- Oracle America Inc. / Oracle Corporation et al. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 8, 2018 · IPR2016-01434 · APJ Michael W Kim · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 11–13 and 15–20 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 14 was not shown unpatentable because the cited personal notes were not “content contributed.”
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“While the parties use slightly different language, we are unable to discern any substantive differences between the proffered levels of skill and basic qualifications of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Accordingly, we adopt Dr. Papakonstantinou’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill as our own, if for no other reason then for its conciseness, with the understanding that the differences between the proffered levels of ordinary skill are limited and inconsequential in our analysis.” slip op. at 23
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“above-identified single statement in the specification, which uses permissible language such as “can be” and “does not need to be,” is sufficient to justify Patent Owner’s assertions, which for all practical purposes, is a disavowal of claim scope. See Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Absent a clear disavowal in the specification or the prosecution history, the patentee is entitled to the full scope of its claim language.”) We also credit the testimony of Dr. Almeroth over that of Dr. Papakonstantinou, because, among other reasons, Dr. Almeroth supports his testimony with relevant citations to the specification, while Dr. Papakonstantinou largely repeats that which is set forth in the Patent Owner Response, without further analysis. graphical fields that allow the input of administrative information without programming” are advantageous over “cumbersome programming performed in the past.” Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 44, 47. We treat this argument as subsumed within Patent Owner’s argument that the specification disparages prior art systems that require HTML programming to perform administrative tasks.” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“224, 232 encompasses a “link to content.” In application, however, “what is a wireless LAN?” 224, 232 is actually two separate components: (1) the underlying technical set of computer instructions that, upon clicking the link associated with “what is a wireless LAN?” 232, transports a user to a web page associated with “what is a wireless LAN?” 232; and (2) the words “what is a wireless LAN?” 224 itself displayed on the computer display, but separate from the technical set of computer instructions set forth in (1). In this example, (1) is “link to content, but not itself ‘content,’” however, (2) is itself “content.” More precisely, when we now consider “what is a wireless LAN?” 224, 232 in relation to the aforementioned construction of “content” as “electronic data embodying information for an individual or individuals,” it becomes clear that “what is a wireless LAN?” 224, 232 is both “links to content” and “content.” Specifically, component (1) of “what is a wireless LAN?” 232 is “links to content,” but not “content” itself, because the underlying technical set of computer instructions is not “electronic data embodying information for an individual or individuals,” but for a computer. By contrast, component (2) of “what is a wireless LAN?” 224 is “content,” as it is clearly “electronic data embodying information for an individual or individuals,” in that the words “what is a wireless LAN?” are intended to convey information to an individual. So, as a practical matter, we discern that every disclosure of a “link to content” that includes “electronic data embodying information for an individual or individuals” (i.e., any information associated with a “link” that is separate from a generic indication of the “link” itself), is “content.” See also Ex. 3001, 6–16 (providing further analysis concerning construction, which we expressly incorporate herein). Accordingly, we determine that a proper construction of “content” is “electronic data embodying information for an individual or individuals,” and excluding “links to content,” but not excluding “content” associated with the “links to content.”” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner. We are persuaded that “administrative interface” is broader than the “administrative page” mentioned in the specification, in that an “administrative interface” may encompass 9 While discussing “graphical user interface” during oral argument, Patent Owner stated that it was not disclaiming claim scope. Tr. 47:20–22 (“We’re not arguing that the claim terms have been disclaimed in some phrase.”). something other than an “administrative page.” We are also persuaded that the specification’s disclosure of a non-limiting embodiment, that of a highlyautomated and browser-based “administrative page,” does not require that a proper construction of “administrative interface” include “graphical user interface.” As admitted by Patent Owner, these pages are “example[s]” only, and, at best, merely “impl[y]” the presence of a “graphical user interface.” See PO Resp. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1002, 16:39–44; Ex. 2002 ¶ 40). We are persuaded that an “implied example” does not belong in a proper construction of a claim term. Indeed, Petitioner asserts that Patent Owner’s factual premise, concerning the above “implied example,” is flawed, as the specification’s “reference to automation and a browser provides no basis for restricting the claimed ‘administrative interface’ to a graphical user interface.” Pet. Reply 5–6 (citing Ex. 1033 ¶ 15) (Dr. Almeroth testifies that “automation of computer systems does not require a graphical user interface.”). More specifically, Dr. Almeroth identifies other automated “interfaces” in the specification, such as “a networked cash register, bar code scanner or electronic product code reader” (Ex. 1002, 13:8–15, 14:51–52) that do not require a “graphical user interface.” Ex. 1033 ¶ 14. We agree with Dr. Almeroth’s analysis of the specification. Dr. Almeroth asserts further, and we agree, again, that “[o]ne of ordinary skill would understand that that cash register could be connected to a server that is accessible only via a command line interface, and that administrators could use command-line tools . . . to group content on that server.” Ex. 1033 ¶ 14. Patent Owner cites In re Abbott Diabetes Care, Inc., 696 F.3d 1142, 1149–1150 (Fed. Cir. 2012) for its finding of an implicit definition of a” slip op. at 13
Patent outcomesUS 7,516,177 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,516,177 - Old Republic General Insurance Group, Inc. / Old Republic Insurance Company et al. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 12, 2017 · IPR2015-01992 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4–12, 14–24, and 34–48 are unpatentable over the stated grounds; claims 3 and 13 were not shown unpatentable, and claims 25–33 and 49 were disclaimed.
