- Cisco Systems, Inc. / Forescout Technologies, Inc. et al. v. K.Mizra LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 19, 2022 · IPR2022-00081 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5–13, and 15–19 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 because Petitioner did not sufficiently explain why a skilled artisan would combine Gleichauf and Lewis.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent training, and approximately two years of professional experience in the field of network communications, and more specifically, network security.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 18). Petitioner asserts that “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 18). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally PO Resp. Dr. Medvidovic, Patent Owner’s declarant, states that “[f]or the purposes of the subject IPR proceedings,” he “employ[s]” the level of ordinary skill in the art articulated by Dr. Reddy. Ex. 2009 ¶ 26. Based on the complete record, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention because Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties dispute construction of “trusted platform module” (Pet. 13–16; PO Resp. 5–6) but do not identify any issue that would turn on the construction of this term. See generally Pet.; PO Resp. Based on the complete record, for purposes of this Decision, we determine no claim terms require express construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Therefore, we find that Gleichauf alone provides all of the alleged benefits or advantages of the proposed combination of Gleichauf and Lewis identified by Petitioner. As discussed above, in the proposed combination of Gleichauf and Lewis, Gleichauf would be modified such that HTTP traffic from a quarantined device would not be redirected to a remediation server but instead would be redirected to a quarantine server, which serves an informational webpage to the user of the device, as taught by Lewis. Pet. 48–49; Pet. Reply 14 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:56–63, 21:1–12; Ex. 1007, 4:24– 31, 13:7–15; Pet. 48). Thus, Petitioner’s proposed combination contemplates (1) modifying Gleichauf’s network by adding a separate quarantine server, (2) modifying Gleichauf’s policy server to not redirect HTTP traffic from a quarantined device to a remediation server and to instead redirect the HTTP traffic to the quarantine server, and (3) providing a quarantine notice webpage to the user from the quarantine server, including a link to the remediation server, which the user can click on to access the remediation server. In addition, Gleichauf’s policy server would also need to be modified to not provide the notification messages to the user for HTTP traffic to avoid having both the policy server and the quarantine server provide the same or similar information displays to the user. Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Reddy explains adequately why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to look to Lewis to introduce such significant changes to the architecture or design of Gleichauf’s network when Gleichauf alone already provides all of the alleged benefits or advantages of the proposed combination identified by Petitioner. See Pet. 26–29; Pet. Reply 14–16; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66–71. Thus, based on the complete record, we find that the alleged benefits or advantages of the proposed combination identified by Petitioner do not provide sufficient basis for establishing why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Gleichauf and Lewis in the manner proposed by Petitioner. See In re Anova Hearing Labs, Inc., 809 F. App’x 840, 843 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (finding that the Board’s general statements that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the prior art references to address the problem of occlusion effect in hearing aids was insufficient when the Board does not explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been “motivated to modify Brown, which already includes vents, to address occlusion effect”) (non-precedential); cf. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Because each device independently operates effectively, a person having ordinary skill in the art, who was merely seeking to create a better device to drain fluids from a wound, would have no reason to combine the features of both devices into a single device.”).” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 8,234,705 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,234,705 - Cisco Systems, Inc. / Forescout Technologies, Inc. et al. v. K.Mizra LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 19, 2022 · IPR2021-00593 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5–13, and 15–19 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not sufficiently explain why a skilled artisan would combine Gleichauf and Lewis as proposed.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent training, and approximately two years of professional experience in the field of network communications, and more specifically, network security.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 18). Petitioner asserts that “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 18). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally PO Resp. Dr. Medvidovic, Patent Owner’s declarant, states that “[f]or the purposes of the subject IPR proceedings,” he “employ[s]” the level of ordinary skill in the art articulated by Dr. Reddy. Ex. 2009 ¶ 26. Based on the complete record, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention because Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties dispute construction of “trusted platform module” (Pet. 13–16; PO Resp. 5–6) but do not identify any issue that would turn on the construction of this term. See generally Pet.; PO Resp. Based on the complete record, for purposes of this Decision, we determine no claim terms require express construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Therefore, we find that Gleichauf alone provides all of the alleged benefits or advantages of the proposed combination of Gleichauf and Lewis identified by Petitioner. As discussed above, in the proposed combination of Gleichauf and Lewis, Gleichauf would be modified such that HTTP traffic from a quarantined device would not be redirected to a remediation server but instead would be redirected to a quarantine server, which serves an informational webpage to the user of the device, as taught by Lewis. Pet. 48–49; Pet. Reply 14 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:56–63, 21:1–12; Ex. 1007, 4:24– 31, 13:7–15; Pet. 48). Thus, Petitioner’s proposed combination contemplates (1) modifying Gleichauf’s network by adding a separate quarantine server, (2) modifying Gleichauf’s policy server to not redirect HTTP traffic from a quarantined device to a remediation server and to instead redirect the HTTP traffic to the quarantine server, and (3) providing a quarantine notice webpage to the user from the quarantine server, including a link to the remediation server, which the user can click on to access the remediation server. In addition, Gleichauf’s policy server would also need to be modified to not provide the notification messages to the user for HTTP traffic to avoid having both the policy server and the quarantine server provide the same or similar information displays to the user. Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Reddy explains adequately why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to look to Lewis to introduce such significant changes to the architecture or design of Gleichauf’s network when Gleichauf alone already provides all of the alleged benefits or advantages of the proposed combination identified by Petitioner. See Pet. 26–29; Pet. Reply 14–16; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66–71. Thus, based on the complete record, we find that the alleged benefits or advantages of the proposed combination identified by Petitioner do not provide sufficient basis for establishing why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Gleichauf and Lewis in the manner proposed by Petitioner. See In re Anova Hearing Labs, Inc., 809 F. App’x 840, 843 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (finding that the Board’s general statements that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the prior art references to address the problem of occlusion effect in hearing aids was insufficient when the Board does not explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been “motivated to modify Brown, which already includes vents, to address occlusion effect”) (non-precedential); cf. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Because each device independently operates effectively, a person having ordinary skill in the art, who was merely seeking to create a better device to drain fluids from a wound, would have no reason to combine the features of both devices into a single device.”).” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 8,234,705 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,234,705 - Cisco Systems, Inc. v. K.Mizra LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 12, 2022 · IPR2021-00594 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 and 9–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Shull, Farnham, and Mui; claim 5 is also unpatentable over those references and Adelman.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering[,] computer engineering[,] or equivalent and two years of professional experience relating to computer networking systems that provide content filtering,” and that a “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 17–19). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 3. We determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioner is consistent with the ’892 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). We adopt that level in deciding the patentability of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“construction standard that would be used to construe the claims in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020). The claim construction standard includes construing claims in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claims as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In construing claims in accordance with their ordinary and customary meaning, we take 1315–17. Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Neither party contends that any claim term requires construction. Pet. 12; PO Resp. 3. We determine that we do not need to expressly construe any terms to decide the issues in this proceeding.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“webpages were publicly accessible. Instead, Dr. Medvidovic testifies that “something like crawling MySpace was not possible until sometime in the second half of 2008,” i.e., much later than the time of the invention. Ex. 1040, 63:21–64:6. In view of the Internet Archive records as well as Mr. Nathaniel E. Frank-White’s testimony, discussed above, we do not find Dr. Medvidovic’s testimony credible. Moreover, Dr. Medvidovic testifies that the Internet Archive “does a certain kind of crawl over publicly accessible websites that allow that kind of crawling” (Ex. 1040, 65:3–6), thus, further supporting that the Internet Archive’s MySpace page captures from 2006 (Ex. 1011) demonstrate automated public accessibility of MySpace at that time. See In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[o]bviousness does not require absolute predictability of success . . . all that is required is a reasonable expectation of success” (quoting In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).” slip op. at 29
