• Qiagen North American Holdings, Inc. v. Handylab, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 14, 2020 · IPR2019-01493 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–33 not shown unpatentable under the asserted §103 grounds because the petitioner did not establish the claimed separate sample inlets or a reasonable expectation of success in combining the references.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “We agree with the parties that a POSA would have had an engineering background and experience with microfluidic devices, which is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Our determination regarding the patentability of the challenged claims does not turn on the differences between Petitioner’s and Patent under either assessment.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We also agree with Patent Owner that the specification defines the structure of the sample lane. PO Resp. 12. The specification states: A sample lane is an independently controllable set of elements by which a sample can be analyzed, according to methods described herein as well as others known in the art. A sample lane comprises at least a sample inlet, and a microfluidic network having one or more microfluidic components as further described herein. Ex. 1002, 12:66–13:4. The embodiments described in the specification include sample inlets associated with each of the sample lanes. See, e.g., id.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner has failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the combination of Zou I and McNeely or Pease teaches multi-lane microfluidic cartridges, because Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a POSA would reasonably have expected to be successful in combining Zou I’s microfluidic chip with a cartridge as taught by McNeely or Pease. In order to demonstrate that the challenged claims are obvious, a petitioner must demonstrate “that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). A petitioner must combination(s) of elements in specific references would yield a predictable result, or [3] how any specific combination would operate or read on the asserted claims.” Id. at 1327–28. Focusing on the parties’ arguments pertaining to how Zou I and McNeely or Pease could be combined, which combination of elements in the references would yield a predictable result, and how the combination would operate or read on the challenged claims, we determine that the evidence on this record is not sufficient to show that a POSA could have had a reasonable expectation of success in attempting to combine the teachings of Zou I with McNeely or Pease. Although the Petition sets forth various rationales for why a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine the teachings of Zou I and McNeely or Pease, the rationales are general in nature and do not address any specific modification to either of the references. Pet. 28–33. The Petition includes a single reference to reasonable expectation of success, in a conclusory statement that “a POSA would have been motivated to combine the multiplexing PCR unit of Zou I with a conventional integrated machine such as in McNeely or Pease, with a high expectation of success.” Id. at 28–29. The First Gale Declaration is similarly conclusory as to how Zou I and McNeely or Pease could be combined and does not elaborate on reasonable expectation of success. See Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 116–127. Such conclusory assertions, lacking factual substantiation, are insufficient for evaluating reasonable expectation of success as part of an obviousness determination. Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 35

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted in part

    “Patent Owner also filed a Motion to Strike certain portions of Petitioner’s Reply. Paper 38. Petitioner filed an Opposition. Paper 39. We granted Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike in part, striking the arguments in Section II.B.ii from Petitioner’s Reply. Paper 42, 6–8, 13. We did not consider those arguments in the course of preparing this Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 2

  Patent outcomesUS 7,998,708 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,998,708
• Eli Lilly And Company v. Teva Pharmaceuticals International GmbHNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 31, 2020 · IPR2018-01711 · APJ James A Worth · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–18 of the ’907 patent not unpatentable over Olesen, Tan, and Queen under §103, finding Lilly had not met its burden.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “appreciable difference in the parties’ respective definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 8. Accordingly, we determined for purposes of our Institution Decision that a person of ordinary skill in the art” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “2. “effective amount” The term “effective amount” is recited in all of the independent” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Reply. In fact, Petitioner argues that “[t]he prior art expressly recognized the downside of treating migraine patients with CGRP inhibitors having a short half-life,” citing to a report that CGRP8-37 (a peptide fragment of CGRP) “‘proved ineffective in migraine treatment’ due to ‘its low potency and short half-life.’” Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1031, 323; Ex. 1014 ¶ 124) (emphasis by Petitioner). Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has not sufficiently established that a POSA would have been motivated to humanize an anti-CGRP antibody fragment.” slip op. at 93

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “the cross-examination of Dr. Ferrari as beyond the scope of Dr. Ferrari’s direct testimony. Mot. Excl. 9. Upon review of the Ferrari Declaration, Exhibit 2268, we agree that questions on cyclic AMP were beyond the scope of the Ferrari Declaration. Accordingly, we grant this aspect of the motion.” slip op. at 159

