- PTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-01110 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16, finding a reasonable likelihood they are obvious over Kim and over Chu and Choi.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable 1 Deputy Director Stewart was recused in this matter. claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons provided below, we determine, based on the record before us, there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least 3 years of experience in the research, design or development of wireless communication devices, systems, and/or networks, or the equivalent, as of the Critical Date,” and that “[i]ncreased educational experience can make up for less work experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, except as to the date that pertains to such skill level. Prelim. Resp. 4–5. Namely, Patent Owner asserts that “Petitioner is incorrect” that “the ’171 Patent is entitled to an effective date of no earlier than January 22, 2021.” Id. at 5. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’171 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of required experience.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“claim construction standard as that applied in federal courts in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), which is generally referred to as the Phillips standard. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under the Phillips standard, “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. “Petitioner submits that no formal claim constructions are necessary.” Pet. 1–2. Similarly, “Patent Owner does not contend that any formal claim construction is necessary” at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 5. For the purpose of institution, we need not explicitly construe any claim terms. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 870–71 (Fed. Cir. 2010). For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must [] convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.”), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). On the record before us, we do not agree that the ’171 Patent is entitled to a filing date earlier than Jan. 11, 2021. In particular, we do not agree that PCT ’199 describes the invention in enough detail such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could conclude that the inventor was in possession of the invention as of the March 4, 2016 filing date. The disclosures of PCT ’199 cited by Patent Owner to show written description support show: (1) transmission packets for multi-user uplink data, which includes padding such that multi-user upstream data transfers from each resource terminate at the same time (see Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 17–21); (2) performing padding on a trigger frame that triggers multi-user simultaneous transmission, where the trigger frame includes AID information of the performing preset padding before the FCS field of the trigger frame according to one embodiment (see Ex. 1012 ¶ 136, Fig. 20); and (4) inserting redundant AID information prior to the FCS field of the trigger frame, according to another embodiment (see Ex. 1012 ¶ 136, Fig. 20). PCT ’199 does not describe the invention in enough detail to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to conclude that the inventor possessed a frame for allocating resource for uplink (UL) multi-user (MU) transmission to one or more terminals that includes the AID field set to a value related to a first padding field, when the padding field is included in the frame. In particular, we discern no disclosure that conveys that the inventor possessed the following: (1) an AID field for the MU UL resource allocation frame is set to a value, (2) that the AID field is set to a value related to the padding field, and (3) that the AID field is set to a value related to the padding field, and conditioned on the inclusion of the AID field in the frame. Moreover, to the extent that Patent Owner’s assertions are premised on the PCT ’199’s disclosure of a preset padding being performed before the FCS field of the trigger frame and the disclosure of inserting redundant AID information prior to the FCS field of the trigger frame, we note that these disclosures are directed to two embodiments. See Ex. 1012 ¶ 136, Fig. 20. PCT ’199 does not provide any suggestion that the two embodiments are used together, or that the redundant AID information of one embodiment can serve as a preset padding of the other embodiment.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,716,171 - PTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-01111 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18, finding a reasonable likelihood they are unpatentable over Kim and over Chu in combination with Choi.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable 1 Deputy Director Stewart was recused in this matter. claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons provided below, we determine, based on the record before us, there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least 3 years of experience in the research, design or development of wireless communication devices, systems, and/or networks, or the equivalent, as of the Critical Date,” and that “[i]ncreased educational experience can make up for less work experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, except as to the date that pertains to such skill level. Prelim. Resp. 4. Namely, Patent Owner asserts that “Petitioner is incorrect” that “the ’186 Patent is entitled to an effective date of no earlier than April 8, 2019.” Id. at 4–5. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’186 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of required experience.” slip op. at 10
