- Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Mullen Industries LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00741 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board denied Patent Owner’s dismissal motions and entered adverse judgment against Mullen Industries LLC on claims 1, 12, 17, and 20 of U.S. Patent 11,376,493 B2 after disclaimer.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“provide that “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding,” and “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). “The application of the [adverse judgment] rule on its face does not turn on the patentee’s characterization of its own request.” Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In this case, Patent Owner, after the institution decisions, disclaimed the challenged claims such that there are no remaining claims in the trials. Patent Owner presents no persuasive reasons why we should not apply Rule 42.73 or why termination or dismissal is more appropriate. Under the IPR2025-00745 (Patent 9,662,582 B2) IPR2025-00746 (Patent 10,974,151 B2) circumstances of these cases, we construe the filing of disclaimers as requests for adverse judgment.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“Constitution that there exist a case or controversy to be adjudicated by a district court. See Sanofi-Aventis, 933 F.3d at 1372–73. The Board is not a district court or any other Article III court, and Patent Owner has not shown persuasively that Sanofi-Aventis supports its argument that dismissal, as opposed to adverse judgement, is appropriate.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 11,376,493 - Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Mullen Industries LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00742 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board denied Patent Owner’s dismissal motions and entered adverse judgment against it for the disclaimed challenged claims in the listed proceedings.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“We determine that Petitioner has the better position. Our rules provide that “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding,” and “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). “The application of the [adverse judgment] rule on its face does not turn on the patentee’s characterization of its own request.” Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In this case, Patent Owner, after the institution decisions, disclaimed the challenged claims such that there are no remaining claims in the trials. Patent Owner presents no persuasive reasons why we should not apply Rule 42.73 or why termination or dismissal is more appropriate. Under the IPR2025-00745 (Patent 9,662,582 B2) IPR2025-00746 (Patent 10,974,151 B2) circumstances of these cases, we construe the filing of disclaimers as requests for adverse judgment.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“In the Motions, Patent Owner, relying on Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC v. Dr. Reddy’s Lab’ys, Inc., argues that, “[b]ecause all claims at issue have been disclaimed, any case or controversy over the claims is moot,” and, “[a]ccordingly, the IPR[s] should be dismissed.” Mot. 2 (citing Sanofi- Aventis U.S., LLC v. Dr. Reddy’s Lab’ys, Inc., 933 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). Sonofi-Aventis pertains to the requirement under Article III of the Constitution that there exist a case or controversy to be adjudicated by a district court. See Sanofi-Aventis, 933 F.3d at 1372–73. The Board is not a district court or any other Article III court, and Patent Owner has not shown persuasively that Sanofi-Aventis supports its argument that dismissal, as opposed to adverse judgement, is appropriate.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 11,904,243 - Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Mullen Industries LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00743 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board denied Patent Owner’s motions to dismiss and entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner for challenged claims 1, 8, 16, and 18 after their post-institution disclaimer.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“provide that “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding,” and “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). “The application of the [adverse judgment] rule on its face does not turn on the patentee’s characterization of its own request.” Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018).” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“Constitution that there exist a case or controversy to be adjudicated by a district court. See Sanofi-Aventis, 933 F.3d at 1372–73. The Board is not a district court or any other Article III court, and Patent Owner has not shown persuasively that Sanofi-Aventis supports its argument that dismissal, as opposed to adverse judgement, is appropriate.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 11,947,716 - Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Mullen Industries LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00744 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board denied Mullen Industries LLC’s motion to dismiss and entered adverse judgment after institution based on its disclaimer of all challenged claims.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“We determine that Petitioner has the better position. Our rules provide that “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding,” and “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). “The application of the [adverse judgment] rule on its face does not turn on the patentee’s characterization of its own request.” Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In this case, Patent Owner, after the institution decisions, disclaimed the challenged claims such that there are no remaining claims in the trials. Patent Owner presents no persuasive reasons why we should not apply Rule 42.73 or why termination or dismissal is more appropriate. Under the IPR2025-00745 (Patent 9,662,582 B2) IPR2025-00746 (Patent 10,974,151 B2) circumstances of these cases, we construe the filing of disclaimers as requests for adverse judgment.” slip op. at 6
