• Intel Corporation v. Advanced Cluster Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00915 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 are unpatentable: claims 1–3, 5–16, and 18–30 as obvious over Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and MPIref; claims 4 and 17 over those references plus POEref.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “Ex. 1163 ¶ 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 71; Ex. 1005, 1–3). We credit Dr. Bajaj’s testimony which is unrebutted and supported by the record. We, thus, agree with Dr. Bajaj’s reasoning which is based on Menon. We further agree with Dr. Bajaj’s conclusion that Menon does not teach away from the combination with Trefethen. Id. ¶ 75. Menon’s description of building on and enhancing the teachings of Trefethen—the earlier work of the same research group at Cornell—by adding MEX routines to achieve high-performance parallel computing and extensibility for MATLAB, demonstrates a classic motivation for a POSITA to combine. RS6000 is specifically referenced in Menon-Trefethen and adds operational details of the parallel operating platform that teach a POSITA how to implement the MultiMATLAB system with a reasonable expectation of success. Considering Menon as a whole, these facts are inconsistent with Patent Owner’s teaching away arguments. For these reasons, Patent Owner’s teaching away argument is unavailing. Motivation to Combine Conclusion We have reviewed Petitioner’s evidence and contentions which we” slip op. at 42

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner establishes by a preponderance” slip op. at 79

  Patent outcomesUS 11,563,621 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,563,621
• Clearwater Paper Corporation v. Graphic Packaging International LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00878 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 and 11 are unpatentable as anticipated by Cleveland and obvious over Nakagawa and over Nakagawa combined with Tanner.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or chemical engineering, materials science, polymer science, or equivalent coursework, at least a year of experience developing paper-based laminates involving the application of polymer coatings to a substrate, and the appropriate industry familiarity with biodegradability standards and degradability techniques [and] . . . [l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree, and vice versa. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 50). Clearwater’s definition is uncontested, and we apply that definition here, as it accords with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art and the problems addressed in the specification of the ’126 patent. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We have reviewed the cited testimony of Clearwater’s expert, including their calculations for arriving at a coat weight in Nakagawa that falls within the claimed range. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132–33. We find that testimony, which is unrebutted, both credible and supported by the evidence of record. Thus, in light of Clearwater’s contentions, the cited portions of Nakagawa, and the unrebutted testimony of Clearwater’s expert, we are persuaded that Nakagawa discloses or otherwise suggests each and every element of claim 1. See Pet. 45–54, 60–64. Clearwater also persuades us that Cleveland discloses the additional subject matter of dependent claims 2, 3, and 11. See Pet. 64–66. Thus, we determine that Clearwater demonstrates that claims 1–3 and 11 are unpatentable as obvious over Nakagawa. F. Ground 3—Obviousness Over Nakagawa and Tanner” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1) “based on both its provisional and non-provisional filing dates.” Inst. Dec. 4 n.5. We were persuaded by Clearwater’s proof that Cleveland’s provisional (Ex. 1006) is “virtually identical” to Cleveland itself (Ex. 1005) and that the provisional provides written description support for at least claim 1 of Cleveland. See Pet. 18–21 (citing Ex. 1006, 2–6, 9). We were also persuaded by Clearwater’s showing that the provisional provides written support for the subject matter relied upon in Cleveland. Id. at 21–40 (citing Ex. 1006, 1–9). We are still persuaded by Clearwater’s showing. Thus, we see no reason to disturb our earlier finding that Cleveland is prior art to the ’126 patent.” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “protectant layers has “a coat weight of from 5 to 30 lbs/3000 ft2.” As noted by Clearwater, Cleveland discloses a total coat weight for layers 14 and 16 as falling within the claimed range. Pet. 32–34 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 32). In particular, Cleveland discloses that “the coextruded layer of copolyester (irrespective of which side of the substrate the layer is disposed) is of a total coat weight of between about 10 and about 40 lb/3000 ft2 in any combination of between about 80/20 to 20/80 parts by weight of Ecoflex to Biomax,” of which “a total coat weight of 25 lb/3000 ft2 is preferred.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 32. As disclosed, Cleveland’s total coat weight range of 10–40 lb/3000 ft2 falls almost entirely within the claimed range, and the preferred total coat weight of 25 lb/3000 ft2 falls squarely within the claimed range. Thus, Cleveland satisfies claim elements [1.3.2] and [1.5.2]. See Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[W]hen, as by a recitation of ranges or otherwise, a claim covers several compositions, the claim is anticipated if one of them is in the prior art.”) (citation omitted). As such, we find that Clearwater adequately demonstrates that Cleveland discloses all the elements of claim 1. 4. Dependent Claims” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 8,637,126 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,637,126
• Netflix, Inc. v. Divx, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 21, 2026 · IPR2020-00558 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Remand

