• Qualcomm Incorporated / Qualcomm Atheros, Inc. v. Parkervision, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 7, 2017 · IPR2015-01828 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 21, 281, 283–286, 288, 289, and 293 are unpatentable as obvious over Nozawa and Philips 4052; claims 25, 26, 363–366, 368, 369, and 373 were not proven unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Qualcomm contends, citing Dr. Larson’s testimony, that one of ordinary skill in the art as of October 1998 would possess, at a minimum, either (a) a master of science degree in electrical engineering and two or more years of experience in radio frequency circuit design, or (b) a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering with three or more years of experience with the design and development of RF circuits. Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–39). ParkerVision does not contest Qualcomm’s designation of the level of ordinary skill in the art as of the date of the invention. Accordingly, we adopt Qualcomm’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “During the trial, ParkerVision asserted that we should maintain our construction of “harmonic” (PO Resp. 19–23), and Qualcomm did not address the adopted construction. With respect to the remaining terms, ParkerVision argues that none of these terms are material to the remaining dispute between the parties, which is focused on the “harmonic” limitation. Id. at 24–25. On this, we agree. As the remaining terms are not material to the parties’ dispute, we decline to construe them further. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “Regarding the Maas equation, ParkerVision directs us to a portion of Dr. Larson’s deposition, in which Dr. Larson used the Maas equation to calculate the harmonics produced by a mixer, given certain assumed inputs supplied by ParkerVision’s counsel (an input signal of 100 kHz and an LO input of 1 MHz). Id. at 29–31 (citing Ex. 2001, 177–87). ParkerVision notes that Dr. Larson’s calculations produced -0.9, 3.1, and -4.9 MHz as the first three harmonics, which are not integer multiples. PO Resp. 31. Thus, ParkerVision argues, the circuit of Nozawa does not necessarily produce a plurality of harmonics, defined by the ’940 patent as being integer multiples of the fundamental frequency. Id. Qualcomm argues that the Maas equation “shows that Nozawa will necessarily produce the required ‘integer multiple’ harmonics for many input frequencies.” Pet. Reply 4 (emphasis added). According to Qualcomm, it is not required to show that Nozawa will produce integer multiple harmonics for all operating conditions; rather, it is only relevant that Nozawa could be operated to produce the harmonics. Id. Regarding Dr. Larson’s calculations during his deposition, Qualcomm contends that even using the assumed inputs provided by ParkerVision, the Maas equation shows that the 35th and 37th harmonics are 35.1 and -36.9 MHz, respectively, which are integer multiples of the fundamental frequency of 0.9 MHz. Id. at 7. Qualcomm also notes that selecting slightly different input frequencies for the Maas equation will produce much lower integer multiple harmonics, such as at the 7th and 9th harmonics. Id. at 8. The parties’ disagreements over the various inputs and permutations of the Maas equation aside, one point appears to be beyond dispute: under some conditions, but not all conditions, the Maas equation shows that Nozawa’s structure will produce a periodic signal that contains integer multiples of the fundamental frequency. In other words, the structure of Nozawa is capable of producing a signal that satisfies the limitations of the claim. Qualcomm argues that this is sufficient to show unpatentability. Pet. Reply 13 (citing Gen. Electric Co. v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1945)). On this point, we agree. Claim 21 and its dependents are apparatus claims; as such, they “cover what a device is, not what a device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In other words, the “periodic signal” limitations, which are directed to the transitory electrical signals produced by the apparatus, cannot give rise to patentability so long as the underlying apparatus has been shown to be capable of generating those signals. Here, it is undisputed that Nozawa’s circuit is capable of generating a periodic signal having a plurality of harmonics, wherein those harmonics are integer multiples of the fundamental frequency. Furthermore, we agree with Qualcomm that Nozawa’s low-pass filter is capable of isolating one or more of those harmonics, as desired.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Qualcomm contends that “Nozawa and Philips 4052 both provide architectures and methods for upconversion that can be used for a transmitter.” Pet. 21. Indeed, as Qualcomm observes, the 74HC4052 chip described in Philips 4052 is used in Nozawa. Id. at 28–29. We agree with Qualcomm that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to look to the disclosure of Philips 4052 to learn more about the operation of the 74HC4052 chip disclosed in Nozawa. ParkerVision does not challenge that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Nozawa with Philips 4052.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 6,091,940 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,091,940
• Honeywell International Inc. v. Allure Energy, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 6, 2016 · IPR2015-01248 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 5, 20, 22–25, and 30 are unpatentable as obvious over Yamashita and Shamoon; claims 2–4, 6–8, and 19 were not proven unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner is attempting to improperly limit the construction. As we explained in our Decision on Institution, we declined to limit “comparison” to a particular type of evaluation, and by our construction, we did not find that the “focus” of the “comparison” is to identify “any dissimilarity” as Patent Owner contends. See Inst. Dec. 9. Indeed, as evidenced by the dictionary definitions cited by Patent Owner and that we relied upon, determining dissimilarities is not the “focus” of the plain and ordinary meaning of “comparison” that we adopted. See Inst. Dec. 9 (citing Ex. 2003 (defining “comparison” as “the act of looking at things to see how they are similar or different” and “the act of suggesting that two or more things are similar or in the same category”)); see also Ex. 2011 (defining “comparison” as “the representing of one thing or person as similar to or like another” and “an examination of two or more items to establish similarities and dissimilarities”).” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Here, we agree with Petitioner that the plain language of the claim is sufficient and no construction is necessary for this term. The claim language already establishes that there are two user profiles, each is associated with a particular and different mobile device, and the profiles include “information to alter an operating condition of the network device according to a preference of a [first/second] user.” The claim already addresses what attributes the user profile must have. We see no support in the claim language or specification for Patent Owner’s additional requirements that the profiles be “individual” and “include information unique to each user.”” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “v. Summary as to Claims 1, 20, 22–25, and 30 Patent Owner raises no evidence of secondary considerations of nonobviousness in this case. Thus, weighing the evidence of obviousness that is before us, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 20, 22–25, and 30 would have been obvious over the combination of Yamashita and Shamoon.” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We do not find Patent Owner’s arguments persuasive. Teaching away requires that “a person of ordinary skill upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994).4 Patent Owner cites nothing in Yamashita that says that adding the features from Shamoon in addition to the automatic functionality of Yamashita would be unlikely to work; Yamashita alleges only that manual control alone has certain disadvantages. 4 We understand Patent Owner to be arguing both that the references teach away from the combination generally and teach away because, in particular, the combination would change the principle of operation of the system. PO Resp. 33–36. See In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding no teaching away where nothing in the prior art device suggested that the claimed invention was unlikely to work). The lack of teaching away is confirmed by Yamashita’s disclosure of an embodiment requiring manual interaction. See Reply 20 (citing Ex. 1006, 22:31–51). Indeed, although Patent Owner contends that automatic functionality is “not the focus or main purpose of Shamoon,” PO Resp. 35, Shamoon’s system demonstrates that automatic functionality can be combined with manual functionality to result in a working system. See Ex. 1007, 8:36–45. As for Patent Owner’s contentions that Yamashita “abandoned bi- directional communication” (PO Resp. 35), we find no support in the cited portions of Yamashita for these contentions. Although Yamashita does tout the benefits of its automatic control system, the cited portions of Yamashita are silent about the advantages or disadvantages of “bi-directional communication.” As for Patent Owner’s arguments about substantial reconstruction and redesign (PO Resp. 36 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 91)), we do not find the testimony or argument persuasive. Yamashita’s control terminal and mobile terminals already has built in communication abilities (Ex. 1006, 11:31–38), and we find Dr. Selker’s testimony persuasive that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to add the ability to communicate the thermostat reading to verify that Yamashita’s automatic control worked. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 205–207. As for Patent Owner’s allegation that the combination with Shamoon would change Yamashita’s principle of operation, we disagree. Yamashita would continue to work as before; the messages, rules, and control information would continue operate in the same manner. Shamoon would only add additional functionality to allow for an improved user interface and two-way communication. Where the device would operate on the same principles as before, the combination does not change the principle of operation. See Mouttet, 686 F.3d at 1332 (noting Ratti inapplicable where the modified apparatus will operate “on the same principles as before”). As Petitioner explains, Shamoon demonstrates that its known techniques have been used to improve similar devices in similar ways. We find that Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinnings to support the combination. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 205–207, 213. Thus, we conclude that a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine the teachings of Yamashita and Shamoon.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 8,626,344 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,626,344
• Honeywell International Inc. v. Allure Energy, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 6, 2016 · IPR2015-01251 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 9–14, 16, and 26–29 are unpatentable as obvious over Yamashita and Shamoon; claims 15, 17, and 18 were not proven unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s further narrowing of our construction is improperly limiting. As we explained in our Decision on Institution, we declined to limit “comparing” to a particular type of evaluation, and by our construction, we did not find that the “focus” of the comparison is to identify “any dissimilarity” as Patent Owner contends. See Inst. Dec. 10. Indeed, as evidenced by the dictionary definitions cited by Patent Owner and that we relied upon, determining dissimilarities is not the “focus” of the plain and ordinary meaning of “comparing” that we adopted; rather, each of them emphasizes determining similarities as well. See Inst. Dec. 9 (citing Ex. 2002 (defining “comparison” as “the act of looking at things to see how they are similar or different” and “the act of suggesting that two or more things are similar or in the same category”)); see also Ex. 2006 (defining “comparison” as “the representing of one thing or person as similar to or like another” and “an examination of two or more items to establish similarities and dissimilarities”). The specification does not compel a different understanding. The” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