  Patent outcomesUS 9,884,907 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,884,907
• Eli Lilly And Company v. Teva Pharmaceuticals International GmbHNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 31, 2020 · IPR2018-01710 · APJ Richard J Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board found that Lilly did not prove claims 1, 3, 4, 8–17, 19, 20, and 24–31 of the ’045 patent, or claims 1–18 of the ’907 and ’908 patents, unpatentable over Olesen, Tan, and …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “appreciable difference in the parties’ respective definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 8. Accordingly, we determined for purposes of our Institution Decision that a person of ordinary skill in the art” slip op. at 13

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “conclusion based on underlying factual findings. Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Jazz Pharm., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC, 895 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). The underlying factual findings include whether the reference was publicly accessible. Id. (citing In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). In an inter partes review, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a particular document is a printed publication. Id. (citing Medtronic Inc. v. Barry, 891 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); see also In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 227 (CCPA 1981) (a party asserting a reference as a prior art printed publication should provide sufficient proof of accessibility).” slip op. at 152

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDenied

    “(Ex. 2239), and also the opportunity to submit a Sur-reply (Paper 43). Therefore, we determine that Patent Owner has failed to meet its burden to show that the arguments and evidence should be stricken. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.20; Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. L.P. v. Biomarin Pharm Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Anacor Pharms., Inc. v. Iancu, 889 F.3d 1372, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (reply may document the knowledge that skilled artisans would bring to bear in reading the prior art identified as producing obviousness). Accordingly, this aspect of the motion is denied.” slip op. at 163

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Reply. In fact, Petitioner argues that “[t]he prior art expressly recognized the downside of treating migraine patients with CGRP inhibitors having a short half-life,” citing to a report that CGRP8-37 (a peptide fragment of CGRP) “‘proved ineffective in migraine treatment’ due to ‘its low potency and short half-life.’” Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1031, 323; Ex. 1014 ¶ 124) (emphasis by Petitioner). Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has not sufficiently established that a POSA would have been motivated to humanize an anti-CGRP antibody fragment.” slip op. at 93

  Patent outcomesUS 8,586,045 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,586,045
• Eli Lilly And Company v. Teva Pharmaceuticals International GmbHNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 31, 2020 · IPR2018-01712 · APJ James A Worth · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–18 of the ’908 patent not unpatentable because Lilly failed to prove the Olesen, Tan, and Queen obviousness ground by a preponderance of the evidence.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Reply. In fact, Petitioner argues that “[t]he prior art expressly recognized the downside of treating migraine patients with CGRP inhibitors having a short half-life,” citing to a report that CGRP8-37 (a peptide fragment of CGRP) “‘proved ineffective in migraine treatment’ due to ‘its low potency and short half-life.’” Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1031, 323; Ex. 1014 ¶ 124) (emphasis by Petitioner). Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has not sufficiently established that a POSA would have been motivated to humanize an anti-CGRP antibody fragment.” slip op. at 93

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “form, not relevant, vague, mischaracterized the witnesses’ prior testimony, called for a legal conclusion, lacked clarity, or contained compound questions. Mot. Excl. 7–12. We consider Patent Owner’s arguments in this regard to address issues of weight rather than admissibility, and we deny these aspects of the motion. See Corning Inc. v. DSM IP Assets B.V., IPR2013-00053, Paper 66 at 19 (PTAB May 1, 2014) (sitting as a non-jury tribunal, the Board may assign appropriate weight to evidence presented) (citing Donnelly Garment Co. v. NLRB, 123 F.2d 215, 224 (8th Cir. 1941)).” slip op. at 158

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDenied

    “(Ex. 2239), and also the opportunity to submit a Sur-reply (Paper 43). Therefore, we determine that Patent Owner has failed to meet its burden to show that the arguments and evidence should be stricken. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.20; Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. L.P. v. Biomarin Pharm Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Anacor Pharms., Inc. v. Iancu, 889 F.3d 1372, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (reply may document the knowledge that skilled artisans would bring to bear in reading the prior art identified as producing obviousness). Accordingly, this aspect of the motion is denied.” slip op. at 163

  Patent outcomesUS 9,884,908 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,884,908
• Yamaha Golf Car Company v. Club Car, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 2, 2019 · IPR2017-02143 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Final written decision