  Claims 1–24 are unpatentable as obvious over Chen, Lindahl, and Hurst because the combination teaches the claim limitations and has motivation to combine and a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “On February 13, 2026, the Federal Circuit issued a decision in the appeal vacating the Second Final Decision as to all challenged claims and remanding for further proceedings. Netflix II, 7. The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s claim construction, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the claim construction the 6 The First Final Decision also addressed Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude (Paper 42), where we granted-in-part, denied-in-part, and dismissed-in-part that Motion. See 1st Final Dec. 28–37. Our determinations on that Motion were a part of Petitioner’s appeal to the Federal Circuit. See Paper 52. As the Federal Circuit did not address this aspect of the First Final Written Decision, we determine our conclusions with respect to that Motion remain undisturbed. Federal Circuit adopted. Id. The Federal Circuit issued its mandate on March 23, 2026.” slip op. at 4

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with at least two years of experience in video streaming and media security or . . . a master’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with a specialization in video streaming and media security.” Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 65–67). Patent Owner does not refute Petitioner’s assessment and appears to apply such a level of skill in its arguments against combining Chen, Lindahl, and Hurst to teach or suggest the elements of the challenged claims. See generally PO Resp. As such, we continue to adopt and apply Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this decision. See Inst. Dec. 6; 1st Final Dec. 6; 2nd Final Dec. 10.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “In response, we conclude that the most natural reading of limitation [l] results from examination of the entire limitation: “locating encryption information that identifies encrypted portions of frames of video within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video.” Ex. 1001, 27:54–57. The “within” most naturally connotes where the encrypted portions of frames of video occur, as opposed to determining where the encryption information may be located. Patent Owner’s interpretation is not wrong, i.e., the limitation could be read as Patent Owner suggests, leading to a narrower construction, but we are not persuaded that the construction of limitation [l] must be so limited, on the basis of the words themselves. We continue to reject Patent Owner’s interpretation that limitation [l] requires locating encryption information within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video. See Inst. Dec. 27–30; 1st Final Dec. 8. Although it is apparent that encryption information can be found within the requested portions, we are not persuaded that the claim language or ’588 Patent implicitly or explicitly requires such a relationship. Likewise, although embodiments disclosed in the Specification of the ’588 Patent are consistent with Patent Owner’s more restrictive construction, the Specification also is consistent with the more grammatically correct construction as well. Thus, we construe limitation [l] as requiring that the encrypted portions of frames of video be within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video, but we do not construe limitation [l] as requiring that the encryption information be within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We are persuaded that the Petition demonstrates that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a motivation to combine Chen, Lindahl, and Hurst, as asserted by Petitioner. As the Federal Circuit found, the Petition pointed to and relied upon the portions in Chen describing pre-Chen art, without scalability or FEC features that were part of what Chen describes as aspects of its own inventive system. Netflix I, slip op. at 9–10 (citing Pet. 17–19, 69–70). We agree with Petitioner that “Chen-924 teaches several embodiments that adaptively stream alternative representations of a video using partially encrypted container files.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1010, 14:41–15:60). We determine that Chen-924 provides support for the rationale provided in the Petition, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Chen and Lindahl in view of the disclosure of Chen-924. As discussed above, the Petition does not rely solely on privacy concerns and improvements to efficiency as its motivation to combine the references. See Pet. 18–19 (specifying piracy concerns, improvements to the efficiency of adaptive streaming, optimization of the balance between bitrate and bandwidth, and improvements to the end-user experience with fast startup and seek). With respect to whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 10,225,588 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,225,588
• Apple Inc. v. Proxense, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 17, 2026 · IPR2025-00562 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Giobbi ’157, Giobbi ’139, and Dua; the Board also finds the claims unpatentable under the Broadcom grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner

    “IPR2024-00783, Ex. 1001, 22:36–49. As the Federal Circuit stated, when a disputed claim limitation does not employ “means for” language, the presumption is that each of the terms conveys sufficiently definite structure or act and, thus, is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6. See Dyfan, 28 F.4th at 1367. Based on the record before us, this presumption that each of the terms is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6 is not overcome.” slip op. at 17

  • Skill levelOther

    “differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, “would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of non-obviousness. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 25

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We find persuasive Dr. Wolfe’s supporting testimony that a POSITA would have understood the terms “PDK” and “RDC” to have “definite structure.” Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 35–56. In particular, we find persuasive Dr. Wolfe’s testimony that the term “PDK,” for example, “encompasses at least ‘a collection of circuit components that includes an antenna, a transceiver, and a controller and memory for storing information particular to a user.’” Id. ¶ 35. Dr. Wolfe’s testimony is consistent with the Specification of the ’188 patent. See Ex. 1001, 5:42–6:7, 3:48–62. In particular, the Specification of the ’188 patent describes a microchip that stores information in memory and responds through an antenna when probed, which is consistent with Dr. Wolfe’s testimony. Id.; Ex. 1001, 1:30–62.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, “would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of non-obviousness. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 9,049,188 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,049,188
• Microsoft Corporation v. Sterling Computers CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 14, 2026 · IPR2025-00270 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–13, 15, 18, 20, 21, and 27 are unpatentable as obvious over Rohall and Schiavone, with Gomes added for claims 9 and 27.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Our Institution Decision adopted Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 9–10. In its Response, Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. See PO Resp. 16 (“Patent Owner and its expert adopt the Board’s definition for purposes of this Response.”). Having considered the record, we continue to adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposal comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’911 Patent. Accord Inst. Dec. 9–10.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner and determine that the construction of “relational references” does not require the use of a relational model and, further, includes pointers that point to related messages exchanged among users. The intrinsic evidence leads us to this construction. First, the relevant language of claim 1 recites “a message container containing relational references pointing to a plurality of sent submessages stored externally to the message container in the message database.” Ex. 1001, 15:56–59. A relational model is not recited in that language or anywhere else in the claim. See id. at 15:51–16:14. Therefore, the claim does not expressly require a relational model. Furthermore, the claim language supports Petitioner’s interpretation that “relational references” include pointers that point to related messages because the claim states that the “relational references” perform the task of “pointing to a plurality of sent submessages.” Pet. Reply 7. Accordingly, the language of the claim supports a construction that does not require a relational model and at least suggests relational references include pointers.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “No other claim terms need construction for our decision here and we decline unnecessarily doing so. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Rohall and Schiavone because Schiavone provides reasons to apply its techniques to email systems such as Rohall’s. Schiavone describes a need for “ensuring compliance of e-mail messages with applicable standards and/or laws and/or otherwise determining appropriateness of a message for an intended recipient,” especially because there is “a patchwork of local, federal and international laws.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 6. Schiavone also states that filtering emails, e.g., to remove spam, is beneficial. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. As Schiavone describes problems in email systems, which its rules-based email processing technique addresses, we determine that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Rohall and Schiavone. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401 (a reference which teaches, suggests, or motivates its combination may “identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the elements”).” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,073,911 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,073,911
• Savant Technologies LLC D/B/A GE Lighting / Elong International USA Inc. et al. v. Feit Electric Company, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 14, 2026 · IPR2025-00698 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11, 18–20, 23–25, and 28 are unpatentable as obvious over the two combinations of prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Thus, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’539 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our obviousness analysis below.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “¶ 39). Petitioner further relies on Stokes to teach an average particle size that preferentially scatter blue . . . LED light as compared to yellow . . . light from the luminescent material.” Id. at 26–27 (citing Ex. 1108, 7:1–4). Petitioner argues that “a POSA would have been motivated to apply this principle to Krummacher, because it would increase the conversion of blue light to yellow light and improve the uniformity of the light source.” Id. at 27 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 237). Petitioner notes that “[c]onversion of blue light to yellow light is improved by maximizing the scattering of blue light.” Id. In addition, Petitioner asserts that “[u]niformity is improved by preferentially scattering the concentrated light from the blue-light LED chip instead of the disperse light emitted by the phosphor.” Id. at 28 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 237). Petitioner contends that “[a] POSA would have had a reasonable expectation of success applying this principle to Krummacher, because the relevant particle size range includes the range disclosed by Krummacher.” Id. Petitioner argues that “[a] POSA would have recognized selecting an average particle size as a design decision to be made based on a number of factors, including the light scattering properties of the particles, and well within the skill of the art.” Id. (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 238). We find this explanation and the supporting testimony of Dr. Doolittle well-reasoned and supported and entitled to significant weight. Thus, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the combination of Krummacher and Stokes teaches limitation 1[c], and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the references in the manner proposed.” slip op. at 40