    “that the parties’ actual dispute is twofold. First, the parties dispute whether the mobile device must be able to transmit location information to the site regardless of whether the proximity setting is enabled or disabled. See Reply 8–9; PO Resp. 14–15. Second, Patent Owner argues that the entire process of proximity detection must be automatic. PO Resp. 14. As we explain below, we agree with Petitioner that this term does not require that the mobile device continue to send location reports if the proximity setting is not enabled, whereas we disagree with Petitioner that the proximity setting is limited to enabling or disabling the ability to send location reports. Instead, we find the specification supports a broader construction. In particular, we find that the specification states that “[f]or example, a user may enable proximity detection using proximity detection selector 1036 and energy use at a site may be altered based on a user[’]s distance to the site.” Ex. 1001, 46:45–48. It further explains that “[i]n some forms, proximity detection selector 1036 can be hidden, displayed, selectable, or any combination thereof in response to a user having a mobile device capable of being detected when a user is at or away from a site.” Id. at 46:50–54. Thus, we consider the broadest reasonable construction of “proximity setting” consistent with the specification to be “a setting that can enable or disable proximity detection, where energy use at a site may be altered based on the user’s location.” Both parties acknowledge that this is a reasonable meaning of the term. Reply 8; PO Resp. 12.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “In sum, Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the control terminal in Yamashita receives messages from the wireless terminals that represent the relative location of the mobile terminal (e.g., within 300 m of the site or moving away from the site) and that the control terminal includes a number of rules to compare the messages to determine what control information to send to the controlled appliances, and that as a result of the comparison sends control information to alter the condition of the controlled appliances. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 214–216. Thus, we are persuaded that Yamashita accounts for the “comparing limitations” of claim 9.” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We find that Petitioner has shown adequately that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Yamashita with Shamoon. In particular, we do not agree with Patent Owner that Yamashita teaches away from the combination or that the combination would change the principle of operation of Yamashita.3 Patent Owner is correct that Yamashita distinguishes manual control, and notes the disadvantages of “burdensome operations” and the possibility the user may forget to perform the required operations. Ex. 1005, 1:35–40. Patent Owner is also correct that Yamashita states that one objective of the invention is a system that can automatically control an appliance based on position without requiring any operation by the user. Id. at 1:44–47. Yet, Yamashita also discloses an embodiment where the user is prompted before a message is sent, which does require an operation by the user. Id. at 23:31–51. Thus, we do not agree that Yamashita disparages all manual interaction as Patent Owner contends. Moreover, teaching away requires that “a person of ordinary skill upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Patent Owner cites nothing in Yamashita that says that adding the communication features from Shamoon to transmit the thermostat readings to the mobile terminal to the automatic functionality of Yamashita would be unlikely to work; Yamashita alleges only that manual control alone has certain disadvantages, not that communicating information from the site to” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 8,626,344 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,626,344
• 10x Genomics, Inc. v. The University Of ChicagoNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 15, 2016 · IPR2015-01157 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–31 were not shown unpatentable because the evidence did not establish the claimed surface-tension relationship under either instituted obviousness ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedNew argument consideredMixed