  Petitioner did not prove claims 1–11 and 13–20 unpatentable on the asserted grounds; claim 12 was disclaimed.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “In the summon mode, pressing a button to summon the caddie of the ’388 patent triggers an autonomous mode but no specific driving commands are provided to the caddie by the golfer. See Ex. 2015 ¶ 195 (“As the robotic caddy cart is operating autonomously at that point, the user does not input these movement commands.”). We agree that the summon command could not be considered a driver command because “merely defining the destination does not generate any control actions.” Id. ¶ 160. Likewise, a summon command to follow a golfer would not be a driver command because the golfer has no direct control over the route taken, the speed of the caddie, or whether or not a caddie could drive into a restricted area –– the caddie’s system pilots itself to a point near the golfer by generating movement inputs on its own. The system detects that the golfer is in a limited access area and the golfer will not be able to summon the caddie into that area. This restriction is not a driver command being limited because the summon command simply activates internal logic to move the caddie near the golfer, not a driver command to move into a restricted area. Indeed, when operating in autonomous mode, the caddie can never enter such restricted areas. We thus agree with Patent Owner that the summon command cannot be overridden or limited in the ’388 patent because the caddie will always come as close as is allowable under the parameters of the caddie’s programming.” slip op. at 45

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Dec. 11. First, we note that the claim language itself focuses on limiting the ability of a “driver” to move the cart. For example, dependent claim 2 recites “an override of a driver input to the motor.” That the “driver input” needs to be overridden or otherwise restricted presumes that the golf cart is being driven by a person who has independent control of the cart and is susceptible to driving in an unruly manner, in other words, an onboard driver of the cart. This is especially true given the lack of any indication in the claims of remote or autonomous operation of the cart. Numerous other dependent claims include similar references to a driver of the cart, for example, “override of driver input” (claim 3), “driver interface unit” (claim 4), “limits the performance of driver commands” (claim 14), and “driver command” (claim 17).” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner overemphasizes the ’053 Application’s use of the terms “golf cart” and “electric vehicle.” Nowhere does the ’053 Application support the disclosure of a rideable cart. Rather, it describes a golf cart that, when read in the context of the reference as a whole, is a riderless cart, or more specifically, a “caddie cart.” This is evidenced by the fact that the ’053 Application incorporates by reference a caddie cart, as discussed above, in which the only mechanism for actually operating the cart is a “grip lever,” which Petitioner’s own expert acknowledges is not something found in a rideable cart. See Ex. 2016, 94:16–95:11 (conceding “there is no such thing as a rideable golf cart, in [his] experience or in 2003, that has a grip lever”); see also 54:5–12 (essentially same testimony). Further evidence that the ’053 Application contemplates only a riderless caddie cart is its description of the golf cart as “moving the golf bag to a location that is convenient for the play by the golfer.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 2. Nowhere does it describe the cart as moving a golfer or caddy. Even Petitioner’s expert agrees that, while the ’053 Application “does describe a caddy cart,” it “does not describe putting the person in the seat.” Ex. 2016, 92:18–93:1; 88:11–15. And to the extent Petitioner’s expert qualifies that testimony by saying that the ’053 Application doesn’t exclude the possibility of a riding cart and doesn’t preclude putting a person in the seat, that qualification is irrelevant to our analysis of anticipation, which depends on what a reference actually discloses, not what possibilities it could have disclosed. Petitioner’s assertion is that each of independent claims 1 and 6 is anticipated by the ’053 Application – Petitioner has not put forth an obviousness ground for these claims based on the ’053 Application.” slip op. at 24

