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  • PTAB · Aug 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00597 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–18 on all asserted grounds and granted Apple’s motion to join IPR2023-01183.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’641 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’641 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition. And, for the reasons set forth below, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “In considering a motion for joinder, and whether such joinder is appropriate, the Board may consider “whether a new ground of unpatentability is raised in the second petition, how the cost and schedule of the first proceeding will be impacted if joinder is granted, and whether granting joinder will add to the complexity of briefing and/or discovery.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide November 20197 at 76 (citing Kyocera Corp. v. SoftView LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013)).” slip op. at 9

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Master’s degree in material science, chemical engineering, chemistry, or similar field with four years experience designing testing, and building secondary lithium batteries.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 51). Petitioner further contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been aware of “(1) positive electrode materials, (2) negative electrode materials, (3) separators, (4) electrolytes, (5) charge-discharge parameters, and (6) protection circuits, as well as ‘battery failure modes’ such as plating and the formation of dendrites.” Id. at 11–12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 50–51). Upon review of the prior art of record and the Petitioner’s arguments, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision as it appears consistent with the ’641 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner provides constructions for the terms “A method for improving . . . characterized in that,” “ratio of positive electrode material to negative electrode material as calculated by a theoretic capacity with a charge cut-off voltage set at 4.2 V” (claim 5), “as calculated by a specific capacity with a charge voltage limited to 4.2 V” (claim 1), and “at least 7500 of capacity” (claim 11). Pet. 8–11. For purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 8

    Claim constructioncites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,749,641
  • PTAB · Jul 31, 2024 · PGR2020-00071 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · PGR · Remand

    On remand, the Board held claims 10 and 27 unpatentable as obvious over Robinson, Greim, and Adams because skilled artisans would have optimized heater length through routine experimentation.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • RemandOther

      “Standard Operating Procedure 3 communicating the parties’ positions on submitting additional briefing on remand. Ex. 3001.2 We responded on April 15, 2024, authorizing the parties to file additional briefs limited to the question of “whether the Federal Circuit’s determinations on written description are applicable to an obviousness analysis, and if so, how they should be applied.” Ex. 3001. Petitioner filed its Supplemental Brief on Remand on April 29, 2024 (Paper 41, “Pet. Supp. Br.”), and Patent Owner filed its Supplemental Reply Brief on Remand on May 13, 2024 (Paper 42, “PO Supp. Reply”). B. The Issue on Remand As part of our Final Written Decision, we determined that Petitioner established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 10 and 27 lack adequate written description support. FWD 38–41. In view of this, we declined to address Petitioner’s arguments that claims 10 and 27 are unpatentable as obvious in view of Robinson,3 Greim,4 and Adams.5” slip op. at 4

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, chemistry, or physics, or a related field, and three to four years of industry experience, or a Master’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, chemistry, or physics, or a related field, and one to two years of industry experience. Such a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have been familiar with electrically powered smoking articles and/or the components and underlying technology used therein. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 26–30). Patent Owner states that “[f]or purposes of the trial in this proceeding, [Patent Owner] accepts Petitioner’s proposed education and experience level of the [person of ordinary skill in the art].” PO Resp. 13. In view of the foregoing, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. The prior art of record reflects this level of ordinary skill. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 16

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner contends that “[t]he challenged claims are unpatentable under any reasonable construction,” and, “for purposes of this proceeding . . . adopts the plain meaning of the claims and submits that no claim term requires construction.” Pet. 14. Patent Owner contends it was improper for Petitioner to adopt the plain meaning of the claims without explaining what it considers the plain meaning of each claim term to be. PO Resp. 13. Patent Owner does not offer a construction for any claim term. PO Resp. 13. After considering the full record developed during trial, we determine that no claim limitations need an express construction for purposes of resolving the controversy.” slip op. at 18