RulingsFinal written decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“On February 8, 2017, Patent Owner informed the Board that it had “disclaimed claims 25–33 and 49” of the ’002 patent, thereby “rendering the institution of claims 25–33 and 49 in the subject inter partes review proceeding moot.” Paper 18, 1; Ex. 2005 (disclaimer of claims 25–33 and 49 pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a)).” slip op. at 2
- BurdenMixed
“2. Analysis To anticipate a claim a “prior art reference must disclose each and every feature of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently.” Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., 471 F.3d 1369, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2006). An inherent disclosure may be found when an asserted prior art reference “necessarily” includes the unstated limitation. Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002).” slip op. at 13
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Upon review of Petitioner’s arguments and supporting evidence, we are persuaded that Petitioner has identified where each limitation of independent claim 1 is disclosed in Huang. Claims 11, 34, and 40 contain limitations similar to claim 1, Petitioner provides detailed arguments as to where each limitation of these claims is disclosed in Huang, and Patent Owner does not present any arguments for these claims separate from those 7 At oral argument, Patent Owner asserted that we should not consider Petitioner’s argument that the icons of Huang contain URL information because this argument was presented for the first time in Petitioner’s Reply. Tr. 32:19–35:5. Patent Owner did not file a motion to exclude this evidence, however, or request a sur-reply to address any allegedly new issues raised for the first time in Petitioner’s Reply. Id. at 34:18–23. Nor is it evident why Petitioner’s arguments are not appropriate rebuttal arguments addressing Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “pointer.” Accordingly, we decline to exclude Petitioner’s URL arguments and evidence.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“be used in conjunction with the mobile interface agent, including “a computer, cable set top box, cellular phone, or other device.” Ex. 1001, 4:44–45. Patent Owner does not explain why the description of a “pointer” in one “context,” i.e., on a computer or PDA, represents a clear and deliberate attempt to define the term in all contexts, such that all pointers must be a “reference” to “a type of menu item” and be “accessible on a computer, PDA, or server.” See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480 (noting that an inventor is “free to define the specific terms used to describe his or her invention,” but “this must be done with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision”). The broadest definition of the term “pointer” in the ’002 patent is “a link/shortcut to an item.” Ex. 1001, 10:8–10 (“As discussed above, a pointer is a link/shortcut to an item such as . . . .”); Dec. on Inst. 10. This definition is consistent with the description of “pointers” in the ’002 patent written description and claims. Ex. 1001, 20:4–6 (“wherein the pointers provide links to access the corresponding user specific resources and information.”). Accordingly, we construe “pointer” to mean “a link or shortcut to an item.”” slip op. at 9
Patent outcomesUS 6,546,002 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,546,002 - Praxair Distribution, Inc. v. Mallinckrodt Hospital Products IP Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 7, 2016 · IPR2015-00529 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8 and 10–19 are unpatentable as obvious over the INOmax label, Bernasconi, Loh, and Goyal; claims 1, 7, 12, and 14 are also anticipated and obvious over the INOmax label.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyOther
“method of providing pharmaceutically acceptable nitric oxide gas requires providing information to the medical provider to safely administer the nitric oxide gas,” thus “confirm[ing] that the ‘providing . . . information’ step is functionally related to the steps in the claimed method.” PO Resp. 31–33. As an initial matter, whether the claims should be interpreted as requiring such a functional relationship is a legal conclusion. See PO Resp. 13. Patent Owner’s conclusion regarding functional relationship between claim terms is based, at least in part, on an overly-limited reading of “pharmaceutically acceptable nitric oxide gas,” as discussed above. See PO Resp. 27. Further, we do not read the transcript testimony relied on by Patent Owner as clearly admitting a functional relationship between the steps of “providing pharmaceutically acceptable nitric oxide gas” and the information of (ii). See PO Resp. 31–32 (citing Ex. 2022, 78:15–80:4, 81:11–22, 111:2–17)). To the contrary, Dr. Beghetti appears to have testified that the claim elements are not directly related. Ex. 2022, 86:10– 25. Although Patent Owner points to In re Distefano, 808 F.3d at 848, as evidence that a “printed matter analysis includes ‘factual findings’” (PO Sur Reply 4, n.6), which inform the ultimate legal conclusion, we do not find the evidence as a whole compelling.” slip op. at 19
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedOther
“IV. PETITIONER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Petitioner moves to exclude certain portions of Ex. 2024 on the grounds that they “are declarations and supporting materials submitted during patent examination . . . in violation of 37 C.F.R. § 42.53(a)” and “lack foundation (FRE 602) and authentication (FRE 901) and constitute impermissible hearsay (FRE 901).” Paper 31, 2–3. Petitioner likewise moves to exclude Exhibit 2029 as not relied on in the Patent Owner Response or by Patent Owner’s expert. Id. at 3. As we do not rely on the objected-to materials in this opinion, we dismiss the motion as moot.” slip op. at 45
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedOther
“V. OBJECTIONS TO DEMONSTRATIVES The parties also submit competing objections to demonstrative exhibits used at trial. Papers 46, 47. Specifically, both parties object to certain slides as setting forth a new argument not previously made in any paper. Papers 46, 47. The parties are reminded that demonstrative exhibits are illustrative only and are not part of the trial record. Indeed, in accordance with our Order on requests for oral argument, neither party filed its demonstratives with the Board. See Paper 45, 2 (“Notwithstanding 37 C.F.R. § 42.70(b), the parties shall not file any demonstrative exhibits in this proceeding without prior authorization from the Board. 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b). Demonstrative exhibits are intended to be visual aids to assist a party in making its oral presentation and will not be entered into the record of these proceedings.”). Nevertheless, in this Final Written Decision, we rely on the arguments presented properly in the parties’ briefs and the evidence of record and do not consider any new arguments not previously set forth in any paper. See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). (“No new evidence or arguments may be presented at the oral argument.”).” slip op. at 45
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“The Applicant amended the preamble of the rejected independent claims to recite “[a] method of providing pharmaceutically acceptable nitric oxide gas,” as presently set forth in claims 1 and 7. Id. at 746–747. Subsequent to the amendment, the Examiner withdrew the objection. Id. at 765; see id. at 733 (“If all the priority issues are resolved then it appears that the primary reference in the 103 rejection will no longer be prior art.” (italics omitted)). On pages 19 and 20 of its Response, Patent Owner argues that the preamble is, therefore, limiting in light of Catalina Mktg. International, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002), which holds that “clear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art transforms the preamble into a claim limitation because such reliance indicates the use of the preamble to define, in part, the claimed invention.” Although the prosecution history shows that amendment of the preamble only indirectly distinguished the claims over the prior art by establishing an earlier priority date, we conclude that both the Applicant and the Examiner treated the preamble as a claim limitation. Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner that the preamble language “pharmaceutically acceptable nitric oxide gas” is limiting.” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 8,846,112 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,846,112 - Symantec Corporation v. The Trustees Of Columbia University In The City Of New YorkSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 30, 2016 · IPR2015-00377 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3–7, 9, 10, 12–16, 18–24, and 26 are unpatentable as obvious; the challenges to claims 2, 8, 11, 17, 25, and 27 were not proven.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownNo construction neededDecided for patent owner
“claims). Pet. 7. In our Decision to Institute, we determined the broadest reasonable construction of anomalous is: “deviation/deviating from a model of typical computer system usage.” Dec. 6. We specifically recognized that the Specification contemplates that “attack data” may be used to build the model used as a baseline for comparison to identify anomalous behavior. Id. Neither party has indicated that our determination in regard to that claim construction was improper, and we do not perceive any reason or evidence that now compels any deviation from our initial determination.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMotivation not foundMixed
“one of these distinct models, the ‘Oracle model,’ is combined with other models.” Pet. Reply 6 (citing Ex. 1008, 11:53–64 (showing that a selected ‘Oracle model’ is used in combination with a k-means algorithm and a Markov transition model); Ex. 1015 (Goodrich Suppl. Decl.) ¶ 19). Petitioner has not explained, however, why models created on different computers would be relevant to Khazan’s static model where the specific execution of two different computers would not affect the model.2 See In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 536 F.3d 1361, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (reasoning that even though a certain modification could have been possible, it would not have been obvious because a person of ordinary skill in the art “would not have seen any need” to make the modification). Although we acknowledge Petitioner’s argument that Agrawal teaches using a combined model from different processors and the testimony of Petitioner’s Declarant, Dr. Goodrich to that effect (Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 84)), we are not persuaded that this would be sufficient to motivate the 2 Petitioner’s Declarant, in his supplemental declaration, states “[u]sing multiple computers spreads the computational overhead involved in creating the models across the computers, and allows for more models to be created in a shorter amount of time.” Ex. 1015 ¶ 20. We do not rely on this statement because this theory was not presented in the Petition and although the paragraph containing this language is cited to in Petitioner’s Reply at page 6, it is not explained or specifically relied upon. 24 combination given the differences discussed above. In other words, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that there was a motivation to apply the models produced on different computers as taught by Agrawal to the system of Khazan. Therefore, Petitioner, has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 11, and 27 were obvious over the combination of Khazan and Agrawal.” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesNot shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed
“Petitioner also asserts through its Declarant that “one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that random selection of models is one of a finite number of identified, predictable selection techniques and it would be obvious to try random selection among models because it has a reasonable expectation of success.” Pet. 29–30 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 86). Petitioner does not explain how random selection is one of a finite number of predictable selection techniques; for example, Petitioner does not show how many other techniques could be considered. See Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“KSR posits a situation with a finite, and in the context of the art, small or easily traversed, number of options that would convince an ordinarily skilled artisan of obviousness . . . . [T]his clearly is not the easily traversed, small and finite number of alternatives that KSR suggested might support an inference of obviousness.”). Dr. Goodrich has not identified sufficient support for the predictability of the art. For example, Dr. Goodrich has not explained sufficiently why, or identified evidence that shows the invention described in the ’322 Patent falls into a very predictable field, one of ordinary skill in the art would have possessed the requisite skills to make the proposed combinations, or one of ordinary skill in the art reasonably would have anticipated the combination to function in an ordinary and expected way. See Rothman v. Target Corp., 556 F.3d 1310, 1319–20 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 21 Finally, Petitioner cites Sobel (Ex. 1011)1 as support for it being “obvious to randomly select a subset of a group of computing choices.” Pet. 30. Petitioner characterizes Sobel’s teachings too broadly. Ex. 2030 ¶ 117. Sobel is directed to “providing software updates to a random sample of computers,” not to randomly selecting models. Pet. 30. Thus, we are not persuaded that Sobel is relevant to the inquiry here. For the reasons stated above, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 8, 17, and 25 were obvious over the combination of Khazan and Agrawal.” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“We have considered Patent Owner’s argument that the Petition fails to propose properly a level of ordinary skill in the Petition itself and that the level of skill suggested by Petitioner’s Declarant is higher than the level used in the related district court case. PO Resp. 6–8. Nevertheless, Patent Owner does not argue that the combinations of the teachings of the references are beyond the level of skill of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art. The level of skill in the art might be gleaned from the prior art itself. See Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163–64 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“A specific finding on the level of skill in the art is not . . . required where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown.”). Here, we find that the prior art adequately reflects an appropriate level of skill and that Patent Owner does not demonstrate a need for testimony or other evidence to establish the level of skill of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art. Also, we find that, even though Dr. Goodrich suggests a level of skill higher than the level used in the related district court case, Patent Owner does not show sufficiently that any such difference in level of skill is material to the obviousness analysis in this case.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 8,601,322 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Markman · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,601,322 - Symantec Corporation v. The Trustees Of Columbia University In The City Of New YorkSome claims unpatentablePTAB · May 31, 2016 · IPR2015-00372 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 3–8 are unpatentable as obvious over Bace and Russinovich; claims 9 and 10 were not shown unpatentable because the evidence did not establish the claimed likelihood of observing a feature.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenMixed
“We have considered the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence, and we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 3–8 would have been obvious over Bace and Russinovich. We determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 9 and 10 would have been obvious over Bace and Russinovich.” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“2. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Michael T. Goodrich, testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’084 patent would have had “a Master’s degree in computer science or a related field with two to three years of experience in the field of software security systems.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 20. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. George Cybenko, testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’084 patent would have had “an undergraduate degree in computer science or mathematics, and one or two years of experience in the field of computer security.” Ex. 2019 ¶ 28. Thus, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Goodrich, defines the level of ordinary skill in the art slightly higher in both education and experience. Patent Owner points out this difference, but does not argue that it materially impacts either party’s analysis. PO Resp. 18–19. In fact, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Goodrich, testifies that his analysis would not change under the slightly lower level of ordinary skill in the art set forth by Patent Owner. Ex 1029 ¶¶ 13–14; Ex. 2018, 78:2-23. In other words, the minor distinctions between the parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are not material. As a result, we determine that both parties define the level of ordinary skill in the art appropriately in this case.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyOther
“Patent Owner’s Motion for Observations E. Patent Owner filed a Motion for Observations on the cross examination of Dr. Michael T. Goodrich (Paper 47), to which Petitioner filed a Response (Paper 50). We have considered Patent Owner’s observations and Petitioner’s responses, and we have given Dr. Goodrich’s testimony the appropriate weight in making our determination in this case.” slip op. at 30
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“determining the likelihood of observing an event, but does not identify evidence indicating that Bace teaches determining the likelihood of observing a feature, as recited in claim 9. Pet. 39–41; Pet. Reply 23–24; Tr. 30:2–15, 31:6–12. Petitioner instead argues that an event is the “same thing” as a feature. Tr. 30:20–24, 32:9–13. Petitioner, however, improperly presented this argument for the first time at the oral hearing. Id. at 30:13– 15; Pet. 39–41; Pet. Reply 23–24; see Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“No new evidence or arguments may be presented at the oral argument.”). Moreover, Petitioner does not identify any evidence from the ’084 patent (or otherwise) to support its argument that an event is the same thing as a feature. Tr. 31:1–5; see Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Our precedent instructs that different claim terms are presumed to have different meanings.”). Therefore, we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 9 would have been obvious over Bace and Russinovich. Claim 10 6. Claim 10 depends from claim 9, and recites “wherein determining a likelihood of observing a feature comprises determining a conditional probability of observing a first feature in the records of processes that access the operating system registry given an occurrence of a second feature in the records.” Ex. 1001, col. 23, ll. 8–12. Because claim 10 depends from claim 9, and Petitioner has not shown that claim 9 would have been obvious over Bace and Russinovich, we determine that Petitioner also has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 10 would have been obvious over Bace and Russinovich. See supra Section II.B.5.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 7,448,084 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,448,084 - Symantec Corporation v. The Trustees Of Columbia University In The City Of New YorkSome claims unpatentablePTAB · May 31, 2016 · IPR2015-00378 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 14 and 16–24 are unpatentable as obvious over Bace and Russinovich; claims 25 and 26 were not shown unpatentable because the evidence did not establish the claimed feature-likelihood limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“contends that this construction is necessary to clarify that the challenged claims require monitoring registry accesses because Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Michael T. Goodrich, testified during his deposition that the records “may be records that don’t have direct impact on the registry.” Id. at 7–8. Even if Patent Owner’s characterization of Dr. Goodrich’s deposition testimony is accurate, Petitioner does not argue in the Petition or the Reply that the challenged claims do not require monitoring registry accesses. See Pet. 13–15, 21–32; Pet. Reply 1, 3–8. As such, there does not appear to be a dispute that requires claim construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”). Nonetheless, in order to avoid any ambiguity, we provide an express construction of the phrase “records regarding processes that access the operating system registry.” We determine that the evidence supports Patent Owner’s proposed construction. The written description of the ’084 patent consistently indicates that records of processes are obtained by monitoring accesses to the operating system registry. Ex. 1001, col. 5, ll. 6–18, col. 8, ll. 9–10, col. 8, ll. 22–24, col. 13, ll. 28–31, col. 13, ll. 46–52. In addition, Petitioner acknowledges that the challenged claims require monitoring accesses to the operating system registry. Tr. 12:15–13:3. Patent Owner’s proposed construction, however, omits the claim terms “processes” and “operating system,” which are part of the phrase being construed. Ex. 1001, col. 23, ll. 32–34. Therefore, we modify Patent Owner’s proposed construction to include those terms. Specifically, we construe the phrase “records regarding processes that access the operating system registry” to mean “records regarding processes obtained by monitoring accesses to the operating system registry.”1” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelOther
“of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’084 patent would have had “a Master’s degree in computer science or a related field with two to three years of experience in the field of software security systems.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 20. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. George Cybenko, testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’084 patent would have had “an undergraduate degree in computer science or mathematics, and one or two years of experience in the field of computer security.” Ex. 2019 ¶ 28. Thus, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Goodrich, defines the level of ordinary skill in the art slightly higher in both education and experience. Patent Owner points out this difference, but does not argue that it materially impacts either party’s analysis. PO Resp. 9–10. In fact, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Goodrich, testifies that his analysis would not change under the slightly lower level of ordinary skill in the art set forth by Patent Owner. Ex 1029 ¶¶ 7–8; Ex. 2018, 78:2-23. In other words, the minor distinctions between the parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are not material. As a result, we determine that both parties define the level of ordinary skill in the art appropriately in this case. Patent Owner argues that, even if Petitioner correctly defines the level” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“90–93, 128, 139 (pp. 68–69); Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 9–10. Therefore, the