    “proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)). For this reason, our Rules require that “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition . . . or patent owner response.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). This reasoning applies equally to reply declarations, submitted to support a party’s reply brief. See Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc., 821 F.3d at 1369–70 (affirming exclusion of reply brief and supporting declaration). Our Trial Practice Guide provides that “a reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence will not be considered. . . . The Board will not attempt to sort proper from improper portions of a reply.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,767 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“Trial Practice Guide”). Of course, “the introduction of new evidence in the course of the trial is to be expected in inter partes review trial proceedings.” Genzyme Therapeutic Prod. Ltd. P’ship v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2016). That new evidence, however, must be responsive to an argument raised by the opposing party in its opposition brief. By contrast, when “new evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case for . . . unpatentability” or “new evidence that could have been presented in a prior filing” is introduced, these are indications that a new issue has been raised improperly. See Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,767.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “The theory advanced by 10X—that the surface tension relationship can be inferred from the lack of adhesion of droplets—suffers from at least two failings. First, as discussed above, to establish the presence of fluorinated surfactants with a hydrophilic head group, 10X relies on paragraph 117 of Quake, which it argues discloses surfactants residing at the oil-water interface between the droplets and the carrier fluid. Indeed, this reliance is crucial to its inference that the surfactants have a hydrophilic head group. But when it comes to inferring that the claimed surface tension relationship is present, 10X points to a different disclosure of surfactants coating the channel walls. As counsel conceded, the disclosures of paragraphs 117 and 118 “disclose two separate uses of surfactants.” Tr. 21:8–9. 10X cannot have it both ways, arguing that the hydrophilic head group is implied because the surfactant is at the oil-water interface, while also arguing that the surface tension relationship is implied because the surfactant coats the channel walls. Furthermore, even if we were to accept 10X’s reliance on the surfactant coating the channel walls, its proposed inference is not supported by the record or logic. While it may be the case that if the surface tension relationship is present, droplets do not adhere to the wall, to infer the reverse would be affirming the consequent.9 In other words, we cannot infer from the fact that droplets do not adhere to the channel wall that the claimed surface tension relationship is necessarily present, because there are other possible causes of non-adherence. As Chicago correctly notes, Quake discloses multiple reasons why a droplet may not adhere to a channel wall, including droplet shape (“about four times as long as [it is] wide”) and size (“[d]roplet adherence is overcome when the droplet is massive enough in relation to the channel size”). PO Resp. 24–25 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 92).” slip op. at 25

  • ExcludeNot reached

    “D. Motion to Exclude Chicago moves to exclude various exhibits filed by 10X, namely Exhibits 1037, 1043, 1045, 1047, 1050, 1051–1056, 1072, 1081, 1088–1092, and portions of Dr. Huck’s testimony (Exs. 1002 and 1087). Mot. 1. The basis for the Motion is Chicago’s prior objections to these exhibits on grounds of hearsay (FRE 802), prejudice (FRE 403), or unreliability (FRE 702). Even having considered these objected-to exhibits, however, we have found in Chicago’s favor on the merits of 10X’s patentability challenge. As such, the grant or denial of Chicago’s Motion would have no effect on the outcome of the proceeding. We, therefore, dismiss the Motion to Exclude as moot.” slip op. at 28

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Chicago that Quake does not explicitly disclose that the surfactants of paragraph 117 have a hydrophilic head group, and that “surfactants” in general include surface active agents both with and without a hydrophilic head group. Nevertheless, we find that a person of skill in the art would understand the surfactants disclosed in paragraph 117 may include a hydrophilic head group. Dr. Olmsted notes, and Chicago does not dispute, that the other surfactants listed as “exemplary”—namely, Tween and Span— have hydrophilic head groups. Ex. 1085 ¶ 27. Furthermore, the sentence characterizes the surfactants as “soluble in oil relative to water,” from which Dr. Olmsted concludes that the oil-water boundary is the surface where the surfactants are expected to reside. Id. ¶ 29. While Chicago is correct that other portions of Quake—for example, as discussed extensively above, paragraph 118—disclose surfactants that coat the channel walls, we do not understand paragraph 117’s surfactants to be so limited.8 For this reason, we find credible Dr. Huck’s and Dr. Olmsted’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand paragraph 117’s disclosure to refer to surfactants having a hydrophilic head group. We find that Quake discloses fluorinated surfactants that reside at the droplet-carrier fluid interface, and which have a hydrophilic head group.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 8,889,083 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,889,083
• Deere & Company v. Richard GrammAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 22, 2016 · IPR2015-00898 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 and 27–34 are unpatentable as obvious over the three instituted combinations of prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “significantly different, and the differences between their proposed levels of ordinary skill would not affect the outcome of this proceeding.5 In light of our review of the record, including the ’395 patent, the competing expert testimony, and the issues discussed during the oral argument, we agree with different aspects of the parties’ proposals. First, as Petitioner notes in its Reply, a mechanical engineer having familiarity with hydraulic systems and sensors, as Patent Owner proposes, does not have experience necessarily with agricultural equipment or combines. Reply 2, n.1. Thus, Patent Owner’s educational prong is overly broad. Second, Petitioner’s educational prong, on the other hand, is too narrow, requiring “design” of combines or agricultural equipment. Third, we find that Petitioner’s experience prong also is too narrow, because it requires experience specifically in the “design” of agricultural equipment or combines. Accordingly, we find that the level of ordinary skill in the art is “a mechanical engineer having familiarity6 with agricultural equipment, such as combines, and hydraulic systems and 5 Indeed, neither party argues that any difference between the proposed levels of ordinary skill would affect the outcome of this proceeding. 6 The familiarity may have been gained, as proposed by Petitioner, by “approximately three years of experience in combine or agricultural equipment design, including components thereof, such as headers and header height control systems” (Pet. 5 (citation omitted)), but also may have been gained through other experience. sensors” or “a person having 10 or more years of experience7 working with combines.”8” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We agree with Petitioner that under either party’s proposed construction, Cleveland’s sensor arm, including spring 38, is flexible. See infra pages 41–42 (Section III.B.5.a.ii.b)2.b.). Accordingly, we need not choose between either party’s proposed constructions. 2. Other Claim Terms The parties propose constructions for several additional claim terms, including “pre-loaded,” “angular deflection sensing means,” “control means,” “biasing means,” “first stop means,” “second stop means,” “guard means,” and “flange.” Pet. 11–15; Resp. 19–23. Although the parties have some disagreement as to the meaning of several of these terms, there is no dispute that the references upon which we instituted review disclose these elements of the claims.4 Accordingly, there is no controversy as to these terms that requires our resolution in order to ascertain whether the claims would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art as of the time of the invention in light of the references and arguments before us.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingMixed

    “a “header” or a “combine” per se; rather, it is a header height control apparatus—an “apparatus for detecting and controlling the height above the soil of an agricultural machine as it traverses a field.” Ex. 1001, 1:11–13. Nonetheless, there is no prohibition on a patentee drafting his or her claim in a manner that further limits the invention if additional structure is recited in the claim. As argued by Patent Owner, the recitation of “a non-cut crop header” and “a combine” in the preamble of claim 1, provide antecedent basis for at least two terms recited in the body of the claim—“the header” and “said combine.” The body of the claim reflects that the patentee chose to claim the header control apparatus in terms not limited to said apparatus standing alone, but rather the apparatus as attached (coupled) to the header of a combine. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 7:33–34 (“a pre-loaded, generally linear flexible arm coupled to a forward portion of the header” (emphasis added)); 7:44–45 (“control means coupled to said header” (emphasis added)); 7:48– 51 (“wherein said flexible arm and angular deflection sensing means are attached to a head housing disposed on a forward portion of said combine” (emphases added)); 7:54–56 (“wherein said mounting bracket further couples said flexible arm to a forward end of said head housing” (emphasis added)). The prosecution history reflects that the patentee at first desired the recitation of “header” in the claim to be limited to “non-cut crop” headers, in an attempt to distinguish cut crop headers. Ex. 1002, 142 (Amendment filed June 19, 2000). The examiner, however, did not accept such argument (id. at 152–53 (Office Action mailed Aug. 24, 2000)), and the patentee did not reiterate or maintain the argument in amending the claims following the August 24, 2000, final rejection. Id. at 158–63 (Amendment filed Nov. 22, 2000). Nonetheless, the prosecution history is informative on this issue. In light of our discussion above regarding the claim language, specification, and the prosecution history, we do not construe the entire preamble as limiting. In particular, the preamble recites an apparatus for maintaining, and is presented clearly as reciting an intended use. That being said, we agree with the Patent Owner that the phrase “non-cut crop header” limits the terms “the header” and “said header” recited in the body of claim 1 such that “the header” and “said header” recited in the body of claim 1 are the same “non-cut crop header” recited in the preamble of the claim.13” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “e. Conclusion of Obviousness We have considered Petitioner’s evidence and argument and determine that the combination of DPC, Chmielewski, Cleveland, and DA meets the limitations of claims 1–7, 10, 27, 28, and 34, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason, with rational underpinning, for combining the teachings of these references. We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary and determine that they are unpersuasive. The parties do not introduce or rely on objective indicia of nonobviousness. After weighing the evidence, we conclude that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1–7, 10, 27, 28, and 34 would have been obvious over DPC, Chmielewski, Cleveland, and DA.” slip op. at 61

  Patent outcomesUS 6,202,395 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,202,395
• Qualcomm Inc. v. Bandspeed, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 7, 2016 · IPR2015-01577 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 13, 14, 16, 25, 26, 28, and 29 are unpatentable; claims 3, 15, and 27 were not shown unpatentable, with the specified-vote limitation not established.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “sequence.” Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Zhi Ding, attests that the phrase is “a well-understood term of art.” Ding Decl. ¶ 35 (citing Ex. 1016, 127–33). Consistent with Dr. Ding’s testimony, we applied a preliminary construction of “hopping sequence” in the Institution Decision as “the order in which the communications network hops among the set of frequencies.” Dec. 7. That construction is not contested by Patent Owner, and we adopt it for this Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “as disclosed by Gerten’s description of modified frequency hopping schemes. Id. at 14. In doing so, Petitioner notes that Gerten discloses periodic updating of the modified frequency hopping scheme, supporting a conclusion that Gerten discloses selection at different times. Id. at 14, 15– 16. Petitioner highlights this periodic updating to identify distinct “period[s] of time” during which different “set[s] of two or more communications channels [are] used to transmit and receive.” Id. at 15–16 (italics omitted). In addressing independent claim 1’s specific requirement that different sets of channels be used with the second and third communications devices, Petitioner reasons that the process summarized above may be applied by the master device to each of the slave devices separately: “the master device of Gerten performs a service discovery request to determine if each slave device has interference avoidance capabilities.” Id. at 18 (emphasis added) (citing Ding Decl. ¶ 53; Ex. 1003, col. 4, ll. 38–51). Thus, Petitioner argues, if one slave has such interference avoidance capabilities, communications with that slave may take place using a modified frequency hopping scheme; if another (legacy) slave lacks such interference avoidance capabilities, communications take place using a normal mode with default communications channels that are not changed based on channel performance. Id. at 18 (citing Ding Decl. ¶ 55); see id. at 16–17. Thus, Petitioner concludes, the recited transmissions and receptions from the third communications device over default communications channels occur “while” transmitting to and receiving from the second communications device over the first and second sets of communications channels, as we have construed the term “while.” Petitioner supports this reasoning with testimony by Dr. Ding, which we credit. Id. at 18 (citing Ding Decl. ¶¶ 53– 55).” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMotivation not foundMixed

