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  • PTAB · Feb 22, 2023 · IPR2019-01199 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Remand

    On remand, the Board terminated the proceedings after settlement because it had not decided the remanded merits concerning claim 20.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • RemandGranted

      “Generally, the Board expects that a proceeding will terminate after the filing of a settlement agreement, unless the Board already has decided the merits of the proceeding. PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 86 (Nov. 2019).6 Here, although the Board already has issued a Final Written Decision, the Federal Circuit reversed the part of that decision addressing claim 20 of the ’552 patent and remanded to the Board for further proceedings regarding claim 20. The Board has not issued a decision on remand and, thus, has not decided the merits of the issues that were remanded to the Board. Under these circumstances, we determine it is appropriate to grant the Motion and terminate the proceedings.” slip op. at 3

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted in part

      “The parties also jointly request that the Agreement be treated as business confidential information and be kept separate from the files of the ’552 patent and these proceedings. Req. 2. We have reviewed the Agreement, which contains confidential business information regarding the settlement terms, and we determine that good cause exists to treat the Agreement as business confidential information pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c) and keep it separate from the files of the ’552 patent and these proceedings. Accordingly, we grant this aspect of the parties’ Joint Request. The parties also “request that the Board order that in the event a person or entity makes a written request, as stated in 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c)(1)-(2), for access to the settlement agreement, that any such written request be served upon Patent Owner and Petitioner on the day the written request is provided to the Board.” Req. 2. However, neither the statute nor the regulation provides for any such notification, and the parties have not provided any reason or special circumstance that would justify issuing an order that purports to impose an additional requirement. Accordingly, we deny that portion of the parties’ Joint Request.” slip op. at 4

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,247,552
  • PTAB · Feb 22, 2023 · IPR2019-01198 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Remand

    The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the remanded proceedings; it also granted in part their request to protect the settlement agreement.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • RemandGranted

      “Generally, the Board expects that a proceeding will terminate after the filing of a settlement agreement, unless the Board already has decided the merits of the proceeding. PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 86 (Nov. 2019).6 Here, although the Board already has issued a Final Written Decision, the Federal Circuit reversed the part of that decision addressing claim 20 of the ’552 patent and remanded to the Board for further proceedings regarding claim 20. The Board has not issued a decision on remand and, thus, has not decided the merits of the issues that were remanded to the Board. Under these circumstances, we determine it is appropriate to grant the Motion and terminate the proceedings.” slip op. at 3

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted in part

      “business confidential information and be kept separate from the files of the ’552 patent and these proceedings. Req. 2. We have reviewed the Agreement, which contains confidential business information regarding the settlement terms, and we determine that good cause exists to treat the Agreement as business confidential information pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c) and keep it separate from the files of the ’552 patent and these proceedings. Accordingly, we grant this aspect of the parties’ Joint Request.” slip op. at 4

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,247,552
  • PTAB · Feb 1, 2023 · IPR2022-01212 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution

    Instituted IPR on claims 1–12 because Ericsson showed a reasonable likelihood that claims would be unpatentable under the asserted § 103 grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review is under 35 U.S.C. § 314. See also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). To institute an inter partes review, the information presented in the Petition must show “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–12 of the ’338 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Postgrant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites /default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_di strict_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf (the “Interim Procedure”). The Interim Procedure explains that “[c]onsistent with Sotera Wireless, Inc., the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Interim Procedure 3 (internal footnote omitted) (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A). The Interim Procedure explains that such a Sotera stipulation “mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB . . . . [and] allows the PTAB to review grounds that the parallel district court litigation will not resolve.” Id. at 7–8. Petitioner “adopts the identical stipulation from Sotera, namely, that if the IPR is instituted, . . . Petitioner will not pursue in the District Court Litigation any ground raised or that could have been reasonably raised in an IPR for the challenged patent.” Pet. 81.” slip op. at 55