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must [] convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.”), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). On the record before us, we do not agree that the ’186 Patent is entitled to a filing date earlier than April 8, 2019. In particular, we do not agree that PCT ’199 describes the invention in enough detail such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could conclude that the inventor was in possession of the invention as of the March 4, 2016 filing date. The disclosures of PCT ’199 cited by Patent Owner to show written description support, show: (1) transmission packets for multi-user uplink data, which includes padding such that multi-user upstream data transfers from each resource terminate at the same time (see Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 17–21); (2) performing padding on a trigger frame that triggers multi-user simultaneous transmission, where the trigger frame includes AID information of the stations assigned to each channel (see Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 134–135, Fig. 20); (3) performing preset padding before the FCS field of the trigger frame inserting redundant AID information prior to the FCS field of the trigger frame, according to another embodiment (see Ex. 1012 ¶ 136, Fig. 20). PCT ’199 does not describe the invention in enough detail to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to conclude that the inventor possessed a trigger frame indicating uplink transmission for one or more terminals that includes an AID field used to identify whether the trigger frame includes a padding field, and the trigger frame including the padding field when the AID field is set to a specific value. In particular, we discern no disclosure that conveys that the inventor possessed the following: (1) a trigger frame indicating uplink transmission to one or more terminals and including an AID field used to identify whether the trigger frame includes a padding field; (2) the AID field for the trigger frame is set to a specific value, and (3) that trigger frame includes the padding field when the AID field is set to a specific value. Moreover, to the extent that Patent Owner’s assertions are premised on the PCT ’199’s disclosure of a preset padding being performed before the FCS field of the trigger frame and the disclosure of inserting redundant AID information prior to the FCS field of the trigger frame, we note that these disclosures are directed to two embodiments. See Ex. 1012 ¶ 136, Fig. 20. PCT ’199 does not provide any suggestion that the two embodiments are used together, or that the redundant AID information of one embodiment can serve as a preset padding of the other embodiment. On the record before us, we also do not agree that KR ’754 describes the invention in enough detail such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could conclude that the inventor was in possession of the invention as of the March 17, 2015 filing date of KR ’754. The disclosures of KR ’754 cited by Patent Owner to show written description support show: (1) multiplexed terminals over respective channels, (see Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 65–66, Fig. 10); (2) differing the number of AID values in the batch acknowledgment (BA) information field when the number of terminals assigned to each channel differs, setting the length of each multiplexed group ACK differently, and, if necessary, aligning the lengths of the multiplexed group ACKs based on the channel with the longest assigned BA information by adding zero padding or repeatedly inserting BA information (see Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 66–70, Fig. 11); and (3) applying the use of the AID field padding and the use of BA padding in a downlink OFDMA trigger process during multi-user downlink transmission to align the length of the trigger when the AP notifies the terminals assigned to each channel by inserting zero padding or repeating AIDs (see Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 71–72, Figs. 11–12). KR ’754 does not describe the invention in enough detail to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to conclude that the inventor possessed a trigger frame indicating uplink transmission for one or more terminals that includes an AID field used to identify whether the trigger frame includes a padding field, and the trigger frame including the padding field when the AID field is set to a specific value. In particular, we do not discern disclosure in KR ’754 that conveys that the inventor possessed the following: (1) a trigger frame indicating uplink transmission to one or more terminals and including an AID field used to identify whether the trigger frame includes a padding field; (2) the AID field for the trigger frame is set to a specific value, and (3) that trigger frame includes the padding field when the AID field is set to a specific value. We find misplaced Patent Owner’s argument that “KR ’754’s discussion about Figure 10 and Figure 11 would have been understood [by a POSITA] as disclosing a padding method used to improve predictability and consistency trigger frame” (Prelim. Resp. 12) because: (1) it addresses uplink transmissions and not a trigger frame indicating uplink transmission to one or more terminals; (2) it does not address that the padding field is included in the trigger frame when the AID field is set to a specific value; and (3) it is unsupported attorney argument regarding the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Argument of counsel cannot take the place of objective evidence. See Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 572 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009). We also find misplaced Patent Owner’s argument that “the padding discussed by KR ’754 regarding its Figure 12 embodiment is not limited to downlink transmission and would have been understood by a POSITA as also being used to schedule uplink ones” (Prelim Resp. 14) because: (1) KR ’754 does not provide any suggestion that the same technique can be used for uplink transmission trigger frames; (2) Patent Owner’s argument does not address that the padding field is included in the trigger frame when the AID field is set to a specific value; and (3) Patent Owner’s argument is unsupported attorney argument regarding the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See Gemtron, 572 F.3d at 1380. For the foregoing reasons and based on