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “Although Patent Owner is correct that Petitioner does not direct us to any disclosure of a heating member having a length that “falls within the claimed range,” such a disclosure in the art is not required for a showing of obviousness. See, e.g., In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 136 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In Huang, the claim required a racquet grip comprising a textile layer and a polyurethane layer, and that the ratio of their thicknesses be “larger than approximately 0.18.” Id. at 137. The prior art disclosed a textile layer and polyurethane layer in thickness ratios ranging from 0.111–0.142. Id. at 136. Although the prior art did not disclose a ratio in the claimed range, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s obviousness rejection because the evidence showed that “one of ordinary skill in the art would have experimented with various thicknesses to obtain an optimum range.” Id. at 139; see In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454 (CCPA 1955) (affirming an obviousness rejection of a claim to a chemical process reciting use of 25– 70% sulfuric acid at 40–80 degrees when the prior art disclosed the same reaction with 10% sulfuric acid at 100 degrees); In re Hill, 284 F.2d 955 (CCPA 1960) (affirming an obviousness rejection of a claim to a chemical process conducted at 150–250 degrees when the prior art disclosed the same reaction at 300 degrees). The Federal Circuit also noted that “Huang does not contend that he has achieved unexpected results by increasing the thickness of the polyurethane layer.” Huang, 100 F.3d at 139–140. Those principles apply with equal force to the facts in this case. Here, the evidence of record demonstrates that heaters having a length that spans some percentage of the length of the disposable aerosol forming substance were known in the art. For example, Robinson discloses one embodiment wherein heating element 72 has an elongated portion that extends into tobacco segment 89. Ex. 1006, 27:35–39, Fig. 3. Greim likewise discloses a heating element having some length, which may be inserted into a plug of an aerosol-forming substrate. Ex. 1007, 13, Fig. 4. Adams discloses similar information. Ex. 1008 ¶ 45 (“The axial length of the projection 72 is selected so that it does not extend all the way through the tobacco plug.”), Fig. 7. Following the reasoning in Huang, these disclosures of a heater having some length, albeit not necessarily a length in the claimed range, are sufficient to demonstrate obviousness if there is evidence demonstrating “one of ordinary skill in the art would have experimented with various [lengths] to obtain an optimum range” and there is no evidence that the claimed range provides unexpected results. Huang, 100 F.3d at 139.” slip op. at 22

    Patent outcomesUS 10,492,542 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,492,542
  • PTAB · Jul 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00120 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 6, 9, 11, and 26–34 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the § 103 challenges.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached

      “2 While the ’230 patent is currently involved in a parallel district-court case, Petitioner argues that “[i]nstitution is appropriate under Fintiv . . . .” Pet. 157. Petitioner also states that “if this proceeding is instituted, Petitioner stipulates not to pursue in the district court the grounds in the Petition or any ground that reasonably could have been raised in the Petition.” Id. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s argument. Accordingly, and in view of Petitioner’s stipulation, it is not necessary to reach Petitioner’s discretionary denial arguments. See Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to section II.A)).” slip op. at 3

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “would have had a bachelor’s degree (B.S.) in mechanical engineering, industrial engineering, or a closely related field and one year of experience working with connectors.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 5–17, 79–84). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’230 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “For purposes of this Decision, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 12

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,191,230
  • PTAB · Jul 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00118 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–28 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Nhep and Watanabe.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition and any response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim, and we institute an inter partes review as to all challenged claims of the ’413 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached

      “1 Petitioner states that “if [this proceeding is] instituted, Petitioner stipulates not to pursue in the district court the grounds in the Petition or any ground that reasonably could have been raised in the Petition.” Pet. 113. In view of Petitioner’s stipulation, we do not discretionarily deny institution. Katherine” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “(1) at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related field and three years of experience in fiber optics and fiber optic connectors; (2) a master’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related field and at least one year of experience in fiber optics and fiber optic connectors; or (3) industry experience (at least three years) designing fiber optic connectors in lieu of a formal degree. Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 44–50). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’413 patent specification and the prior art.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

      “C. Claim Construction We interpret the challenged claims using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. 8 The present record does not include any objective evidence of nonobviousness. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner states that it “does not believe any claim terms require specific construction and thus should receive their plain and ordinary meaning, in the context of the ’413 patent specification, under the Phillips standard.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 91–93). For purposes of this Decision, no claim terms require express construction.” slip op. at 10

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,340,413
  • PTAB · Jul 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00121 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–53 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Lee and Raven render claim 1 obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition and any response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim, and we institute an inter partes review as to all challenged claims of the ’701 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther

      “Petitioner argues that “the prior art provides a motivation” to make Petitioner’s modifications. Id. at 20. In particular, Petitioner relies on Raven’s teaching (discussed above in Section III.D.2) that “it is not uncommon for the installers to get confused between transmitting and receiving cables.” Ex. 1006, 1:13–25. Raven continues that this can make it “necessary for the installer to replace the existing cable or remove the connecting head from the fibres and effectively remanufacture the cable on site, which is very cumbersome and time consuming.” Id. at 1:32–35. Raven describes that its addresses the problem by disclosing a “fibre optic cable assembly and a method for changing the polarity of first and second optical fibres in a fibre optic cable assembly.” Id. at 2:17–19. Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make the modifications to “Lee’s connector to change polarity easily.” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 193–200); see also id. at 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 221) (arguing the proposed modifications would have allowed “the polarity of Lee’s connector to be altered easily without the need to remanufacture the cable.”). Petitioner also argues the following: [T]his modification involves applying a known technique (Raven’s removable latch configuration) to a similar device (Lee’s connector) in the same way (providing latch couplings on exterior walls of a connector housing to receive a removable latch). A POSITA would have understood that there are a finite number of ways of making Lee’s latch arm 28 removably coupled to the exterior walls of its connector housing.” slip op. at 20

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “had “at least an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering, industrial engineering, or a closely related field and one year of experience working with connectors.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 117–128). Petitioner adds that “[a]dditional relevant experience can compensate for a lack of relevant education, and vice versa.” Id. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’701 patent specification and the prior art.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner asserts that the Petition “affords all terms their ordinary and customary meaning.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 129–131). For purposes of this Decision, no claim terms require express construction.” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,181,701
  • PTAB · Jul 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00117 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Institution

    Instituted IPR on claims 1–13 on all petitioned grounds; Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim, including anticipation of claim 1 by Nguyen.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition and any response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim, and we institute an inter partes review as to all challenged claims of the ’836 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

      “A reference qualifies as a printed publication only if it was publicly accessible before the effective filing date of the challenged patent. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1); M & K Holdings, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 985 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Public accessibility “has been called the touch-stone” in determining whether a reference qualifies as a printed publication. M & K Holdings, 985 F.3d at 1379 (quoting Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 772 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). “A reference will be considered publicly accessible if it was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Id. (quotes and citations omitted).” slip op. at 8

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “2. Independent Claim 1 a. Preamble Petitioner contends that Nguyen discloses the claim 1 preamble, which recites “an adapter for mating with optical fiber connectors.” Ex. 1001, 18:12. Pet. 32–33 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 26–30, Figs. 1, 2). We find that Petitioner’s contention for the claim 1 preamble is adequate for purposes of institution.” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “2. Reasons to Combine Petitioner contends that it would have been obvious to modify Nguyen’s adapter in two ways. Pet. 54. First, Petitioner asserts it would have been obvious to include “optical-fiber connectors that employ handles configured to remotely release connectors from the adapter” by replacing Nguyen’s connectors with Lee’s connectors. Pet. 54–56 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 289–295). Second, Petitioner asserts it would have been obvious to include “a transverse wall that includes slots halfway between two ends of the adapter and sleeve holders that employ sockets to mate with cylindrically-shaped ferrules” by replacing Nguyen’s wall with Lee’s sleeve holders. Pet. 54, 56 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 296–302). Petitioner provides several reasons for the first modification, including a desire for convenience, tightly packed fiber optic ferrules, ease of maintenance, and scalability. Pet. 54 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 289–290). According to Petitioner, these goals would be served because “Lee’s handle allows a user to disengage the latch arm further from the adapter” whereas “[t]he latch arms of Nguyen require a user to be closer to the adapter.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 289). Petitioner also provides reasons for the second modification, asserting that “Lee’s sleeve holders are easy to maintain because they are removable, able to snap into place, and coordinate with dust caps to maintain cleanliness, as opposed to Nguyen’s immobile wall.” Pet. 56 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 297). According to Petitioner, “a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Nguyen’s adapter to incorporate Lee’s sleeve holders and slots to provide a system that is easier to maintain.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 298–299). We find that Petitioner’s asserted rationale for modifying Nguyen in view of Lee is adequate for purposes of institution.” slip op. at 20

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,333,836
  • PTAB · Jun 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00380 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5, 7, and 9–14 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner

      “because they are premised on a misapplication of our precedent. Providing a document to the Office in an Information Disclosure Statement is sufficient to satisfy AB prong one as long as that “previously presented” art is “the same or substantially the same” as that presented in the Petition. See Advanced Bionics, 7–8 (holding that “[p]reviously presented art includes . . . art provided to the Office by an applicant, such as on an Information Disclosure Statement (IDS), in the prosecution history of the challenged patent”). As we have already found, there are no material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination under BD factor (a). Petitioner provides no authority that requires us to interpret “involved during examination” under BD factor (a) as “used in a rejection” or “mentioned by the examiner” (Pet. 60), and we are aware of none. Patent Owner’s position, in that regard, appears to conflate the first AB prong (whether the art previously was presented to the Office) with an aspect of the second AB prong (the extent to which the Examiner considered that art).” slip op. at 11

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The findings and conclusions set forth in this Decision are provided for the exclusive purpose of explaining our determination that Petitioner has met that standard on this record. slip op. at 6

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in a field such as chemistry, physics, or chemical engineering, as well as at least two years of experience with plasma-polymerization techniques.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 22–29). Patent Owner does not propose a different level of skill in the art at this stage of the proceeding. See Prelim. Resp., generally. On this record, we determine that the level of ordinary skill is reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (specific findings on the ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163–64 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). A more specific definition is not necessary for purposes of deciding whether to institute review. To the extent a more specific definition is required, however, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed unchallenged definition because, on this record, it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art references.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner asserts that the claimed term “aryl” should be construed to mean “an aromatic ring system.” See Pet. 20–23. Patent Owner does not propose a different claim construction at this stage of the proceeding. See Prelim. Resp., generally. After review of the preliminary record, we determine that no claim terms need to be construed for purposes of institution. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 8

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 11,041,087
  • PTAB · Jun 18, 2024 · PGR2023-00008 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · PGR · Final written decision

    Claims 1 and 4–13 are unpatentable; claims 2 and 3 are cancelled, and proposed substitute claims 14–24 are denied because Petitioner proved them unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “skill in the art, because Petitioner’s position is more consistent with the ’624 patent Specification and the prior art. Our ultimate determination, however, would be the same under either party’s proposal. The two levels of skill in the art put forth by Petitioner and Patent Owner are not substantially different and, in fact, overlap significantly. Neither party has persuasively explained how, if at all, the proposals of their respective experts regarding the level of ordinary skill change the analysis in this case. The Board, sitting as a non-jury tribunal with administrative expertise, is well-positioned to determine and assign appropriate weight to evidence presented by each declarant in this case. Gnosis S.P.A. v. S. Ala. Med. Sci. Found., IPR2013- 00118, Paper 64 at 43 (PTAB June 20, 2014). Accordingly, we evaluate each declarant’s testimony along with the remainder of the evidence before us to reach our conclusions. Moreover, an express definition of the level of ordinary skill is not required in all situations, as the level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that “specific findings on the level of skill in the art . . . [are not required] ‘where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown’” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 13

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part

      “generally RMTA Opp. Accordingly, we determine that Patent Owner has shown that the proposed substitute claims meet the statutory and regulatory requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 326(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.221.” slip op. at 58

    • ExcludeOther

      “further corroborating evidence. Dr. Herb’s contentions from the prosecution of Application No. 16/516,792 not only concern another patent application altogether, but are merely a portion of the evidence we have before us concerning the tie layer arguments and the interpretation of that term. Other evidence suffices to corroborate Petitioner’s contentions, and the Herb Declaration is ineffective, in view of the totality of the evidence, to refute Petitioner’s positions. Even if the disputed evidence is considered, we have accorded it its proper weight and we are nevertheless unpersuaded that Patent Owner has prevailed in its arguments. Thus, Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude is dismissed as moot as to Exhibit 2019.” slip op. at 75

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Optional or preferred embodiments of particular configurations disclosed in Riis do not rise to the level of teaching away. Additionally, our reviewing court has explained that a reference must be “considered for all it taught, disclosures that diverged and taught away from the invention at hand as well as disclosures that pointed towards and taught the invention at hand.” Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 296 (Fed. Circ. 1985). Riis’s teaching of using LDPE, an acknowledged adhesive layer and a “workhorse” among layers, points towards and teaches the invention at hand. We already addressed, above, the interpretation of “tie layer” and the function of Riis’s LDPE layer as a tie layer, and for similar reasons, disagree that Riis’s disclosure of an LDPE layer constitutes a “teaching away” as argued by Patent Owner. Finally, Patent Owner’s “peelable” arguments are insufficiently explained, as noted by Petitioner, to persuasively support Patent Owner’s teaching away arguments. Reply 16. Accordingly, we do not find any teaching away in Riis of using LDPE as a tie layer.” slip op. at 43