    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “Determining the level of ordinary skill in the art involves various factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The prior art of record also reflects the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Institution Decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Patent Owner as it is consistent with the ’338 patent and the asserted prior art. Even if we were to adopt Petitioner’s similar assessment, it would not alter our decision to institute.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “Turning to the claim language, limitation vii recites “reconfiguring each remote radio unit by: determining a load percentage for each remote radio unit.” Claim 1 simply does not specify how to determine the load percentage for each remote radio unit and “load percentage” is a broad term. Stated differently, claim 1 does not specify the numerator or denominator to be used in determining the load percentage, but the parties agree that the numerator is the amount of load used in an RRU, as indicated above. On this preliminary record, Petitioner’s interpretation of “available capacity” as including “a single radio, a group of radios or the entire DAS system, [able to] be determined using throughput, number of connections, number of users, number of carriers, or power,” is sufficient for purposes of institution. See Pet. Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:24–27; 5:13–15; 6:1–4; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104–06). On this preliminary record, as Petitioner argues (Pet. Reply 2) and contrary to Patent Owner’s construction, the claim language and the specification do not support limiting available capacity to a single RRU, or similarly, limiting the scope of “load percentage” to a load consumed by a remote radio unit divided by the assigned available capacity for that remote radio unit.6” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,682,338
  • PTAB · Nov 18, 2022 · IPR2018-01165 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Adverse judgment

    The Board granted adverse judgment against Patent Owner as to claims 16–19 after their statutory disclaimer and terminated the proceeding.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “Moreover, under 37 § C.F.R. 42.73(b), a “party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” The only claims before us on remand have been disclaimed. Accordingly, we construe Patent Owner’s disclaimer to be a request for adverse judgment as to those claims which remain before us, which we now grant.” slip op. at 3

    • RemandOther

      “Written Decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Papers 31, 32. The court issued its decision affirming our findings as to all claims except claims 15–19. Nichia Corp. v. Document Sec. Sys., Inc., Nos. 2020-2261, 2020-2287, 2022 WL 1218036, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 26, 2022). Specifically, the court reversed our determination that Petitioner had not shown independent claim 15 to be unpatentable and remanded for further proceedings regarding dependent claims 16–19. Id. On June 14, 2022, the court issued the formal mandate. Paper 33. On June 23, 2022, Patent Owner statutorily disclaimed claims 16–19 of the ’087 patent. Thus, claims 16–19 are no longer part of this proceeding and no issues remain for us to consider on remand. See Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Inc., 933 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (noting that disclaiming claims effectively eliminates those claims from the patent as though the disclaimed claims had never existed (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also Asetek Danmark A/S v. CoolIT Sys., Inc., IPR2020-00747, Paper 42 at 6 (PTAB Sept. 30, 2021) (determining that a proceeding); cf. 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”).” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,524,087
  • PTAB · Mar 2, 2022 · IPR2021-00737 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–38 are unpatentable as obvious under §103(a): claims 1–34, 36, and 38 over Zavracky, Chiricescu, and Akasaka; claim 35 with Satoh; and claim 37 with Alexander.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “4. Petitioner’s Showing, Claims 1–22, 36, and 38 Claim 1’s preamble recites “[a] processor module comprising.”” slip op. at 29

    • Expert testimonyOther

      “incorporation-by-reference of pages of evidence that Patent Owner attributes to Petitioner. Also, the cited three pages of Exhibit 2014 are in the middle of an industry article, and the pages are densely packed two-column pages that facially appear to have at least the same number of words in some of the complained-about citations to multiple paragraphs that Petitioner provides to Dr. Souri’s Reply Declaration. Here, Patent Owner leaves it to the Board to dig into the cited pages of Exhibit 2014 to find the alleged TSV interconnection issues and place it in context to the background information in the whole article. In reaching our decision, we exercised judgment as to all the evidence cited by the parties for its relevance, context, and substance, and weighed it accordingly.” slip op. at 123

    Patent outcomesUS RE42,035 unpatentable
    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  • PTAB · Mar 2, 2022 · IPR2021-00735 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–6 and 26–31 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations of Zavracky, Chiricescu, and Akasaka, with Satoh or Alexander added for dependent claims.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The parties dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. The level of” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “C. Claim Construction In an inter partes review, the Board construes each claim “in” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “articulated reasoning to support a conclusion of obviousness. PO Resp. 2–3, 23–39; PO Sur-reply 10–14. (i) Alleged Misrepresentation of Chiricescu First, Patent Owner contends that “Petitioner misrepresents Chiricescu to allege motivation to combine Zavracky and Chiricescu.” PO Resp. 24–25 (Section VI.A.3(a)). Patent Owner specifically asserts that Chiricescu does not employ Zavracky’s principles, does not utilize Zavracky’s principles to improve reconfiguration time, and “does not employ Zavracky’s die-area vertical interconnections to connect a memory die to an FPGA, and no die-area vertical is involved whatsoever in reconfiguring Chiricescu’s FPGA.” PO Resp. 24 (citing Pet. 18–19, Ex. 1004, 232 (Exhibit page 1), 234 (Exhibit page 3); Ex. 2011 ¶ 6117). The record does not support this line of argument. Chiricescu’s Abstract indicates the paper describes “[t]he architecture of a 3-dimensional FPGA for reconfigurable computing machines” and “is based on a novel 3-D circuit technology developed at Northeastern University.” Ex. 1004, 232 (Abstract); see Pet. Reply 13. Chiricescu specifically notes “[a]t Northeastern University, the 3-D Microelectronics group has developed a unique technology which allows us to design individual CMOS circuits and stack them to build 3-D layered FPGAs which can have vertical metal 17 Dr. Souri’s declaration testimony cited by Patent Owner (Ex. 2011 ¶ 61) is a single-sentence conclusion that provides no more reasoning than that included in the Patent Owner Response to the Petition (Paper 19).” slip op. at 33

