• Deltran USA LLC / Adc Solutions Auto LLC v. The Noco CompanyAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2026 · IPR2024-01219 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 are unpatentable as obvious over the Richardson-based grounds; the Yu and Paparrizos grounds do not establish unpatentability.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art, “[a]s of the claimed priority date of July 3, 2014, . . . would have been a person with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or its equivalent and two years of experience in the field of electrical engineering including some experience in design of battery charging systems.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–30). Patent Owner “does not propose a different level of skill in the art[.]” PO Resp. 16. In light of the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, because it is supported by the testimony of C. Arthur MacCarley and not disputed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner submits there are no formal claim constructions necessary in this proceeding[.]” Pet. 22. Patent Owner also “does not propose any terms need to be construed.” PO Resp. 15. As neither party proposes an express construction for our consideration and because we determine that claim construction is not necessary, we do not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review). slip op. at 11

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelNot reached

    “arguments relating to whether the prior findings are “necessary to the determination” or whether estoppel applies to arguments relating to Richardson being inoperative. See Pet. Reply 27. Nor does Petitioner respond to our inquiry about whether collateral estoppel maybe applied on a limitation by limitation basis. See Pet. Reply 27. At the hearing, however, Petitioner confirmed that resolution of the issue is not necessary to our final determination. JUDGE ROSS: Do we even need to decide the collateral estoppel issue? I mean, it seems to me that if your petition clearly made out your case for the combination of Richardson and Zhao, then we don't even need to reach that. MR. CHANDRA: That’s exactly right, Your Honor. That is our position, as well. We believe collateral estoppel applies, but you don't need to decide that issue in order to find these claims unpatentable. As I mentioned before, these are the same references. We have fairly sought out all of the portions of Richardson, we cited to specific portions. Not just relying on collateral estoppel, but the teachings of the reference itself. So, while this is an issue, we believe that collateral estoppel should apply. It does not have to apply in order to find the challenged claims unpatentable. Tr. 19:9–20. We are persuaded, as discussed in Section II.G., that Petitioner has shown where Richardson in combination with Zhao meets each limitation of the claims of the ’203 patent. Accordingly, we need not address whether Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently that collateral estoppel applies here.” slip op. at 14