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“skilled artisan would have had reason to combine the teachings of Shull and Farnham. Pet. 23–28. Although Shull does not specifically disclose social networking websites, like MySpace, as a source of potential data, Shull seeks to “bring massive amounts of data together . . . for the development of a reputational database,” and teaches obtaining data from numerous sources on the Internet, including “from enabling parties (such as ISPs, registrars, hosting providers, certificate authorities, etc.).” Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 40, 47, 68–69. We are persuaded that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have considered MySpace to be a data source for Shull’s system. For example, Shull defines “enabling party” as “any party that provides services facilitating an entity’s presence on the Internet.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 42 (emphasis added). Petitioner provides persuasive evidence that the MySpace platform did just that. Pet. 24–25 (citing Ex. 1011; Ex. 1003 ¶ 52) (explaining with an example how MySpace facilitates musical artist KanYe West’s presence on the internet and documents “data regarding friends, groups, etc., associated with KanYe West”); Pet. Reply 16 (citing Ex.1010, 1; Ex. 2014, 22:14–23:23). without limitation, registrars . . . and/or registries . . . , hosting providers . . . , ISPs . . . , DNS providers . . . , certificate authorities 145d, and/or the like.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 42 (emphasis added). Shull further explains that “[d]ata about and/or from these parties can include data compiled and/or maintained by these providers about their customers, . . . historical behavior of customers of a given provider, etc.” Id. Farnham discloses that MySpace makes similar data about its members publicly available. Farnham discloses the types of data available on MySpace groups, including comments posted by MySpace members. Ex. 1021, 119, 122–23, 126; Pet. 37–38. Dr. Reddy testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have found MySpace’s relationship data as well as activity data useful in “identify[ing] relationships (e.g., friendships, group memberships, and related domains) and also to identify a person’s activity and associated content (e.g., comments, messages, blogs, etc.) that may directly impact the reputation score for the person and the web page.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 57. We credit Dr. Reddy’s testimony because it is consistent with Shull and Farnham’s disclosure.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 8,965,892 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,965,892 - ROKU, Inc. v. Universal Electronics, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 11, 2022 · IPR2021-00455 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 were not shown unpatentable over Chardon and HDMI 1.3a because the combination does not disclose data that itself identifies a controllable function.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“As Patent Owner observes, the two proposals differ “in terms of the level of experience specifically with home theater systems.” Id. at 10. Because all of the challenged claims make specific reference to a “home theater device,” Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable on the current record, and is additionally supported by the testimony of Dr. Russ. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 15– 19. Patent Owner notes that its expert, Dr. Turnbull, agrees with Patent Owner’s proposed articulation, but that Dr. Turnbull’s “conclusions resulting from his analysis did not change when reviewing the cited references from the perspective of the level of ordinary skill in the art as proposed by the Petition.” PO Resp. 10–11 (citing Ex. 2003, 31–41). We adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill for purposes of this Decision. We note, however, that we would reach the same ultimate conclusion were we to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“phrase creates a degree of ambiguity, we are mindful that “the claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms” and that “the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. In this instance, the related phrasing that appears in the “automatically adding” and “causing” limitations of issued independent claim 1 is illuminating. Both of those limitations refer to “the controllable function of the controllable appliance that was identified by the data received from the controllable appliance.” Ex. 1001, 17:11–14, 17:21–24 (emphasis added). There is no question that the only antecedent for “the data” in these limitations is the “data that functions to identify a controllable function of the controllable appliance” recited in the “receiving” limitation. See id. at 17:8–9. And there is no apparent room in the language “that was identified by the data” for the introduction or consideration of such “other information” that Petitioner would like to use “in connection with” the recited “data” to identify the controllable function. See Reply 2.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner reasons that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined such teachings from HDMI 1.3a with Chardon’s system because HDMI 1.3a “is a technical guide for the interoperability of the HDMI standard and how HDMI enabled devices operate,” and that “Chardon relies on HDMI capabilities to facilitate communication and monitoring-device state changes in its system.” Pet. 30–31 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:18–21; Ex. 1010, 17; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 130–131). According to Petitioner, “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would have therefore turned to at least one of the versions of the HDMI Specification to fill in any details in Chardon with respect to how HDMI-capable devices, such as those of Chardon and the ’486 patent operate, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” Id. at 31. Petitioner supports this reasoning with testimony by Dr. Russ that it is a “well-known industry practice” to rely on HDMI 1.3a as “specification of an industry standard” when “designing and building devices that implement the HDMI standard, incorporating all of the capabilities it offers.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 133. Patent Owner disputes the sufficiency of Petitioner’s showing. In” slip op. at 35
