- Giesecke+devrient GmbH / Giesecke+devrient Currecy Technology GmbH et al. v. Lumenco, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00838 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–12 are unpatentable: claims 1 and 6 over Fuhse262, and the dependent claims over the additional asserted combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA because Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the types of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology. For example, the ʼ191 patent provides, as relevant background, a discussion of anti-counterfeiting devices made up of arrays of lenses used to display unique images, placed on currency and labels for retail products. Ex. 1001, 1:27–42. The ʼ191 patent also discusses using lenses to create holograms. Id. at 2:6–21. Similarly, the prior art in this field, such as Fuhse262, relates to the use of lenses and mirrors to create hologram images for security purposes. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 1–7. These descriptions demonstrate, consistent with Petitioner’s proposed definition, that a POSITA would need an educational background to understand optics, lenses, and mirrors along with professional experience with optical security features to understand the creation of holograms and images using lenses and mirrors for the purpose of preventing counterfeiting of currency and other valuable products.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“spot. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 95–96, Fig. 10. Dr. Hesselink credibly testifies that while Fuhse262 depicts rays that form a light spot, the rays depicted are “chief rays” that depict only the center rays of light for each optical element. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 178–179. Ambient light, however, reflects from the entire surface of the mirrors and forms reflected beams of light, not just the center rays aimed at the center point. Id. ¶ 178. According to Dr. Hesselink, the “chief ray” is representative of the larger bundle of rays that form the beams of light reflected off of the mirrors. See Id. ¶ 44. The volume of the voxel is set by the intersection of these beams and the center of the voxel is the point at which the center rays of each beam intersect. Id. ¶ 179. Although Dr. Lindstrand testifies “a POSITA would not have understood Fuhse262 to disclose creating a voxel” (Ex. 2004 ¶ 43), Dr. Lindstrand does not dispute Dr. Hesselink’s testimony that light would reflect off of the entire surface of Fuhse262’s mirrors and form reflected beams of light. See Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 42–58; Ex. 1055, 112:15–21 (“You also agree the ambient light would not just strike the center of the surface, it would strike the entire surface, correct? . . . THE WITNESS: I would say that that is a fair and accurate description.”) Dr. Hesselink’s testimony explaining that light beams would reflect off the entire surface of Fuhse262’s micromirrors and would create a voxel when they intersect with each other, provides sufficient support demonstrating how a POSITA would have understood Fuhse262’s disclosure of light rays being reflected off of mirrors and converging at a light spot shown in Figure 10. See Unification Techs. LLC v. Micron Tech. Inc., 2024 WL 3738401 at *7 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 9, 2024) (affirming the use of expert testimony to demonstrate how a skilled artisan would have understood a prior art reference’s disclosure as teaching a claim limitation).” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that “no claim terms require express construction.” Pet. 15. “Patent Owner agrees that the terms do not require construction for purposes of evaluating the Petition.” PO Resp. 13. We do not need to construe any terms explicitly to reach our decision on institution. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (approving Board decision not to construe claim language where construction is not material to the dispute).” slip op. at 12
- BurdenUnpatentable
“off the entire surface of Fuhse262’s micromirrors and would create a voxel when they intersect with each other, provides sufficient support demonstrating how a POSITA would have understood Fuhse262’s disclosure of light rays being reflected off of mirrors and converging at a light spot shown in Figure 10. See Unification Techs. LLC v. Micron Tech. Inc., 2024 WL 3738401 at *7 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 9, 2024) (affirming the use of expert testimony to demonstrate how a skilled artisan would have understood a prior art reference’s disclosure as teaching a claim limitation). Patent Owner argues that light beams that intersect in an irregular or unintentional manner would not necessarily form a voxel, but does not explicitly show that Fuhse262’s light beams do, in fact, intersect in an irregular manner. PO Resp. 19. Petitioner has shown, as supported by Fuhse262’s disclosure, that Fuhse262’s mirrors are each oriented intentionally to point to a spot that allows them to create a light spot at the intended coordinates. See Pet. 27 (“In particular, Fuhse262 explains that ‘[t]he position of the mirror surfaces, i.e. the normal vector n, is to be determined in such a way that the light incident from a specified direction k ⃗ is reflected onto the focal point (x0, y0, z0) for all micromirrors 102 assigned to light spot 110.’”) (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 96–97). This disclosure, combined with Dr. Hesselink’s testimony that the intersection of light beams from the mirrors would create not just a spot but a voxel due to light reflecting off the entire surface of Fuhse262’s mirrors demonstrates that Fuhse262 teaches limitation 1b.5.