this record, for the purpose of institution, we find that the ’186 Patent is not entitled to an effective filing date earlier than April 8, 2019 and find that Kim is prior art. We note that the limitations at the heart of the written description dispute were added in an amendment filed August 9, 2020. See Ex. 1002, 214–21. In further briefing, the parties should address the respective burdens of production and persuasion for establishing that the ’186 Patent is entitled to an earlier” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments because they are premised on Choi’s teachings as limited to AIDs transmitted via a control frame broadcast as a TIM element. A prior art “reference must be considered for everything it teaches by way of technology and is not limited to the particular invention it is describing and attempting to protect.” EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal Inc., 755 F.2d 898, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis omitted). Chu, Choi, and the testimony of Dr. Ding (Ex. 1003), we are persuaded Petitioner sets forth sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine Chu’s teachings with Choi’s use of specific AID or ΔAID values as indicators of the end of meaningful data and the beginning of padding that would allow client stations to reliably determine where the useful content of the trigger frame ends and where optional padding begins, with the benefits of improved parsing efficiency, enhanced synchronization, and reduced likelihood of misinterpreting padding as data as padding. See Pet. 46–48 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 150–156; Ex. 1015 ¶ 93; Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 24, 184), 61–62 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 157–163, Pet. 45–48); KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.” slip op. at 29
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,911,186 - Luxottica Of America Inc. v. E-Vision Optics, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 16, 2025 · IPR2024-01070 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 and 12–19 are unpatentable; claims 10 and 11 were not shown unpatentable, because the asserted grounds failed to establish unpatentability for those claims.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties do not identify, and we do not discern, any material difference between the parties’ proposed definitions. Based on the record currently before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill. See, e.g., GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record). We note that we would reach the same conclusions under either proposed standard.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“The parties agree that “constrain” means to retain the module in a fixed position. Patent Owner further interprets “constrain” not to allow minor movement. This interpretation is consistent with the ’174 patent, which states, In some embodiments, the first electrical conductor may be configured to constrain or substantially constrain the electronics module. As used in this context, “constrain” may refer to when the first electrical conductor is configured to provide support (i.e. a restraining force) for the electronics module to retain the module in a fixed position within the temple. That is, the first electrical conductor may be configured to hold the electronics module in place. . . . The term “substantially constrain” is used in this context to account for some minor movement of the electronics module within the temple, but the conductor may generally hold the electronics module within the temple in place (such that it remains in an operative position). Ex. 1001, 11:50–12:3 (emphasis added). Thus, the ’174 patent distinguishes between an electrical conductor configure to “constrain” an electronics module and an electrical conductor configured to “substantially constrain” an electronics module, with the latter allowing for “some minor movement of the electronics module.” We therefore adopt Patent Owner’s interpretation of “constrain” as used in claim 1 to mean the first and second electrical conductors are configured to provide a restraining force that retains the module in a fixed position without allowing for minor movement of the electronics module.7 This interpretation also is consistent with Petitioner’s interpretation, which includes retaining the module in a fixed position within the temple. See Pet. 20.” slip op. at 24
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“therefore, are unavailing. As correctly noted by Petitioner, Brunton discloses that “the [hearing aid] units may be provided with any suitable number of contact pins and the sockets provided with a corresponding number of tubular contacts that are positioned to receive the pins and in which the pins are frictionally retained.” Ex. 1003, 3:61–65 (emphasis added). Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Feland, testifies, Frictionally retaining the hearing aid unit’s pins in the cavity means that the socket contacts couple the hearing aid unit to the temple and constrain the hearing aid unit. Brunton’s socket contacts (corresponding to the claimed first and second electrical conductors) accordingly are configured to couple the hearing aid unit (corresponding to the claimed electronics module) to the temple to constrain the hearing aid unit. Ex. 1002 ¶ 64. We credit this testimony of Dr. Feland, which is consistent with the ordinary and customary meaning of a friction-fit connection. We give less credit to the testimony of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Oliver. Dr. Oliver testifies that “Brunton describes a cover plate that physically secures the sockets.” Ex. 2016 ¶ 87 (citing Ex. 1003, 3:71–4:1). However, this assertion is contradicted by the very disclosure Dr. Oliver quotes in his declaration, which explains that the material of the temple retains the sockets in place: “The sockets for the transistor and unit, such as the sockets 19 and 20, may be frictionally held in the cavity or may be embedded in the material of the temple, as may be desired.” Ex. 1003, 3:71–74 (emphases added); see also Ex. 2016 ¶ 87 (quoting same). Brunton does disclose a cover plate to cover the cavity, but Brunton does not disclose or suggest that the cover plate contacts or otherwise influences the hearing aid: “In the design shown, the temple is provided with a cover plate 31 that is secured in position over the unit 77 and the transistor 29 with screws 32.” Ex. 1003, 3:74–4:1; see also Ex. 2016 ¶ 87 (quoting same).” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We are persuaded that Petitioner has set forth adequate reasoning to combine the teachings of Eichelberger and Howell-596. Howell-596 teaches electronic circuitry having UV radiation monitoring capability that can be used within eyewear. Ex. 1015, code (57). Howell-596 discloses that the UV detection system can be activated by a switch, which can be a capacitive touch switch. Id. ¶¶ 88, 191; Ex. 1019, 172. As discussed above, Eichelberger teaches a capacitive touch switch with electronic components disposed thereon. Ex. at 3:6–14, 3:43–50. We are persuaded that using Eichelberger’s capacitive touch switch in place of Howell-596’s would have been obvious. See Pet. 83–84; Ex. 1002 ¶ 221. e. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 15 would have been obvious in view of the combination of Howell-596 and Eichelberger.” slip op. at 55
Patent outcomesUS 8,801,174 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,801,174 - Luxottica Of America Inc. v. E-Vision Optics, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 16, 2025 · IPR2024-01069 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–21 are unpatentable as obvious, including under Blum, Sikonowiz, and Howell-719; the Board rejected the separate Howell-719, Sikonowiz, and Blum ground for claims 14–21.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner contends that “no claim terms require construction to resolve the obviousness challenges here.” Pet. 16. Petitioner contends that, in its mappings of the challenged claims, it “identifies passages from the specification demonstrating that the prior art discloses claim terms in the manner [that] the ’355 patent uses them.” Id. at 17. Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s contentions or proffer any constructions of its own. See generally PO Resp. We determine that no express construction of any term is necessary. slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or manufacturing engineering; mechatronics; electrical engineering plus coursework in mechanical engineering, manufacturing engineering, or mechatronics; or a similar technical degree,” and “would have also had at least 2 years of experience designing consumer electronics, such as eyewear with electronics.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 32). Petitioner contends that “[w]ork experience could substitute for formal education and additional formal education could substitute for work experience.” Id. at 16 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 32). Patent Owner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or computer engineering, or an equivalent degree and, in addition, approximately two years of work experience with embedded electronic devices” and “[m]ore advanced degrees or training in a related discipline or both can compensate for shorter work experience.” PO Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 29–32). The parties do not identify, and we do not discern, any material difference between the parties’ proposed definitions. Based on the record currently before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill. See, e.g., GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record). We note that we would reach the same conclusions under either proposed standard.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). The Supreme Court’s decision in [KSR] directs us to construe the scope of analogous art broadly, stating that “familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and a person of ordinary skill often will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” [KSR, 550 U.S.] at 402 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“electronic components . . . comprising . . . at least one of an accelerometer or a gyroscope.” Ex. 1001, 30:15–28. Petitioner relies on Howell-719 to disclose a switch that the user operates “to control audio while wearing the glasses.” Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 93). Petitioner relies on Blum to disclose glasses including an accelerometer or gyroscope that allows the user to control a switch, thereby “allowing the user to use a head movement to change the functionality of the glasses.” Id. at 46–47 (citing Ex. 1006, 30:39–45). Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan to [i]ncorporat[e] [Blum’s] accelerometer- or gyroscope-based switch controls into Howell-719 [as] a simple substitution of one known alternative (accelerometer/gyroscope-based motion detector allowing for head movement to activate switch) for a component (physical switches) serving the same purpose (allowing the user to activate switch to control functionality while the user is wearing the glasses and cannot see the switches) with the added benefit of hands-free control. Id. at 47 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 130). Thus, Petitioner’s modification is to replace Howell-719’s “physical switch” with Blum’s “accelerometer/ gyroscope-based motion detector.” Claim 14 also recites “a capacitive touch switch operably coupled to an electronic component in the plurality of electronic components.” Ex. 1001, 30:26–28. Petitioner argues that “Howell-719 discloses a capacitive touch switch operably coupled to the speaker to control the speaker.” Pet. 48. However, as noted above, Petitioner modifies Howell-719’s glasses to replace its switch with an accelerometer/gyroscopebased motion detector. Thus, the glasses as modified by Petitioner do not include Howell-719’s switch, and it is not clear, based on the record, how the requirement for a capacitive touch switch is satisfied in this combination of references. See PO Resp. 18–20; see also PO Sur-reply 7. 2. Conclusion For at least these reasons, on this record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 14–21 would have been obvious in view of Howell-719, Sikonowiz, and Blum.” slip op. at 42