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “3. Independent Claims 1, 2, 26, and 27 Turning to the independent claims 1, 2, 26, and 27, Petitioner presents” slip op. at 47

    Patent outcomesUS 7,126,214 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,126,214
  • PTAB · Mar 2, 2022 · IPR2020-01567 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision

    The Board held claims 1–6 and 26–31 unpatentable as obvious over the cited combinations of prior art.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelOther

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The parties dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. The level of” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

      “C. Claim Construction In an inter partes review, the Board construes each claim “in” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. More specifically, Petitioner must demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that “a skilled artisan would have had reason to combine the teaching of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success from doing so.” PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2014).” slip op. at 8

    • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

      “we do not agree with Patent Owner that we should not consider Dr. Franzon’s Reply Declaration. Patent Owner makes only general assertions that seem to be based primarily on multiple paragraphs being identified in a citation, which as discussed below we find provide context for Petitioner’s arguments. Additionally, Patent Owner does not address the significant overlap in the cited paragraphs with arguments made in the Reply. Moreover, in reaching our decision regarding the patentability of the challenged claims, we exercised judgment as to all the evidence cited by the parties for its relevance, context, and substance, and weighed it accordingly.” slip op. at 91

    Patent outcomesUS 7,126,214 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,126,214
  • PTAB · Nov 24, 2021 · IPR2020-01020 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision

    The Board held claims 1, 5, and 7 anticipated by Alexander, and all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner contends that “a person of ordinary skill in the art . . . would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering or a related and either (1) two or more years of industry experience; and/or (2) an advanced degree in Electrical Engineering or related field.” PO Resp. 4–5 (citing Ex. 2015 ¶ 33). We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art as we did in the Institution Decision, which comports with the teachings of the ’035 patent and the asserted prior art. See Inst. Dec. 19. Patent Owner’s proposed level is slightly lower than Petitioner’s but it overlaps with Petitioner’s proposed level. Even if we adopted Patent Owner’s proposed level, the outcome would remain the same. C.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). Under the same standard applied by district courts, claim terms acquire their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “There are only two exceptions to this general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Based on the current record, no terms require explicit construction. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’. . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D.” slip op. at 9

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “In other words, contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Alexander need not enable “wafer-thinning technology,” because challenged claims 1, 5, and 7 at issue here do not require that technology. Even so, the ’035 patent admits the “wafer-thinning technology” was known and “developed by Tru-Sci Technologies” prior to the invention. See Ex. 1001, 2:20–30; Prelim. Resp. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:20–30; Ex. 2008); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Enablement of an anticipatory reference may be demonstrated by a later reference”). Accordingly, an artisan of ordinary skill reading Alexander 9 Patent Owner does not challenge this preliminary finding in its Response. After a full review of the record, we incorporate and adopt this finding as supported by a preponderance of the evidence. would have considered Alexander enabled for such known technology at the time of the invention.10” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “Contrary to these arguments, claim 9 does not recite or require a “stacked die hybrid,” “buffer cells,” any improvements in FPGA reconfiguration times, or a “3D IC.” Claim 9 recites a “reconfigurable computer system” in the preamble, but it does not even recite how the “memory” and “processor” functionally or structurally relate to the “first and second integrated circuit die elements” of the “processor module.” As indicated above, Alexander carries a presumption of enablement as a prior art reference. See Antor Media, 689 F.3d at 1288; Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1355. Alexander employs multi-chip module fabrication techniques “to establish electrical contacts between the interconnect substrate and pads on individual dies.” Ex. 1006, 4. As to obviousness, Petitioner relies on known systems that include a microprocessor, FPGA, and memory. Pet. 22–23 (citing “APA Figure 1”). Petitioner persuasively shows that an artisan of ordinary skill readily could have connected the known FPGA module in a processor and memory system as a substitute for a prior art FPGA, with the system performing as predicted, as evidenced by the block diagram wiring connections in admitted prior art Figure 1 of the ’035 patent, in order to save space and increase processing speed with a reasonable expectation of success. See Pet. 10–11, 21–25 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 85–93). Patent Owner also alleges thermal issues in Alexander render the claimed combination “inoperable.” PO Resp. 25–28. Again, however, Patent Owner relies on a module or stack of a “3D FPGA with other power hungry components, such as logic dies including microprocessors” to support its arguments. Id. at 27. This argument mischaracterizes the breadth of claims 9, 13, and 15, which do not require a stack that includes a 3D FPGA stack with a microprocessor and memory in that stack, as Petitioner shows and as outlined above. Based on the foregoing discussion, Petitioner shows persuasively that” slip op. at 25