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“The difficulty with Petitioner’s and Dr. Russ’s position is that it is inconsistent with our adopted claim construction that the data itself identify a controllable function of the controllable appliance from which the data is received. See supra § II.C. As Patent Owner asserts, HDMI 1.3a “does not contemplate the exchange of any information that itself functions to identify a controllable function of a playback device.” PO Resp. 24 (emphasis added). All that the “Deck Status” message indicates in the example of Figure 17 is that the current status of the playback device is “Stop.” We also are not persuaded by Petitioner’s and Dr. Russ’s argument that HDMI 1.3a’s Tables 13 and 26 disclose that “Deck Info” information is returned with the “Deck Status” message, and that such “a deck status message includ[es] the features that the device can provide (e.g., play, pause, stop, etc.).” Pet. 41; Ex. 1003 ¶ 117. Reliance on such “Deck Info” information is problematic at least because it is “other information” that would be used in combination with the “Deck Status” to determine controllable functions of the controllable device, which is precluded by our adopted claim construction.” slip op. at 36
Patent outcomesUS 10,325,486 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,325,486 - ROKU, Inc. v. Universal Electronics, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 5, 2022 · IPR2021-00261 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 3, 5, 6, and 18–20 were held unpatentable; claims 1, 2, and 4 were cancelled, and substitute claims 21–23 were denied for inadequate written-description support.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We find that the parties’ proposals are not materially different despite minor differences in wording between them (e.g., “at least two years” of “industry experience, including in consumer electronics, graphical user interfaces, cable or satellite television systems, set-top boxes, multimedia systems, or programmable remote controls” under Petitioner’s proposal, as opposed to “two years” of “work experience relating to communications or consumer electronics” under Patent Owner’s proposed definition). See Pet. 15; MTA 8; RMTA 15. For purposes of this Final Written Decision, we find no meaningful differences between the parties’ respective definitions that would materially alter the outcome of this Decision. These proposals are similar for all purposes relevant to this Final Written Decision, and both are consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected in the disclosure of the ’514 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, for this Final Written Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention. Our analysis and conclusions in this Final Written Decision would be the same regardless of whether Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art is adopted.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states that no construction is necessary in this proceeding. Pet. 15. Based on the full record, for purposes of this Final Written Decision, we determine no claim terms require express construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“contends, citing the testimony of Mr. Tinsman, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Seidel with Caris because Seidel suggests using remote control key presses to initiate the remote control programming process and a person of ordinary skill in the art would have looked to Caris for its explicit description of a remote control with a “dedicated button” used to initiate a remote control set-up process. Pet. 20– 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 119–126; Ex. 1005, 12:30–35, 12:67–13:2, 13:48–64; Ex. 1006, 5:17–24, 5:47–6:3). Petitioner further contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that implementing the dedicated button would have provided the user with a simple and efficient way to initiate the remote control programming process. Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 123). According to Petitioner, combining Caris’s dedicated button with Seidel would have furthered “Seidel’s express goals of facilitating the ease of programming and minimizing user frustration” and “enabling the set-top control unit 110 to ‘interact with the user to improve the accuracy, efficiency and/or simplicity of detecting the particular mode code.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1005, 3:54–58, 13:48–50; Ex. 1003 ¶ 123). In addition, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Seidel with Caris because “[b]oth Seidel and Caris use common and similar remote controls to perform similar operations.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 124– 126). Petitioner further argues that it would have been obvious to combine Caris’s remote control having a dedicated button with Seidel because “combining Seidel with Caris would have resulted in merely combining known elements to yield predictable results.” Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 124–126). Based on the complete record and for the reasons explained by Petitioner, we find that Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently the combination of Seidel and Caris teaches all recitations of claim 3. We also find that Petitioner articulates sufficient rationale for combining the respective teachings of Seidel and Caris in the manner proposed by Petitioner to arrive at the subject matter recited in claim 3. Having weighed each of the Graham factors, including the scope and content of the prior art and the differences between the prior art and the challenged claim, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 3 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of Seidel and Caris.” slip op. at 27