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “With respect to Petitioner’s allegations that rest on AAPA, we determine Petitioner has failed to show that claims 2, 10, and 11 are unpatentable. Our rules require that a petition for inter partes review must base the asserted challenges on “prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” 35 U.S.C. § 311(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) and (4). And, a petitioner who relies on applicant admitted prior art as the basis, or part of the basis, of a ground, runs afoul of § 311. Qualcomm, 134 F.4th at 1365; see also USPTO Memorandum, Enforcement and Non-Waiver of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) and Permissible Uses of General Knowledge in Inter Partes Reviews (Jul. 21, 2025), available at www.uspto.gov/sites/default/ files/documents/aapa_memo_final__signed.pdf. We acknowledge but reject Petitioner’s position that its combinations discussing AAPA do not “rely” on AAPA but rather rely on U.S. Patent No. 5,793,185 (“the ’185 patent”), described in the ’203 patent as prior art. Pet. Reply 26. A petition for inter partes review must identify, “in writing and with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104 (b)(4). Here, Petitioner’s contention that the Grounds 2 and 5 actually rely on the ’185 patent when discussing AAPA is inconsistent with the Petition. In particular, the Petition does not cite to or direct our attention to any specific details from the ’185 patent to support its challenges. See generally Pet. 54–57, 76–77. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 2, 10, and 11 would have been unpatentable over the combination of Richardson, Zhao, and AAPA as well as over the combination of Yu, Paparrizos, and AAPA. Petitioner’s alternative allegations based on Epower-20/Epower-21 are considered below.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 11,667,203 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,667,203
• Avanos Medical, Inc. v. Stratus Medical, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 10, 2026 · IPR2024-01209 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–27 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations, principally Racz, Fitz, and Lee; both parties’ motions to exclude are dismissed as moot.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “PO Resp. 30 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 58). Patent Owner’s proposal is too narrow in two respects. First, it mandates certain education and experience in RF neurotomy specifically. This is too narrow as the description of the scope of the invention set forth in the ’782 patent as described above is not limited to RF neurotomy. Second, it requires the POSA to be both a physician who performs thermal ablation (RF neurotomy specifically) and an engineer with training and experience “in the design and development of devices and methods” for performing the same. Id. This is too narrow because it excludes physicians and other advanced degree holders who research and design devices and methods for performing thermal ablation but do not actually operate on patients. We adopt the Petitioner’s definition of a POSA, quoted above, as it is reflective of the level of skill in the art when viewed in light of the disclosure of the ’782 patent. Supra (quoting Pet. 11).” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “With respect to the challenged claims, Petitioner contends that no claim term requires express construction. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1031 ¶106 (Dr. Robert D. Tucker’s11 testimony that “the terms in the Challenged Claims would be understood by a POSA to have their plain and ordinary meaning and do not require a special construction or definition”)). In instituting the IPR, we found no need to provide an express construction of any claim term. Inst. Dec. 12. We likewise find no need to do so now, as neither party has proposed a construction for any claim term and none of the parties’ arguments turns on a disputed meaning of any claim language.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “(Fed. Cir. 1985)). “Whether a reference in the prior art is ‘analogous’ is a fact question.” Clay, 966 F.2d at 658. “Two criteria have evolved for determining whether prior art is analogous: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” Id. at 658–59. Patent Owner argues that Lee is not analogous art under the first criterion because “Lee does not relate to neurotomy at all.” PO Resp. 34. However, as discussed above, the field of the invention is not limited to neurotomy. The field of the invention is thermal ablation generally, which encompasses RF neurotomy, but which is not limited to RF neurotomy. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument. To the contrary, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that Lee is analogous art, under at least the first Clay criterion, because it “discloses various techniques for deploying electrodes from the tip of an RF ablation device.” Pet. 18.” slip op. at 24

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Dr. Tucker’s testimony is not a bald conclusion. His conclusion as to a reasonable expectation of success is set forth in paragraph 148 of his declaration. Ex. 1031 ¶148. It is supported extensively with testimony regarding what the prior art teaches (see id. ¶¶110–117 (Racz), ¶¶118–123 (Fitz), ¶¶124–131 (Lee)) and why and how a POSA would have combined the prior art teachings (see id. ¶¶132–147). Dr. Tucker’s testimony clearly is entitled to weight. Since 1983, he has “been a Professor at the University of Iowa where [he] direct[s] an active research program in radiofrequency electrosurgical procedures and instrumentation.” Ex. 1031 ¶3. He has a Ph.D. in biophysics, and he is also a medical doctor (albeit he is not Board certified as pointed out by Patent Owner19). Id. ¶2. He also has additional training and experience that is relevant, but which is not necessary, but further establishes that he is well qualified to offer the opinions set forth in his declaration. Id. ¶¶2–11. Patent Owner argues that Dr. Tucker is not qualified to testify here because “he is not Board certified” and he is “not a pain-specialist physician and has never performed a neurotomy.” PO Resp. 30. Dr. Tucker explained, however, that he is not Board certified nor does he operate on 19 See PO Resp. 30 (citing Ex. 2020, 10:19–12:20). patients because his work focuses on the development of instrumentation, not the use of it, explaining on cross-examination:” slip op. at 39

  Patent outcomesUS 10,966,782 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,966,782
• Avanos Medical, Inc. v. Stratus Medical, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 6, 2026 · IPR2024-01211 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 18–47 and 53–74 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Racz, Fitz, Lee, and the additional references in Grounds 2–8.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In sum, the field of the invention is thermal ablation. It encompasses RF neurotomy, but it is not limited to RF neurotomy. With that settled, we turn now to the person of ordinary in the field/art (POSITA or POSA).” slip op. at 17