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “¶ 39). Petitioner further relies on Stokes to teach an average particle size that preferentially scatter blue . . . LED light as compared to yellow . . . light from the luminescent material.” Id. at 26–27 (citing Ex. 1108, 7:1–4). Petitioner argues that “a POSA would have been motivated to apply this principle to Krummacher, because it would increase the conversion of blue light to yellow light and improve the uniformity of the light source.” Id. at 27 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 237). Petitioner notes that “[c]onversion of blue light to yellow light is improved by maximizing the scattering of blue light.” Id. In addition, Petitioner asserts that “[u]niformity is improved by preferentially scattering the concentrated light from the blue-light LED chip instead of the disperse light emitted by the phosphor.” Id. at 28 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 237). Petitioner contends that “[a] POSA would have had a reasonable expectation of success applying this principle to Krummacher, because the relevant particle size range includes the range disclosed by Krummacher.” Id. Petitioner argues that “[a] POSA would have recognized selecting an average particle size as a design decision to be made based on a number of factors, including the light scattering properties of the particles, and well within the skill of the art.” Id. (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 238). We find this explanation and the supporting testimony of Dr. Doolittle well-reasoned and supported and entitled to significant weight. Thus, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the combination of Krummacher and Stokes teaches limitation 1[c], and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the references in the manner proposed.” slip op. at 40

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Finally, we do not agree with Patent Owner that “quantum efficiency” would have dissuaded a person of ordinary skill from making the combination. PO Resp. 36–38. To begin with, “[i]t’s not necessary to show that a combination is the best option, only that it be a suitable option.” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Here, as demonstrated by, at least, Shimizu and Stokes, blue LEDs in this wavelength range were known to work as light sources for white-light LEDs. See Pet. 30–31. Additionally, we find persuasive Petitioner’s evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been concerned solely with quantum efficiency, but also with overall luminous efficacy of a complete white LED package. Reply 9. As Dr. Schubert’s textbook explains, A fundamental drawback of UV pumped white LEDs is the energy loss (Stoke’s shift). The potential luminous efficacy of UV pumped white LED lamps is, therefore, markedly lower than that of white sources based on a blue LED exciting a yellow phosphor. Ex. 2014, 358–59; see also Ex. 1148, 87:5–88:4 (acknowledging Stokes shift). Thus, the evidence shows that, whatever gain in quantum efficiency a lower wavelength might offer, there were other drawbacks that a person of ordinary skill would have to balance. But “a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.” Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1165. Indeed, Petitioner has shown several references—including, Shimizu and Stokes—that made this tradeoff. Moreover, “[o]bviousness does not require absolute predictability of success. . . . [A]ll that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 1988). We find that the prior art of record demonstrates that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have such an expectation in making the combination of Krummacher, Stokes, and Shimizu. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there would have been motivation to combine Krummacher, Stokes, and Shimizu with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 8,614,539 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,614,539
• ARM Ltd v. Daedalus Prime LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00207 · APJ Gregg I Anderson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 11–14, and 16–19 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, physics, or a similar field, and (2) approximately two years of industry or academic experience in a field related to microelectronic architecture design, including experience with cache management in multicore systems-on-a-chip (SoCs). (Ex-1003 ¶¶50-51.) More related education would compensate for fewer years of work experience (and vice versa). (Ex-1003 ¶¶50-51.) Pet. 4–5. This definition was adopted in the Institution Decision. Inst. Dec. 13. Patent Owner does not dispute the finding. PO Resp. 5–6. For the purpose of our Decision, we maintain the finding made in the Institution Decision.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “1. “a single caching agent” (claim 1) We note a construction issue from the ’1344 IPR where we construed a “single caching agent,” which is recited in claim 1 here. ’1344 IPR Final Decision, 16–18. We concluded that a “‘single caching agent’ means ‘one caching agent for the processor, which may be formed from distributed portions.’” Id. at 18. We adopted that construction in our Institution Decision in this case. Inst. Dec. 15.” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “2. Remaining claim terms Independent claims 11 and 16 include different language as to “caching agent.” Claim 11 recites “a caching agent.” Ex. 1001, 8:18. Claim 16 similarly recites “a first caching agent.” Id. at 8:47–48. Neither claims 11 or 16 includes claim 1’s recitation of “distributed portions. The “caching agent” limitations of claims 11 and 16, are not at issue. Accordingly, no construction is necessary.” slip op. at 18