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Alternatively, Petitioner argues that the ’053 Application’s disclosure of a golfer selecting a destination on an LCD display “inherently teaches” the ability of “overriding a driver command.” Pet. 29–30 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 37). We disagree. The ability to select a travel destination on an LCD display is not the same as the ability to “override” or “restrict” a previous command to travel to a certain destination. As argued by Patent Owner, “[t]he selection of a point on a map is just that—a selection to travel to a point on the map, not to take a particular route to that point.” PO Resp. 34 (citing Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 150–152). Nowhere does the ’053 Application say that the selected point on the display will be disregarded if it is within a prohibited area. Thus, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that the ’053 Application inherently teaches the ability to “override” a driver input. Reply 3, 23–24. In its Petition, however, Petitioner deliberately chose not to rely on the ’053 Application’s manned operating mode in arguing those particular limitations. See Pet. 28–29 (referencing repeatedly “unmanned mode operation” and showing ellipsis “. . .” where “manual traveling mode” would have been discussed in paragraph 34 of the ’053 Application). Petitioner cannot switch positions midstream and raise an entirely new argument in its reply that reasonably could have been made in the petition. See Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 775 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Blizzard, as petitioner, had an opportunity to present this argument in its petition, but chose not to.”). A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding patent owner response. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Indeed, in its patent owner response, Club Car carefully notes that the ’053 Application’s manned operating mode is “not relied upon by Petitioner.” PO Resp. 28. Because Petitioner’s assertion in its reply of the ’053 Application’s manned operating mode constitutes new argument outside the scope of a proper reply, we decline to consider it.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 7,480,569 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,480,569
• Ebay Inc. v. Masterobjects, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 25, 2018 · IPR2017-00740 · APJ Christa P Zado · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9, 12, 15–17, 21, 24–26, and 32–37 were not shown unpatentable because the petition did not establish the claimed usability test.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “skill in the art include, but are not limited to, the types of problems encountered in the art, the sophistication of the technology, and educational level of active workers in the field. In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “interpreted according to their “broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent” in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141–46 (2016). We interpret claim terms using “the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “1. Overview of Kravets (Ex. 1003) Petitioner asserts Kravets is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). Pet. 15. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assertion that Kravets is prior art. Kravets issued from a patent application filed January 31, 2000. Ex. 1003, [22]. Based on the earliest possible priority date of the ’024 patent (see supra Section I.C), for purposes of this Final Written Decision, we conclude that Kravets is prior art to the ’024 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “display to the user includes 1) PSS 40 identifying a first set of search terms, which preferably comprises 500 search terms, where the first n characters of each search term matches the n-character input string in the request (Ex. 1003, 6:17–36); and 2) PSS 40 selecting a second set of search terms, such as 6 terms, from the first set of search terms by selecting the 6 terms that have the highest value scores (Ex. 1003, 7:26–40). This disclosure does not describe a client object testing for usability by checking that a return message corresponds to the latest query. First, this disclosure relates to actions performed by the server, rather than the client. Id. at 6:17–36, 7:26–40 (describing PSS 40 performing this technique). But claim 1 requires the client object perform the test for usability. Ex. 1001, 32:2–3 (“the client object tests the usability of the results in the return message”) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 8,539,024 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,539,024
• Campbell Soup Company / Campbell Sales Company et al. v. Gamon Plus, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 2, 2018 · IPR2017-00087 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 were cancelled at Patent Owner’s request; claims 27, 28, and 32–35 were not shown unpatentable over the instituted §103 grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art, as of the earliest priority date of the claims, would have had either: “(1) a Bachelor’s Degree in Industrial Design and at least 1-2 years of experience in designing gravity feed display dispensers, or (2) 5-10 years of experience in designing gravity feed display dispensers.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 36). Patent Owner does not propose an explicit level of ordinary skill in the art in its Response. Consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record, see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978), we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “construed according to their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016). Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In our Institution Decision, we construed several claim terms recited in claims 1–17. Inst. Dec. 13–20. Patent Owner requests cancellation of claims 1–16 and we did not institute inter partes review of claim 17. Thus, none of the claim terms we construed previously are at issue in the trial. Additionally, Patent Owner’s Response and Sur-Reply and Petitioner’s Reply do not request that we construe any additional claim terms. Accordingly, we need not construe expressly any claim terms to resolve the controversy before us. See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “how or why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been led to combine Weichselbaum and Nesso in the manner claimed. On that point, the Petition rests on bare opinion testimony that is not tethered to any disclosure in the prior art or other objective proof. Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 168–170). We are mindful that a reason to combine prior art may exist “in the content of the public prior art, in the nature of the problem addressed by the invention, or even in the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art.” Princeton Biochemicals Inc. v. Beckman Coulter Inc., 411 F.3d 1332, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2005). But when we turn to the opinion testimony that undergirds Petitioner’s argument on the reasons to combine, we find no objective proof and inadequate reasoning. Id. Ultimately, Petitioner presents two very weak reasons based on unstated and unexplained factual assumptions in support of its view that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been prompted to modify Weichselbaum. Additionally, as explained above, Petitioner takes conflicting positions as to how Nesso’s second chute would be incorporated in Weichselbaum’s device and the record remains unclear as to the precise structure resulting from Petitioner’s combination. Accordingly, Petitioner fails to provide sufficient clarity regarding the specific modifications to Weichselbaum, fails to provide a sufficient reason with rational underpinning as to why and how one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Weichselbaum in light of Nesso, and appears, on this record, to engage in an impermissible exercise of hindsight reconstruction to make out a reason to combine the applied references in the manner claimed. Further, in light of the full trial record, including Patent Owner’s evidence of secondary considerations discussed below, we are persuaded that the bare opinions set forth in the Visser Declaration (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 168–170) are entitled to little weight. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Lack of factual support for” opinion testimony “going to factual determinations” may be of little probative value in validity determination.”).” slip op. at 36

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Commercial successObjective indicia with nexusDecided for patent owner