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Dr. Tucker’s testimony is not a bald conclusion. His conclusion as to a reasonable expectation of success is set forth in paragraph 162 of his declaration. Ex. 1033 ¶162. It is supported extensively with testimony regarding what the prior art teaches (see id. ¶¶124–131 (Racz), ¶¶132–137 (Fitz), ¶¶138–145 (Lee)) and why and how a POSA would have combined the prior art teachings (see id. ¶¶146–161). Dr. Tucker’s testimony clearly is entitled to weight. Since 1983, he” slip op. at 39

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “35. “Although § 103 does not, by its terms, define the ‘art to which [the] subject matter [sought to be patented] pertains,’ this determination is frequently couched in terms of whether the art is analogous or not, i.e., whether the art is ‘too remote to be treated as prior art.’” In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 741 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). “Whether a reference in the prior art is ‘analogous’ is a fact question.” Id. at 658. “Two criteria have evolved for determining whether prior art is analogous: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” Id. at 658–59. Patent Owner argues that Lee is not analogous art under the first criterion because “Lee does not relate to neurotomy at all.” PO Resp. 33. However, as discussed above, the field of the invention is not limited to neurotomy. The field of the invention is thermal ablation generally, which encompasses RF neurotomy, but which is not limited to RF neurotomy. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument. To the contrary, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that Lee is analogous art, under at least the first Clay criterion, because it “discloses various techniques for deploying electrodes from the tip of an RF ablation device.” Pet. 17.” slip op. at 25

  • BurdenDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not identify any legal requirement for petitions to illustrate proposed combinations of prior art features. Indeed, the very statute identified by Patent Owner as “requiring petitions to set forth challenge grounds ‘with particularity’” (see PO Resp. 36) calls for the requisite particularity to be “in writing,” not by illustration. See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (“A petition filed under section 311 may be considered only if . . . (3) the petition identifies, in writing and with particularity . . . the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based.”). Simply put, there is no legal requirement to provide multiple illustrations of a proposed combination of prior art features (as Patent Owner implies), let alone a single illustration (as Petitioner has done).” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 10,736,688 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,736,688
• Avanos Medical, Inc. v. Stratus Medical, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 6, 2026 · IPR2024-01210 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17 and 48–52 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of prior art, principally Racz, Fitz, and Lee.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In sum, the field of the invention is thermal ablation. It encompasses RF neurotomy, but it is not limited to RF neurotomy. With that settled, we turn now to the person of ordinary in the field/art (POSITA or POSA).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 741 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). “Whether a reference in the prior art is ‘analogous’ is a fact question.” Id. at 658. “Two criteria have evolved for determining whether prior art is analogous: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” Id. at 658–59.” slip op. at 24

  • BurdenDecided for petitioner

    “illustrate proposed combinations of prior art features. Indeed, the very statute identified by Patent Owner as “requiring petitions to set forth challenge grounds ‘with particularity’” (see PO Resp. 36) calls for the requisite particularity to be “in writing,” not by illustration. See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (“A petition filed under section 311 may be considered only if . . . (3) the petition identifies, in writing and with particularity . . . the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based.”). Simply put, there is no legal requirement to provide multiple illustrations of a proposed combination of prior art features (as Patent Owner implies), let alone a single illustration (as Petitioner has done).” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “a POSA would have had an apparent reason to make Racz’s modified device. Pet. 22–27. We need not address these additional arguments and evidentiary citations, however, as Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that implementing deployable filaments on the distal tip of an RF ablation device was a known technique for expanding and controlling the ablation volume. Thus, so long as there would have been a reasonable expectation of success in making Racz’s modified device (addressed infra), the combination would have been obvious. See Intel Corp., 61 F.4th at 1380 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”); Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1165 (“[A]n obviousness determination requires not only the existence of a motivation to combine elements from different prior art references, but also that a skilled artisan would have perceived a reasonable expectation of success in making the invention via that combination.”).” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 10,736,688 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,736,688
• Avanos Medical, Inc. v. Stratus Medical, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 5, 2026 · IPR2024-01212 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–29 are unpatentable because Petitioner showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the asserted prior-art combinations rendered them obvious under §103.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. In this case, we must determine whether one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that applying the teachings of Fitz and Lee of deploying multiple filaments to increase and control the ablation volume to Racz’s distal tip would improve Racz’s device in the same way. For us to resolve this question in Petitioner’s favor, Petitioner must provide “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988). However, bodily incorporation, i.e., “an actual physical substitution of” Lee’s filaments into Racz is not required. See In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It is well-established that a determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.”); In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973) (“Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.”).” slip op. at 30