NonePatents in suitUS 12,019,791 - Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Mullen Industries LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00745 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board denied Mullen Industries LLC’s motions to dismiss and entered adverse judgment on challenged claims 1, 2, 11, and 13 after their post-institution disclaimer.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“provide that “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding,” and “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). “The application of the [adverse judgment] rule on its face does not turn on the patentee’s characterization of its own request.” Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018).” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“Constitution that there exist a case or controversy to be adjudicated by a district court. See Sanofi-Aventis, 933 F.3d at 1372–73. The Board is not a district court or any other Article III court, and Patent Owner has not shown persuasively that Sanofi-Aventis supports its argument that dismissal, as opposed to adverse judgement, is appropriate.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 9,662,582 - Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Mullen Industries LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00746 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board denied Mullen Industries LLC’s motion to dismiss and entered adverse judgment after institution for disclaimed claims 1–3 of U.S. Patent 10,974,151.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“We determine that Petitioner has the better position. Our rules provide that “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding,” and “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). “The application of the [adverse judgment] rule on its face does not turn on the patentee’s characterization of its own request.” Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In this case, Patent Owner, after the institution decisions, disclaimed the challenged claims such that there are no remaining claims in the trials. Patent Owner presents no persuasive reasons why we should not apply Rule 42.73 or why termination or dismissal is more appropriate. Under the IPR2025-00745 (Patent 9,662,582 B2) IPR2025-00746 (Patent 10,974,151 B2) circumstances of these cases, we construe the filing of disclaimers as requests for adverse judgment.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“Constitution that there exist a case or controversy to be adjudicated by a district court. See Sanofi-Aventis, 933 F.3d at 1372–73. The Board is not a district court or any other Article III court, and Patent Owner has not shown persuasively that Sanofi-Aventis supports its argument that dismissal, as opposed to adverse judgement, is appropriate.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 10,974,151 - Orca Security Ltd. v. Wiz, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2025-01084 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–29 over Ross, Agarwal, and Biran because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’896 patent. We institute inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’896 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had a bachelor’s degree in an academic area emphasizing computer science (i.e., computer science, computer information systems, computer engineering, etc.) or cybersecurity and (2) at least two years of work experience with cybersecurity and cloud computing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 53–54). Petitioner further argues that “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Id. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA at this stage of the proceeding. See generally, Prelim. Resp. ordinary skill because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’896 patent and the cited prior art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner
“1[Pre] A method for generation of unified graph models for network entities, comprising: Petitioner contends that the preamble is not limiting, but to the extent by teaching the remaining limitations of the claim which are the steps in generating unified graph models for network entities, as the preamble recites. Pet. 9–10. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contentions. At this stage of the proceeding, we agree with Petitioner that the preamble is not limiting because it merely states the purpose or intended use of an invention and because none of the subsequent limitations rely upon the preamble for completeness or antecedent basis. See Catalina Marketing Int’l., Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re Hirao, 535 F.2d 67 (CCPA 1976).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“sufficiently established a motivation to combine Ross, Agarwal, and Biran in the manner proposed. For example, Petitioner contends for limitation 1[b] that a POSITA would have been motivated to implement Ross’s system to genericize network entities as taught by Agarwal and that Agarwal provides an express motivation to do so, explaining that “[t]he grouping of nodes can be helpful when attempting to understand system properties in a cloud environment, like availability, security and performance, where the system includes a large number of nodes.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:13–26, 13:21–27; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103–108). Similarly, for limitation 1[d] Petitioner argues that “Biran provides express motivation to implement Ross to gather information on host-less components . . . to generate an accurate, service-aware view of the system infrastructure.” Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:59– 61; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 134–136). These disclosures demonstrate that Petitioner’s motivation to combine stems from the prior art references themselves rather than from hindsight. Moreover, Petitioner’s contentions are supported by credible testimony from Dr. Easttom. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103–108, 122–123, Addressing a motivation to combine on a limitation-by-limitation basis, as Petitioner has done in its Petition, is not necessarily improper, and may in fact be more suitable in certain situations depending on the proposed combination. Patent Owner does not provide any authority supporting its contention that providing a motivation to combine in the manner asserted in the Petition is contrary to proper obviousness analysis under Graham.” slip op. at 25