    “Petitioner further provides persuasive reasoning why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the relevant teachings of Gerten and Cuffaro, including that “Cuffaro and Gerten are in the same field of endeavor” of selecting channels to avoid interference in a communications system; that measuring interference signal strength at a slave device such as described by Cuffaro provides a more accurate determination of the impact of the receiver unit from the interference on a given channel, and, therefore, would provide more accurate identification of bad channels in Gerten; and that Gerten suggests such a modification by describing that both a master and a slave can participate in identifying channels to avoid. Pet. 30–31. Petitioner supports this reasoning with declaration testimony by Dr. Ding. Ding Decl. ¶¶ 128, 129.” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “Two criteria have evolved for determining whether prior art is analogous: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658–59 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (CCPA 1979)). Patent Owner understates the degree to which Petitioner addresses the analogousness of the art by focusing on Petitioner’s contention that Gerten and Cuffaro are in the same field of endeavor. PO Resp. 40 (citing Pet. 30). Petitioner also addresses the second prong of the Clay test by providing reasons why a person of skill in the art would use the transmitted performance data of Cuffaro in the selection process of Gerten, including improved accuracy in determining the impact on the receiver unit from the interference on a given channel. See Pet. 31. We agree with Petitioner’s reasoning and find that Cuffaro and Gerten are analogous art to the claimed invention at least because they are reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor was involved. We conclude that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 2, 14, and 26 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Gerten and Cuffaro.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 7,477,624 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,477,624
• Kingston Technology Company, Inc. v. Catr Co. Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 10, 2016 · IPR2015-00559 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 9, 14, 17, 19, and 21–23 are unpatentable as obvious over Matsumiya and Deng and over Wu and Hoogesteger; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “1. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In our Final Written Decision in IPR 149, we found “that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a degree in mechanical engineering or industrial design, but also a general understanding of the use of electrical components, which may be incorporated in mechanical designs.” IPR 149 Decision 23. The parties present the same arguments here, with respect to their views of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as they did in IPR 149. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed in our Final Written Decision in IPR 149 we adopt the same level of skill here. Id. at 22–23.” slip op. at 17

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Second, Dr. Wolfe testified that Matsumiya discloses “a shaft” that protrudes from each side of the case. Ex. 1016 ¶ 97. On cross-examination, however, Dr. Wolfe admitted that while Matsumiya could disclose a “split axle,” “normally, you’d presume that it’s a through axle.” Ex. 2012, 85:9– 18. Dr. Wolfe did not explain in his direct testimony how either an axle or split axle would be integrated with or attached to at least one side of the case. Third, Petitioner relied on the express disclosure of Matsumiya, not a modification of Matsumiya, as teaching this element of the claims. See Pet. 16 (relying only on Matsumiya’s disclosure). In its Reply, Petitioner asserts, for the first time, that Matsumiya “could also use a snap hinge,” pointing to Professor Visser’s cross-examination testimony. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1050, 127:9–11). Professor Visser’s testimony, however, does not support Petitioner’s argument. Professor Visser testified that Matsumiya does not show a snap-on hinge, and that a snap-on hinge would not have the same functionality as an axle. Ex. 1050, 127:18–21. He also testified that the two concentric rings on the arms of Matsumiya are inconsistent with a snap-on hinge. Id. at 128:17–20. Thus, the issue before us is not whether it would have been obvious to modify Matsumiya to include a snap-on hinge or hinge protuberance on the side of the case because that was not the basis set forth in the Petition and upon which we instituted review; rather, the issue is whether Petitioner has shown that Matsumiya discloses a hinge element or hinge protuberance integrated with or attached to at least one side of the case. In light of the record before us, and as detailed in the discussion above, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown that Matsumiya discloses a hinge element or a hinge protuberance “formed on at least one side of the case.” We find that Petitioner has failed to present sufficient evidence to show that Matsumiya discloses this element of the claims, and we find Patent Owner’s evidence in the form of Dr. Wolfe’s cross-examination testimony and Professor Visser’s testimony more persuasive.” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNon analogous artDecided for patent owner

    “Id. at 1:14–23. Accordingly, we find that Kindig’s field of endeavor is hinged enclosures to house appliances that make noise when operated. The ’544 patent states that “[t]he present invention relates to a flash memory apparatus, and more particularly to a flash memory apparatus, wherein a cover is not completely separated from the main body upon being in use so that lost [sic] of the cover is prevented.” Ex. 1001, 1:8–11. The ’544 patent is largely directed to a cover that rotates with respect to a case (as is evident from the parties’, and consequently our, extensive discussion of the hinged connection (i.e., hinge protuberances and hinge holes)), but is not readily disconnected. In fact, the ’544 patent discloses the recited “hooking groove” and “hooking threshold” specifically to prevent the hinge hole from being easily detached from the hinge protuberance. Id. at 3:36–43 (“Furthermore, a hooking groove 34 is preferably formed on the lower periphery of the hinge protuberance 33. A hooking threshold 45 is hooked on the hooking groove 34 and is preferably formed on a rim confining the hinge hole 41 in order to prevent the hinge hole 41 from being easily detached from the hinge protuberance 33 after joining of the hinge hole 41 and the hinge protuberance 33.”). Thus, we find that the ’544 patent’s field of endeavor is hinge assemblies for a flash memory apparatus.” slip op. at 32