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “11. Balancing the Graham Factors After weighing all the evidence submitted by the parties in light of the Graham factors, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the claims 1, 3–10, 18–26, 28, and 29 would have been obvious over Racz, Fitz, and Lee. As discussed above, Petitioner’s evidence establishes that the combination of Racz, Fitz, and Lee teaches every limitation of claims 1, 3–10, 18–26, 28, and 29 and that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Racz, Fitz, and Lee with a reasonable expectation of success. Further, as discussed above, Patent Owner’s evidence of secondary considerations is entitled to little, if any, weight because Patent Owner fails to establish nexus. Consequently, after considering all the evidence in the record both for and against patentability, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 3–10, 18–26, 28, and 29 would have been obvious over Racz, Fitz, and Lee. E. Ground B: Obviousness in view of Racz, Fitz, Lee and Young ’965 Petitioner contends that claims 1–10, 18–26, and 28–29 are also obvious over Racz, Fitz, Lee, and Young ’965. Pet. 62–67. Patent Owner argues that Young ’965 does not cure the alleged deficiencies in Ground 1, is directed to tumor ablation not neurotomy, would require a substantial redesign of Racz’s modified device, and there is no motivation to combine. PO Resp. 59–60. We start with a brief overview of Young ’965 and address the parties’” slip op. at 78

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Accordingly, both Motions are dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 94

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of skill in the art, we consider the type of” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 10,925,664 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,925,664
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01223 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 34–37 and 40–46 were not shown unpatentable because Suzuki’s organic barrier layer was not shown to meet the agreed construction of “planarization layer.”

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “layer of material that planarizes such that the propagation of defects from one layer to another layer can be interrupted and the topography of the underlying layer and/or structure is not reproduced.” PO Resp. 10. According to Patent Owner, we should adopt this construction because the parties agreed to it in a related district court proceeding and it is supported by the intrinsic evidence. Id. at 10–14. Petitioner does not dispute this 1 Japanese Published Application No. H09-245964, Pub. Sep. 19, 1997 (Ex. 1010, “Kijima”) (English translation). 2 US 6,198,217, Pub. Mar. 6, 2001 (Ex. 1012, “Suzuki”). 3 US 6,087,196, Pub. July 11, 2000 (Ex. 1013, “Sturm”). 4 WO 2001/08242, Pub. Feb. 1, 2001 (Ex. 1016, “Duthaler”). 5 Japanese Published Application No. H10-41069, Pub. Feb. 13, 1998 (Ex. 1014, “Fujimori”) (English translation). construction. Paper 33, 6:17–8:1; see Pet. Reply 5. We adopt the parties’ agreed-to construction.” slip op. at 4