teachings of Bace, together with the background knowledge and perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art, would have made it obvious to use records obtained by monitoring registry accesses as an information source for an anomaly detection system. See Randall Mfg. v. Rea, 733 F.3d 1355, 1362– 63 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Health, Inc., 805 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Thus, Petitioner identifies evidence indicating that Bace teaches determining the likelihood of observing an event, but does not identify evidence indicating that Bace teaches determining the likelihood of observing a feature, as recited in claim 25. Pet. 41–42; Pet. Reply 23–24; Tr. 30:2–15, 31:6–12. Petitioner instead argues that an event is the “same thing” as a feature. Tr. 30:20–24, 32:9–13. Petitioner, however, improperly presented this argument for the first time at the oral hearing. Id. at 30:13– 15; Pet. 41–42; Pet. Reply 23–24; see Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“No new evidence or arguments may be presented at the oral argument.”). Moreover, Petitioner does not identify any evidence from the ’084 patent (or otherwise) to support its argument that an event is the same thing as a feature. Tr. 31:1–5; see Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Our precedent instructs that different claim terms are presumed to have different meanings.”). Therefore, we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 25 would have been obvious over Bace and Russinovich.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 7,448,084 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,448,084 - Symantec Corporation v. The Trustees Of Columbia University In The City Of New YorkSome claims unpatentablePTAB · May 31, 2016 · IPR2015-00374 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 are unpatentable as anticipated by Bace and Denning; claims 7 and 8 were not shown unpatentable because neither reference disclosed determining the likelihood of observing a feature.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’306 patent would have had “a Master’s degree in computer science or a related field with two to three years of experience in the field of software security systems.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 20. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. George Cybenko, testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’306 patent would have had “an undergraduate degree in computer science or mathematics, and one or two years of experience in the field of computer security.” Ex. 2019 ¶ 24. Thus, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Goodrich, defines the level of ordinary skill in the art slightly higher in both education and experience. Patent Owner points out this difference, but does not argue that it materially impacts either party’s analysis. PO Resp. 8. In fact, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Goodrich, testifies that his analysis would not change under the slightly lower level of ordinary skill in the art set forth by Patent Owner. Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 7–8. In other words, the minor distinctions between the parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are not material. As a result, we determine that both parties define the level of ordinary skill in the art appropriately in this case.” slip op. at 5
- BurdenMixed
“determining the likelihood of observing an event, but does not identify evidence indicating that Bace discloses determining the likelihood of observing a feature, as recited in claim 7. Pet. 30–32; Pet. Reply 14–15; Tr. 30:2–15, 31:6–12. Petitioner instead argues that an event is the “same thing” as a feature. Tr. 30:20–24, 32:9–13. Petitioner, however, improperly presented this argument for the first time at the oral hearing. Id. at 30:13– 15; Pet. 30–32; Pet. Reply 14–15; see Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“No new evidence or arguments may be presented at the oral argument.”). Moreover, Petitioner does not identify any evidence from the ’306 patent (or otherwise) to support its argument that an event is the same thing as a feature. Tr. 31:1–5; see Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Our precedent instructs that different claim terms are presumed to have different meanings.”).” slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Bace specifies that certain information sources are used for a computer system with a Windows operating system. Namely, Bace discloses that, for a Windows computer system, “security log events are the primary focus of intrusion detection systems,” and “especially those having to do with the creation, deletion, and alteration of system files and other 3 Patent Owner suggests that this portion of Bace only relates to the system call records gathered by UNIX system audit trails. Paper 48 ¶¶ 3–5. Section 3.2.4 of Bace, however, describes the advantages of operating system audit trails generally, not just UNIX system audit trails. Ex. 1007, 70. objects.” Id. at 74–75 (emphases added). Bace then explains that the reference data obtained from the Windows computer system is used to generate the anomaly detection models discussed later in Bace. Ex. 1007, 109 (“Anomaly detectors are populated by running them against the collected reference event data.”); id. at 74–75, 121–122; Ex. 1003 ¶ 112. Thus, for a Windows computer system, Bace expressly links the reference data obtained by monitoring the creation, deletion, and alteration of system files with the disclosed anomaly detection models. Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 15–19; cf. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that the prior art did not link two distinct teachings). Bace further discloses that Denning’s anomaly detection model, which includes the mean and standard deviation model, is the “seminal” anomaly detection model. Ex. 1007, 108, 121–122. As a result, Bace provides a specific reason for selecting Denning’s anomaly detection model from among the other models disclosed in Bace. Ex. 1003 ¶ 111; Ex. 1029 ¶ 19. c. Summary For the reasons discussed above, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is anticipated by Bace.” slip op. at 11