    “specific product and that product ‘is the invention disclosed and claimed in the patent.’” WBIP, 829 F.3d at 1329 (citation omitted). The presumption is rebuttable, but “a patent challenger cannot successfully rebut the presumption with argument alone—it must present evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). Patent Owner has shown that the asserted objective evidence, discussed further below, is tied to a specific product and that product “is the invention disclosed and claimed in the patent.” Id. (quoting J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). “This showing––that the specific products are embodiments of the claimed invention and that the proffered objective evidence relates to these products—is sufficient to establish the presumption of nexus for the objective considerations at issue in this case.” Id. at 1330. It is, therefore, Petitioner’s burden to rebut that presumption. Id. at 1329 (“a patent challenger cannot successfully rebut the presumption with argument alone— it must present evidence”); see Tr. 46:20–47:8 (Petitioner agreeing that nexus is presumed and that Petitioner has the burden to overcome the presumption.). Petitioner does not rebut the presumption of nexus. First, Petitioner’s entire argument is phrased as challenging whether Patent Owner satisfied its burden of establishing nexus, as opposed to whether Petitioner rebuts the presumption of nexus. Pet. Reply 20–21 (“It is Patent Owner’s burden to establish a nexus.”) (citing CaptionCall LLC v. Ultratec Inc., IPR2013- 00540, Paper 78 at 50 (PTAB Mar. 3, 2015)). Second, Petitioner points to other factors, including higher prices and increased advertising, referred to in Campbell’s annual reports that contributed to increased soup sales. Pet. Reply 21–22. There is no dispute that other factors also contributed to the increase in soup sales. But, there is also no dispute that Campbell’s own statements, through its Annual Reports and Mr. Finnel’s interview, tie increased soup sales expressly to Gamon’s display racks. Additionally, Campbell’s internal presentation describes Gamon’s IQ Maximizer as “Breakthrough Gravity Feed Shelving” and attributes the following to the display racks based on the results of its study: • +13.6% volume lift for Corporate Brand • +10% volume lift for Condensed Segment • +9.3% volume lift for Campbell’s Condensed • +5.5% volume lift for Wet Soup Category • Encourages purchase of additional varieties • Billboard effect improves branding: 210% larger • Positive labor impact due to elimination of shelf conditioning Ex. 2032, 4. Although other factors had some degree of impact on commercial success,29 we determine that Patent Owner has established that an appreciable amount of Campbell’s increased commercial success of soup during the relevant time period is attributable to the display rack covered by claim 27 of the ’111 patent. Accordingly, Gamon’s sales to Campbell of about $31 million from 2002–2009 as well as a portion of the increased sales of Campbell’s soup using Gamon’s display racks provide a strong showing of commercial success of the commercial embodiment of claim 27 of the ’111 patent.” slip op. at 61

  Patent outcomesUS 8,827,111 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,827,111
• Xactware Solutions, Inc. v. Pictometry International Corp.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 28, 2017 · IPR2016-00593 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held that claims 12–15, 21–23, 25–27, 33–38, 44, and 45 were not shown unpatentable because Pictometry was not established as a publicly accessible printed publication.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

    “Version 2.7 (“EFS 2.7 User Guide,” “Pictometry,” or “User Guide”) and, as the name suggests, is a user guide for the Pictometry software product. See Ex. 1004, xiii. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner does not demonstrate that Pictometry is prior art. PO Resp. 5–10. In our Final Written Decision in IPR2016-00594, we considered substantively the same arguments and evidence Patent Owner and Petitioner raise in this case. See IPR2016-00594 FWD 17–29; compare IPR2016-00594 Paper 31, 13–20 with PO Resp. 6– 13; and compare IPR2016-00594 Paper 33, 3–9 with Reply 4–11. In IPR2016-00594, we found Pictometry’s limited dissemination to some governmental entities subject to licensing restrictions was not sufficient to show public dissemination or public accessibility. IPR2016-00594 FWD 17–29. We adopt that same finding here. For the reasons explained in IPR2016-00594, we find that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Pictometry was publicly accessible so as to render it a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b) and 311(b).” slip op. at 6

