- PTAB · Jul 22, 2025 · IPR2025-00254 · APJ Lisa A Murray · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 are unpatentable under § 103(a).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We may institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). If we institute an inter partes review, the trial must encompass all claims and grounds identified in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2025) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of all challenged claims. We, therefore, institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 on the grounds asserted in the Petition. B.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner does not comment on Petitioner’s formulation or offer any competing formulation in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. Mr. Haeberli, however, testifies as follows in his Declaration: 29. In my opinion, the POSITA at the time of the alleged invention of the Asserted Patents would have had a (1) a Bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as computer science, electric engineering, computer engineering, or a related field and (2) have 2–4 years of experience in working with computing devices and have an understanding of indexed search systems utilized by such computing devices. 30. I am aware that Petitioner has provided its own definition . . . . 31. I believe Petitioner’s definition is not meaningfully different from my definition of a POSITA. My opinions would not change regardless of which definition of POSITA is applied. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 29–31. We find Mr. Haeberli’s formulation to be consistent with the evidence of record at this stage of the proceeding, including the asserted prior art and the ’490 patent, and, accordingly, we adopt and apply that definition for purposes of this Decision. B.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“art. Prelim. Resp. 30–34. Limitation [1.10] reads, “wherein the first and second partial search strings are separated by a string separator character in the first search field.” Ex. 1001, 30:8–10. Petitioner asserts that both of the Lotus Notes references teach receiving a first search string and a second search string in a single search field, separated by “a string separator character (e.g., a comma and/or a Boolean AND operator).” Pet. 23–24 (footnote omitted). We are not fully persuaded by Petitioner’s argument. In particular, the evidence does not support Petitioner’s argument that a Boolean operator such as “AND” is a string separator character. Patent Owner has pointed to intrinsic and extrinsic evidence demonstrating that a string separator character consists of just one character.16 Consequently, based on the current record, for the purposes of this Decision we preliminarily construe the term “string separator character” to mean “a single-character string separator.” The parties are invited to address the appropriateness of this construction in future briefing. If Boolean modifiers are excluded from the definition of a “string separator character,” then the Londergan Search Bar and Search Builder features, which accept only Boolean operators, do not teach or suggest 16 As Patent Owner argues, the intrinsic evidence does not support this interpretation of the claim language. Prelim. Resp. 31–32. “First, the ’490 patent distinguishes between string separator characters (such as space, comma, etc.) and ‘modifiers’ (such as AND, OR, NOT, etc.).” Id. at 32; compare Ex. 1001, 31:14–17 (claim 12, “string separator character”), with id. at 32:19–23 (claim 20, Boolean “modifiers”). Moreover, Patent Owner persuasively argues that “a POSITA would not understand Boolean operators such as ‘AND’ to function as string separator characters” and “would have known that the operator AND is a search syntax instruction rather than a string separator.” Prelim. Resp. 32 (citing Ex. 1059, 162; Ex. 2001 ¶ 110). Even Petitioner acknowledges in a footnote that it may not be appropriate to include the Boolean AND operator in the definition of “string separator character.” Petitioner argues: To the extent Patent Owner argues the Boolean AND operator is not a string separator character (which Petitioner does not acquiesce is appropriate), it would have been obvious to a POSITA when implementing Raskin’s teachings to perform the search incrementally to use a single-character string separator character, such as a plus sign, as was known in the art (e.g., EX1057, 60, 109, 129, 151), or a comma, as described by the Lotus Notes references (EX1059, 159-165), at least because a POSITA knew that a goal of the incremental search is to minimize the number of characters the user has to enter before obtaining the desired search results. Pet. 24 n.7. limitation [1.10].17 See Ex. 1061, 140–42. The Wilcox Search Bar similarly is limited to strings separated by a Boolean operator. See Ex. 1059, 160–62. The Wilcox Query Builder, however, does teach multiple search strings separated by a string separator character, specifically a comma. Id. at 163 (“If you want to search for documents that contain all of several words, type them in this box, separated by commas.”). Thus, while we do not accept all of Petitioner’s reasoning, there is evidence to support Petitioner’s overall argument that the proposed combination discloses multiple search strings separated by a string separator character, as we have preliminarily construed the term.” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“extreme technical difficulties with even using incremental searches.” Prelim. Resp. 21, 25 (citing Ex. 1021, 126). Patent Owner argues that “[a] POSITA is not motivated to undertake a modification of the prior art with something that the art teaches would be difficult or impossible to do.” Id. at 21 (citing Natera, Inc. v. NeoGenomics Labs., Inc., 106 F.4th 1369, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2024)). We do not interpret Raskin in this manner. Patent Owner points to a passage in Raskin stating, “almost all interface-building tools make it easy to implement delimited searches and difficult or impossible to implement incremental searches.” Ex. 1021, 126. There is a difference, however, between “difficult to implement” and “difficult to use.” For the end-user, Raskin concludes that “[f]rom the point of view of interface engineering, the advantages of incremental searching are so numerous and the advantages of delimited searches so few that I can see almost no occasions when a delimited search would be preferred.” Id. at 126 & n.7 (“A search is either incremental or excremental.”). It is reasonable to conclude that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to choose a search method that offered numerous advantages to end-users. Finally, Patent Owner argues that “Raskin’s entire philosophy to user interfaces was incompatible with Lotus Notes.” Prelim. Resp. 22–25. According to Patent Owner, “Lotus Notes is all about centralized collaboration around documents, files, and file structures[,]” while Raskin “goes in a completely different direction, espousing the elimination of filenames and ‘hierarchical file structures’ including directories and folders.” Id. at 23 (citing Ex. 1021, 119). Patent Owner claims that modifying the Lotus Notes references with Raskin would “effectively render[] Lotus Notes’ functionality of hierarchical viewing of and responding to documents unusable.” Id. Petitioner, however, does not propose to incorporate Raskin’s views on hierarchical file structures into the combination of Wilcox and Londergan. It is not necessary for the entirety of Raskin’s teachings to be physically compatible with the Lotus Notes systems described in Wilcox and Londergan. Orthopedic Equip., 702 F.2d at 1013 (“Claims may be obvious in view of a combination of references, even if the features of one reference cannot be substituted physically into the structure of the other reference.”); In re Sneed, 710 F.2d at 1550. Raskin is cited for one purpose: its teachings regarding incremental search. On the current record, we find Petitioner has demonstrated that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to modify the combination of Lotus Notes references according to those teachings in Raskin. slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,552,490 - PTAB · Jul 22, 2025 · IPR2025-00253 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–10 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 10 are obvious over Wilcox, Londergan, Raskin, and Wu.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We may institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). If we institute an inter partes review, the trial must encompass all claims and grounds identified in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2025) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner does not comment on Petitioner’s formulation or offer any competing formulation in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. Mr. Haeberli, however, testifies as follows in his Declaration: 29. In my opinion, the POSITA at the time of the alleged invention of the Asserted Patents would have had a (1) a Bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as computer science, electric engineering, computer engineering, or a related field and (2) have 2–4 years of experience in working with computing devices and have an understanding of indexed search systems utilized by such computing devices. 30. I am aware that Petitioner has provided its own definition . . . . 31. I believe Petitioner’s definition is not meaningfully different from my definition of a POSITA. My opinions would not change regardless of which definition of POSITA is applied. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 29–31. We find Mr. Haeberli’s formulation to be consistent with the evidence of record at this stage of the proceeding, including the asserted prior art and the ’035 patent, and, accordingly, we adopt and apply that definition for purposes of this Decision. B.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“in the prior art. Prelim. Resp. 30–34. Limitations [1.4] and [10.4] both recite: “wherein the first and second strings are separated by a string separator character in the first search field.” Ex. 1001, 29:44–46, 30:41–43. Petitioner asserts that both of the Lotus Notes references teach receiving a first search string and a second search string in a single search field, separated by “a string separator character (e.g., a comma and/or a Boolean AND operator).” Pet. 26–27 (footnote omitted). We are not fully persuaded by Petitioner’s argument. In particular, the evidence does not support Petitioner’s argument that a Boolean operator such as “AND” is a string separator character. Patent Owner has pointed to intrinsic and extrinsic evidence demonstrating that a string separator character consists of just one character.17 Consequently, based on the current record, for the purposes of 17 As Patent Owner argues, the intrinsic evidence does not support this interpretation of the claim language. Prelim. Resp. 31–32. “First, the ’035 patent distinguishes between string separator characters (such as space, comma, etc.) and ‘modifiers’ (such as AND, OR, NOT, etc.).” Id. at 31 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:45–59, 22:34–46). Moreover, Patent Owner persuasively argues that “a POSITA would not have understood Boolean operators like AND to be a string separator as used in the claims” and “would have known that the operator AND is a search syntax instruction rather than a string separator.” Prelim. Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 1059, 162; Ex. 2001 ¶ 109). Even Petitioner acknowledges in a footnote that it may not be appropriate to include the Boolean AND operator in the definition of “string separator character.” Petitioner argues: To the extent Patent Owner argues the Boolean AND operator is not a string separator character (which Petitioner does not acquiesce is appropriate), it would have been obvious to a POSITA when implementing Raskin’s teachings to perform the this Decision we preliminarily construe the term “string separator character” to mean “a single-character string separator.” The parties are invited to address the appropriateness of this construction in future briefing.” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“based on the fact that all three references “generally relate to searching.” See Prelim. Resp. 20. The fact that Raskin does not explicitly discuss searching across multiple files does not mean that there would be no motivation to combine Raskin with the Lotus Notes references. Although a conclusion of obviousness must be supported by findings and analysis establishing a reason to combine or modify the known elements in the manner proposed, the analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, [but] can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. We conclude on the current record that Petitioner’s rationale for combining Raskin with the Lotus Notes references is not over-broad.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,370,035 - PTAB · Jul 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00175 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–17 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2023). For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the patentability of at least one claim of the ’562 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–17 of the ’562 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“POSITA”) would have had “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design,” and “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 80–” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Neither party proposes any explicit construction of any term. See Pet. 7 (“For the purposes of this IPR, the plain meaning of each term can be applied.”). We do not expressly construe any term for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner adequately establishes that Usui discloses all of the limitations of claim 1. Usui discloses that aluminum or aluminum alloy layer 15 is in electrical contact with titanium underlayer 13, and titanium nitride layer 14 is located “intermediate the [titanium underlayer] 13 and the aluminum or aluminum alloy layer 15” to prevent “reaction between the aluminum layer 15 and underlayer 13.” Ex. 1004, 3:27–29, 3:38–41, 3:58–63. Usui further discloses that “a capping layer is provided above layer 15,” and that “[p]referred capping layers are titanium nitride and combinations of as layer 18 of a group IVA metal, preferably titanium with a titanium nitride layer 19.” Id. at 3:67–4:6. Usui teaches that titanium nitride layer 19 is about 150 to 800 Å thick, and that the thickness of titanium underlayer 13 is between about 90 to 110 Å. Id. at 3:31–33, 4:6–8. Usui also teaches that the interconnect metallurgy structures described therein “exhibit[] enhanced electromigration characteristics” and “are especially useful for forming electrical connections or wiring such as between active and/or passive devices of an integrated circuit structure.” Id. at 1:8–14. Usui’s description of a plurality of metal layers (layers 13–18) and a capping layer formed over the plurality of metal layers (layer 19), along with its description of the structure’s usefulness for forming electrical connections in an integrated circuit structure, is sufficient, on this record, to establish that Usui discloses “an electrode stack including a plurality of metal layers and a capping layer formed over said plurality of metal layers” as recited in claim 1. Usui’s teaching that the capping layer is a refractory metal nitride (titanium nitride) that has a thickness (150–800 Å) greater than the bottommost layer of the plurality of metal layers (layer 13, 90–110 Å), sufficiently establishes, on this record, that Usui discloses the “said capping layer consisting only of a refractory metal nitride, said refractory metal nitride forming a top of said electrical contact and having a thickness greater than that of a bottommost layer of said plurality of metal layers” limitation of claim 1.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,686,562 - PTAB · Jul 2, 2025 · PGR2025-00013 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–16 and 18, finding a sufficient preliminary showing of unpatentability for claims 1–4, 7, 9–11, 13, and 18 under the Mabuchi-based grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review under 35 U.S.C. §§ 6, 324. Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the Petition, Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail in establishing unpatentability of at least one of claims 1–16 and 18, which are the challenged claims of the ’082 patent that remain after Patent Owner’s disclaimer.” slip op. at 2
- Other 314aOther
“II. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL In view of the Acting Director’s memo bifurcating discretionary considerations and merits considerations,8 we note that Patent Owner had the opportunity to file a brief requesting discretionary denial of institution but did not file such a brief. Paper 7, 1. Accordingly, any discretionary issues were mooted, and the case was referred to this Board panel to consider the merits and other non-discretionary considerations. Id. at 1–2.” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“[a] person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time (“POSITA”) would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, or a related field, and two-to-three years of experience in the research, design, development, or testing of rotating or reciprocating mechanisms, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 37). Patent Owner contends that [a] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) as of the effective filing date of the Challenged Claims would have a working knowledge of product development and would likely have a degree in engineering and/or industrial design and/or at 5 Harris et al., US 6,432,072 B1, issued Aug. 13, 2002. Ex. 1006. 