Patent outcomesUS 10,613,355 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,613,355 - Luxottica Of America Inc. v. E-Vision Optics, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 11, 2025 · IPR2024-01071 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 are unpatentable as obvious; the Board found each challenged claim unpatentable under at least one asserted § 103 ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We find that the proposals from the parties substantially overlap, such that it remains unclear whether any substantive difference exists. Notably, neither party argues that the minor differences in the proposals lead to a different outcome on any issues in this proceeding. Based on our review of the proposals, we apply Patent Owner’s proposal because it is consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the ’541 patent and prior art of record. See, e.g., GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record). The outcome of the issues addressed in this Decision would not change if we applied Petitioner’s proposal.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b), we apply the claim construction standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under that standard, we give the words of a claim their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by one skilled in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Id. at 1312–13. Only terms in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Here, Petitioner posits that “no claim terms require construction to resolve the obviousness challenges here.” Pet. 12. Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s position or proffer any constructions of its own. See generally PO Resp. We determine that no express construction of any claim element is necessary to resolve the issues in this proceeding.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Based on our review of the record, we find Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the motivation to combine Howell-596 and Howell-158 persuasive. Importantly, the references themselves support the combination because Howell-158 expressly teaches the advantages of using an insulating layer with metal frames and incorporates by reference Howell-596 and its embodiments that disclose all but the insulating layer limitations of claim 1. See Pet. 15–21. While Patent Owner correctly notes that the references do not expressly teach the use of the insulating layer in the Howell-596 embodiments, the references do not teach away from that approach and at least implicitly support Petitioner’s proposed combination, which involves using an advantageous design element (an insulating layer) with another embodiment incorporated into the same document. See id.; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 3 (incorporating Howell-596), 52–53 (disclosing the use of metal frames and the advantages of using an insulating layer with metal frames). Patent Owner does not dispute that the stated advantages of the insulating layer— preventing short circuits and reducing leakage current—would apply to the embodiments of Howell-596 when those designs incorporate a metal frame. See PO Resp. 18 (arguing that the advantages of the insulating layer only apply if metal frames are implemented in Howell-596’s system). In short, the references themselves amply support Petitioner’s motivation to combine arguments and the expert testimony Petitioner relies on in support of those arguments. See Pet. 21–24; Pet. Reply 2–10; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 63–69.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesMotivation foundUnpatentable
“POSITA would have found it obvious, through routine optimization, to select a housing module with the claimed thickness of less than or equal to 0.7 mm. See Aller, 220 F.2d at 456; In re Boesch, 617 F.2d 272, 276 (CCPA 1980) (“[D]iscovery of an optimum value of a result effective variable . . . is ordinarily within the skill of the art.”); see also Power- Kennedy Contracting Corp. v. Concrete Mixing & Conveying Co., 282 U.S. 175, 184–85 (1930) (“[O]bviously a mere change in proportion would involve no more than mechanical skill and would not amount to invention.”). Several reasons support Petitioner’s arguments, which we address in turn.” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 8,905,541 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,905,541 - PTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · IPR2025-01069 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–14 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing based on Bharadwaj alone and Bharadwaj with Yu.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute review. Paper 11. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“To the extent Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art need not be defined as of the critical date, we disagree. Under Section 103, we must determine “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains” (emphasis added). “Obviousness is determined from the vantage point of a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art to which the patent pertains.” In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Thus, we define the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art as of a time before the effective filing date. To the extent Patent Owner’s argument is that, to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art, one need not have been a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the critical date, we agree. Although one must at least possess ordinary skill in the art to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill, [a]n expert need not have acquired that skill level prior to the time of the invention to be able to testify from the vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Rather, an expert can acquire the necessary skill level later and develop an understanding of what a person of ordinary skill knew at the time of the invention. Osseo Imaging, LLC v. Planmeca USA Inc., 116 F.4th 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2024). the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’077 patent and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of experience.