    Patent outcomesUS 11,260,624 unpatentable
    § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
    Patents in suitUS 11,260,624
  • PTAB · May 31, 2024 · IPR2024-00255 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–4 and 6–11 on both asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “that, because judgments have been entered in the district court actions, there is finality as that relates to Fintiv issues. In a similar instance, where a district court’s § 101 determination was appealed to the Federal Circuit, the Director determined that the Board had the authority to institute an inter partes review and a Fintiv analysis should be performed. See Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., IPR2022-01366, Paper 15 at 1–8 (PTAB May 2, 2023). The Director has additionally distinguished a Fintiv analysis under similar circumstances to those here, where “the district court’s judgment of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 101, i.e., a statutory ground that could not have been raised before the Board, does not raise concerns of inefficient duplication of efforts or potentially inconsistent results between the Board and the district court.” AviaGames, Inc., Paper 14 at 3. Further, the Director determined that, “the challenged claims have not yet been cancelled and remain in force until the opportunity to appeal has been exhausted,” noting that “[b]y the time an appeal will have concluded, Petitioner will be barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) from bringing a new challenge in an IPR petition.” Id. at 3–4. Fintiv states that “a district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and discern that the § 101 issues addressed in the Federal Circuit appeal would duplicate the anticipation and obviousness issues addressed here. Accordingly, given the limited § 101 issues on appeal, we do not discern there are any concerns about duplication of efforts. Moreover, because of the uncertainty of the timing of any remand from the Federal Circuit to the district court to address any anticipation or obviousness issues, the present circumstances with a pending appeal effectively act as a stay on the assessment of invalidity issues.9” slip op. at 12

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 7 n.2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 8, 10, 26). Dr. Sundaresan testifies that a person having ordinary skill in the art “had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar discipline, and at least two years of experience in the field working with . . . navigation and/or geolocation systems,” and “[s]uperior education could compensate for a deficiency in work experience, and vice-versa.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 8. For the purposes of its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 32. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’104 patent and the prior art. See” slip op. at 7

    • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the district court’s construction of “grid point” as “a point associated with representative calibration data for an area.” See Ex. 1054, 18–20. This construction is consistent with the claim language and the specification of the ’104 patent and is further supported by the reasoning provided by the district court’s claim construction order. See id. We do not discern a need to construe explicitly any other claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,561,104
  • PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00481 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 12, 14, or 16–18 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition in view of the present record and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review on the grounds set forth in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had (i) a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable subject and two to three years of experience in the design and architecture of laptop computers and other portable electronic devices, or (ii) an advanced degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable subject and one year of post-graduate research or work experience in the field. Ex. 1003, ¶102. A POSITA would have been familiar with the structural hardware aspects of laptop computers and other portable electronic devices as well as designs of user interfaces employed and displayed by computer operating systems and their organization of content and functionality. Id. Pet. 10–11. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 18. For this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the level of skill reflected in both the prior art and the ’229 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “For this decision, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analysis below and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “Lane’s orientation information would generate information indicative of a current mode of operation as claim 18 requires. Instead, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not carried its burden to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have, based on the teachings of Lane or other cited art, used an accelerometer that generates orientation information indicative of the current mode of operation. See Prelim. Resp. 35–42. Lane’s accelerometer provides information only on the “spatial orientation” of the first module (keyboard) or second module (screen). Ex. 1005, 5:23–6. “Spatial orientation,” as used in Lane, refers to the orientation of the first or second module relative to the earth’s gravity because Lane teaches that its accelerometer uses a “movable conductor” that “responds via gravitational forces” to reorientation. Id. Lane does not teach using the accelerometer to determine the orientation of the first and second modules relative to each other, and Petitioner does not suggest that Lane could be modified to determine the orientation of the first and second modules relative to each other. Rather, Petitioner argues that, for example, a determination that the keyboard is “facing upward but at a diagonal angle” (relative to the earth’s gravity) would be indicative of “easel mode.” Pet. 29.” slip op. at 20

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,563,229

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.