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,929,896 - Orca Security Ltd. v. Wiz, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2025-01087 · APJ Lisa A Murray · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–17 because Orca showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its § 103 obviousness ground over Shua and Lang.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons given below, on this record, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. We determine that institution of an inter partes review of the challenged claims is appropriate. B. Real Parties in Interest” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“35 U.S.C. § 103 involves determining the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time the invention was made. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. The level of skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who knows the relevant art. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Factors to consider include the types of problems encountered in the art, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Id. One or more factors may predominate. Id. Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the field of the ’529 Patent would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, electrical engineering, or a similar degree, with 2–3 years additional education or experience might substitute for these requirements.” Pet. 5; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 32–33. Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response does not address this issue. We find Petitioner’s formulation to be consistent with the evidence of record at this stage of the proceedings, including the asserted prior art and the ’529 Patent, and we preliminarily adopt and apply that definition for purposes of this Decision. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“Owner contends that Petitioner’s argument “inverts the appropriate understanding: just because the challenged patent identifies an example security database that stores a representation of a computing environment as nodes and edges does not mean that anything that stores a representation of a computing environment as nodes and edges is necessarily a security database.” Prelim. Resp. at 7–8. We agree with the logic of Patent Owner’s argument, but disagree that Petitioner necessarily “relies on this inverted understanding for its prior art mapping.” Id. at 8. We understand Dr. Zadok’s explanation to mean only that the claim term “security database” encompasses graph databases that include a representation of the computing environment, meaning that some (but not necessarily all) security databases are graph databases. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 100. The language in the Petition to which Patent Owner objects can be read consistently with Dr. Zadok’s declaration. Petitioner does not, however, take a position on what the outer bounds of the claim term “security database” should be. Without attempting a full construction of the term “security database,” it is possible to determine from the current record, at least on a preliminary basis, some of the database types that would fall within its scope. The ’529 Patent explains that the claimed “security database” is part of an “inspection cybersecurity threats. Specifically, it provides as follows: In certain embodiments, the cloud computing environment 110 is monitored for cybersecurity objects, threats, risks, and the like, by an inspection environment 130. In an embodiment, the inspection environment 130 is configured to monitor the cloud computing environment 110 for cybersecurity objects, threats, risks, combinations thereof, and the like. Ex. 1001, 6:1–7; see id. Fig. 1. The ’529 Patent also provides: “In an embodiment, the inspection environment 130 further includes a security database 136. In some embodiments, the security database 136 is configured to store a representation of the cloud computing environment 110, for example based on a predetermined data schema.” Id. at 7:46–50. Thus, we can conclude that the term “security database,” as used in the ’529 Patent, encompasses at least a database within an inspection environment that monitors for cybersecurity threats and is configured to store a representation of a cloud computing environment that is monitored by the inspection environment. An example of such a security database is the Neo4j® graph database. Id. at 7:58–60. As discussed below, another example is the “context map” disclosed in Shua ’048. See Ex. 1005, 15, 25.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We find nothing contradictory in Petitioner’s argument that “100% of an organization’s assets” would include its AI models. Pet. 11, 21. Shua ’048 appears to contemplate treating multiple layers of structures as assets to be mapped and monitored. Ex. 1005 ¶ 30 (Shua’s Orca system “automatically assesses the security state of discovered asset[s] throughout the technology stack, including all four cloud layers: I/S, OS, apps, and data.”). On the current record, a VM is an asset that contains other assets, including an AI model.10 We conclude that for the purposes of institution, Petitioner’s mapping, as elucidated by Dr. Zadok, adequately demonstrates that the combination of Shua and Lang discloses limitation 1[c] and the corresponding limitations in claims 9 and 10. We further conclude that Petitioner’s identification of a motivation to combine Shua with Lang is adequate for institution purposes.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,003,529 - Orca Security Ltd. v. Wiz, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2025-01083 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that Shivamoggi disclosed the required natural-language list of abnormal connections, including for the dependent-claim grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’554 patent. We do not institute inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’554 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had a bachelor’s degree in an academic area emphasizing computer science (i.e. computer science, computer information systems, computer engineering, etc.) or cybersecurity, with at least two years of experience in the field of cybersecurity.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 49). Petitioner further argues that “additional education or experience might substitute for these requirements.” Id. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA at this stage of the proceeding. See generally, Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’554 patent and the cited prior art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts that “no claim terms need to be construed to resolve any issues in controversy in the Petition.” Pet. 7 (citing Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Patent Owner asserts that “[n]o constructions are necessary to deny institution because denial is warranted for numerous reasons that do not depend on claim construction, as further detailed below.” Prelim. Resp. 2. We determine that, at this stage of the proceeding, no explicit constructions are required to resolve the dispute between the parties.” slip op. at 8