    Patent outcomesUS RE42,035 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  • PTAB · Nov 25, 2019 · IPR2018-01157 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 13–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Yamamoto and Nishimoto; the Chowdhury and Webb grounds, with or without Tanaka162, do not establish unpatentability.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableDecided for petitioner

      “III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we determine Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that each of claims 13–20 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 26

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “The parties submit and we agree that there is no need to construe any term to resolve the issues in this decision. See Pet. 7–9; PO Resp. 6; Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 6

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “e. Summary For the reasons described above, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention would have had reason to combine Yamamoto’s and Nishimoto’s teachings as asserted by Petitioner and that the combination teaches all of claim 13’s limitations. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 13 would have been obvious over Yamamoto and Nishimoto.” slip op. at 21

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “tunable compensators is a contingent argument, applicable only if one reads claim 13 to require a certain transmission rate. PO Resp. 21–25. We do not read Petitioner’s argument as so constrained. Rather, we understand Petitioner to argue that a desire for higher transmission speeds would drive skilled artisans to use solutions such as Nishimoto’s tunable compensators, particularly in light of Nishimoto’s guidance regarding the ability to achieve high speeds with the system. See Pet. 21–23. In that regard, we agree with Petitioner that the increase in transmission rates from Yamamoto’s to Nishimoto’s disclosures would have given skilled artisans reason to consider Nishimoto’s teachings. Pet. Reply 16–18 (citing Ex. 1005 8:9–11; Ex. 1007, 12:37–39). As Petitioner points out, Nishimoto specifically discloses that higher-speed transmissions were more sensitive to dispersion. Pet. Reply 17 n.9. Thus, we find the desire for higher transmission speeds and the need for techniques such as taught by Nishimoto would have given skilled artisans reasons to combine Nishimoto’s disclosure regarding dispersion compensation with Yamamoto’s system to achieve Yamamoto’s goals regarding the dispersion maps for multiple channels. Further, Petitioner does not rest entirely on the desire for high-speed operation. Petitioner argues also that using Nishimoto’s adjustable compensators and feedback control would “yield an improved WDM system capable of automatic compensation for degradation of the optical signal waveform caused by both wavelength dispersion and polarization mode dispersion of the optical transmission path, resulting in further reduced size and cost.” Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 99, 101; Ex. 1007, 3:41–60, 4:3–58, Figs. 17, 20, 21), 29–30 (quoting Ex. 1007, Abstract, 3:37–40, 6:56–64, 7:53–56, 11:41–46, 17:53–55, 17:59–60; citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 114–115); accord id. at 14 (quoting Ex. 1007, 3:19–25). Patent Owner recognizes that basis for the combination but argues that the record lacks evidence to support Petitioner’s claim of reduced size and cost. PO Resp. 25–26. Patent Owner does not contest that the modification would give Yamamoto’s system the ability to automatically compensate for signal degradation from dispersion. Nishimoto discloses that as transmission speeds increase, “changes in wavelength dispersion characteristics due to temperature changes of optical fiber; and the influence by polarization mode dispersion” both “can not be neglected,” therefore requiring a system for automatically compensating for wavelength dispersion and polarization mode dispersion,” as taught by Nishimoto. Ex. 1007, 1:34–41. We find that a skilled artisan would have had reason to make the combination because the system would gain capability for automatic compensation. Regarding reduced size and cost resulting from the combination, Patent Owner does not provide any contrary evidence and we conclude that Nishimoto’s statements regarding the benefit of its invention also would have motivated skilled artisans to make the combination. See Ex. 1007, 3:17–26 (“to thereby provide a dispersion compensating apparatus of reduced sizes at a reduced cost”).” slip op. at 18