6 Pivaroff, US 6,682,496 B1, issued Jan. 27, 2004. Ex. 1007. 7 Clark, US 3,007,504, issued Nov. 7, 1961. Ex. 1014. 8 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ InterimProcesses-PTABWorkloadMgmt-20250326.pdf. least three to five years of experience in conceiving, designing, engineering, and/or modifying such products and devices. Prelim. Resp. 16. While we appreciate that the parties differ slightly on the details of experience that an ordinary artisan would possess, we do not find a difference that affects our Decision. For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. The parties may provide briefing at trial, if appropriate, to explain why adoption of one definition over the other changes the remaining analysis.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION In a post-grant review, we interpret a claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b). Under this standard, we construe the claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. Neither party identifies any term that requires construction. Pet. 13‒ 15; Prelim. Resp. 16‒17. Accordingly, we need not construe any term at the present time.” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,938,082 - PTAB · Jun 18, 2025 · IPR2025-00289 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–15 under all four asserted §103 grounds because the petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. For reasons explained below, we conclude that Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail with respect to at least one of the ’005 patent’s challenged claims. In a separate decision, the Acting Director denied Patent Owner’s request for discretionary denial. Paper 9. We institute inter partes review on all challenged claims. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“POSA”) in August 2018 “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or a related engineering discipline and 2–4 years of catheter design experience.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 35). Patent Owner provides no alternative definition of the POSA’s qualifications and, instead, applies Petitioner’s definition in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 26. We apply Petitioner’s proposed POSA level for this Decision, which level appears to be reasonable and consistent with the cited prior art.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“disclosure about filament features) includes the same disclosures concerning “loop” and “bight” embodiments as in the patent challenged in the 1157 IPR. Ex. 1017 ¶¶ 64–69, Figs. 6–9. And claim 1 of the ’005 patent encompasses, but is not limited to, filaments that form a loop. Thus, similar to our preliminary decision in the 1157 IPR, we decline at this time to construe the filament of claim 1 of the ’005 patent as limited to a “flexible” filament.13” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner contends a POSA would have been motivated to use Schaffer’s hemostasis valve in Garrison’s aspiration system for several reasons. Pet. 35–37. For example, Petitioner contends that Garrison discloses that adjustable-opening valves may be used, that Schaffer suggests its valve may be used with interventional catheters of the type described in Garrison, and that a skilled artisan would have recognized that Schaffer’s valve, with its features biasing the valve to a closed position, could simplify operation of Garrison’s system by avoiding a need to manually close/seal the valve during procedures. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 95–99). We find that Petitioner’s contentions are supported by the cited teachings in the references and the testimony of Mr. Thornton. Petitioner’s evidence is sufficient at this stage and we determine that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail in showing that at least claim 1 would have been obvious over Garrison and Schaffer. Below we explain why Patent Owner’s counterargument does not undermine Petitioner’s showing on this record.” slip op. at 29
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,554,005 - PTAB · Jun 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00232 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 17–19, 21–23, 33, 34, 59, 60, and 66 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 17 is obvious over Strub, Woo, Nagai, and Gleissner.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“final written decision in this proceeding would be in June 2026. There is no trial date set in the district court case. See Ex. 1031, 3. Therefore, we find that factor 2 weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“preliminary responses, decisions on institution,3 and various exhibits filed in the Lectrosonics IPRs. See Prelim. Resp. 21; Ex. 2027, 10–16. The examiner subsequently signed the IDS with the footnote “ALL REFERENCES CONSIDERED EXCEPT WHERE LINED THROUGH.” Ex. 2028, 6–12. Further, the petitioner in IPR2018-01130, for example, asserted that the challenged claims were unpatentable over various combinations of Strub, Woo, Nagai, and Gleissner, and the petition, preliminary response, and decision on institution from that proceeding were provided to the examiner. See Ex. 1018, 5–6 (listing the asserted grounds); Ex. 1021, 7–8 (same); Ex. 2027, 14–15. Accordingly, the same art previously was presented to the Office.” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review unless the information in the petition and preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 17–19, 21–23, 33, 34, 59, 60, and 66 of the ’207 patent on all grounds of unpatentability asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for patent owner
