• Runergy Alabama Inc. / Runergy USA Inc. et al. v. Trina Solar Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 15, 2026 · IPR2025-00006 · APJ Debra L Dennett · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17 are unpatentable under § 103, principally over Chang and Jin; the Board rejected the Jin and Feldmann combinations for lack of a reason to combine.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In light of the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’009 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’009 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner contends that “[n]o claim construction is believed to be necessary to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 24. Patent Owner does not address claim construction. See generally Resp.; Sur-reply. For purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “However, Petitioner proposes to remove the tunnel oxide layer from the edge and offers little explanation of why the skilled artisan would apply Jin’s gap- T isolation region to both of Feldmann’s polysilicon and tunnel oxide layers. As noted above, Petitioner states that the skilled artisan would have included Jin’s gap-T isolation region in order to prevent shorting. Pet. 26. Petitioner’s reasoning is questionable—supported only by the conclusory testimony of Dr. Banerjee. Dr. Banerjee’s testimony offers no more evidentiary support than provided in the Petition. Compare Ex. 1003 ¶ 116 with Pet. 26). Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” See Magnum, 829 F.3d at 1380. We acknowledge Dr. Banerjee’s testimony that the combination of Jin’s gap-T isolation region would prevent shorting and that extending the tunnel oxide layer the edge “could trap impurities and create negative fixed oxide charges, which could then create a p-type inversion in the n-type base substrate, leading to a leakage path to the p-type emitter on the front of the solar cell” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 116 (emphasis added)) but are not convinced by his equivocal testimony. Notably too, neither Jin nor Feldmann discuss issues relating to trapped impurities and Petitioner, as well as Dr. Banerjee, fail to direct our attention to any record evidence to support their contentions. Rather, we are persuaded by Dr. Peckerar’s testimony that as a general rule in semiconductor process technology, a bare silicon surface should not be left unpassivated after processing. Elemental silicon is highly chemically reactive. As such, the bare surface is a “magnet” for defects and contamination. Leaving the tunnel oxide in place across the entire substrate backside would reduce this problem. Ex. 2001 ¶ 142. Dr. Peckerar further explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known how to avoid shorting and leakage. In particular, he testifies that the manner by which charge is transported through a tunnel oxide can be controlled by adjusting manufacturing parameters such as time, temperature, thickness, and ambient impurities. A POSITA would plainly have adjusted these parameters to ensure that the tunnel oxide operates as intended (i.e., minimizes recombinant losses while transporting charge carriers to the backside of the solar cell) while avoiding undesirable leakage current. Because unwanted leakage charge can be avoided via other means during manufacture, there would have been no reason to reduce the physical extent of the tunnel oxide. Ex. 2001 ¶ 152 (referring to Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 149–151). Moreover, Dr. Peckerar testifies that “Dr. Banerjee also appears to be arguing that incorporation of impurities into the oxide will produce a MOSFET-like structure, with the contaminated oxide acting as a MOS gate leading to enhanced leakage,” but, for that to occur, “the source and drain areas would need to be of the same type.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 159. Here however, “the tunnel oxide layer is located between an n-type polysilicon layer and p-type frontside emitter layer” so “[n]o MOSFET-like structure can form because the source and drain are of different types.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 159. Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Banerjee address or dispute this testimony. See generally Reply; Ex. 1037. We credit Dr. Peckerar’s testimony in this regard.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “configuration in which the emitter area and back surface field area are not adjacent to each other, thus eliminating “the necessity of performing an isolation process when the emitter area [] and the back surface field are [] are formed to be adjacent to each other.” Resp. 42 (citing Ex. 1013 ¶ 76). In so doing, Patent Owner side steps Chang’s unambiguous definition that “‘entirely formed’ means that an element such as a layer is formed over an entire surface without an empty area or a non-coverage area, or is formed over an entire area excluding pre-designated or inevitably formed regions such as periphery region, isolation region or the like.” Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 45, 51, 56, 62 (emphasis added). Chang discloses that a first tunneling layer, a first portion of an emitter area, a second tunneling layer, and a back surface field area may each be “formed over an entire area excluding pre-designated or inevitably formed regions such as periphery region, isolation region or the like.” Id. Chang’s definition of “entirely formed” (“excluding pre-designated or inevitably formed regions such as periphery region, isolation region or the like”) implies use of a mask. See Chang ¶ 62; Tr. 15:20–17:11. Dr. Banerjee testifies that the need to electrically isolate the emitter region from the back surface field was well known in the field, and both Chang and Jin teach backside isolation regions. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73, 217 (citing Ex. 1023 § 1). Chang also discloses that the emitter area may be formed by thermal diffusion, ion implantation or the like. Ex. 1013 ¶ 98. Petitioner persuasively argues that Chang’s disclosure of thermal diffusion of the emitter layer would result in dopants diffused into not only the top surface of the substrate, but also the exposed lateral surfaces, a problem also noted in Jin. See Pet. 11–12; Reply 6–7; Ex. 1003 ¶ 71; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 57–58. Jin discloses avoiding shorting of the emitter layer and back surface field layer by edge isolation on the back surface field layer using a mask to create a “gap-T.” Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 57–58, 83. Chang discloses excluding a tunneling layer and a base surface field area from periphery region and isolation region. Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 56, 62. Using a mask, as implied in Chang and explicitly disclosed in Jin, would “pre-designate” and/or “inevitably form” the regions where the tunneling layer and back surface field area are excluded. We credit Dr. Banerjee’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art reviewing Chang would therefore understand the importance of implementing the isolation region in Chang’s device, and would therefore be motivated to look to other references, such as Jin (which was assigned to the same original assignee as Chang, LG Electronics, EX1009-Jin, face; EX1013-Chang, face) to understand details regarding Chang’s isolation region.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 10,230,009 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,230,009
• Runergy Alabama Inc. / Runergy USA Inc. et al. v. Trina Solar Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 15, 2026 · IPR2025-00918 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 are unpatentable under § 103 over Chang and Jin; the Board rejected the Jin and Feldmann based grounds for lack of a reason to combine without hindsight.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been someone with an advanced degree involving the disciplines of electrical engineering, applied physics, chemistry, or materials science, and at least two years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field. Alternatively, that person would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, applied physics, or materials science, and at least three years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner contends that “[n]o claim construction is believed to be necessary to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 23. And, Patent Owner does not address claim construction. See generally PO Resp. As neither party proposes an express construction for our consideration and because we determine that an express claim construction is not necessary for us to render a decision in this matter, we do not construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “base a conclusion of obviousness upon facts gleaned only through hindsight. “The invention must be viewed not after the blueprint has been drawn by the inventor, but as it would have been perceived in the state of the art that existed at the time the invention was made.” Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Therefore, “to establish a prima facie case of obviousness based on a combination of elements disclosed in the prior art, the [Petitioner] must articulate the basis on which it concludes that it would have been obvious to make the claimed invention.” Id. Impermissible hindsight is inferred when the specific understanding or principle within the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art that would motivate one (with no knowledge of the claimed invention) to make the proposed combination has not been explained. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Patent Owner focuses on Chang’s description in paragraph 76 of a single configuration in which the emitter area and back surface field area are not adjacent to each other, thus eliminating “the necessity of performing an isolation process when the emitter area [] and the back surface field are [] are formed to be adjacent to each other.” PO Resp. 42–43 (citing Ex. 1013 ¶ 76). But, in so doing, Patent Owner side steps Chang’s unambiguous definition that “‘entirely formed’ means that an element such as a layer is formed over an entire surface without an empty area or a non-coverage area, or is formed over an entire area excluding pre-designated or inevitably formed regions such as periphery region, isolation region or the like.” Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 45, 51, 56, 62 (emphasis added). Chang discloses that a first tunneling layer, a first portion of an emitter area, a second tunneling layer, and a back surface field area may each be “formed over an entire area excluding pre-designated or inevitably formed regions such as periphery region, isolation region or the like.” Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 45, 51, 56, 62. Chang’s definition of “entirely formed” (“excluding pre-designated or inevitably formed regions such as periphery region, isolation region or the like”) implies use of a mask. See Ex. 1013 ¶ 62; Tr. 15:20– 17:11. Dr. Banerjee testifies that the need to electrically isolate the emitter region from the back surface field was well known in the field, and both Chang and Jin teach backside isolation regions. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70–81, 91–96, 200 (citing Ex. 1026 § 1 and stating that “[b]oth Chang and Jin likewise teach backside isolation regions”). Chang also discloses that the emitter area may be formed by “thermal diffusion, ion implantation or the like.” Ex. 1013 ¶ 98. Petitioner persuasively argues that Chang’s disclosure of thermal diffusion of the emitter layer would result in dopants diffused into not only the top surface of the substrate, but also the exposed lateral surfaces, a problem also noted in Jin. See Pet. 11–12; Pet. Reply 6–7; Ex. 1003 ¶ 71; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 57–58. Jin discloses avoiding shorting of the emitter layer and back surface field layer by edge isolation on the back surface field layer using a mask to create a “gap-T.” Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 57–58, 83. Chang discloses excluding the second tunneling layer and a base surface field area from periphery region and isolation portion. Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 56, 62. Using a mask, as implied in Chang and explicitly disclosed in Jin, would “pre-designate” and/or “inevitably form” the regions where the tunneling layer and back surface field area are excluded. We credit Dr. Banerjee’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art “reviewing Chang would therefore understand the importance of implementing the isolation region in Chang’s device, and would therefore be motivated to look to other references, such as Jin (which was assigned to the same original assignee as Chang, LG Electronics, EX1009-Jin, face; EX1013-Chang, face) to understand details regarding Chang’s isolation region.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 201.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 9,722,104 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,722,104
• Runergy Alabama Inc. / Runergy USA Inc. et al. v. Trina Solar Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 15, 2026 · IPR2025-00186 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 are unpatentable under § 103 over Chang and Jin; the Board found the combination disclosed the claimed isolation portion and supported the challenged claims.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been someone with an advanced degree involving the disciplines of electrical engineering, applied physics, chemistry, or materials science, and at least two years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field. Alternatively, that person would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, applied physics, or materials science, and at least three years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 49). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally PO Resp; Sur-reply. In light of the complete trial record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’104 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’104 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “C. Claim Construction We construe claim terms according to the standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under Phillips, we give claim terms “their ordinary and customary meaning.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. “Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id. Petitioner contends that “[n]o claim construction is believed to be necessary to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 23. And, Patent Owner does not address claim construction. See generally PO Resp. As neither party proposes an express construction for our consideration and because we determine that an express claim construction is not necessary for us to render a decision in this matter, we do not construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed

    “edge and offers little explanation of why the skilled artisan would apply Jin’s gap- T isolation region to both of Feldmann’s polysilicon and tunnel oxide layers. As noted above, Petitioner states that the skilled artisan would have included Jin’s gap-T isolation region in order to prevent shorting. Pet. 25. Petitioner’s reasoning is questionable—supported only by the conclusory testimony of Dr. Banerjee. Dr. Banerjee’s testimony offers no more evidentiary support than provided in the Petition. Compare Ex. 1003 ¶ 113, with Pet. 25. Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” Magnum Oil, 829 F.3d at 1380. We acknowledge Dr. Banerjee’s testimony that the combination of Jin’s gap-T isolation region would prevent shorting and that extending the tunnel oxide layer the edge “could trap impurities and create negative fixed oxide charges, which could then create a p-type inversion in the n-type base substrate, leading to a leakage path to the p-type emitter on the front of the solar cell” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 113 (emphasis added)) but are not convinced by his equivocal testimony. Notably too, neither Jin nor Feldmann discuss issues relating to trapped impurities and Petitioner, as well as Dr. Banerjee, fail to direct our attention to any record evidence to support their contentions. Rather, we are persuaded by Dr. Peckerar’s testimony that as a general rule in semiconductor process technology, a bare silicon surface should not be left unpassivated after processing. Elemental silicon is highly chemically reactive. As such, the bare surface is a “magnet” for defects and contamination. Leaving the tunnel oxide in place across the entire substrate backside would reduce this problem. Ex. 2001 ¶ 142. Dr. Peckerar further explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known how to avoid shorting and leakage. In particular, he testifies that the manner by which charge is transported through a tunnel oxide can be controlled by adjusting manufacturing parameters such as time, temperature, thickness, and ambient impurities. A POSITA would plainly have adjusted these parameters to ensure that the tunnel oxide operates as intended (i.e., minimizes recombinant losses while transporting charge carriers to the backside of the solar cell) while avoiding undesirable leakage current. Because unwanted leakage charge can be avoided via other means during manufacture, there would have been no reason to reduce the physical extent of the tunnel oxide. Ex. 2001 ¶ 152 (referring to Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 149–151). Moreover, Dr. Peckerar testifies that “Dr. Banerjee also appears to be arguing that incorporation of impurities into the oxide will produce a MOSFET-like structure, with the contaminated oxide acting as a MOS gate leading to enhanced leakage,” but, for that to occur, “the source and drain areas would need to be of the same type.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 159. Here however, “the tunnel oxide layer is located between an n-type polysilicon layer and p-type frontside emitter layer” so “[n]o MOSFET-like structure can form because the source and drain are of different types.” Ex. 2001” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “base a conclusion of obviousness upon facts gleaned only through hindsight. “The invention must be viewed not after the blueprint has been drawn by the inventor, but as it would have been perceived in the state of the art that existed at the time the invention was made.” Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Therefore, “to establish a prima facie case of obviousness based on a combination of elements disclosed in the prior art, the [Petitioner] must articulate the basis on which it concludes that it would have been obvious to make the claimed invention.” Id. Impermissible hindsight is inferred when the specific understanding or principle within the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art that would motivate one (with no knowledge of the claimed invention) to make the proposed combination has not been explained. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998).” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 9,722,104 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,722,104
• Runergy Alabama Inc. / Runergy USA Inc. et al. v. Trina Solar Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 15, 2026 · IPR2025-00007 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 are unpatentable under §103 over Chang and Jin because the combination teaches the claimed isolation portion and the claimed tapering.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been someone with an advanced degree involving the disciplines of electrical engineering, applied physics, chemistry, or materials science, and at least two years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field. Alternatively, that person would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, applied physics, or materials science, and at least three years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 49). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally PO Resp; Sur-reply. In light of the complete trial record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’104 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’104 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner contends that “[n]o claim construction is believed to be necessary to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 23. And, Patent Owner does not address claim construction. See generally PO Resp. As neither party proposes an express construction for our consideration and because we determine that an express claim construction is not necessary for us to render a decision in this matter, we do not construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightTeaching away not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “On this complete trial record, we agree with Patent Owner. It is improper to base a conclusion of obviousness upon facts gleaned only through hindsight. “The invention must be viewed not after the blueprint has been drawn by the inventor, but as it would have been perceived in the state of the art that existed at the time the invention was made.” Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Therefore, “to establish a prima facie case of obviousness based on a combination of elements disclosed in the prior art, the [Petitioner] must articulate the basis on which it concludes that it would have been obvious to make the claimed invention.” Id. Impermissible hindsight is inferred when the specific understanding or principle within the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art that would motivate one (with no knowledge of the claimed invention) to make the proposed combination has not been explained. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998).” slip op. at 16

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “However, Petitioner proposes to remove the tunnel oxide layer from the edge and offers little explanation of why the skilled artisan would apply Jin’s gap- T isolation region to both of Feldmann’s polysilicon and tunnel oxide layers. As noted above, Petitioner states that the skilled artisan would have included Jin’s gap-T isolation region in order to prevent shorting. Pet. 25. Petitioner’s reasoning is questionable—supported only by the conclusory testimony of Dr. Banerjee. Dr. Banerjee’s testimony offers no more evidentiary support than provided in the Petition. Compare Ex. 1003 ¶ 113, with Pet. 25. Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” Magnum Oil, 829 F.3d at 1380. We acknowledge Dr. Banerjee’s testimony that the combination of Jin’s gap-T isolation region would prevent shorting and that extending the tunnel oxide layer the edge “could trap impurities and create negative fixed oxide charges, which could then create a p-type inversion in the n-type base substrate, leading to a leakage path to the p-type emitter on the front of the solar cell” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 113 (emphasis added)) but are not convinced by his equivocal testimony. Notably too, neither Jin nor Feldmann discuss issues relating to trapped impurities and Petitioner, as well as Dr. Banerjee, fail to direct our attention to any record evidence to support their contentions. Rather, we are persuaded by Dr. Peckerar’s testimony that as a general rule in semiconductor process technology, a bare silicon surface should not be left unpassivated after processing. Elemental silicon is highly chemically reactive. As such, the bare surface is a “magnet” for defects and contamination. Leaving the tunnel oxide in place across the entire substrate backside would reduce this problem. Ex. 2001 ¶ 142. Dr. Peckerar further explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known how to avoid shorting and leakage. In particular, he testifies that the manner by which charge is transported through a tunnel oxide can be controlled by adjusting manufacturing parameters such as time, temperature, thickness, and ambient impurities. A POSITA would plainly have adjusted these parameters to ensure that the tunnel oxide operates as intended (i.e., minimizes recombinant losses while transporting charge carriers to the backside of the solar cell) while avoiding undesirable leakage current. Because unwanted leakage charge can be avoided via other means during manufacture, there would have been no reason to reduce the physical extent of the tunnel oxide.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 9,722,104 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,722,104
• Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co. Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco N.V.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 7, 2026 · IPR2024-01439 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 and 13–21 are unpatentable under § 103 based on Ono and Corbett and Uchida and Grimshaw; the Board did not find Ichieda unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a Master’s Degree in Electrical Engineering with . . . five years of work experience in computer science and embedded systems, or Master’s Degree in Computer Science with . . . five years of work experience in electrical and computer engineering and embedded systems. Additional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience. level of skill in the art.” PO Resp. 10. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, as it is consistent with the ’951 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “determine that none of the claim terms the parties provide constructions for require an express construction in this proceeding. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The parties do appear to disagree on the meaning of “trigger,” however. Although neither party actually identifies that term as needing interpretation and neither party actually provides a claim construction analysis to support its respective position, the parties do dispute whether the evidence presented shows a “trigger,” both presumably giving that term its plain and customary meaning. In other words, while both parties appear to agree “trigger” carries its plain meaning, in application, the parties’ dispute regarding the particular limitations including that term appears to turn, not over what the evidence discloses, but only on whether the disclosure satisfies the plain meaning of “trigger” (see infra § II.E.2). Accordingly, while we apply the plain meaning of “trigger” in this proceeding, and in doing so, we address which party has properly applied the plain meaning and, in doing that, we address the scope properly afforded to “trigger.” That analysis, however, is done below in the context of the limitation in which this issue arises (see id.).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “has now been developed, and in view of both parties’ arguments, we find Petitioner has persuasively shown that modifying Ono’s peripheral device (i.e., communications module 44) to include an input device/physical actuator like the one described for Ono’s remote controller 69 to control the display of image data from a particular user’s computer would have been obvious to a skilled artisan at the time of the invention. More specifically, Petitioner has shown persuasively Ono shows that the use of an input device/physical actuator to send a signal that causes a participant’s computer to transmit and control the image data presented on a shared display in an image display system was a known technique (see Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 7, 44–48, 66– 71, 77–78, 80–89, 144, Figs. 3, 6, 8, 9; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 85–100, 121–127) and available location for such an input device/physical actuator to initiate the transmission of data (see Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 6, 18, 20, 22–23, 26, 28, 46, Fig. 1; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 92–100). Petitioner has also persuasively shown that a skilled artisan recognized benefits to giving a participant the ability to locally control the display of their computer’s image data. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 87–91; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 4, 19–20, 27–28; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 10–13, 39–10, 70–72. When Ono and Corbett are considered together as a whole from the perspective of a skilled artisan, therefore, it is clear that applying a similar input device/physical actuator to Ono’s peripheral device would have been recognized to result in the benefit of providing a participant with the same ability to send a signal that causes a participant’s computer to transmit and control the image data presented on a shared display from their computer within an image display system. As a result, a motivation has been established because the combination is an application of a known technique to derive a known benefit using prior art elements according to their established functions. Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023).” slip op. at 24

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “that, from their perspective, the plain meaning of the term “trigger” does not exclude intervening steps between a user’s action on an input device and the ultimate transfer of the user selected arbitrary media content. Pet. Reply 11– 12 (indicating that “trigger” encompasses “a process that begins with and thus is triggered by a user pressing a button followed by an ‘image transfer’ from a PC to a projector”). For its part, Patent Owner maintains (at least implicitly) that intervening steps are excluded from the plain meaning. Neither party addresses with more specificity why, or why not, the scope of “trigger” supports their positions, however. Having now the complete record before us, we find that out preliminary assessment was wrong because the plain meaning of the term “trigger” does not exclude intervening steps between the cause-and-effect relationship of the trigger and the result it is intended to cause. Take, for example, a simple gun. Pulling the “trigger” to fire a gun necessarily includes intervening steps to occur: the trigger releases a hammer that, in turn, contacts a blasting cap within a bullet casing, which is what actually causes the gunpowder to ignite (i.e., fire) and expel the bullet. And there is no evidence in this record to suggest that this customary understanding of the word “trigger” is any different in the electrical arts, other