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“C. Claim Construction The parties agree that no claim terms require express construction. Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 2–4. Patent Owner, however, notes that, in related district court litigation, Petitioner has asserted that some claims terms are indefinite. Patent Owner argues that the Petition should be denied because Petitioner has taken inconsistent claim construction positions between the district court and the Board. Paper 14 at 1–3 (citing Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, IPR2025-00340, Paper 18 at 4 (PTAB Nov. 5, 2025) (informative); Revvo Techs., Inc. v. Cerebrum Sensor Techs., Inc., IPR2025-00632, Paper 20 at 4–5 (PTAB Nov. 3, 2025) (precedential)). Petitioner responds that, in the related district court litigation, the parties have narrowed the claim construction disputes and that Petitioner accords the plain and ordinary meaning to claim terms and no longer asserts that any claim term of the ’077 patent is indefinite. Paper 15 (citing, inter alia, Ex. 1126 (Defendants’ Responsive Claim Construction Brief)). The evidence supports Petitioner’s position because, in the related district court litigation, the defendants agree with the plaintiff (Patent Owner) that certain phrases in the ’077 patent claims should be given their “[p]lain and ordinary meaning” and are “not indefinite.” Ex. 1126, 6 (native page 1). Thus, the record does not show inconsistent claim construction positions that warrant denial under PTAB precedent. See Revvo, Paper 20 at 5 (addressing a situation in which a petitioner advances “different claim construction positions” in district court and at the PTAB). See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Patent Owner that Bharadwaj includes subject matter that is not in Bharadwaj-Prov59, namely the change from adding the value Resp. 20; Ex. 1007 ¶ 51 (adding m); Ex. 1006 ¶ 50 (subtracting m); Prelim. Resp. 20. Petitioner, however, points out this change in the Petition and acknowledges that it is after the identified critical date of August 20, 2015. See Pet. 28. Thus, we do not understand Petitioner to be relying on Bharadwaj’s disclosure of subtracting m to determine length, as disclosed in the publication of the non-provisional application, as a prior art disclosure. We understand Petitioner to be relying on disclosures in Bharadwaj-Prov059 for prior art teachings for its obviousness contentions. Patent Owner does not appear to dispute that Bharadwaj-Prov59’s disclosures are prior art, arguing instead that it is improper to rely “on matters in Bharadwaj beyond ‘incorporation by reference’ of the Bharadwaj-Prov59.” See Prelim. Resp. 20–21. On this record, we determine that Bharadwaj-Prov59’s disclosures are prior art as of its June 2, 2015, filing date by virtue of its incorporation by reference into Bharadwaj, a published US patent application. Ex. 1006 ¶ 1; see Pet. 12–13.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,313,077 - Apple Inc. v. Apex Beam Technologies LLCInstitutedPTAB · Dec 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00897 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the Kim, Dahlman, and Kim966 combination renders claim 1 obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may be instituted if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the papers, we determine that the information presented in the Petition demonstrates that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’527 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“invention of the ’527 patent “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with two years of experience designing or developing wireless networks, including long-term evolution LTE/4G or 5G new radio (NR) cellular technology,” and that “[a]dditional education might substitute for some of the experience, and additional substantial experience might substitute for some of the educational background.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 40–43). Patent Owner at this stage of the proceeding does not provide an alternative definition for a level of skill in the art that one would have had at the time of the invention of the ’527 patent or identify any shortcoming in Petitioner’s formulation. See Prelim. Resp. 3–4. For purposes of this Decision on Institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 12. We view the definition for the level of ordinary skill is consistent with the ’527 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that “no claim terms need be construed to resolve issues of controversy in the present Petition.” Pet. 2. At this stage, Patent Owner agrees that no terms need construction. Prelim. Resp. 3. We determine that no express constructions are needed for us to render our Decision on Institution. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”). Rather, at this stage of the proceeding, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“discloses the preamble and the remaining limitations of claim 1. Pet. 38–64. Petitioner identifies where the combination of Kim, Dahlman, and Kim966 teaches these limitations, supported with testimony from Dr. Mandayam, which Patent Owner does not specifically rebut at this stage. We determine, on this record, that the combination of Kim, Dahlman, and Kim966 teaches the preamble (whether or not limiting) and the remaining undisputed limitations of claim 1. See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L., 759 F. App’x 917, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (nonprecedential) (“The Board is ‘not required to address undisputed matters’ or arguments about limitations with which it was never presented.”) (quoting In re NuVasive, Inc., 841 F.3d 966, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). We also find that Petitioner has provided sufficiently articulated reasoning, which Patent Owner does not specifically address at this stage, to support combining Kim, Dahlman, and Kim966’s teachings in the manner Petitioner does. Pet. 21–38. 