“the Board applied the BRI standard to the claims challenged in the Lectrosonics IPRs, so no claim interpretation was ever rendered under the Phillips standard and “issues regarding obviousness, which rely on such claim constructions, have also not been litigated.” Prelim. Resp. 22–24 (citing SkyHawke Techs., LLC v. Deca Int’l Corp., 828 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Patent Owner argues that “[w]here a first IPR is decided under the BRI standard, and a second IPR concerning the same patent is to be decided under the Phillips standard, ‘collateral estoppel . . . is not appropriate.’” Id. at 23 (citing Ebates Performance Mktg., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., IPR2022-00646, Paper 56 at 10 (PTAB Oct. 11, 2023)). We agree with Patent Owner based on the current record. Although the Lectrosonics IPRs involved patents from the same family as the ’207 patent, which recite many similar claim limitations, the Lectrosonics IPRs were all decided using the BRI standard, not the Phillips standard. Thus, no claim interpretation has been made using the standard that will be applied in this case, and the asserted prior art has not been applied to claims interpreted according to the standard in this case. Accordingly, on this record, we are not persuaded that collateral estoppel applies to any of the disputed issues in this proceeding. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Priceline.com LLC, 122 F.4th 911, 918–919 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“‘Because the Board applies the broadest reasonable construction of the claims while the district courts apply a different standard of claim construction as explored in Phillips,’ a party is not collaterally estopped in district court proceedings by the Board’s constructions during IPR.”); SkyHawke, 828 F.3d at 1376. Regardless, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its asserted ground as to claim 17 based on the preliminary claim interpretations applied herein. See supra Section II.E.” slip op. at 36
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,276,207 - PTAB · Jun 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00231 · APJ Matthew J Mcneill · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6, 9, 10, 13, and 16–20 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Strub, Woo, Nagai, and Gleissner.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“following factors to assess “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding”: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential). In evaluating these factors, we take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot reached
“Pursuant to our authorization provided by email (Ex. 3003), Patent Owner filed a motion to terminate on the basis that the Petition is time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Papers 15 (confidential), 16 (public redacted). Petitioner filed its response on June 5, 2025. Paper 20. The parties’ briefing did not permit sufficient time to decide the motion prior to the three-month statutory deadline for determining whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(b). We express no opinion at this time on Patent Owner’s motion to terminate, which will be decided in due course.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review unless the information in the petition and preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–6, 9, 10, 13, and 16‒20 of the ’902 patent on all grounds of unpatentability asserted with respect to those claims in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner based on the current record. Although the Lectrosonics IPRs involved the ’902 patent and other patents from the same family as the ’902 patent, which recite many similar claim limitations, the Lectrosonics IPRs were all decided using the BRI standard, not the Phillips standard. Thus, no claim interpretation has been made using the standard that will be applied in this case, and the asserted prior art has not been applied to claims interpreted according to the standard in this case. Accordingly, on this record, we are not persuaded that collateral estoppel applies to any of the disputed issues in this proceeding. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Priceline.com LLC, 122 F.4th 911, 918–919 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“‘Because the Board applies the broadest reasonable construction of the claims while the district courts apply a different standard of claim construction as explored in Phillips,’ a party is not collaterally estopped in district court proceedings by the Board’s constructions during IPR.”); SkyHawke, 828 F.3d at 1376. Regardless, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its asserted ground as to claim 1 based on the preliminary claim interpretations applied herein. See infra Section II.E.5.h.” slip op. at 29
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,929,902 - PTAB · Jun 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00230 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–4, 7–9, 15, 17, 19, 20, and 22–27 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Strub, Woo, Nagai, and Gleissner.