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner argues Suzuki’s organic barrier layer does not reproduce the underlying layer’s/structure’s topography because “Suzuki’s organic barrier layer 20 ‘makes a smooth surface on the relatively irregular surface of the cathode 18.’” Pet. Reply 7 (quoting Ex. 1012, 5:59–67). We disagree. Instead, we agree with Patent Owner that Suzuki’s irregular-surface smoothing describes covering defects, not suppressing the underlying cathode’s topography. PO Sur-reply 5. The smooth-surface passage that Petitioner highlights comes immediately after two sentences describing inevitable “defects,” “pinholes,” and “foreign matter” on the cathode surface and before a sentence describing “ensuring the formation of the layer 22, which is substantially defect-free.” Ex. 1012, 5:52–67. Suzuki’s organic barrier 20 “makes a smooth surface” by covering defects because the defects are the only source of the “irregularity” that Suzuki refers to here. Id. We note Mr. Humphrey’s testimony, which we credit in this regard, that the “defects are created incidentally on the surface of the underlying layer and are generally not considered to be part of the underlying layer’s topography, which is a macroscopic property by design” and that the organic layer is not a planarization layer because it would reproduce the topography of the underlying layer. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 47–48. Because the parties’ agreed-to construction of “planarization layer” “requires ‘a layer of material that planarizes’ for two distinct functions,” Petitioner’s showing of just one of those functions is insufficient. PO Sur-reply 2.” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “G. Level of Skill in the Art Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and at least one year of experience in display technologies” and that “[a]dditional education might compensate for a deficiency in experience, and vice-versa.” Pet. 14–15. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. We agree with and adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the level of skill reflected in both the prior art and the ’389 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “which is substantially defect-free.” Ex. 1012, 5:52–67. Suzuki’s organic barrier 20 “makes a smooth surface” by covering defects because the defects are the only source of the “irregularity” that Suzuki refers to here. Id. We note Mr. Humphrey’s testimony, which we credit in this regard, that the “defects are created incidentally on the surface of the underlying layer and are generally not considered to be part of the underlying layer’s topography, which is a macroscopic property by design” and that the organic layer is not a planarization layer because it would reproduce the topography of the underlying layer. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 47–48. Because the parties’ agreed-to construction of “planarization layer” “requires ‘a layer of material that planarizes’ for two distinct functions,” Petitioner’s showing of just one of those functions is insufficient. PO Sur-reply 2.” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 6,949,389 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,949,389
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01222 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 34–37 and 40–46 are unpatentable as obvious over the Yamazaki-based and Weaver-based grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner bears the burden of production to establish that its claimed invention is entitled to an earlier priority date for this fact-intensive issue. See In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We agree with Petitioner that the email chain does not support Patent Owner’s conception claim because it “does not discuss depositing a planarization layer, as required by both independent claims.” Pet. Reply 3. Patent Owner asserts that the inventor’s discussion of “PML” (polymer multi-layer) encapsulation in the email chain shows their conception of the claimed planarization layer because the ’389 patent describes that PMLs “‘[t]ypically’ include[e] ‘a planarization layer’ that ‘is provided to give a planar surface’ for deposition of an upper layer,” and “‘address ‘any point defects (i.e. pin holes)’ that might appear in the barrier layer’s surface.” PO Resp. 6 (quoting Ex. 1001, 1:31–37, 1:41–44, 1:56–62). We disagree with Patent Owner for two reasons. First, the challenged patent’s specification does not corroborate that the inventors conceived the claimed planarization before the challenged patent’s priority because it did not exist at the time of the email. Whether the inventors, at the time of filing, considered PMLs to typically include a planarization layer as of the claimed priority date does not support the allegation that they conceived of that same planarization layer more than a year earlier. Moreover, the ’389 patent’s teaching that “[t]ypically, for PML structures, a planarization layer 106 is formed” (Ex. 1001, 1:30–31) shows that the inventors recognized PML structures and planarization layers were distinct because only a subset of PML structures formed planarization layers, even if they do so typically. Thus, the inventor’s discussion of a PML layer in the email chain does not evidence their conception of the claimed planarization layer, as Patent Owner contends. Additionally, even if we were to understand the inventors’ mention of PML encapsulation in the emails, together with the discussion of patterning techniques for an organic layer, as discussing a planarization layer, such discussions are evidence of brainstorming ideas, rather than documenting the path taken with the claimed invention. For instance, the inventors use phrases like “don’t know if this will work,” “these are all just ‘undeveloped’ ideas,” and “looking forward to keep this discussion rolling.” Ex. 2006, 1; see also Ex. 1034, 59:22−59:18. As Petitioner argues, and we agree, these are more theoretical and future-development discussions than an exchange of a definite idea. Pet. Reply 2−3 (citing Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986). For these reasons, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner has not” slip op. at 6