than the trigger and result are generally electrical in nature, rather than mechanical. We find no clear disavowal of claim scope within the intrinsic record of the ’951 patent to indicate that the term “trigger” was intended to be understood any differently to exclude any intervening steps between a user’s action on an input device and the resulting transfer of user selected arbitrary media content. intervening steps would exist because the input device does not actually do the transferring of the media content; instead, the claims recite the transferring is “from the transmitter to the wireless communications network and [then] to the base node.” See Ex. 1001, 11:3–48, 27:62–28:1 (claim 1), 28:62–67 (claim 9), 29:42–46 (claim 16), 30:36–44 (claim 21) (emphasis added). A skilled artisan would have recognized that there would be intervening steps between the input device being acted upon and the content being displayed by base node’s display. See Ex. 1083 ¶¶ 11–12. In the claims, the input device is analogous to a gun’s trigger, the user carrying out a user action on the input device is analogous to pulling a gun’s trigger, and the transfer of user selected arbitrary media content is analogous the gun expelling a bullet. In both cases, there can be, and usually are, intervening steps, moreover, in both cases, inadvertent things can happen that may prevent the intended result (e.g., in the case of a gun, the hammer can jam; in the case of an input device, a connection can be rejected). Nevertheless, in both cases, the trigger is the thing that initiates an automated process that leads to a particular result, unless a conditional error occurs.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 11,422,951 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,422,951
• Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co. Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco N.V.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 7, 2026 · IPR2024-01438 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4, 5, 8, 14, 16, and 18–20 are unpatentable under § 103 based on the five asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” (alteration in original)). This search for answers about whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious to a skilled artisan at the time of the invention applies “an expansive and flexible art elements would have been obvious is determined by whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions. Id. at 417. Reaching this conclusion, however, “requires more than a mere showing that the prior art includes separate references covering each separate limitation in a claim under examination.” Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “Rather, obviousness requires the additional showing that a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention would have selected and combined those prior art elements in the normal course of research and development to yield the claimed invention.” Id.” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “3. Conclusion as to Secondary Considerations We have considered all of Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence concerning secondary considerations. We give Patent Owner’s evidence regarding its revenue and profits from the ClickShare product line little weight. We give some weight to Patent Owner’s evidence of licensing. We, however, do not find the licensing evidence outweighs Petitioner’s showing of obviousness.” slip op. at 86

  Patent outcomesUS 11,258,676 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,258,676
• Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co., Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco N.V.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 7, 2026 · IPR2024-01437 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 9, 18, and 19 are unpatentable as obvious over Kaplan and Mardiks and over Maeda and Deforche.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a Master’s Degree in Electrical Engineering and five years of work experience in computer science and embedded systems, or a Master’s Degree in Computer Science and five years of work experience in electrical and computer engineering and embedded systems. Additional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience. Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 10. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, as it is consistent with the ’237 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). In applying this standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. See id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner and Patent Owner propose constructions for a number of claim terms. Pet. 9–14; PO Resp. 8–10. Only those terms in controversy, however, need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). We need not construe explicitly any claim term.” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “a) Whether Dr. Almeroth’s Testimony should Be Given Little Weight Patent Owner argues that we should give little weigh to the testimony of Dr. Almeroth because Dr. Almeroth’s testimony is allegedly inconsistent across the related inter partes reviews. PO Resp. 11–16; PO Sur-reply 21– 22. We have reviewed the disputed portions of Dr. Almeroth’s testimony and, when read in context, we are not persuaded that the testimony is inconsistent so as to be afforded little weight. As Petitioner points out (Pet. Reply 2), Patent Owner’s arguments do not properly account for the context in which the testimony was given in the related inter partes reviews.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the Deutschland Gmbh v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). We are persuaded by Petitioner that Mardiks meets at least the second test because both the ’237 patent and Mardiks “are directed to solving the same problem of using standard, pre-installed generic drivers, such as human interface device (HID) drivers, to access programs stored on peripheral devices.” Pet. Reply. 3–5; See Ex. 1001, 5:38–40; Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 3, 28. We, thus, are not persuaded by Patent Owner that Mardisk is non-analogous art. slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 11,403,237 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,403,237
• Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co., Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco N.V.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 7, 2026 · IPR2024-01436 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 9–11, 19, 21, and 22 are unpatentable as obvious over Kaplan, Ahmed, and Deforche, and over Maeda, Ahmed, and Deforche.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had at least a Master’s Degree in Electrical Engineering and five years of work experience in computer science and embedded systems, or a Master’s Degree in Computer Science and five years of work experience in electrical and computer engineering and embedded systems. the work experience. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 12. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, as it is consistent with the ’002 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “term “pre-installed generic driver.” Pet. 13; PO Resp. 9–10. Those proposed constructions are consistent with the lexicographic definition provided in the ’002 patent. In a section titled “Definitions,” the ’002 patent states: The term “pre-installed generic driver” is intended to mean a driver which is installed on a processing device such as a computer as a standard driver, e.g. is installed with the installation of the operating system. Such a driver is standard for the operating system and can drive a standard class of peripheral devices coupled to or connected to the processing device. Ex. 1001, 14:32–38. We apply this lexicographic definition in our analysis below.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “a) Whether Dr. Almeroth’s Testimony should Be Given Little Weight Patent Owner argues that we should give little weigh to the testimony of Dr. Almeroth because Dr. Almeroth’s testimony is allegedly inconsistent across the related inter partes reviews. PO Resp. 13–19; PO Sur-reply 21– 22. We have reviewed the disputed portions of Dr. Almeroth’s testimony and, when read in context, we are not persuaded that the testimony is inconsistent so as to be afforded little weight. As Petitioner points out (Pet. Reply 2–3), Patent Owner’s arguments do not properly account for the context in which the testimony was given in the related inter partes review.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s arguments are unpersuasive. We are not persuaded that these differences between Kaplan, Ahmed, and Deforche are dispositive. To the contrary, we find the differences establish why a POSITA would have further modified Kaplan and Ahmed with the teachings of Deforche. Deforche expressly teaches that a disadvantage of wireless modems is that they require installation of an appropriate driver before applications running on the computer device can use the functionality of the wireless modem to connect to wireless networks. Ex. 1030 ¶¶ 2–3. Deforche solves this problem by using the processing device’s pre-installed drivers, which can be for a human interface device, to set up a modem/host communication interface for communication. Id. ¶¶ 4, 9. Because “[d]ata traffic from the computer device towards the wireless communication network and vice versa is routed over this modem/host communication interface and uses the generic communication protocol provided by the preinstalled generic driver,” Deforche states this “has the advantage that the need for a specific driver for the communication between the wireless modem device and the computer device can avoided” and “the advantage that a user can use the wireless modem device on a computer device on which he has no administrator rights, i.e. a computer specific driver for the wireless modem device.” Id. ¶ 9. “The motivation-to-combine analysis is a flexible one. Any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.” Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (internal quotations omitted). As the Federal Circuit held, “[t]here is a motivation to combine when a known technique has been used to improve one device, and a [skilled artisan] would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way.” Intel Corp., 61 F.4th at 1380. Here, Deforche establishes that utilizing an operating system’s preinstalled generic driver to provide a generic protocol communications between the processing device and a peripheral device was known for improving wireless modems because it does not require administrator rights and a specific driver to be installed to enable communications between the wireless modem device and the processing device.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 10,762,002 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,762,002
• Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. California Institute Of TechnologyNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01451 · APJ Tawen Chang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 were not shown unpatentable: Larson did not establish the claimed detection in a single sample volume, and the asserted obviousness combinations did not cure the deficiencies.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this IPR proceeding, PO does not contest Petitioner’s description of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) set forth [above].” PO Resp. 23. In view of the above, and because Petitioner’s uncontested description of one of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable and consistent with the ’921 patent and the cited art, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSA for purposes of this Decision, except that we replace the phrase “at least a year of experience in quantitative and/or dPCR and fluorescence-based analyte detection” with “around a year of experience in quantitative and/or dPCR and fluorescence-based analyte detection.” Pet. 9 (emphasis added).13” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We begin with “the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim,” which can be “highly instructive.