- Expert testimonyOther
“Based on the complete record and for the reasons explained by Petitioner, we find that Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently the combination of Seidel and Caris teaches all recitations of claim 3. We also find that Petitioner articulates sufficient rationale for combining the respective teachings of Seidel and Caris in the manner proposed by Petitioner to arrive at the subject matter recited in claim 3. Having weighed each of the Graham factors, including the scope and content of the prior art and the differences between the prior art and the challenged claim, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 3 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of Seidel and Caris.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 7,969,514 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,969,514 - Bytedance Ltd. / Tiktok Inc. v. Triller, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 19, 2022 · IPR2021-00099 · APJ Gregg I Anderson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Beauregard and Hozumi; the other asserted anticipation and obviousness grounds were not shown.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“synchronizing . . . from a first beginning, the selected audio track at substantially the same time as a second beginning of capturing each video take of the plurality of video takes.” Patent Owner characterizes this term and the “beginning-beginning synchronization requirement.” PO Resp. 24 (emphasis omitted). Petitioner argues that this element “does not require ‘a first beginning’ and ‘a second beginning’ to be at the beginning of the audio track, but rather are a matching point between the audio track and the video clip.” Pet. 17. Patent Owner agrees with what was preliminarily determined in the Institution Decision, i.e., the “beginning-beginning requirement means that the ‘beginning’ of the audio track and the video take occur at the same time.” PO Resp. 18 (citing Inst. Dec. 19 (citing Ex. 1001, 26:63–67, Figs. 6A–6C, Fig. 7A). Thus, according to Patent Owner “the audio track must be playing while the video take is being captured.” Id. at 12 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 30). Petitioner argues that applying the plain meaning or Patent Owner’s proposed construction does not change the result and construction is not (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). We agree with Petitioner, and because applying either the plain and ordinary meaning or Patent Owner’s proposal, which we find is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning, does not affect our final decision below, no express construction of this term is necessary. The third appearance is for “synchronized” and recites “at least two video takes of the plurality of video takes synchronized with the selected audio track.” Neither party argues any construction for this appearance and we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of “synchronized” as it appears in limitation 1.4. slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Consistent with the preceding, nothing in the Specification precludes a “video take” from being the same as or including a “video clip” or other piece of video. The Specification states that “each video take, whether it begins at the beginning of the audio track or at some other point of the audio track, will be synchronized to the audio track.” Ex. 1001, 10:24–26 (“each video take, whether it begins at the beginning of the audio track or at some other point of the audio track, will be synchronized to the audio track”). A “video take” is described as “a plurality of captured video takes synchronized to a selected audio track.” Id. at 11:4–6. Based on this, we find that a person or ordinary skill would have understood the Specification as describing a “video take” as sometimes the equivalent video clip or segment of video. See Ex. 1001, 10:24–26. We agree with Patent Owner that a “video take” is a continuous recording. Petitioner agreed during the ’663 Lawsuit claim construction process that a video take is “continuous.” PO Resp. 14–15 (citing Ex. 2011,6 8 (“agree any stoppages of recording (e.g., pausing) and restarting is not allowed”); Ex. 2012,7 4). Accordingly, we determine that “video take”” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“C. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner alleges: A person of ordinary skill in the art as of the Critical Date of the ’429 Patent (“POSITA”) would have been a person with a working knowledge of digital video and audio technologies. The person would have had a Bachelor of Science, a Bachelor of Applied Science, or a Bachelor of Engineering degree in an academic discipline emphasizing the design of electrical, computer, or software technologies, in combination with training or at least one to two years of related work experience with capture and processing of data or information, including but not limited to digital video and audio technologies. TIKTOK-1003, ¶12. Alternatively, the person could have also had a Master of Science, Master of Applied Science, or Master of Engineering degree in a relevant academic discipline with less than a year of related work experience in the same discipline. Id. Pet. 6. Patent Owner does not comment on Petitioner’s proposal or propose an alternative. On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed description of a person of ordinary skill, which is consistent with the disclosure in the ’429 patent and the cited prior art.