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Applicant-admitted prior artDecided for petitioner

    “B. Whether Petitioner Relies on Applicant Admitted Prior Art Patent Owner asserts we should “not consider” Yamazaki-based challenges because Petitioner included Applicant Admitted Prior Art (AAPA) in those grounds. See PO Resp. 16 (citing Qualcomm Incorporated v. Apple Inc., 134 F.4th 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2025)) (holding that AAPA may not be part of the basis for an inter partes review). We disagree. As Petitioner notes, it “utilizes the AAPA in the alternative with Ghosh, to show that it was known to manufacture OLED devices in bulk (which [Patent Owner] does not dispute).” Pet. Reply 9. Because “[t]he Petition identifies disclosures in Ghosh that independently demonstrate the same teachings for which the AAPA is cited,” we agree with Petitioner that it does not improperly rely on AAPA for any of its challenges. Id.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “C. Whether Yamazaki, Weaver, and Palanisamy Are Printed Publications under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) Patent Owner asserts that Yamazaki, Weaver, and Palanisamy do not qualify as printed publications under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) because they only qualify as prior art under § 102(e). PO Resp. 17. According to Patent Owner, “[e]ven though the Federal Circuit has held that such references are ‘printed publications’ under 311(b), to preserve arguments on appeal, Patent Owner submits that such an interpretation is inconsistent with the plain statutory language, the precedent, and non-public accessibility of an unpublished patent application.” Id. We disagree with this argument because the Federal Circuit has rejected it, as Patent Owner acknowledges. See Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 2023-2346, Slip. Op. (Fed. Cir. Jan. 14, 2025).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Yamazaki does not involve multiple devices on a substrate” and Ghosh teaches “non-selective deposition of at least the barrier layer.” PO Resp. 31. We disagree with this argument because it attacks Yamazaki and Ghosh individually, rather than the combination of Yamazaki’s selective deposition and Ghosh’s plurality of devices that Petitioner asserts. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). We also disagree with Patent Owner’s criticism that Petitioner fails to explain why skilled artisans would have ignored Ghosh’s non-selective deposition method for barrier layers on multiple devices. PO Resp. 32. This argument attacks a straw man as Petitioner does not propose modifying Ghosh’s method with Yamazaki’s selective deposition. See Pet. 21–23. Rather, Petitioner proposes modifying Yamazaki’s selective deposition method by applying it to Ghosh’s teaching of encapsulating a plurality of OLED devices. Id. Next, Patent Owner asserts that skilled artisans would not have extended Yamazaki’s single-device fabrication/encapsulation method to a plurality of devices on a substrate because doing so would “multiply defects and errors, drop the yield exponentially, and increase the cost.” PO Resp. 34. Patent Owner asserts that precision/defect problems would be particularly acute when using Yamazaki’s inkjet method to print devices’ electro luminescence layers. Id. at 35–36. We disagree. Even if extending Yamazaki’s method to Ghosh’s multiple devices comes at a cost of potential defects, that tradeoff would not undermine Petitioner’s proffered combination given Petitioner’s articulated benefits outline above, including facilitating manufacturing display panels for OLEDs with improved throughput, improved productivity, and reduced manufacturing costs, as compared to fabricating/encapsulating just a single device. See Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another.”). It also does not matter that “inkjet printing yielded devices of half the efficiency than spin coating,” as Patent Owner asserts (PO Resp. 35), because Petitioner does not need to show that Yamazaki’s inkjet printing would be the best option for batch fabrication/encapsulation, only that it would was a suitable one from which the prior art did not teach away. See Par Pharm., Inc. v. TWi Pharms., Inc., 773 F. 3d 1186, 1197–98 (Fed. Cir 