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 10,901,191 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,901,191 - Giesecke+devrient GmbH / Giesecke+devrient Currency Technology GmbH et al. v. Lumenco, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 17, 2025 · IPR2024-00836 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 6–14, 28, and 32–39 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Fuhse262, Fuhse925, Jordan, and Fuhse172.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ways: the first is the inclusion of “or a similar field” when describing the education level of a POSITA, and second is the inclusion of “with diffusive light” when describing the experience level of a POSITA. We decline to include either of these additional requirements in the definition of the level of ordinary skill. As to the first difference, Patent Owner does not explain what aspects of computer science would make it a field similar to the others listed, nor what additional engineering coursework would suffice. See Ex. 2004 ¶ 25. Nor does Patent Owner explain, generally, what makes a field “similar” to the ones listed or how to make that determination. We determine that Patent uncertainty into the definition and, therefore, do not adopt it. As to the second difference, Patent Owner proposes that the level of skill include two years’ experience with “diffusive light micro-optic security features.” The ʼ294 patent, however, does not mention “diffusive light.” Instead, the challenge claims and the written description of the ʼ294 patent use the term “ambient light.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Abstract, 20:50, 59. Ambient light, such as sunlight, includes both parallel and diffuse light. See Ex. 1055, 97:21–98:8; Ex. 1006 ¶ 54 (describing the use of sunlight or ceiling light). The ʼ294 patent mentions ambient light in an ordinary manner without discussing any distinctions between parallel light and diffuse light or giving any significance to the nature of diffuse light and its effects on the invention. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s definition of level of ordinary skill except that we find that the phrase “at least” in Petitioner’s proposed definition creates a vague, open-ended upper bound for the level of ordinary skill, and we therefore do not adopt that aspect of the proposal.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“references expressly teach but what they would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made”) (quoting In re Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750 (CCPA 1976)) (emphasis added); Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“What a reference teaches a person of ordinary skill is not . . . limited to what a reference specifically ‘talks about’ or what is specifically ‘mentioned’ or ‘written’ in the reference.”). Here, Petitioner has established that Fuhse262 discloses mirrors that reflect light rays converging at a light spot. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 95–96, Fig. 10. Dr. Hesselink credibly testifies that while Fuhse262 depicts rays that form a light spot, the rays depicted are “chief rays” that depict only the center rays of light for each optical element. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 169–170. Ambient light, however, reflects from the entire surface of the mirrors and forms reflected beams of light, not just the center rays aimed at the center point. Id. ¶ 170. According to Dr. Hesselink, the “chief ray” is representative of the larger bundle of rays that form the beams of light reflected off of the mirrors. See Id. ¶ 44. The volume of the voxel is set by the intersection of these beams and the center of the voxel is the point at which the center rays of each beam intersect. Id. ¶ 171. Although Dr. Lindstrand testifies a POSITA would not have understood Fuhse262 to disclose creating a voxel (Ex. 2004 ¶ 43), Dr. Lindstrand does not dispute Dr. Hesselink’s testimony that light would reflect off of the entire surface of Fuhse262’s mirrors and form reflected beams of light. See Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 42– 58; Ex. 1055, 112:15–21 (“You also agree the ambient light would not just strike the center of the surface, it would strike the entire surface, correct? . . . THE WITNESS: I would say that that is a fair and accurate description.”) would reflect off the entire surface of Fuhse262’s micromirrors and would create a voxel when they intersect with each other, provides sufficient support demonstrating how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Fuhse262’s disclosure of light rays being reflected off of mirrors and converging at a light spot shown in Figure 10. See Unification Techs. LLC v. Micron Tech. Inc., 2024 WL 3738401 at *7 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 9, 2024) (affirming the use of expert testimony to demonstrate how a skilled artisan would have understood a prior art reference’s disclosure as teaching a claim limitation).” slip op. at 28
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner argues that “no claim terms require express construction to resolve the challenges here.” Pet. 13. Patent Owner “agree[s] that the terms Resp. 13–14. Having reviewed the record and the arguments before us, we determine that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the dispute between the parties.