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. In this case, claim 1 recites that the claimed assay is “capable of unambiguously detecting the presence or absence of each of said at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, in a single sample volume, . . . wherein the analytes are amplified in the single sample 15 In this regard, we note that Petitioner’s claim construction position is not predicated on the collection of droplets being reconstituted into its original, pre-partition form prior to amplification; rather, the droplets remain compartmentalized from each other in the PCR thermal cycling tube. Tr. 65:21–66:9 (Petitioner’s counsel explaining that the droplets do not combine in the PCR thermal cycling tube but, rather, are “suspended in an immiscible fluid and analyzed en masse”). indicates that the first instance of single sample volume, i.e., the single sample volume in which the presence or absence of each M analytes are to be detected, is the antecedent basis for the second instance of “single sample volume,” i.e., the single sample volume in which the analytes are amplified. Thus, as the parties appear to agree, the single sample volume in which amplification takes places must be the same single sample volume in which the presence or absence of analytes are to be detected. We are not persuaded that, when accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, a single sample volume divided into a collection of droplets would be considered the “same” single sample volume prior to its partition.” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “With respect to the limitation, “wherein the analytes are amplified in the single sample volume,” Petitioner asserts that “Larson discloses PCR assays that amplify target polynucleotide in a single sample volume, specifically a portion of the reaction mixture that is subsequently partitioned into droplets.” Pet. 31 (emphasis added). There is no dispute that the amplification of the analytes in Larson occurs in the droplets. Larson ¶¶ 6–7 (explaining that “[d]igital PCR (dPCR) is an alternative quantitation method in which dilute sample are divided into many separate reactions” and that “[t]he template is amplified in the droplet for detection”) (emphasis added). Because the claims require that amplification of the analytes be in the same sample volume in which the at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, is unambiguously detected, and because the pre-partition single sample volume is not the same single sample volume as the collection of droplets after partition under our claim construction set forth above, we find Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of evidence, that claims 1–10 and 13–19 are anticipated by Larson.17 Tr. 68:12–69:14 (Petitioner’s counsel” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Although we agree with Petitioner that Larson contemplates scenarios in which droplets may contain more than one target molecule and does not require the exclusion of such multiple occupancy droplets in all embodiments, we are nevertheless not persuaded Petitioner has shown, based on a preponderance of evidence, that Larson renders obvious an assay capable of unambiguously detecting, in such multiple occupancy droplets, the presence or absence of each of at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, when M is greater than F and F is at least 2.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 11,827,921 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,827,921
• Kohler Co. v. Delta Faucet Co.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 18, 2026 · IPR2024-00700 · APJ Jane E Inglese · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held claims 1–24 unpatentable as obvious over the asserted prior-art grounds, including Tseng’s disclosure of side-emitted light under the Director’s construction.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision on Remand from Director Review is entered pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). Having reviewed the complete trial record pursuant to the Director Review Order, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. Petitioner’s witness (Mr. Cook) qualifies as a POSITA under this definition, and, therefore, is qualified to opine from the perspective of a POSITA on technical matters included within the areas of expertise prescribed by the definition. As indicated above, Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA does not require education in the field of optics and professional experience designing or analyzing optical apparatus, unlike Patent Owner’s definition. We are aware, however, that Patent Owner’s witness (Dr. Klopp) has more extensive experience with optical systems and methods than Petitioner’s witness (Mr. Cook). Compare Ex 1003 ¶¶ 8–14, Ex. 2005, 39:21–59:17, with Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 3–20, Ex. 2004, 1–2, Ex. 1015, 10:22–13:25. Although Mr. Cook possesses excellent credentials in the field of mechanical engineering, his experience in the design and analysis of optical systems and methods is sparse and insubstantial compared to that of Dr. Klopp. Id. Due to this difference in experience levels, in instances where the witnesses express differing views on factual issues related to optical systems and methods, we accord more weight to Dr. Klopp’s testimony than to Mr. Cook’s.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “The Director’s Order instructs us to adopt its interpretation of the recitation in claim 10 of “an outer illumination surface extending perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the housing” (“the disputed limitation”) as being “satisfied by any amount of light emitted from the side surface.” Order 3. We, accordingly, construe the disputed limitation of claim 10 as a surface extending perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the housing through which any amount of light is emitted from the side surface.” slip op. at 10

  Patent outcomesUS 10,393,363 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,393,363

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.