2014). That is, Petitioner does not need to show that Yamazaki’s inkjet method was an improvement over other known fabrication/encapsulation methods, so long as it was a known fabrication/encapsulation method and skilled artisans would understand that implementing it for a plurality of devices had known advantages over fabricating/encapsulating a single device, which Petitioner identifies. See Pet. 22. We also agree with Dr. Subramanian that skilled artisans would have a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination given similarities between the references (both are directed to encapsulation of an OLED display device with multiple thin-film layers and at least the first encapsulation is selectively deposited) and because “as the ’389 patent admits, in the prior art it was conventional to use batch fabrication to manufacture OLED display devices with thin-film encapsulation.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 86. As Dr. Subramanian explains, a particular advantage of inkjet printing is that it scales well to larger areas and it was known at the time of the ’389 patent that inkjet could be used to print multiple devices on a glass substrate. Ex. 1032 ¶¶ 2, 27–28. Patent Owner’s argument that “Yamazaki’s methods are far from ready for manufacturing” (PO Resp. 34) goes well beyond what is necessary to show that skilled artisans would have had a reasonable expectation of achieving what is claimed. See Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Given Petitioner’s analysis outlined above, we agree with Petitioner that it would have been obvious to skilled artisans to fabricate and encapsulate multiple OLED devices on a substrate using Yamazaki’s ink-jet methods. slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 6,949,389 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,949,389
• Kohler Co. v. Delta Faucet Co.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 18, 2026 · IPR2024-00700 · APJ Jane E Inglese · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held claims 1–24 unpatentable as obvious over the asserted prior-art grounds, including Tseng’s disclosure of side-emitted light under the Director’s construction.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision on Remand from Director Review is entered pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). Having reviewed the complete trial record pursuant to the Director Review Order, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. Petitioner’s witness (Mr. Cook) qualifies as a POSITA under this definition, and, therefore, is qualified to opine from the perspective of a POSITA on technical matters included within the areas of expertise prescribed by the definition. As indicated above, Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA does not require education in the field of optics and professional experience designing or analyzing optical apparatus, unlike Patent Owner’s definition. We are aware, however, that Patent Owner’s witness (Dr. Klopp) has more extensive experience with optical systems and methods than Petitioner’s witness (Mr. Cook). Compare Ex 1003 ¶¶ 8–14, Ex. 2005, 39:21–59:17, with Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 3–20, Ex. 2004, 1–2, Ex. 1015, 10:22–13:25. Although Mr. Cook possesses excellent credentials in the field of mechanical engineering, his experience in the design and analysis of optical systems and methods is sparse and insubstantial compared to that of Dr. Klopp. Id. Due to this difference in experience levels, in instances where the witnesses express differing views on factual issues related to optical systems and methods, we accord more weight to Dr. Klopp’s testimony than to Mr. Cook’s.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “The Director’s Order instructs us to adopt its interpretation of the recitation in claim 10 of “an outer illumination surface extending perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the housing” (“the disputed limitation”) as being “satisfied by any amount of light emitted from the side surface.” Order 3. We, accordingly, construe the disputed limitation of claim 10 as a surface extending perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the housing through which any amount of light is emitted from the side surface.” slip op. at 10