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Second, Petitioner asserts that Kindig’s hinge connection “would advantageously help to retain connection between the cover of Matsumiya and the memory card,” id. at 25, but Petitioner has not shown that Matsumiya fails to retain the connection between case and cover or has difficulty doing so. Rather, from our review the record supports that Matsumiya’s cover is securely attached to the case. Additionally, we are unaware of any teaching in Matsumiya of disconnecting the cover from the case. Similarly, the ’544 patent aims to avoid disconnecting the cover from the case, as discussed above. Kindig, however, is directed to an easily detachable cover. Accordingly, Petitioner’s reason—as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been prompted to modify Matsumiya by adding the elements of claim 13 from Kindig—lacks a rational underpinning. 3. Conclusion of Obviousness For the foregoing reasons, after consideration of the entire record, we” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 6,926,544 mixed
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,926,544
• LG Electronics, Inc. / Toshiba Corp. et al. v. Straight Path IP Group, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 9, 2016 · IPR2015-01406 · APJ Kalyan K Deshpande · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 5 of the ’469 patent and claim 3 of the ’121 patent are unpatentable as obvious; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s argument is not persuasive. We agree with Petitioner that 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) applies only to civil actions for patent infringement, and not to an administrative proceeding, including an ITC investigation. See Amkor, Paper 98, slip op. at 6–18; Brinkman Corp. v. A&J Mfg., LLC, Case IPR2015-00056, slip op. at 7–8 (PTAB Mar. 23, 2015) (Paper 10). Although Amkor and Brinkman Corp. are not precedential, we find them instructive and directly on point. In Amkor, the Board determined that “had Congress intended for arbitration, ITC, or other non-judicial proceedings to trigger the time bar of section 315(b), it would have used more encompassing language than ‘Patent Owner’s Action’ and ‘served with a complaint,’ which are harmonious with a civil action.” Amkor, Paper 98, slip op. at 11 (determining that the time bar is limited to being triggered by the service of a complaint in a civil action). A similar decision by the Board in Brinkman Corp. reaches the same result and specifically is directed toward an ITC investigation. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner that Petitioner is barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “running instance of a computer program or application.” PO Resp. 26‒31. Petitioner accepts Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Pet. Reply 6; Tr. 20:1–4. Petitioner and Patent Owner, however, disagree as to whether a computer with an operating system is a computer program, and, therefore, a “process.” PO Resp. 26–36; Pet. Reply 7–10. In Ancora Technologies, the Federal Circuit explained that “[t]he ordinary meaning of the word ‘program’ in the computer context encompasses both operating systems and the applications that run on them (as well as other types of computer programs)” and “‘to a computer programmer’ a program is merely a ‘set of instructions’ for a computer.” Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 744 F.3d 732, 734 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Applying this guidance to the case before us, we agree with Petitioner and construe the term “process” to mean “a running instance of a computer program or application,” where a “computer program” is a set of instructions for a computer that encompasses both operating systems and the applications that run on them. We further note that the ʼ704, ʼ469, and ʼ121 patent specifications interchange the terms “process” and “processing unit.” For example, the specifications explain that a first “processing unit” is “established in the database [] as an active on-line party.” Ex. 1001, 5:29–34. The claims recite the term “process.” Accordingly, our construction is also consistent with the specifications, such that a “process” includes a “processing unit” that is running a program (operating system) or application.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “fail to determine whether a computer or process is connected to the computer network. PO Resp. 48–51. In view of our construction of this claim limitation, we agree with Patent Owner. WINS discloses that once a computer is registered with the WINS server (which is a NetBIOS Name Server (NBNS)) as active and on-line, the WINS server maintains a database of names and addresses as active and on-line by (1) releasing names once a computer is shut down properly, and (2) requiring a renewal time period in which a computer must reregister. Ex. 1003, 62–63, 68–69. WINS discloses that in response to User Datagram Protocol (UDP) name queries, “a mapping in the database does not ensure that the related device is currently running.” Id. at 68. WINS further explains that a “local WINS database should periodically be cleared of released entries and old entries that were registered at another WINS server but did not get removed from this WINS database for some reason.” Id. at 150. In other words, WINS discloses that the WINS database may include entries of computers that are not currently connected to the WINS network. Accordingly, a query to as to whether a second process “is connected to the computer network” in WINS will not determine whether the second process is connected to the WINS network at the time that the query is transmitted to the server. As discussed above in our claim construction analysis above (see Section I.E.1), a query as to whether a process “is connected to a computer network” or has an “on-line” status asks “whether the device ‘is’ connected, not whether it was connected or whether it is still registered as being connected even if that registration information is no longer accurate. It is not a reasonable interpretation of the claim language . . . to say that it is satisfied by a query that asks only for registration information, regardless of its current accuracy.” Straight Path, 806 F.3d at 1360. WINS discloses that the WINS server has information that a process “was” connected to the computer network, and that information may no longer be accurate. See Ex. 1003, 68, 150. As such, we determine that WINS does not disclose the claimed “is connected to the computer network,” “on-line status,” or “is accessible,” as construed herein.” slip op. at 23