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel appliesDecided for petitioner

    “(1) the issue is identical to one decided in the first action; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the first action; (3) resolution of the issue was essential to a final judgment in the first action; and (4) plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action. Pet. Br. 2. Further, Petitioner alleges the ’1344 Final Decision was not appealed by Patent Owner and is therefore a basis for issue preclusion. Id. (citing Power Integrations, Inc. v. Semiconductor Components Indus., LLC, 926 F.3d 1306, 1311–12 (Fed. Cir. 2019)).” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,984,228 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,984,228
• Charles River Laboratories, Inc. v. Seikagaku CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 8, 2026 · PGR2025-00023 · APJ Per Curiam · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as anticipated by the ’629 publication; the claims are not entitled to the 2013 priority date.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “We find that a rigid requirement as to the subject of a POSITA’s doctoral degree (e.g., biochemical engineering, enzymology), or experience working specifically with horseshoe crab proteins, is not consistent with the evidence of record. See, e.g., Ex. 1067, 20:23–21:2 (Dr. Schaefer testifying that the fact the “name of [his] Ph.D. is immunology . . . does not change the fact that the core of [his] thesis training was really in molecular biology”), 22:3–15 (explaining that “the fact that the production of proteins recombinantly is mostly species agnostic”); Ex. 1069, 45:20–47:17 (Dr. Morris testifying that whether a person is a POSITA depends on the person’s “experience, [ ] publications,” and work done for the Ph.D. rather than the name of the Ph.D. program). We also find that evidence of record supports Petitioner’s assertion that, for purposes of defining a POSITA, “[m]ore education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” See, e.g., Pet. 22; Ex. 1065, 99:14–100:3. Accordingly, based on the entirety of the trial record, we find a POSITA with respect to the claims of the ’109 patent would have had a two years of experience with cloning genes, expressing cloned genes as proteins, and/or characterizing such cloned genes and proteins, with more education being able to substitute for experience, and vice versa. A POSITA may also have collaborated with others, including those with specific experience in utilizing or assessing horseshoe crab Factor C for endotoxin detection and quantitation.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither party proposes an express construction of any claim term. See Pet. 22–23 (not proposing any constructions); PO Resp. 23 (“Patent Owner agrees that the terms can be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning.”). However, Patent Owner states that some of Petitioner’s arguments implicitly construe claim 1 in an erroneous manner. PO Resp. 23–28. “For example, Petitioner argues that ‘an adequate written description would have to either disclose representative examples of the possible working cascades of various proteins or some accurate structural feature of the claimed proteins that allow them to function in the claimed assay as a whole.’” Id. at 23 (quoting Pet. 35). Patent Owner argues that, contrary to what Petitioner’s argument allegedly implies, “Claim 1 is directed to a method for producing an endotoxin assay agent” and does not require the use – Owner that claim 1 does not require the use of endotoxin assay agent. However, the claimed endotoxin assay agent must be capable of performing the assay, as counsel for Patent Owner acknowledged. Tr. 83:5–9.” slip op. at 10