    Patent outcomesUS 8,351,798 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,351,798
  • PTAB · Mar 5, 2019 · IPR2018-01556 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claim 4 was obvious over Padovani and Gils.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “B. Principles of Law In an inter partes review, “the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (requiring a petition for inter partes review to identify how the challenged claim is to be construed and where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied on). Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 7

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “Although Petitioner contends “a POSITA would have been motivated to provide greater protection for the decimal integer portion (an error in which would be magnified versus an error in the decimal fraction portion)” in Padovani (Pet. 33), Petitioner does not identify any passage or combination of passages in Padovani that teaches or suggests providing, or even the need to provide, greater protection for one decimal portion than the other decimal portion, let alone by using “different coding schemes for the different parts.” Id. As Patent Owner asserts, “Padovani discloses using a single code to encode the DRC message[,]” and “does not teach using multiple codes to encode different portions of the DRC message.” Prelim. Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 1009, 45:20–22 (emphasis added)). We recognize that Petitioner’s Declarant, Dr. Min, testifies that, “by virtue of Padovani contemplating the use of an (n,k) coding scheme,” the POSITA “would have naturally sought out similar coding schemes [as those of Gils] to protect DRC messages.” See Pet. 41 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 156). Dr. Min further testifies that “a POSITA would have been motivated to provide greater protection for certain bits by selecting appropriate code words generated by one or more of the coding schemes contemplated by Gils,” and thus, use “different coding schemes for the different parts.” Ex. 1017 ¶ 132. Dr. Min’s testimony, however, does not address adequately why one of ordinary skill in the art would have used together different coding schemes from Gils, let alone a separate scheme for certain bits over the other bits. As Dr. Min testifies, “a single UEP coding scheme could also be used depending upon how a POSITA would have wanted to implement unequal error protection.” Ex. 1017 ¶ 132; see Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 132). As such, Dr. Min acknowledges that a single unequal error protection coding scheme could be used as well as applying different coding schemes to different parts of a message. Here, Dr. Min’s testimony that a single unequal error protection coding scheme could be used further undermines Petitioner’s position that one of ordinary skill in the art would have used the different coding schemes for different parts as set forth in Gils. Thus, Dr. Min’s testimony does not adequately explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have applied different coding schemes from Gils to the DRC message of Padovani, much less in the manner proposed by Petitioner, of providing greater protection for the decimal integer portion than the decimal fraction portion, especially when Padovani discloses “using a single code to encode the DRC message.” See Prelim. Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 1009, 45:20–22).” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “Here, for these reasons discussed above, we conclude that Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence from prior art references or Dr. Min’s declaration testimony to support its contention that one of ordinary skill in the art would have used Gils’s techniques to encode Padovani’s DRC message in the manner required by the claims—such that the most significant bit of the plurality of bits is encoded to be less susceptible to errors. Petitioner also has not demonstrated articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Instead, we conclude that Petitioner used improper hindsight to reconstruct the claimed subject matter by using the claims as a guide to combine the prior art references. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize- Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Care must be taken to avoid hindsight reconstruction by using ‘the patent in suit as a guide through the maze of prior art references, combining the right references in the right way so as to achieve the result of the claims in suit.’” (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 16

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “Moreover, Dr. Min’s contention that “[t]he nature of binary numbers (or other base-x number systems) means that the leftmost bit of any binary number is the most significant bit” (Ex. 1017 ¶ 154) is conclusory. As Patent Owner points out, “Dr Min’s declaration, however, merely repeats the allegations of the Petition without any explanation or citation to any supporting or corroborating evidence.” Prelim. Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 154). That is, “[t]here is no proffered evidence that it was well understood by a POSITA at the time that the leftmost bit in binary numbers, and specifically in the DRC message of Padovani, is the ‘most significant bit.’” Prelim. Resp. 20. For that reason, we give little weight to Dr. Min’s uncorroborated testimony that “the leftmost bit of any binary number is the most significant bit.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); In re Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations[.]”).” slip op. at 15

    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 7,206,587

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