  • ExcludeOther

    “Exhibits 2021, 2028, 2031, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, and 2039. Mot. 1. Petitioner specifically argues that Exhibits 2021, 2028, 2031, 2033, 2034, 2035, and 2036 should be excluded because these Exhibits are irrelevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401. Id. at 1‒5. Petitioner also argues that Exhibits 2028 and 2033 have not been authenticated under Federal Rules of Evidence 901(b)(1). Id. at 1‒3. Petitioner additionally argues that Exhibits 2028, 2033, and 2039 should be excluded as hearsay under Federal Rules of Evidence 802. Id. Because our decision does not rely on any of the challenged Exhibits, we dismiss Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude as moot.” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 6,108,704 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,108,704
• LG Electronics, Inc. / Toshiba Corp. et al. v. Straight Path IP Group, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 9, 2016 · IPR2015-01407 · APJ Kalyan K Deshpande · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 5 of the ’469 patent and claim 3 of the ’121 patent are unpatentable over prior art; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s argument is not persuasive. We agree with Petitioner that 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) applies only to civil actions for patent infringement, and not to an administrative proceeding, including an ITC investigation. See Amkor, Paper 98, slip op. at 6–18; Brinkman Corp. v. A&J Mfg., LLC, Case IPR2015-00056, slip op. at 7–8 (PTAB Mar. 23, 2015) (Paper 10). Although Amkor and Brinkman Corp. are not precedential, we find them instructive and directly on point. In Amkor, the Board determined that “had Congress intended for arbitration, ITC, or other non-judicial proceedings to trigger the time bar of section 315(b), it would have used more encompassing language than ‘Patent Owner’s Action’ and ‘served with a complaint,’ which are harmonious with a civil action.” Amkor, Paper 98, slip op. at 11 (determining that the time bar is limited to being triggered by the service of a complaint in a civil action). A similar decision by the Board in Brinkman Corp. reaches the same result and specifically is directed toward an ITC investigation. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner that Petitioner is barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “connected to the computer network” has a facially clear meaning, that “the query transmitted to the server seeks to determine whether the second unit is connected at that time, i.e., connected at the time that the query is sent.” Straight Path, 806 F.3d at 1360.11 The Federal Circuit held that the query 11 Petitioner argues that the relevant specifications do not include an embodiment that “guarantee[s]” that an entry in its database is online, and, therefore, Patent Owner’s argument does not distinguish the ’704, ’469, and ’121 patents over the prior art. Addʼl Br. 6‒7. However, such an argument goes towards whether there is written description and enablement support for the claims. In Straight Path, the Federal Circuit did not offer a view as to the sufficiency of the written description or enablement based on the asks “whether the device ‘is’ connected, not whether it was connected or whether it is still registered as being connected even if that registration information is no longer accurate.” Id. The Federal Circuit further explained that “[i]t is not a reasonable interpretation of the claim language . . . to say that it is satisfied by a query that asks only for registration information, regardless of its current accuracy.” Id. The Federal Circuit explained, “[w]hen claim language has as plain a meaning on an issue as the language does here, leaving no genuine uncertainties on interpretive questions relevant to the case, it is particularly difficult to conclude that the specification reasonably supports a different meaning. The specification plays a more limited role than in the common situation where claim terms are uncertain in meaning in relevant respects.” Id. at 1361. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit construed the limitation “is connected to the computer network” as “is connected to the computer network at the time that the query is transmitted to the server.” Id. at 1363.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner further contends that WINS discloses that NetBIOS is incorporated into the WINS system and expressly discloses that WINS should be combined with NetBIOS. Id. at 37–38 (citing 198 Ex. 1002 ¶ 81; Ex. 1003, 65). Accordingly, Petitioner concludes that one of ordinary skill in the art would have known about and been motivated to combine the references. Id. Petitioner further contends that a person with ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated similarly to combine WINS and NetBIOS with Pinard because Pinard discloses a telephony application with a graphical user interface that allows a user to establish and manage telephone calls. Id. at 38–39. Petitioner specifically argues that Pinard references Windows 3.1 and WINS references Windows 3.11 and Windows NT, and, therefore, a person with ordinary skill in the art would have known how to adapt the graphical user interfaces in Pinard to the system in WINS. Id. We are persuaded that Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows NT utilizes NetBIOS features for name resolution, as disclosed by WINS, and Pinard’s program is compatible with a Windows operating system, and, therefore, a person with ordinary skill in the art would have readily combined the disclosures of WINS, NetBIOS, and Pinard.” slip op. at 30

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed

    “fail to determine whether a computer or process is connected to the computer network. PO Resp. 48–51. In view of our construction of this claim limitation, we agree with Patent Owner. WINS discloses that once a computer is registered with the WINS server (which is a NetBIOS Name Server (NBNS)) as active and on-line, the WINS server maintains a database of names and addresses as active and on-line by (1) releasing names once a computer is shut down properly, and (2) requiring a renewal time period in which a computer must reregister. Ex. 1003, 62–63, 68–69. WINS discloses that in response to User Datagram Protocol (UDP) name queries, “a mapping in the database does not ensure that the related device is currently running.” Id. at 68. WINS further explains that a “local WINS database should periodically be cleared of released entries and old entries that were registered at another WINS server but did not get removed from this WINS database for some reason.” Id. at 150. In other words, WINS discloses that the WINS database may include entries of computers that are not currently connected to the WINS network. Accordingly, a query to as to whether a second process “is connected to the computer network” in WINS will not determine whether the second process is connected to the WINS network at the time that the query is transmitted to the server. As discussed above in our claim construction analysis above (see Section I.E.1), a query as to whether a process “is connected to a computer network” or has an “on-line” status asks “whether the device ‘is’ connected, not whether it was connected or whether it is still registered as being connected even if that registration information is no longer accurate. It is not a reasonable interpretation of the claim language . . . to say that it is satisfied by a query that asks only for registration information, regardless of its current accuracy.” Straight Path, 806 F.3d at 1360. WINS discloses that the WINS server has information that a process “was” connected to the computer network, and that information may no longer be accurate. See Ex. 1003, 68, 150. As such, we determine that WINS does not disclose the claimed “is connected to the computer network,” “on-line status,” or “is accessible,” as construed herein. Similarly, NetBIOS discloses a registration process for resources or nodes to receive a unique name by registering a name. Ex. 1004, 379. During a name query (discovery), a datagram is sent requesting the name and address of another resource. Id. at 396. The NBNS maintains a database of resource names through explicit name deletion, where the node specifies a deletion function and implicit name deletion, which occurs when a node ceases operation. Id. at 379. NetBIOS explains that implicit name deletion “is a frequent occurrence.” Id. Implicit name deletion is managed by assigning nodes a specified lifetime for registered names, where a name is silently released if a node fails to refresh the registered name before the lifetime expires. Id. NetBIOS further discloses a mechanism where the NBNS may correct the information stored after an incorrect response is provided to a requesting node. See id. at 409. However, similar to WINS, NetBIOS discloses that the information stored by the NBNS may be incorrect, and, therefore, will not determine whether a second process is connected to the computer network at the time that the query is transmitted to the server. Therefore, NetBIOS also does not disclose the claimed “is connected to the computer network,” “on-line status,” or “is accessible.” Given that the combination of WINS and NetBIOS fails to teach or” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 6,131,121 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,131,121
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. et al. v. Straight Path IP Group, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2016 · IPR2015-01007 · APJ Kalyan K Deshpande · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 5, and 10 of the ’469 patent were held unpatentable; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable because the cited art did not establish current network connection status.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd mixedMixed