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “substantively the same as the arguments made in IPR2016-00594. In IPR2016-00594, we denied Patent Owner’s motion to exclude Exhibit 1004 (Pictometry), Exhibit 1011 (a Merriam-Webster Dictionary Definition “database” copied from a web page), Exhibit 2010 (Cohasset Town Report 2008), 2011 (LARIAC1 Pictometry Training), Exhibit 2012 (LAR-IAC2 Product Guide), Exhibit 2020 (“GIS: Pictometry: Oblique Imagery training), Exhibit 2021 (“Pictometry License Guidelines”), and Exhibit 2022 (“Pictometry – April 19, 2007”). IPR2016-00594 FWD 5–17. We granted Patent Owner’s motion to exclude Exhibit 2013 (article titled “Los Angeles County Extends its License Agreement with Pictometry for New Oblique Aerial Photos”), Exhibit 2014 (“Pictometry Administrative Training”), Exhibit 2015 (“Information about TXWILM Administrative Training”), Exhibit 2016 (“Pictometry Administrative Training”), Exhibit 2019 (“GIS Working Group Meeting Minutes”), Exhibit 2023 (“Welcome to Your End User Training”), Exhibit 2024 (“Electronic Field Study Getting Started Guide”), Exhibit 2025 (“Pictometry Announces Technical Advancements for GIS Professionals1”), and Exhibit 2026 (“Pictometry Announces Technical Advancements for GIS Professionals2”). Id. We adopt the same findings and conclusions here. For the reasons explained in IPR2016-00594, we deny the motion to exclude Exhibits 1004, 1011, 2010, 2011, 2020, 2021, and 2022, but grant the motion to exclude Exhibits 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2019, 2023, 2024, 2025, and 2026. See id.” slip op. at 5

  Patent outcomesUS 8,823,732 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 8,823,732
• Blackberry Corp. / Blackberry Ltd. v. Zipit Wireless, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 29, 2016 · IPR2014-01506 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 10–17, and 20 were not shown unpatentable because the cited references did not teach or suggest the claimed graphical emoticons.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We note first that the parties do not dispute that Dr. Konchitsky is qualified to provide his expert opinion on the subject matter of the ’837 patent even without considering his Ph.D. from Bournemouth University. Sur-Reply 13–15; Tr. 4:14– 22, 21:1–15. Petitioner concedes that Dr. Konchitsky “worked at Nokia. He worked at a company that was purchased by Intel. To be able to testify about emoticons and parental controls on devices he meets the low threshold under the federal rules for providing expert testimony.” Tr. 4:21–24. Accordingly, the circumstances surrounding Dr. Konchitsky’s Ph.D. credentials go to the weight of his testimony rather than admissibility. Further, we do not find that Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently that Dr. Konchitsky’s testimony should be afforded diminished weight because Dr. Konchitsky falsified his Ph.D. from Bournemouth University Extension through Ramat Gan College in Israel. Petitioner concedes that [t]he sur-reply shows that it’s possible that Konchitsky did receive a degree from either Ramat Gan or the extension at Ramat Gan. That was not an authorized diploma, had nothing to do with the Bournemouth University. And whether or not he knew that or was unwittingly duped into believing that he was getting a genuine Bournemouth University diploma, in the time allotted in IPR and our resources, there’s just not enough time and money available to prove that circumstantial case whether he knew that his diploma was not genuine. Tr. 5:14–22. Additionally, Petitioner has withdrawn all its allegations that Dr. Konchitsky himself engaged in any act of forgery or perjury with respect to his Ph.D. Ex. 2106; Tr. 4:11–23, 6:13–8:2. This is not to say that there is sufficient evidence to establish whether Dr. Konchitsky’s Ph.D. is genuine. However, as Petitioner argues, the issue is one of Dr. Konchitsky’s veracity and credibility. Tr. 7:7–17. Thus, while it may be possible Dr. Konchitsky’s Ph.D. is not genuine, Petitioner has not shown that Dr. Konchitsky engaged in any wrongdoing in obtaining his Ph.D. or representing that he obtained a Ph.D. from Bournemouth University Extension in Israel. Thus, we do not diminish the weight of Dr. Konchitsky’s on this basis.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionOther

    “Based on the full record and consideration of the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “graphical symbols,” as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, in the context of the entire disclosure is “graphical emoticon.” See Ex. 1001, 3:37– 39, 4:36–55, 6:49–67, 8:17–20, 16:1–10, 17:47–18:13, Figs. 12a and 12b. We agree with Patent Owner that the Specification of the ’837 patent shows “symbols” being generated by textual characters. PO Resp. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1001 3:34–44, 4:40–55). Specifically, the ’837 patent refers to characters generating graphical symbols where symbols are pictorial representations, e.g. , indicates to a person of ordinary skill in the art that symbols (and graphical symbols) are distinct from the textual characters used to generate them. Ex. 1001 3:34–44, 4:40–55. Thus, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument or the testimony of their Declarant that the ’837 patent Specification does not distinguish between characters and symbols. Reply 12–13. We find that the Specification of the ’837 patent showing combination of textual characters that are used to generate “graphical symbols” across different messaging services further supports the distinctions between textual characters and graphical symbols. See Ex. 1001, 6:64–67; 8:2–7, Tables 1– 4.” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the e740 User’s Manual explicitly or inherently discloses the limitations of independent claims 1 and 11. See PO Resp. 36–37. The Petition applies a construction for “graphical symbol” that includes text emoticons and individual characters themselves as graphical symbols. See Pet. 23 n.2, 31 n.4 (citing individual characters such as “)” and “-“ as graphical symbols alone). The Petition states that the “combination of characters, each element of the smiley face—‘:’, ‘-‘, ‘)’—is also a graphical symbol” like a “character sequence, such as ‘:-)’ or ‘;-)’, that represents a graphical symbol.” Pet. 23 n.2. Based on the claim construction determined above, “graphical symbols” are “graphical emoticons” that are distinct from “textual emoticons” presented by Petitioner. Petitioner’s evidence and argument do not establish that the cited reference teaches a “device [] configured to generate textual characters and graphical symbols” as recited in independent claim 1 and related limitations in claim 11. Pet. 12–13, 28. Upon review of the complete record, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that the e740 User’s Manual and Morrison disclose graphical emoticons. Reply 22; Tr. 38:13–39:10. Petitioner’s efforts to bootstrap MSN Messenger as discussed in the e740 User’s Manual (or Morrison) to the disclosure of graphical emoticons is not supported by the Petitioner’s evidence and argument as presented in the Petition. Pet. 12–13, 28, 42. In sum, Petitioner has not provided persuasive or sufficient evidence that the e740 User’s Manual discloses “graphical symbols” as recited in independent claims 1 and 11. Pet. 11–22 (claim 1), 28–29 (claim 11).” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner’s argument and evidence rely on the same overly broad construction of “graphical symbols” used in the anticipation grounds based on the e740 User’s Manual. Pet. 38–39, 42–43, 45, 49 (citing e740 User’s Manual for teaching recited claim limitations). As discussed above, Petitioner’s argument that the combination of Morrison and the e740 User’s Manual teach “graphical symbols” is not supported by the Petition. Id. Although we carefully weighed Patent Owner’s Declarant testimony, we agree with Patent Owner’s argument that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Morrison and the e740 User’s Manual teach or suggest “graphical symbols” or “graphical emoticons” as opposed to textual characters cited by Petitioner. PO Resp. 44–48; Pet. 38–39, 42–43, 45, 49. We have considered the arguments and evidence presented by the Petitioner and Patent Owner. We conclude that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that each element of claims 1–5, 10–17, and 20 are obvious in view of e740 User’s Manual and Morrison or that claims 5 and 16 are obvious in view of the e740 User’s Manual and the Nokia IM+ Manual.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 7,894,837 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,894,837
• Toshiba Corporation v. Optical Devices, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 9, 2016 · IPR2014-01446 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Final written decision