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“As to the reasons supporting the combination, Patent Owner focuses narrowly on the users of the Beauregard system and not what a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from the combination of Beauregard and Hozumi. Patent Owner cites no authority for its argument that a lack of “coordination and communication” between Beauregard’s users is required for a person of ordinary skill in the art to have had reason to make the proposed combination. Cf. In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859–60 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Patent Owner’s arguments regarding use are “basically irrelevant, the criterion being not whether the references could be physically combined but whether the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the stated in the Shamos Declaration are unsupported by facts and thus entitled to little or no weight. See Ex. 2009 ¶ 115; 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Although the references being in the same field of art is not conclusively a reason for a person of ordinary skill to make the combination, it is a factor. KSR, 550 U.S. 401 (“When a work is available in one field, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or in another. If a person of ordinary skill in the art can implement a predictable variation, and would see the benefit of doing so, § 103 likely bars its patentability.”). As for Patent Owner’s argument about hindsight reasoning (PO Resp. 69), “[a]ny judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning, but so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.” In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). Here, Petitioner provides persuasive evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have been motivated to combine Hozumi with Beauregard based on the disclosures of Hozumi and Beauregard and the evidence of the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’429 patent’s filing date. See, e.g., Pet. 53–56; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 80–82. This is not evidence of hindsight bias. Patent Owner does not identify, and we do not discern, any particular knowledge used by Petitioner in its combination of Beauregard and Hozumi that was gleaned only from the ’429 patent’s disclosure and was not within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. and motivation for combining the teachings of Hozumi with Beauregard is sufficient. See Pet. 53–56.” slip op. at 37
Patent outcomesUS 9,691,429 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,691,429 - Unified Patents, LLC v. Oceana Innovations LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 14, 2022 · IPR2020-01463 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5 are unpatentable: claims 1–3 are anticipated by Jones, and claims 1–5 are obvious over the combinations stated in the grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“angled away from each other” means “extending away from each other” and encompasses “angled at 180 degrees,” i.e., pointing in opposite directions. See Pet. 28. First, the claim language supports the conclusion that “being angled away from each other” means “extending away from each other” and encompasses “angled at 180 degrees.” Claim 1 requires that “said third sides are substantially perpendicular to said first side.” Ex. 1001, 6:2–3. Claim 2 depends from claim 1 and requires that “said fifth sides are respectively and substantially perpendicular to said third sides.” Id. at 6:6–8. Thus, claim 2 defines an assembly with (1) third sides “substantially perpendicular” to the first side, i.e., third sides arranged about 90 degrees relative to the first side, and (2) fifth sides “substantially perpendicular” to respective third sides, i.e., fifth sides arranged about 90 degrees relative to respective third sides. In that assembly, the fifth sides are arranged about 180 degrees relative to the first side, and the fifth sides are “angled at 180 degrees” relative to each other. A dependent claim should narrow a base claim by containing a reference to the base claim and “then specify[ing] a further limitation of the subject matter claimed.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 (2006); see Myco Indus., Inc. v. BlephEx, LLC, 955 F.3d 1, 14 (Fed. Cir. 2020). So if narrower claim 2 encompasses an assembly with fifth sides “angled at 180 degrees” relative to each other, then broader claim 1 also encompasses such an assembly. As an example, claim 1 covers an arrangement where the fifth side on the left has a slight inclination clockwise from horizontal (⸜) and the fifth side on the right has a slight inclination counterclockwise from horizontal (⸝), such that the sides angle upwardly (⸜ ⸝) relative to a centerline. As another example, claim 1 covers an arrangement where the fifth side on the left has a slight inclination counterclockwise from horizontal (⸝) and the fifth side on the right has a slight inclination clockwise from horizontal (⸜), such that the sides angle downwardly (⸝ ⸜) relative to a centerline. Patent Owner does not dispute that claim 1 covers these example arrangements. See Resp. 10–16; see also id. at 47–48, 50–51. Based on the claim language, claim 1 also covers an arrangement intermediate between these example arrangements where the fifth side on the left has no inclination from horizontal (–) and the fifth side on the right has no inclination from horizontal (–), such that the sides point in opposite directions (– –), i.e., the sides are “angled at 180 