3. Summary In summary, based on the current record, we determine that Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood that the combination of Kim, Dahlman, and Kim966 renders claim 1 obvious.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,944,527 - Apple Inc. v. Apex Beam Technologies LLCInstitutedPTAB · Dec 2, 2025 · IPR2025-00894 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Yeo and TS36 render at least claim 1 obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims. slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art stating that “[f]or the purposes of this Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 2. On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not disputed and is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’767 patent and the asserted prior art references. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)No construction neededNot reached
“under 112(f) pointing out the respective functions and structure disclosed in the ’767 patent specification. Pet. 18–20. Patent Owner does not dispute the construction of these terms, stating only “that claim construction is not required to resolve any issues.” PO Resp. 2 (citing Pet. 18–20). Where there is no dispute and our Decision does not turn on any particular construction of these terms, we need not decide at this point whether “receiver module” and “transmitter module” invoke means-plus-function under 112(f). Pet. 13; Prelim. Resp. 5. And, because there is no dispute, we conclude that no express interpretation of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute an inter partes review in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the” slip op. at 10
- BurdenInstituted
“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1889, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,462,767 - Texas Instruments Incorprated v. Parkervision, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00934 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 19–21 are unpatentable as obvious over DeMaw and, separately, over Macnally.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“1. Principles of Law A claim is unpatentable under § 103(a) if the differences between the” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 7,496,342 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,496,342 - PTAB · Nov 20, 2025 · IPR2025-00951 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–19 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over DuroMax and De Vries.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63, 369–70 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. As to the inclusion of physics in Petitioner’s definition, Patent Owner acknowledges that an undergraduate mechanical engineering degree holder would have the requisite knowledge here but does not adequately explain why an undergraduate physics degree holder would not. In addition, Patent Owner requires “a four-year degree in mechanical engineering or a closely related field,” but fails to identify what fields are “closely related.” See Prelim. Resp. 10 (emphasis added). Based on the Winkel Declaration, we are persuaded at this stage that a hypothetical undergraduate physics degree holder would have had adequate knowledge for one of ordinary skill in the art of the invention here. See Winkel Decl. ¶ 106. As to the requisite years of experience proposed in the definitions— three for Petitioner versus “at least one” for Patent Owner—we note that Patent Owner’s definition is broader than, but includes, Petitioner’s definition. Moreover, for both the inclusion of physics and the years of experience issues, Patent Owner acknowledges that the arguments in the Preliminary Response “are not impacted based on which definition is applied.” Prelim. Resp. 10. Further, Patent Owner does not argue at this stage that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would have understood either the challenged patent or the prior art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“At this stage of the proceeding and on the current record, we need not and do not explicitly construe the phrase “selector switch.” See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Although we do not expressly adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction at this stage of the proceeding, we note that it at least generally aligns with the tentative claim construction issued by the United States District Court in the California Litigation: “Mechanical device whose positioning precludes simultaneous access to two fuels.” Ex. 300310 at 2; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“Any prior claim construction determination concerning a term of the claim in a civil action, or a proceeding before the International Trade Commission, that is timely made of record in the inter partes review proceeding will be considered.”); Memorandum from Acting Director Coke Morgan Stewart to Members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Sept. 15, 2025), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ Memo_re_prior_findings_of_fact_and_conclusions_of_law_9_16_25.pdf (“Prior Determinations Memo”) (discussing PTAB consideration of prior findings of fact and conclusions of law). We also note that Patent Owner” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Like the Federal Circuit in In re Ellis, although the patent classification of the reference is “some evidence of ‘non-analogy, . . . we consider the similarities and differences in structure and function of the inventions . . . to carry far greater weight.” In re Ellis, 476 F.2d at 1372 (affirming the Board and rejecting the applicant’s nonanalogous art argument). Here, the challenged patent discusses in the Background of the Invention the need for a way to “prevent both valves from being ‘on’ at the” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,598,101
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.