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “In this case, to show that the claims of the ’109 patent are unpatentable for lack of written description, Petitioner would have needed to show that the specification as filed (i.e., the ’420 application) fails to reasonably convey to those skilled in the art that Patent Owner had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the July 3, 2023, filing date. Petitioner did not. Pet. 23–24. Nor does Petitioner’s declarant offer testimony that could support such a showing. See Ex. 1003 ¶50 (“I have been asked to provide my opinions as to the state of the art in this field for purposes of determining what the inventors disclosed as their invention as of December 10, 2013.”), ¶51 (“Whenever I offer an opinion in this declaration about the knowledge of a POSA, the manner in which a POSA would have understood the claims of the ’109 patent or its description, the manner in have been led to do based on the prior art, I am referencing the December 10, 2013 timeframe.”). In our Institution Decision, we stated: Although the ’420 application is essentially identical to the ’767 application, the person of ordinary skill in 2013 is not the same as in 2023. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (“[T]he [written description] test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” (emphasis added)). Thus, the information presented in the Petition, which is limited to the perspective of a 2013 POSITA, does not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable for lack of written description. Inst. Dec. 12 (alterations in original). During trial, Petitioner did not present any further arguments in support of Ground 1. See generally Pet. Reply. Petitioner has failed to prove that claims 1–9 are unpatentable for failing to meet the written description requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).” slip op. at 12

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot shown unpatentable

    “Although the evidence before us shows that, in 2013, a POSITA knew how to recombinantly express genes in expression systems such as CHO or HEK-293 cell lines, the evidence shows that this was true only for genes whose genetic sequences were known or readily available. See, e.g., Ex. 1069, 34:11–22 (“Q. Okay. So you would agree that the creation of the recombinant protein requires the underlying sequence of, as you said, the original animal? A. Of course.”) Because it is undisputed that, in 2013, the genetic sequence for Limulus polyphemus Factor C was unknown, or least not publicly available, Falko-Gunter does not support a finding of adequate written description here. See, e.g., Tr. 48:18–19 (“Patent Owner agrees that there had not been, as of 2013, the full length cDNA sequence for Limulus polyphemus Factor C published.”).” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 11,959,109 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 11,959,109
• Charles River Laboratories, Inc. v. Seikagaku CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 8, 2026 · IPR2025-00440 · APJ Tawen Chang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 21 is unpatentable as obvious over Mizumura with either the ’498 PCT or McClymont; the Revised Contingent Motion to Amend proposing claim 22 is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “overlap to a significant degree, i.e., a person with a Ph.D. in a discipline related to biological sciences and having had at least two years of work experience. However, the parties’ proposals differ slightly in the specific subjects in which a POSA would have had a doctoral degree, and whether the person’s work experience must have been directly related to horseshoe crab Factor C. As an initial matter, we find that a rigid requirement as to the subject of a POSA’s doctoral degree (e.g., biochemical engineering, enzymology), or experience working specifically with horseshoe crab proteins, is not consistent with the evidence of record. See, e.g., Ex. 1067, 20:23–21:2 (Dr. Schaefer testifying that the fact the “name of [his] Ph.D. is immunology . . . does not change the fact that the core of [his] thesis training was really in molecular biology”), 22:3–15 (explaining “the fact that the production of proteins recombinantly is mostly species agnostic”); Ex. 1069, 45:20–47:17 (Dr. Morris testifying that whether a person is a POSA depends on the person’s “experience, [ ] publications,” and work done for the Ph.D. rather than the name of the Ph.D. program). We also find that evidence of record supports Petitioner’s assertion that, for purposes of defining a POSA, “[m]ore education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” See, e.g., Pet. 19; Ex. 1065, 99:14–100:3. with respect to the claims of the ’318 patent would have had a Ph.D. in molecular biology, biochemistry, or a related discipline, and about two years of experience with cloning genes, expressing cloned genes as proteins, and/or characterizing such cloned genes and proteins, with more education being able to substitute for experience, and vice versa. A POSA may also have collaborated with others, including those with specific experience in utilizing or assessing horseshoe crab Factor C for endotoxin detection and quantitation.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction The parties agree that “the terms in claim 21 can be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning for purposes of this proceeding” without further construction. Pet. 19–20; PO Resp. 11. Because express claim construction is not needed to resolve the issues in this case, we need not, and do not, construe expressly any claim term for purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “Carrying Out the Invention section, that “[t]he Factor C of the present invention is a Factor C derived from a horseshoe crab,” and states later in the same section that “[e]xamples of the horseshoe crab include . . . Limulus polyphemus.” Ex. 1006, 40. However, none of the remaining portions of ’767 application cited by Patent Owner relate directly to L. polyphemus; instead, the remaining portions of ’767 application cited by Patent Owner are directed to other species, in particular the Japanese horseshoe crab T. tridentatus. Further, Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Schaefer, conceded that the ’767 application does not contain Factor C sequence information for L. polyphemus. See, e.g., Ex. 1067, 44:25–45:23. Although “[n]o length requirement exists for a disclosure to adequately describe an invention,” Falko-Gunter, 448 F.3d at 1365–1366, we are persuaded that a POSA would not, based on the totality of the above disclosures, reasonably understand that the inventors were in possession of the claimed HEK-293 recombinant L. polyphemus Factor C protein, in view of the state of the art as of December 10, 2013. In this regard, we note that adequate written description of a biological molecule, such as a HEK293 recombinant L. polyphemus Factor C protein, requires “more than a mere statement that it is part of the invention and reference to a potential method for isolating it”; instead, what is required is “‘a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties,’ not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed chemical invention.” The Regents of the” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Neither do we see Petitioner’s arguments regarding the December 10, 2013 priority date to be “mutually opposed” as Dr. Schaefer testified. Ex. 1067, 216:4– 24. Instead, we credit evidence of record, including Dr. Jain’s testimony and the February 22, 2018 Mizumura Declaration, that existence of the full sequence would permit a more complete analysis and that such an analysis would provide a POSA with a reasonable expectation that the claimed L. polyphemus recombinant protein would have a residual activity within the claimed range. See, e.g., Ex. 1029, 2–5; Ex. 1010, 48; Ex. 1065, 117:14– 130:24 (explaining that comparison of partial sequences in the Tokunaga 1991 publication showed “difference around the cleavage site” between T. tridentatus and L. polyphemus but comparison of the full sequence revealed that “the catalytic triad of histidine, serine, aspartate . . . to be more similar between Tachypleus and Limulus”). Patent Owner asserts that “Petitioner’s reliance on a statement made by Dr. Mizumura in a declaration submitted during prosecution of the ’767 Application fails to fill the gap in the analysis” regarding reasonable expectation of success, because the declaration “offers no evidence of the percentage of conserved amino acid substitutions that exist to support the conclusion that a POSA would have expected residual activity to be maintained between Tachypleus tridentatus and Limulus polyphemus” PO Resp. 47. However, as noted above, Dr. Mizumura provides an alignment of Factor C proteins from the two different species of horseshoe crab, determines that the similarity between the amino acid sequence is 99.5%, states that the amino acid residues that can undergo N-type sugar chain that L. polyphemus, like T. tridentatus, would also be less susceptible to inhibition by ions. Ex. 1029, 4–5. For the reasons discussed above, we also disagree with Patent Owner’s assertion that Petitioner’s reasonable expectation of success argument is “nothing more than conclusory assertions with no support.” PO Resp. 46. Rather, we find Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a POSA would have had reason to combine the teachings of Mizumura and the ’498 PCT, with a reasonable expectation of success in arriving at the Factor C protein recited in claim 21.” slip op. at 38