    “and NetBIOS fail to determine whether a computer or process is connected to the computer network. PO Resp. 35, 49–51. In view of our construction of this claim limitation, we agree with Patent Owner. Microsoft Manual discloses that once a computer is registered with the WINS server (which is a NetBIOS Name Server (NBNS)) as active and on-line, the WINS server maintains a database of names and addresses as active and on-line by (1) releasing names once a computer is shut down properly and (2) requiring a renewal time period in which a computer must reregister. Ex. 1012, 62– 63, 68–69. Microsoft Manual discloses that in response to User Datagram Protocol (UDP) name queries, “a mapping in the database does not ensure that the related device is currently running.” Id. at 68. Microsoft Manual further explains that a “local WINS database should periodically be cleared of released entries and old entries that were registered at another WINS server but did not get removed from this WINS database for some reason.” Id. at 150. In other words, Microsoft Manual discloses that the WINS database may include entries of computers that are not currently connected to the WINS network. Accordingly, a query to as to whether a second process “is connected to the computer network” in Microsoft Manual will not determine whether the second process is connected to the WINS network at the time that the query is transmitted to the server. As discussed above in our claim construction analysis above (see Section I.E.1), a query as to whether a process “is connected to a computer network” or has an “on-line” status asks “whether the device ‘is’ connected, not whether it was connected or whether it is still registered as being connected even if that registration information is no longer accurate. It is not a reasonable interpretation of the claim language . . . to say that it is satisfied by a query that asks only for registration information, regardless of its current accuracy.” Straight Path, 806 F.3d at 1360. Microsoft Manual discloses that the WINS server has information that a process “was” connected to the computer network, and that information may no longer be accurate. See Ex. 1012, 68, 150. As such, we determine that Microsoft Manual does not disclose the claimed “is connected to the computer network,” “on-line status,” or “is accessible,” as construed herein.” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “In Ancora Techs., the Federal Circuit explained that “[t]he ordinary meaning of the word ‘program’ in the computer context encompasses both operating systems and the applications that run on them (as well as other types of computer programs)” and “‘to a computer programmer’ a program is merely a ‘set of instructions’ for a computer.” Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 744 F.3d 732, 734 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Applying this guidance to the case before us, we agree with Petitioner and construe the term “process” to mean “a running instance of a computer program or application,” where a “computer program” is a set of instructions for a computer that encompasses both operating systems and the applications that run on them. We further note that the ʼ704, ʼ469, and ʼ121 patent specifications interchange the terms “process” and “processing unit.” For example, the specifications explain that a first “processing unit” is “established in the database [] as an active on-line party.” Ex. 1001, 5:29–34. The claims recite the term “process.” Accordingly, our construction is also consistent with the specifications, such that a “process” includes a “processing unit” that is running a program (operating system) or application.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner contends that “WINS is an implementation of NetBIOS” and, therefore, Petitioner contends that “one having skill in the art would have known about and been motivated to combine Microsoft Manual with NetBIOS.” Id. at 34 (citing 67 Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 88–89). We are persuaded by Petitioner that the combination is reasonable because Microsoft Manual demonstrates that Microsoft TCP/IP has combined the elements of NetBIOS and Microsoft Manual in the same manner in which Petitioner proposes to combine NetBIOS and Microsoft Manual. See 67 Ex. 1012, 3, 11. Microsoft Manual discloses that Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows NT provides support for application interfaces, including NetBIOS for establishing logical names and sessions on the network. Id. at 11. Microsoft Manual describes that “[w]hen WINS servers are in place on the network, NetBIOS over TCP/IP resolves names on a client computer by communication with the WINS server.” 67 Pet. 34 (quoting 67 Ex. 1012, 62). We are persuaded that Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows NT utilizes NetBIOS features for name resolution, as disclosed by Microsoft Manual, and a person with ordinary skill in the art would have readily combined the disclosures of Microsoft Manual and Microsoft Manual.” slip op. at 25

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “and NetBIOS fail to determine whether a computer or process is connected to the computer network. PO Resp. 35, 49–51. In view of our construction of this claim limitation, we agree with Patent Owner. Microsoft Manual discloses that once a computer is registered with the WINS server (which is a NetBIOS Name Server (NBNS)) as active and on-line, the WINS server maintains a database of names and addresses as active and on-line by (1) releasing names once a computer is shut down properly and (2) requiring a renewal time period in which a computer must reregister. Ex. 1012, 62– 63, 68–69. Microsoft Manual discloses that in response to User Datagram Protocol (UDP) name queries, “a mapping in the database does not ensure that the related device is currently running.” Id. at 68. Microsoft Manual further explains that a “local WINS database should periodically be cleared of released entries and old entries that were registered at another WINS server but did not get removed from this WINS database for some reason.” Id. at 150. In other words, Microsoft Manual discloses that the WINS database may include entries of computers that are not currently connected to the WINS network. Accordingly, a query to as to whether a second process “is connected to the computer network” in Microsoft Manual will not determine whether the second process is connected to the WINS network at the time that the query is transmitted to the server. As discussed above in our claim construction analysis above (see Section I.E.1), a query as to whether a process “is connected to a computer network” or has an “on-line” status asks “whether the device ‘is’ connected, not whether it was connected or whether it is still registered as being connected even if that registration information is no longer accurate. It is not a reasonable interpretation of the claim language . . . to say that it is satisfied by a query that asks only for registration information, regardless of its current accuracy.” Straight Path, 806 F.3d at 1360. Microsoft Manual discloses that the WINS server has information that a process “was” connected to the computer network, and that information may no longer be accurate. See Ex. 1012, 68, 150. As such, we determine that Microsoft Manual does not disclose the claimed “is connected to the computer network,” “on-line status,” or “is accessible,” as construed herein. Similarly, NetBIOS discloses a registration process for resources or nodes to receive a unique name by registering a name. Ex. 1014, 379. During a name query (discovery), a datagram is sent requesting the name and address of another resource. Id. at 396. The NBNS maintains a database of resource names through explicit name deletion, where the node specifies a deletion function and implicit name deletion, which occurs when a node ceases operation. Id. at 379. NetBIOS explains that implicit name deletion “is a frequent occurrence.” Id. Implicit name deletion is managed by assigning nodes a specified lifetime for registered names, where a name is silently released if a node fails to refresh the registered name before the lifetime expires. Id. NetBIOS further discloses a mechanism where the NBNS may correct the information stored after an incorrect response is provided to a requesting node. See id. at 409. However, similar to Microsoft Manual, NetBIOS discloses that the information stored by the NBNS may be incorrect, and, therefore, will not determine whether a second process is connected to the computer network at the time that the query is transmitted to the server. Therefore, NetBIOS also does not disclose the claimed “is connected to the computer network,” “on-line status,” or “is accessible.” Given that the combination of Microsoft Manual and NetBIOS fails to teach or suggest the claims as construed, we need not reach the remaining arguments presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 6,009,469 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,009,469

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.