degrees” relative to each other. Second, the ’678 patent’s specification supports the conclusion that “being angled away from each other” means “extending away from each other” and encompasses “angled at 180 degrees.” See Ex. 1001, 3:66–4:19, Figs. 9–10. When describing the receptacle and the complementary plug depicted in Figures 9 and 10, the patent states that “[t]he third sides 373 (483) are substantially perpendicular to the first side 371 (481).” Id. at 4:14–16. The patent also states that “[t]he fifth sides 375, (485) are respectively and substantially perpendicular to the third sides 373 (483).” Id. at 4:18–19. Hence, similar to claim 2, Figures 9 and 10 depict an assembly with (1) third sides “substantially perpendicular” to the first side, i.e., third sides arranged about 90 degrees relative to the first side, and (2) fifth sides “substantially perpendicular” to respective third sides, i.e., fifth sides arranged about 90 degrees relative to respective third sides. Ex. 1001, 4:14–19, Figs. 9–10. In that assembly, the fifth sides are arranged about 180 degrees relative to the first side, and the fifth sides are “angled at 180 degrees” relative to each other. Id. at 4:14–19, Figs. 9–10. Further, when describing the receptacle and the complementary plug depicted in Figures 9 and 10, the ’678 patent states that “[t]he fifth sides 375 (485) are angled away from each other while extending from the fourth sides 374 (484) to the third sides 373 (483).” Ex. 1001, 4:11–13, code (57). Thus, the patent uses “angled away” to encompass “angled at 180 degrees,” i.e., pointing in opposite directions. Third, the ’678 patent’s prosecution history supports the conclusion that “being angled away from each other” means “extending away from each other” and encompasses “angled at 180 degrees.” See Ex. 1004, 17, 41–48, 144–51, 153–58; see also Ex. 1010, 2:52–54, 2:66–3:14, 3:46–4:31, Fig. 1. Application claim 1 became patent claim 1. Ex. 1004, 241. As filed, application claim 1 recited “said fifth sides being angled away from each other while extending from said fourth sides to said third sides.” Id. at 17. In the first Office action, the Examiner rejected application claims 1–3 and 7 as anticipated by Nishio. Ex. 1004, 42–44, 48, 144–51. In rejecting application claim 1, the Examiner found that Nishio discloses an assembly with “fifth sides being angled away from each other while extending from the fourth sides to the third sides.” Id. at 43, 145. As explained below, Nishio discloses an assembly with fifth sides “angled at 180 degrees” relative to each other. See Ex. 1010, 2:52–54, 2:66–3:14, 3:46–4:31, Fig. 1; infra § III.G.2(l). Petitioner provides an annotated excerpt from Nishio’s Figure 1 (reproduced below) depicting an assembly with fifth sides “angled at 180 degrees” relative to each other (Pet. 30): Figure 1 is “an exploded perspective drawing of an electrical connector” with “a section cut away.” Ex. 1010, 2:52–54, Fig. 1. The above annotated excerpt from Figure 1 includes two green lines denoting two fifth sides, and the two green lines are “angled at 180 degrees” relative to each other. See Pet. 30. The Applicant did not dispute the Examiner’s finding that Nishio” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“3. OTHER CLAIM TERMS We determine that no other claim terms require explicit constructions” slip op. at 24
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“2. INDEPENDENT CLAIM 1 (a) Preamble [1a] Claim 1’s preamble recites “[a]n electrical connector assembly.” Ex. 1001, 5:9. Petitioner contends that Jones discloses claim 1’s preamble because Jones discloses “a series of electrical connector assemblies each . . . comprising a socket and a corresponding plug.” Pet. 31 (alteration by Petitioner) (quoting Ex. 1007, 1:43–45). Patent Owner makes no arguments specific to claim 1’s preamble. See Resp. 16–28. Nonetheless, the burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate unpatentability. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378.” slip op. at 29
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“Alleged Objective Indicia of Nonobviousness (i) Background Before reaching a conclusion about obviousness, we consider evidence concerning objective indicia of nonobviousness. See Apple, 839 F.3d at 1048. For such evidence to have substantial weight, “its proponent must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention.” ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “[T]here is no nexus unless the evidence presented is ‘reasonably commensurate with the scope of the claims.’” Id. (quoting Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). The patentee “bears the burden of showing that a nexus exists.” WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999). A rebuttable presumption of nexus arises “when the patentee shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product ‘embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Whether a rebuttable presumption of nexus arises “turns on the nature of the claims and the specific facts.” Teva Pharm. Int’l GmbH v. Eli Lilly & Co., 8 F.4th 1349, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2021). When, “for example, the patented invention is only a small component of the product tied to the objective evidence, there is no presumption of nexus.” Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Absent a presumption of nexus, the patentee may prove nexus by showing that the objective evidence resulted directly from “the unique characteristics of the claimed invention.” Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1373–74; see In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Thus, the Board employs a two-step analysis in evaluating whether a patentee has established a nexus between the evidence concerning objective indicia of nonobviousness and the merits of the claimed invention. See Lectrosonics, Inc. v. Zaxcom, Inc., IPR2018-01129, Paper 33 at 32–33 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2020) (precedential). Initially, the Board considers whether the patentee has demonstrated that the “products are coextensive (or nearly coextensive) with the challenged claims,” resulting in a rebuttable presumption of nexus. Id. at 33. Absent a presumption of nexus, the Board considers whether the patentee has demonstrated “a legally and factually sufficient connection” between the evidence and the claimed invention. See Henny Penny, 938 F.3d at 1332; Lectrosonics, IPR2018-01129, Paper 33 at 33.” slip op. at 81