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDenied
“A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition or patent owner response.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Here, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s Reply exceeds the scope of a proper reply because it presents a new theory of unpatentability for claim 7 based on the TIM system in Bace that is not included in the Petition. PO Mot. Str. 2–3. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that its Reply is proper because the Petition relies on the TIM system in Bace with respect to claim 8, and, thus slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 7,913,306 mixed§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 7,913,306 - Ubisoft, Inc. / Ubisoft Entertainment SA v. Guitar Apprentice, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 1, 2016 · IPR2015-00298 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 17, 18, and 20 are unpatentable as anticipated by Lee and Epstein; claims 9–12, 14, and 16 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner
“limitations in claim 9 are similar to the limitation at issue in Williamson. Specifically, the “proficiency sensing module” and “mode control module” limitations are in a format consistent with traditional means-plus-function limitations. Ex. 1001, col. 10, ll. 40–53; see Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350. Each limitation replaces the term “means” with the term “module,” and recites certain functions performed by the module. Ex. 1001, col. 10, ll. 40– 53; see Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350. The word “module” by itself does not provide any indication of structure. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350–51; PO Brief 3 (“Thus, the module, like most computing elements, are a combination of relatively generic computer hardware coupled with software.”). Further, neither party argues specifically or identifies evidence indicating that the prefixes “proficiency sensing” and “mode control” impart structure into the term “module.” See Pet. Brief 2; PO Brief 5–6; Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350–51. Patent Owner argues that the claim language imparts structure by reciting the input and output of each module. PO Brief 5–6; Tr. 25:7–14. The functions recited in claim 9, however, only describe certain inputs and outputs at a very high level (e.g., receiving signals from a guitar and comparing the received signals to expected signals). Ex. 1001, col. 10, ll. 40–53; see Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351. The ’849 patent explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would conceive of numerous structural means” for performing the recited functions of the “proficiency sensing module” and the “mode control module.” Ex. 1001, col. 3, ll. 19–28; see id. at col. 3, ll. 58–67. As a result, the functions recited in claim 9 for the “proficiency sensing module” and the “mode control module” do not connote sufficiently definite structure. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351. Therefore, we determine that the “proficiency sensing module” and “mode control module” limitations in claim 9 are means-plus-function limitations under § 112 ¶ 6.” slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Patent Owner argues that Lee does not disclose the above limitation of claims 1 and 17, because the system in Lee does not define the number of user segments in a subsequent iteration of a musical performance based on a user proficiency level determined from a previous iteration of the musical performance. PO Resp. 5–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 106, 161, 183). Specifically, Patent Owner argues that, in Lee, “the user, not the system,” selects the difficulty level (and thus the number of user segments) for a subsequent session. PO Resp. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 183). Patent Owner’s argument is not persuasive. Lee discloses that “when the difficulty level of a musical piece is set to a low level, the user may be required to play only one out of every N 1 Lee discloses maintaining the number of musical events played by the user, as required by claim 17. Pet. 30–31; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 165, 173, 174; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 32–34. musical events, where N>1,” and, “[a]s the user progresses and gains skill from session to session, the value of N may be gradually reduced to 1” at which point “the user may be required to correctly play each of N musical events.”2 Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 173, 174 (emphasis added). Thus, Lee discloses a system that defines the number of user segments in a subsequent session based on the user’s proficiency level in a previous session. Id. Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Michael Zyda, testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art reading Lee would have known that the system can adjust the number of user segments from session to session, as described in paragraphs 173 and 174 of Lee, without input from the user.3 Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 25, 29, 30.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“2 As discussed above, Lee discloses that the term “musical piece” refers to a song or musical composition, and the term “musical event” refers to a note or chord in the musical piece. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 30, 31, 58. 3 Dr. Zyda testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, physics, mathematics, or a related field or an equivalent number of years of working experience, in addition to one to two years of software programming experience. Ex. 1006 ¶ 17. Patent Owner does not dispute Dr. Zyda’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, and we adopt that level of ordinary skill in the art in this case. discussed above, though, the evidence indicates that the system disclosed in Lee also can adjust the number of user segments from session to session without input from the user. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 173, 174; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 25, 29, 30.” slip op. at 9