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Paper 8 at 20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential); Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019), 58 & n.2, available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. We consider the following factors to assess “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding”: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential). In evaluating these factors, we take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review unless the information in the petition and preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–4, 7‒9, 15, 17, 19, 20, and 22‒27 of the ’443 patent on all grounds of unpatentability asserted with respect to those claims in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We conclude that interpretation of the term “wearable” is necessary to resolve the parties’ dispute. Patent Owner argues that the ’443 patent describes wearability of local audio devices and requires the local audio device to include an audio input device, such as a microphone, that is worn by the performer and connects to the performer’s local audio device to capture the performer’s isolated audio track. Prelim. Resp. 24 (citing Ex. 1001, code (57), col. 7, l. 65‒col. 8, l. 4, col. 8, ll. 59‒62, col. 21, ll. 60‒61). Patent Owner further argues that the prosecution history of the ’443 patent “clarifies that ‘wearable’ requires the audio device to be ‘suitable to be worn by the performer’ and excludes devices that are merely portable (e.g., able to be carried in a backpack).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Patent Owner argues that the Notice of Allowance for the ’443 patent distinguishes 5 In the district court case, Petitioner argued that “wearable” means “suitable and in a condition to be worn” and Patent Owner argued that the term means “[s]uitable to be worn by a performer.” See Ex. 2006, 13–14. between “portable” and “wearable” where the prior art of record taught a portable device that could be carried in a backpack, which the Examiner found did not teach a “wearable” limitation of the claims at issue. Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 2017). We agree with Patent Owner’s analysis to the extent it specifies that the audio device is “suitable to be worn,” but do not include “performer” in the interpretation, as claim 1 recites an audio device wearable by a “creator of said locally generated audio.” See Prelim. Resp. 24‒25. Based on the current record, we interpret “wearable” as “suitable and in a condition to be worn.”” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We conclude that no express interpretation of “locally generated audio” is necessary to determine whether to institute an inter partes review because, even if Patent Owner’s interpretation is adopted, Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Strub teaches “locally generated audio.” See infra Section II.E.5.c; Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)). The parties, however, are encouraged to address interpretation of the phrase during trial.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,711,443 - PTAB · Jun 11, 2025 · IPR2025-00115 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–4, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 21, 22, 24, 26, 28–30, 32, 33, and 35 on all asserted grounds, based on a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“4. Determination as to a Reasonable Likelihood of Prevailing Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence of record, we conclude, for the reasons provided above, that the information presented in the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of claims 1–4, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 21, and Wampler.” slip op. at 41
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“With respect to Patent Owner’s assertions about word count limits, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide November 2019 (“Consolidated TPG”) states that “deleting spacing between words, or using excessive acronyms or abbreviations for word phrases, in order to circumvent the rules on word count, may lead to a party’s brief not being considered.” Consolidated TPG, 40 (citing Pi-Net Int’l, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 600 F. App’x 774 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). As the basis for denying the Petition, Patent Owner alleges “undue prejudice.” Prelim. Resp. 76. Patent Owner, however, did not raise with the Board, prior to filing its Preliminary Response, any concern with the manner in which Petitioner formatted its Petition. As a result, Patent Owner did not avail itself of the opportunity to seek relief to address any alleged undue prejudice short of denying the Petition through, for example, an increase in the word count for its own brief. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a)(2). Under the circumstances alleged improper formatting.8” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in engineering; knowledge and experience in human circulatory system anatomy and physiology; and at least five years’ experience designing and developing implantable medical devices.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 18). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. 1–2. We find, for purposes of the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of skill reflected in these references and in the ’517 patent is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 22
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“In sum, Petitioner maintains a narrower construction of “magneto coupling” is correct, and alleges grounds of unpatentability based on both its narrower proposed construction (a construction encompassed by the broader construction), as well as based on the broader construction that Patent Owner does not dispute. We, therefore, find no merit to Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner’s contention “contradicts itself” or fails to present a “prima facie obviousness position.” See Prelim. Resp. 3. Patent Owner does not dispute the broader construction applied by Petitioner, which encompasses the narrower construction Petitioner proposes. For purposes of this Decision, we apply the broader construction of “magneto coupling,” which encompasses generating a rotating field either by rotating magnets or by an electromagnet / stator.” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,674,517 - PTAB · Jun 11, 2025 · IPR2025-00116 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review on all challenged claims and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Abbott would prove at least one claim unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (2024). Upon consideration of the papers, we conclude that the information presented shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’077 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“least a bachelor’s degree in engineering; knowledge and experience in human circulatory system anatomy and physiology; and at least five years’ experience designing and developing implantable medical devices.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 18). At this stage, “Patent Owner takes no position regarding the appropriate level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 1. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 6. We view this definition for the level of ordinary skill as consistent with the ’077 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“axially adjacent.” In particular, Petitioner argues in connection with mapping cited art to challenged claims for the Wampler and Akamatsu asserted grounds that “a magnetic element sealed within a rotor is . . . ‘axially adjacent.’” Pet. 20 n.6. Petitioner fails to point to any intrinsic evidence to support this construction. Rather, Petitioner alleges that Patent Owner took this position in the parallel litigation in a chart mapping claim 1 to accused products. Id. (citing Ex. 1019,6 5–7). Petitioner does not explain how Patent Owner’s chart supports Petitioner’s construction here. See id. at 6 Petitioner identifies this exhibit as “Exhibit 13 of Complaint, dated November 27, 2023,” which comprises a claim chart mapping accused products to claim 1. when “a magnetic element [is] sealed within a rotor,” it necessarily means being “axially adjacent,” as Petitioner alleges. See Ex. 1019. Rather, we agree with Patent Owner that this chart instead labels product components that are adjacent to one another as measured along a central axis. Prelim. Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 1019, 6–7). In addition, we agree with Patent Owner that “[t]his [mapping] is in accordance with the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms and does not suggest that any component ‘sealed within’ another component would categorically be axially adjacent thereto.” Id. We note that Petitioner applies the plain and ordinary meaning of “axially adjacent” for other asserted grounds, arguing that components which are adjacent to one another along a central axis are “axially adjacent.” E.g., Pet. 55–57. Accordingly, we find, for purposes of this Decision, that the plain and ordinary meaning of “axially adjacent” is being adjacent to one another as measured along a central axis, and does not mean a magnetic element sealed within a rotor. Id. at 20. slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“would have found it obvious to include Wampler’s “techniques related to its axially aligned inflow tube” in the HeartMateIII device taught by Bourque. Pet. 81–88. Petitioner argues that Wampler teaches an arrangement for which “[g]ood anatomic compatibility is possible . . . fitting well between the apex of the heart and the adjacent diaphragm.” Id. at 83 (quoting Ex. 1008 ¶ 76) (alterations in original). Petitioner reasons that applying Wampler’s arrangement to Bourque combines old elements performing known functions yielding expected results. Id. at 83–84. According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known from Wampler that an axial inflow, as taught by Wampler, would have improved blood flow for the device of Bourque by eliminating the flow restrictive elbow in Bourque. Id. at 84 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 648–649; Ex. 1007, 2; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 75–76). Petitioner contends that Bourque recognized certain components, including inflow components, were the cause of clinical troubles, and that Wampler “taught how to eliminate these components that caused clinical troubles–using the inlet to also ‘serve[] as the inflow canula.’” Id. at 85–86 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 741–747; Ex. 1007, 1, 5; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 75–76). Petitioner also argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Wampler’s arrangement would have reduced “rates of infection” by avoiding placement of the pump in a preperitoneal pocket person of ordinary skill in the art “would have adhered to the express teachings of [Wampler], which focused on ‘[g]ood anatomic compatibility’ so that the device ‘fit[s] well between the apex of the heart and the adjacent diaphragm,’ eliminating the need for a peritoneal pocket dissection associated with increased rates of infection.” Id. at 86–87 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 651–654; Ex. 1008 ¶ 76) (second and third alterations in original). Petitioner reasons that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success because the asserted combination of Bourque and Wampler “would ‘fit[] well between the apex of the heart and the adjacent diaphragm’ due to the pump’s ‘development as a compact’ device and the existence of several similar LVADs that fit well at that position.” Id. at 87 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 652–655; Ex. 1007, 5). Lastly, Petitioner argues that the asserted combination would have been obvious to try, because “there were a finite number (i.e., two) [of] options for LVAD implantation: the device would be implanted at a preperitoneal pocket, or at the cardiac apex.” Id. at 87–88 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 656). At this stage, we find Petitioner’s arguments persuasive, and find that Petitioner has provided sufficiently articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support combining Wampler and Bourque’s teachings in the manner Petitioner does.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,754,077
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.