  Toshiba did not prove claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, and 16 unpatentable over Baird and Yoshimoto, or that combination with the ST Datasheet, which was not established as prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “As we seek to give the term “DSP” its ordinary and customary meaning, as would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, we take into account the Microsoft and IBM dictionary definitions submitted by Optical Devices. We note that each of those dictionaries define a DSP as designed for “high speed” manipulation of data/digital signals. Ex. 2002; Ex. 2003. Optical Devices, however, has not directed our attention to evidence establishing what “high speed” encompasses. We note that one of the submitted dictionary definitions characterizes such digital signal manipulation as “real-time.” Ex. 2003. However, the Specification’s disclosure describes that some embodiments can execute real time digital servo algorithms on a DSP. We determine that Optical Devices has not established persuasively that the broadest reasonable interpretation of a DSP requires “high speed” processing achieving this “real time” feature. Indeed, Patent Owner’s “basic” construction for a DSP does not include a “real time” requirement for “real time” processing. See PO Resp. 10 (providing a minimal definition for a DSP). We are persuaded that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “digital signal processor,” consistent with the Specification, is “an integrated circuit structured and arranged for manipulation of digital signals in accordance with programmed commands, and in a manner that operates faster than a microprocessor.” We do not adopt Optical Devices’ proposal to further characterize further an integrated circuit as “specialized.” We find that proposed modification is superfluous in that our construction describes that the integrated circuit is structured and arranged to achieve a specific function, i.e., manipulation of digital signals and operating faster than a microprocessor.” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Optical Devices asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have “a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical or Electrical Engineering and at least two years of experience in control systems technology.” PO Resp. 6 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 9–11) (emphasis added). Based on our consideration of the record, we find that the evidence as a whole supports Toshiba’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Accordingly, we adopt Toshiba’s statement of the ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “that Toshiba has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Baird inherently discloses a DSP configured to determine a FES and a TES from digital signals received by the SCP. In particular, Toshiba’s primary contention with respect to inherency is that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Baird must determine a FES and TES in order for the SCP to operate focus and tracking control loops. Pet. Reply 14 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 81). However, neither Toshiba nor Toshiba’s declarant, Dr. Zech, provides any explanation why that is true. When asked for an explanation during his deposition, Dr. Zech responded in a manner that relied upon a probability that Baird’s SCP determines FES and TES. For example, the following is an excerpt from Dr. Zech’s deposition: Q Can you explain to me why it is your opinion that it is inherent that a servo control processor in Baird determines a focus error signal and a tracking error signal? A Well, because the way he designed it, it does. And I can’t imagine why somebody, an engineer at Cirrus Logic, would swim against the current and come up with something entirely new. The chip surely would not sell. I know that from pretty broad experience in sales and marketing. Once you tell me optical disk drive -- I’ve explained to you the statistics of it -- 99 percent plus are probably using continuous composite servoing. When you use continuous composite servoing, you need to have a tracking error and a focus error signal. So it’s not much of a leap for me to conclude that that’s what’s going on here. Ex. 2001, 151, 3–20 (emphases added). Dr. Zech’s deposition testimony describes what functions and systems optical disk drives “are probably using” and that “it’s not much of a leap” for him to conclude what is occuring in Baird with respect to whether error signals are determined Id.; See MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (inherency is not to be established by probabilities or possibilities). Moreover, both in his declaration and at the deposition, Dr. Zech bases his opinion regarding that issue on assumptions unsupported by evidence. See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide 77 Fed. Reg. 48, 756, 48,763 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“Affidavits expressing an opinion of an expert must disclose the underlying facts or data upon which the opinion is based. . . . Opinions expressed without disclosing the underlying facts or data may be given little to no weight.”) (citations omitted). Thus, we do not afford Dr. Zech’s unsupported opinions persuasive weight.” slip op. at 21

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Having considered the arguments and evidence, we are not persuaded that Toshiba has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Baird inherently discloses a DSP configured to determine a FES and a TES from digital signals received by the SCP. In particular, Toshiba’s primary contention with respect to inherency is that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Baird must determine a FES and TES in order for the SCP to operate focus and tracking control loops. Pet. Reply 14 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 81). However, neither Toshiba nor Toshiba’s declarant, Dr. Zech, provides any explanation why that is true. When asked for an explanation during his deposition, Dr. Zech responded in a manner that relied upon a probability that Baird’s SCP determines FES and TES. For example, the following is an excerpt from Dr. Zech’s deposition: Q Can you explain to me why it is your opinion that it is inherent that a servo control processor in Baird determines a focus error signal and a tracking error signal? A Well, because the way he designed it, it does. And I can’t imagine why somebody, an engineer at Cirrus Logic, would swim against the current and come up with something entirely new. The chip surely would not sell. I know that from pretty broad experience in sales and marketing. Once you tell me optical disk drive -- I’ve explained to you the statistics of it -- 99 percent plus are probably using continuous composite servoing. When you use continuous composite servoing, you need to have a tracking error and a focus error signal. So it’s not much of a leap for me to conclude that that’s what’s going on here. Ex. 2001, 151, 3–20 (emphases added). Dr. Zech’s deposition testimony describes what functions and systems optical disk drives “are probably using” and that “it’s not much of a leap” for him to conclude what is occuring in Baird with respect to whether error signals are determined Id.; See MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (inherency is not to be established by probabilities or possibilities). Moreover, both in his declaration and at the deposition, Dr. Zech bases his opinion regarding that issue on assumptions unsupported by evidence. See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide 77 Fed. Reg. 48, 756, 48,763 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“Affidavits expressing an opinion of an expert must disclose the underlying facts or data upon which the opinion is based. . . . Opinions expressed without disclosing the underlying facts or data may be given little to no weight.”) (citations omitted). Thus, we do not afford Dr. Zech’s unsupported opinions persuasive weight.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 7,196,979 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,196,979

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.