  Patent outcomesUS 11,236,318 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,236,318
• Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon.Com Services LLC et al. v. Soundclear Technologies LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 3, 2026 · IPR2025-00673 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as obvious over the combined teachings of the asserted references, including Shin and Aoyama and Shimomura and Iwase.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsOther

    “1 SoundClear also filed a Contingent Motion to Amend that proposed to replace originally challenged claim 5 of the ’675 patent with proposed substitute claim 8. Paper 21. We, however, granted SoundClear’s request to withdraw its Contingent Motion to Amend and, as a result, the Contingent Motion to Amend will no longer be considered in this proceeding. Paper 30.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelOther

    “2. Level of Skill in the Art In determining whether an invention would have been obvious, we” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMotivation not foundMixed

    “combination because (1) configuring Shin’s processor 120 accordingly “would have been trivial, involving straightforward changes to enhance the processor’s approach to simplifying and abbreviating its output”; and (2) this approach was well-known as evidenced by Ha’s disclosure of replacing “team meeting” and “date” with “schedules” based on the user’s environment.6 Id. at 27–28 (first quoting Ex. 1011 ¶ 97, then quoting Ex. 1011 ¶ 98) (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 102; Ex. 1011, Fig. 7).” slip op. at 33

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “4. Dr. Stern’s Testimony is Reliable In its Patent Owner Response, SoundClear contends that “Dr. Stern’s” slip op. at 125

  Patent outcomesUS 11,244,675 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,244,675

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.