disclosure of all the elements recited in limitations 1.9 and 8.6. At least at this stage, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown, for the purpose of institution that Josiam is prior art.16 We credit the testimony of Dr. Buehrer cited in the Petition that none of the Korean applications to which the ’281 patent claims priority filed earlier than May 14, 2016, “explicitly, implicitly, or inherently discloses using both the bandwidth field of the HE-SIG-A and the resource unit allocation field of the HE-SIG-B to indicate channel puncturing information as the claim elements require. . . . At best, these documents discuss indicating unused channels using either HE-SIG-A or HE-SIGB fields—but not both.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 (Buehrer Decl.) ¶¶ 90–91). Dr. Buehrer’s testimony has not been shown by Patent Owner to be inaccurate.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,687,281
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.