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Having reviewed the record presently before us, we agree with Patent Owner. Limitation 1[d] requires generating “insights, wherein the generated insights include at least a list of abnormal connections between the identified network objects.” The ʼ554 patent states that “[n]etwork insights are natural-language representations of aspects of the network graph.” 1 Ex. 1001, 10:15–17. Petitioner acknowledges that the recited “insights” are “natural-language representations.” Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1001, 10:16–18). Dr. Easttom also agrees that insights are natural-language representations. Ex. 1003 ¶ 100 (testifying that “Shivamoggi’s insights are provided to the user as textual descriptions (i.e. natural-language representations).”). As an 1 The parties do not address whether the “wherein” clause of limitation 1[d] runs afoul of the printed matter doctrine. “[T]he petition must set forth . . . . [h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104. Even though “insights” are described in the ʼ554 patent as “natural-language representations of aspects of the network graph” (Ex. 1001, 10:15–17), Petitioner does not construe “insights, wherein the generated insights include at least a list of abnormal connections between the identified network objects,” as “printed matter” that may be disregarded because it is “not functionally related to the substrate.” See Praxair Distribution, Inc. v. Mallinckrodt Hosp. Prods. IP Ltd., 890 F.3d 1024, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“‘Where the printed matter is not functionally related to the substrate, the printed matter will not distinguish the invention from the prior art in terms of patentability.’. . . For example, in In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004) there was no functional relationship between claimed instructions and a diagnostic kit, as the instructions ‘in no way depend[ed] on the kit, and the kit [did] not depend on the’ instructions.” (quoting Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Because the parties have not addressed it, we decline to consider if the printed matter doctrine applies here. “virtual machine one to load balancer five, where port eighty is routed to port 1337 on virtual machine one, then from load balancer five to firewall two, where port eighty of firewall two is open, then from firewall two to subnet sixteen, where subnet sixteen has a network address of 10.0.1.0/24, then from subnet sixteen virtual network ten, where virtual network ten has a network address of 10.0.0.0/16, then from virtual network ten to virtual network eleven, via peering connection twelve, where peering connection twelve includes a routing rule to virtual network twelve, specifying virtual network twelve's network address, where virtual network twelve's network address is 172.31.0.0/16.” Ex. 1001, 10:31–45 (quotation marks in original). This example illustrates that an insight is provided in natural-language, or textual, format, consistent with the description of an insight in the ʼ554 patent and the testimony of Dr. Easttom. The limitation, which recites “the generated insights include at least a list of abnormal connections,” therefore requires generating a naturallanguage representation of a list of abnormal connections.” slip op. at 18
Claim constructioncites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,722,554 - Orca Security Ltd. v. Wiz, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2025-01086 · APJ Lisa A Murray · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Orca did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing, based on its unexplained inconsistent positions on a claim term.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons given below, on this record, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims. B. Real Parties in Interest” slip op. at 2
- Prior constructionPrior construction not adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The Board has recently clarified that “[s]imply noting that the petitioner is adopting a patent owner’s claim construction proposals from district court . . . is not a sufficient reason for advancing different positions in the two forums.” Revvo Techs., Inc. v. Cerebrum Sensor Techs, Inc., IPR2025-00632, Paper 20, 5 (PTAB Nov. 3, 2025) (precedential). In Revvo, as in this case, the petitioner did not propose its own constructions for claim terms in the Petition, but instead accepted the patent owner’s proposed constructions from the related district court litigation. Id. at 2. Although the petitioner had proposed different constructions for the claim terms in district court, it did not explain why it was taking a different position before the Board. Id. The Board’s trial rules “do not necessarily prohibit petitioners from taking inconsistent claim construction positions before the Board and a explain why alternative positions are warranted.” Revvo, Paper 20, 3–4 (quoting Cambridge Mobile Telematics, Inc. v. Sfara, Inc., IPR2024-00952, Paper 12 at 8–9 (PTAB Dec. 13, 2024) (informative)). Petitioner has not sufficiently done so here. Moreover, the fact that Petitioner cannot raise its indefiniteness challenge in an inter partes review is not a sufficient reason to allow Petitioner to take inconsistent claim construction positions before the Board and the district court. Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, IPR2025- 00340, Paper 18, 3 (Nov. 5, 2025) (informative). As explained in the Board’s Tesla decision: Petitioner’s statement that it cannot raise indefiniteness challenges in an inter partes review is not a sufficient explanation. Indeed, the statement amounts to an assertion that a petitioner should be permitted to raise inconsistent invalidity challenges in the two forums. Petitioner’s explanation may have risen to a sufficient level, for example, if Petitioner had shown that, notwithstanding the alleged indefiniteness of the claim term, an ordinarily skilled artisan would understand that the asserted art satisfies the claim limitation (such as if the limitation prescribed a range and only the outer bounds of the range were unclear). Instead, Petitioner argued indefiniteness in the district court and then adopted Patent Owner’s plain and ordinary meaning construction from the district court litigation in its Petition. Allowing a petitioner to advance a claim construction before the Board when that petitioner has made inconsistent indefiniteness arguments in” slip op. at 7
Claim constructioncites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 12,001,549
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.