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“As to Petitioner’s more general allegations regarding motivation to combine the embodiments of Fuhse262 and reasonable expectation of success, we agree with Petitioner for the reasons provided in the Petition and summarized above. Specifically, we agree with Petitioner that Fuhse262 concave mirrors and lenses with embodiments that use micromirrors. See Ex. 1006 ¶ 83 (“In order to still obtain a higher resolution in the produced light-spot image with an unchanged high floating height, the large mirrors or lenses used in the previous exemplary embodiments are each replaced by a plurality of smaller micromirrors or microprisms, which together have essentially the same optical effect as the original optical element.”). We also agree that the embodiments of Fuhse262 build on each other and often refer back to each other. For example, Fuhse262 expressly refers back to “previous exemplary embodiments” when explaining that micromirrors may replace other optical elements in the various embodiments. Ex. 1006 ¶ 83. Fuhse262’s Figures 8(a) through 8(d) build on each successive example, adding and modifying the configuration of mirrors disclosed in the previous figure. See Id. ¶¶ 88, 94 (explaining that Figure 8(b) is based on Figure 8(a) but shows mirrors arranged in checkerboard-like manner and Figures 8(c) and 8(d) further modify the configuration with every “fourth field” and “ninth field” respectively being assigned to specific light spots.) Fuhse262 also explains that Figure 9 is a sectional view of Figure 8 and that Figure 10 illustrates the “calculation of the flat mirror surfaces of the micromirrors” of Figures 8 and 9. Id. ¶¶ 91, 95. For the aforementioned reasons, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the relied upon embodiments of Fuhse262.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 10,189,294 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,189,294 - PTAB · Nov 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00878 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–3 and 11 after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by Cleveland or obvious over Nakagawa.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“contentions, the cited portions of Cleveland, and the testimony of Clearwater’s expert), we find, preliminarily, that Cleveland discloses each claim element in the manner recited by claim 1. Thus, on the current record, Clearwater demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that challenged claim 1 is unpatentable as anticipated by Cleveland.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“5 Clearwater argues that Cleveland qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1) “based on both its provisional and non-provisional filing dates.” Pet. 17. In support, Clearwater asserts that Cleveland’s provisional (Ex. 1006) is “virtually identical” to Cleveland itself (id. at 18) and submits claim charts to demonstrate that the Cleveland provisional provides written support for: (1) at least claim 1 of Cleveland (id. at 18–21); and (2) the subject matter relied upon in Cleveland (id. at 21–40 (citing Ex. 1006 throughout)). Based on our review of the Cleveland provisional, as well as Clearwater’s claim charts, we are persuaded that the current record demonstrates that Cleveland is prior art to the challenged patent. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 4
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“satisfies each claim element as identified above in Section I.D, i.e., elements [1.pre]–[1.6]. See id. at 22–40. Clearwater also submits annotated Figure 3 of Cleveland, reproduced below, to further illustrate the specific laminate structure of Cleveland’s coffee cup. See id. at 39.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“protective layers have “a coat weight of from 5 to 30 lbs/3000 ft2,” Clearwater submits the declaration of its expert, who explains that, because Nakagawa identifies the specific polymers and the thickness of the coat used for the plastic layers and one skilled in the art “would recognize that the disclosed polymers have a given density,” then “[w]ith these known parameters, the coat weight is easily calculated to be 23.04 lbs./ 3000 ft2 — falling squarely within the claimed range.” Pet. 53–54 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132–133; Ex. 1008 ¶ 24; Ex. 1024, at 4). At this stage, we find that testimony credible and supported by the evidence presently of record. After reviewing the preliminary record (including Clearwater’s contentions, the cited portions of Nakagawa, and the testimony of Clearwater’s expert), we find, preliminarily, that Nakagawa discloses or otherwise suggests each claim element in the manner recited by claim 1. Thus, on the current record, Clearwater demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that challenged claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Nakagawa. We need not decide Clearwater’s challenge of the dependent claims based on Nakagawa alone nor its challenge of claims 1–3 based on Nakagawa and Tanner. Our analysis of these challenges, in our view, is best left for trial after full development of the record.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,637,126 - PTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · PGR2025-00002 · APJ Frederick C Laney · PGR · Adverse judgment
After Patent Owner disclaimed claims 1–78, the Board granted its motion for adverse judgment and terminated the post-grant review.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding,” which includes “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). See Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“there is no claim remaining for trial . . . when, as here, all of the challenged claims have been cancelled”). Thus, actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include cancellation of patent claims such that a party has no remaining claim in the trial. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). Because Patent Owner has disclaimed all challenged claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 12,134,952 - Alpinestars S.P.A. / Alpinestars USA Inc. v. Dainese S.P.A.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00750 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–22 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any of its three obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Because Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of establishing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined EP’536 (with or without Hatton) and CN’180 in the proposed manner, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to claims 1 and 18. 