  Patent outcomesUS 10,393,363 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,393,363
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 17, 2026 · IPR2024-01187 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 8–11, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over Ingle and Hasei; claims 3, 5, and 6 were not shown unpatentable because the Hanamura-based grounds lack the claimed trench.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “isolation, rather than in the claims’ context, and in light of the ’492 patent’s specification. In the trench/layers context of the ’492 patent, the word in requires more than it does in the circle/square context.” slip op. at 6

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Physics, or a comparable field of study, and at least three years of research or industrial experience with semiconductor (organic or inorganic) optoelectronic devices and/or lighting or displays. An individual with additional education could have less research or industrial experience and vice-versa. Pet. 9. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed definition because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “rather than the combination of Ingle’s capacitor and Hasei’s droplet discharge application that Petitioner asserts. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Even if Ingle falls short of teaching structured application for its capacitor’s cathode, as Patent Owner argues, that does not undermine Petitioner’s challenge because Petitioner proposes using Hasei’s structured application (i.e., a droplet discharge device) to form the cathode of Ingle’s capacitor. See Pet. 24–25. Patent Owner’s additional argument that “Hasei contains no discussion of forming capacitors” (PO Resp. 36; see PO Sur-reply 17–18) is similarly flawed—it attacks Hasei individually, while ignoring Ingle’s capacitor teaching. We agree with Petitioner—the combination of Ingle and Hasei teaches structured application of the capacitor’s cathode. In addition, we disagree with Patent Owner that “Petitioner provides no reason why a POSITA would have extended Hasei’s method for producing its OLED to a capacitor.” PO Resp. 36; see PO Sur-reply 17 (asserting “pure conjecture”). To the contrary, as noted above, Petitioner explains, with relevant support from Hasei, that its structured application method reduced electrode-material waste and shortened manufacturing times as compared to photolithography. Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 5, 7). Given those benefits, Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support that its proffered combination would have been obvious. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 9,257,492 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 9,257,492
• Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2024-01119 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 27, 37, 58, 60-64, 67-79, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 197, 199-204, 208-216, 223, 225, and 230 were not proven unpatentable over the asserted combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner “does not agree with all aspects of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill” but did not propose an alternative definition. PO Resp. 10–11. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Rosenberg, adopted Dr. Terveen’s definition for the purposes of his declaration. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 32–33. We again adopt the main portion of Dr. Terveen’s definition, and determine that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience working with graphical user interfaces and applications for computers.” This definition is commensurate with the problems and solutions in the ’754 patent and prior art of record and is supported by declarant testimony.” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Given our determination of how Ahn consistently describes the “touch and drag” gesture and “dragged” to mean the movement of a finger (or other object external to the touch screen), and in the absence of persuasive evidence in the figures or in other portions of Ahn to support the movement or appearance of a menu during a user input gesture, we determine that the present record does not support a conclusion that Ahn teaches or suggests a menu sliding onto a display or appearing during an input gesture such as a touch and drag gesture, as opposed to being displayed after such a gesture is completed.” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Given our determination of how Ahn consistently describes the “touch and drag” gesture and “dragged” to mean the movement of a finger (or other object external to the touch screen), and in the absence of persuasive evidence in the figures or in other portions of Ahn to support the movement or appearance of a menu during a user input gesture, we determine that the present record does not support a conclusion that Ahn teaches or suggests a menu sliding onto a display or appearing during an input gesture such as a touch and drag gesture, as opposed to being displayed after such a gesture is completed.” slip op. at 27

  • Expert testimonyDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner argues that “even under [this] interpretation of Ahn, the only difference between Ahn and the claims is whether the animation occurs in direct correspondence with a user’s dragging gesture or after the dragging gesture is complete – a straightforward design choice if ever there was one.” Pet. Reply 3–4 (citing Ex. 1024, 99:16–108:20; Ex. 1023 ¶ 12). However, as Patent Owner argues (PO Sur-reply 7–8) this argument is presented in Reply and is an improper shift of theory from the Petition. Nevertheless, were we to consider it, we would not find it compelling; Dr. Terveen’s cited testimony repeats this bare statement and is not supported by any evidence or additional explanation. Ex. 1023 ¶ 12; see 37 CFR § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (assigning little weight to opinion testimony that “merely repeats” conclusory statements in a brief, without “cit[ing] any additional supporting evidence or provid[ing] any technical reasoning to support [the declarant’s] statement”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 10,656,754 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,656,754

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.