Patent outcomesUS 6,508,678 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,508,678 - Bytedance Ltd. / Tiktok Inc. v. Triller, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 12, 2021 · IPR2021-00774 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR for claims 11–19 under § 314(a), exercising discretion based on the General Plastic factors and the burdens of a second petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“On this record, we have some “road mapping” concerns. Although Patent Owner identifies no relevant differences between the instant Petition and the ’099 Petition, Petitioner fails to provide any explanation for why the instant Petition was filed nearly two months after receiving Patent Owner’s preliminary response in the ’099 IPR. This fact pattern is troubling because there are significant overlaps in the subject matter recited in the challenged claims and because Hozumi is a primary reference in both proceedings. But Petitioner did not have the benefit of the ’099 Institution Decision (and the concerns articulated therein) at the time it filed the instant Petition.” slip op. at 12
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,691,429 - Cisco Systems, Inc. v. K.Mizra LLCInstitutedPTAB · Sep 24, 2021 · IPR2021-00593 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 5–13, and 15–19 because Cisco showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on obviousness over Gleichauf, Ovadia, and Lewis.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“under NHK have sought to balance considerations such as system efficiency, fairness, and patent quality.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 5 (collecting cases). Fintiv sets forth six non-exclusive factors for determining “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. at 6. These factors consider: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 5–6.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent training, and approximately two years of professional experience in the field of network communications, and more specifically, network security.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 18). Petitioner asserts that “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 18). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, although Patent Owner states that it “reserves the right to dispute Petitioner’s definition if an IPR is instituted.” Prelim. Resp. 16. Based on the current record, we find Petitioner’s proposal consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Therefore, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention.” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“The parties dispute construction of “trusted platform module” (Pet. 13–16; Prelim. Resp. 17) but do not identify any issue that would turn on the construction of this term, at least for purposes of deciding whether to institute a review. See generally Pet.; Prelim. Resp. Based on the current record, for purposes of this Decision, we determine no claim terms require express construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Based on the record presented, we determine, for purposes of this Decision, Petitioner has shown sufficiently how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Gleichauf with Ovadia to obtain the subject matter recited in limitations [1.2] and [1.4]. We also determine, for purposes of this Decision, Petitioner sufficiently articulates a reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Gleichauf and Ovadia with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 50
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,234,705 - ROKU, Inc. v. Universal Electronics, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 17, 2021 · IPR2019-01615 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Roku’s rehearing request, leaving intact its determination that claims 1, 3, 5, and 7 were not shown unpatentable over Chardon.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. DISCUSSION On request for rehearing, “[t]he burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, reply, or a sur-reply.” Id. We have reviewed Petitioner’s Request and carefully considered all of the arguments presented. We are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any arguments or evidence, and thus we decline to modify the Decision.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“first communication method” and “second communication method” recited in claim 1 with Chardon’s “CEC command codes” and “IR command codes,” respectively, where Chardon’s command codes are stored in a database linked to the Extended Display Identification Data (EDID) for target devices. Dec. 20–21. We thus evaluated whether command codes in an EDID-linked database teach or suggest the claimed listing comprised of at least a first communication method and a second communication method, and determined that “the record falls short of providing evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood stored command codes to act as an identification of communication methods to be used.” Id. at 21–22. slip op. at 3
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,716,853
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.