5. Claims 2–17 and 19–22 Because Petitioner has not shown a reasonably likelihood of prevailing with respect to independent claims 1 and 18, Petitioner also has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the claims that depend therefrom (claims 2–17 and 19–22).” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not offer its own definition of the level of ordinary skill or dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally Prelim. Resp. The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). As Petitioner’s unchallenged description of an ordinarily skilled artisan appears consistent with the subject matter discussed in the references and that of the challenged claims, for purposes of this Decision we apply Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“For purposes of our analysis, we need only address the meaning of “planar structure,” and only to note that this limitation requires that all portions of the casing body, when inflated against the first mesh portion, second mesh portion, and tie elements, “form a planar structure” when the casing body is inflated. This is evident from both the claim language and the written description of the ’065 patent. Limitation [1e] of claim 1 recites that in the inflated condition, “said portions of the casing body” are “inflated against said first mesh portion, said second mesh portion, and said tie elements.” We understand “said portions of the casing body” to refer to all of the portions of the casing body. Likewise, “said first mesh portion, said second mesh portion, and said tie elements” refers to the entire mesh structure recited in limitation [1a]. Thus, this limitation requires all of the casing-body portions to inflate against the entire mesh structure to form the “planar structure.” This reading is consistent with the Specification. The Specification teaches that “[t]he first mesh portion and the second mesh portion together with the tie elements determine with the casing body the final shape of the inflatable element,” which “can reach a generally flat and planar final shape.” Ex. 1001, 4:19–23; see also id. at 4:59–5:3 (teaching that the casing body inflated within the mesh structure results in a “globally planar structure”). Here, “inflatable element” refers to the entire structure because it is comprised of the mesh structure and casing body. Id. at 3:11–18. Thus, the entire structure, when inflated, is “generally flat and planar.”” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“portions of the casing body, when inflated against the first mesh portion, second mesh portion, and tie elements, “form a planar structure” when the casing body is inflated. This is evident from both the claim language and the written description of the ’065 patent. Limitation [1e] of claim 1 recites that in the inflated condition, “said portions of the casing body” are “inflated against said first mesh portion, said second mesh portion, and said tie elements.” We understand “said portions of the casing body” to refer to all of the portions of the casing body. Likewise, “said first mesh portion, said second mesh portion, and said tie elements” refers to the entire mesh structure recited in limitation [1a]. Thus, this limitation requires all of the casing-body portions to inflate against the entire mesh structure to form the “planar structure.” This reading is consistent with the Specification. The Specification teaches that “[t]he first mesh portion and the second mesh portion together with the tie elements determine with the casing body the final shape of the inflatable element,” which “can reach a generally flat and planar final shape.” Ex. 1001, 4:19–23; see also id. at 4:59–5:3 (teaching that the casing body inflated within the mesh structure results in a “globally planar structure”). Here, “inflatable element” refers to the entire structure because it is comprised of the mesh structure and casing body. Id. at 3:11–18. Thus, the entire structure, when inflated, is “generally flat and planar.”” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,012,065 - Ascend Elements, Inc. v. Duesenfeld GmbHInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · PGR2025-00037 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 1–14 because Petitioner did not show that any challenged claim was more likely than not unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 321 . . . demonstrates that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least one of claims 1–14 of the ’463 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny institution of a postgrant review of claims 1–14 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, material science, chemical engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 to 3 years of academic or industry experience in the recycling or processing of lithiumion batteries. Additional formal education focusing on processing of lithium batteries may substitute for practical experience and additional practical experience can substitute for less education.” Pet. 10–11. Patent Owner does not contest this definition of a person of skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as, on the present record, it appears consistent with the ’463 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“distinct from “comminute[ion],” Petitioner offers only the testimony of its expert, Mr. Juzkow, who equates Tomioka’s “cutting” with “comminute[ion].” See Ex. 1003 ¶ 121. However, Mr. Juzkow provides insufficient reasoning to support his conclusion, particularly given the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence discussed above. In contrast, Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. Dantam, provides extensive reasoning, supported by citations to other evidence, to support his conclusion that Tomioka’s “dismantling” is not the claimed “comminution.” Thus, we give more weight to Mr. Dantam’s testimony than Mr. Juzkow’s testimony. Weighing this evidence all together, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka’s teaches the claimed comminution under Petitioner’s first theory.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundTeaching away not foundNot shown unpatentable
“obvious. Pet. 34–35. However, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has also failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka renders this limitation obvious. See Prelim. Resp. 28–31. To begin with, Petitioner’s contentions lack sufficient reasoning explaining why a person of ordinary skill would have modified Tomioka in the manner proposed. “[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Petitioner merely asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art could use the roller system in place of the dismantling disclosed for the embodiments in Figures 19 and 20. On this record, we find this bare contention insufficient. actual disclosure of Tomioka. The rollers in Tomioka are used to separate the “battery body” from the “resin package enclosing the battery body,” and Tomioka specifically discloses that this technique is designed to “avoid damaging the battery body.” Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 25, 26, 29; Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 72–73. Thus, there is a significant difference between what Tomioka teaches and what Petitioner proposes to use the roller system to do. In addition, as Patent Owner points out, Tomioka specifically discloses there are risks associated with mechanically crushing battery packs, such as “risk of sparking due to residual voltage if the battery units are damaged in the process.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 5. Although we do not agree with Patent Owner that this amounts to a “teaching away,” see In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994), we do believe that this teaching suggests a trade off that should be weighed in determining whether to make the modification, see Medichem S.A. v. Rolabo S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). However, Petitioner has failed to account adequately, if at all, for this trade off. Thus, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka accounts for the claimed “comminuting.”” slip op. at 15
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 12,119,463 - PTAB · Oct 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00698 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–11, 18–20, 23–25, and 28 on all petitioned grounds, based on a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted obviousness challenges.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Relying on the declaration testimony of Dr. Doolittle, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan for the ’539 patent “would have had an undergraduate degree (i.e., B.S., B.S.E. or the equivalent) in electrical engineering, materials science, physics, or a similar discipline” and “would also have one to two years of experience in the field of LED packaging design.” Pet. 6. Petitioner additionally contends that “[m]ore education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” Id. Petitioner further contends that “[t]his person would have been capable of understanding and applying the teachings of the ’539 patent and the prior-art references discussed herein,” and “[m]oreover, the prior art reflects the level of skill at the time of the claimed invention.” Id. (citing Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 38–42). Patent Owner states that “solely for the purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner and its technical expert employ the same level of skill in the art as Petitioners.” Prelim. Resp. 22. Based on this record, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’539 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our obviousness analysisbelow. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that “no construction should be necessary to institute this petition.” Pet. 20. Patent Owner “requests that the Board adopt the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 22. Having considered the record, we determine that, at this stage, no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). We note, however, there may be some claim terms below whose constructions that the parties may wish to address during trial.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“and “how” the references would have been combined. As the Petition explains, Krummacher discloses radiation scattering particles having a size range of 50 to 1000 nm. See Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1107 ¶ 39). Petitioner further explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would use Stokes teachings to further refine that size range to optimize the particle size to preferentially scatter blue light. See id. at 26–27. Petitioner further provides reasons, suggested in Stokes itself, why a person of ordinary skill would have made this modification to Krummacher. See id. at 27–28 (citing Ex. 1108, 7:17–26; Ex. 1102 ¶ 128). Petitioner provides sufficient evidence that such a particle size selection was within the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 122–128, 140–144; Ex. 1108, 7:1– 17; Ex. 1124 ¶¶ 80–81. We note that we have reviewed the testimony of Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Schubert, but this testimony does not, at this stage, diminish the weight we give to Petitioner’s expert. Thus, we find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the combination of Krummacher and Stokes accounts for this limitation and that a person of ordinary skill would have combined the references in the manner suggested with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 23
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute an inter partes review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Supreme Court has held that the Board, in a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b), may not institute review on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018). Moreover, in accordance with our rules, “[w]hen instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2020); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”). Applying those standards, and upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’539 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,614,539 - BTL Industries, Inc. v. Inmode Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00703 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–58 were not shown unpatentable: the Edwards, Ingle, and Mosher combination fails to establish key limitations, and Ollivier was not shown to be a prior art printed publication.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We apply Patent Owner’s proposed definition, as it appears consistent with the field of the ’511 patent and the prior art and is consistent with testimony of Dr. Poulos and the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Berenholz. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355, (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the level of ordinary skill in the art may be reflected in the prior art itself); Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 35–39; Ex. 2005, 55:5–17, 57:17–58:19. In our view, however, Petitioner’s proposed definition is not so different that our decision would change if we were to apply Petitioner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner’s argument are persuasive. We agree with Patent Owner that a plain reading of the wherein clause requires the treating to begin at the introitus and extend at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. This construction is consistent with the ’511 patent’s Specification, which states: In typical embodiments, the length of the energy delivery element is about 1 to about 3 cm in length, in other embodiments it may be as long as about 4 cm. This is a length well adapted to treating the lower aspects of the vagina, wherein treatment by the method comprises contacting the vaginal epithelium in a region that extends from the introitus inward to a position about 3 to 4 cm inward from the introitus. In some embodiments of the invention, the method can b[e] practiced with a single row of parallel contract sites immediately inside the introitus. In other embodiments, the method may include deeper rows, or rows that overlap an initial row, while keeping the contact sites within the lower portion of the vagina. Ex. 1001, 3:28–40 (emphasis added); see also id. at 14:47–57. The ’511 patent Specification also states: “the portion of the vagina to be treated is a region between the introitus and a position located no further than about 3 to about 4 cm inward from the introitus.” Id. at 11:48–51 (emphasis added). Given the plain language of claim 1, consistent with the ’511 patent’s Specification, we construe “heating a portion of the vagina extending from the introitus inwardly to a location from 1 cm to 3.5 cm in from the introitus” to require heating a portion of the vagina beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Patent Owner’s arguments is persuasive. The cited portion of Mosher does not explicitly state the location of the treatment area. Ex. 1006 ¶ 74. In it Reply, Petitioner additionally points to paragraph 54 of Mosher, which states: “Preferably, the location of the treatment volume of endopelvic fascia will be disposed along a length of the urethra between the bladder neck and the external meatus so as to avoid injuring nerves.” Pet. Reply 14 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 54). Petitioner argues that “[t]reating the vaginal wall adjacent to the mid-urethral region is within the claimed region of ‘from 1 cm to 3.5 cm in from the introitus.’” Pet. Reply 14–16. This, however, does not teach the claimed area beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. The Petition fails to show that either Edwards or Mosher discloses heating a portion of the vagina beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. In its Reply, Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious to modify Edwards to treat the area beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 2–4, 16–17 (citing Pet. 35). The Petition’s argument is unpersuasive because it is conclusory and does not adequately address Edwards’s use of a speculum. Pet. 35. The Petition includes no” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“In its Reply, Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious to modify Edwards to treat the area beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 2–4, 16–17 (citing Pet. 35). The Petition’s argument is unpersuasive because it is conclusory and does not adequately address Edwards’s use of a speculum. Pet. 35. The Petition includes no persuasive explanation as to why it would have been obvious to modify Edwards to use the treatment blade without the speculum. See Pet. 22–24, 35–36. We determine that Petitioner fails to meet its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is unpatentable over Edwards, Ingle, and Mosher.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 8,961,511 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,961,511 - Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden Canada UlcAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01382 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s withdrawal of its motion to amend and entered adverse judgment against all challenged claims after their statutory disclaimer, terminating the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 11,740,423 - Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden Canada UlcAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01228 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s withdrawal of its motion to amend and entered adverse judgment on the disclaimed challenged claims, terminating the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 11,656,422
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.