Patent outcomesUS 8,586,849 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 8,586,849 - Digital Ally, Inc. v. Utility Associates, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 27, 2015 · IPR2014-00725 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 9, 10, and 12–25 are unpatentable; claim 11 was not shown unpatentable because the petitioner did not explain why the Monroe ’320 multiplexer would perform compression.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the types of problems encountered in the art and the prior art solutions to those problems. See In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The ’556 patent explains that: The VCR is a technical device nearing the end of its lifecycle; therefore, no serious advancements are on the drawing board that address the numerous technical issues incumbent to videotape recording. On the other hand, digital capture and storage is at the beginning of its technological curve, with rapid development of new devices. The only available means to ensure sufficient quality and control of video recording, access, and storage is an increase in the number of well-trained persons with those responsibilities. Ex. 1001, col. 1, ll. 29–37 (emphasis added). In other words, the ’556 patent focuses on transitioning surveillance systems from outdated VCR technology to the rapidly developing technology of digital capture and storage. Id. This is also reflected in the claims of the ’556 patent, which recite “capturing,” “integrating,” and “storing” information. See, e.g., id. at col. 8, ll. 44–49. Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, thus, appropriately includes an education in electrical engineering or computer science and experience in signal processing, or other related disciplines. Ex. 1003 ¶ 39.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner submits evidence showing that the ordinary and customary meaning of the term “vehicle” is any means of carrying or transporting something and, thus, includes an aircraft. Pet. 19–20; Ex. 1007, 4. This definition is consistent with the Specification of the ’556 patent, which indicates that the disclosed surveillance system has “airline applications.” Ex. 1001, col. 2, ll. 15–19. Patent Owner, on the other hand, identifies portions of the Specification and prosecution history that describe a land-based, first-responder vehicle as an example of a vehicle. PO Resp. 17–18; Ex. 1001, col. 2, ll. 39–44 (“The embodiment disclosed herein is used in a police car,” but “the present invention is not limited to this example.”) (emphasis added); Ex. 1002, 59 (“The present invention is used for emergency response vehicles, such as police cars, ambulances, and the like.”) (emphasis added). But the Specification shows that the term “vehicle” is broader. Namely, the ’556 patent states that the disclosed surveillance system is “for use in public and commercial vehicles” and “can be deployed on police, fire, and rescue vehicles and is adaptable for use on transportation and industry vehicles, as well as having rail and airline applications.” Ex. 1001, col. 1, ll. 7–10, col. 2, ll. 15–19. Therefore, we decline to limit the term “vehicle” to particular examples in the Specification or prosecution history. See Aria Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 726 F.3d 1296, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2013).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“The parties agree that the term “integrating” refers to “combining.” Pet. 21; PO Resp. 37. This is consistent with the Specification of the ’556 patent, which states: “The captured data from the sixteen inputs . . . are . . . combined with the video and audio information . . . to create aggregated documentation that is sent to a storage unit 270 in one data stream.” Ex. 1001, col. 4, ll. 28–34 (emphasis added). The parties also agree that the term “integrating” does not include superimposing, mixing, laying over, or layering. Pet. 21–22; PO Resp. 36–37; Ex. 1003 ¶ 49; Tr. 9:1–9. This is consistent with statements made by the patentee during prosecution of the application that issued as the ’556 patent. Ex. 1002, 129–30.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Monroe ’320. Pet. 12. A claim is anticipated if each limitation of the claim is disclosed in a single prior art reference arranged as in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Petitioner provides detailed explanations and evidence showing how Monroe ’320 discloses each claim limitation as arranged in the claims. Pet. 30–38, 42–43, 45–51, 53–55. We have considered the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence, and we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–4, 9, 13–18, and 20–25 are unpatentable as anticipated by Monroe ’320. We address below Patent Owner’s arguments. 1. Monroe ’320 Monroe ’320 discloses a surveillance system for aircraft, ships, and land vehicles. Ex. 1004, col. 1, ll. 27–34, col. 1, ll. 60–65. The surveillance system in Monroe ’320 includes video cameras, microphones, and sensors for capturing video, audio, and data information, respectively. Id. at col. 22, ll. 4–10, col. 22, ll. 40–44, col. 22, ll. 48–51, Fig. 15. Monroe ’320 discloses a digital multiplexer network that combines the video, audio, and data into a combined, comprehensive output signal. Id. at col. 22, ll. 57–64, col. 23, ll. 15–17, Fig. 15. Monroe ’320 discloses storing the combined, comprehensive output signal on a recorder in the vehicle and transmitting the combined, comprehensive output signal to a ground station. Id. at col. 23, ll. 10–12, col. 23, ll. 17–22.” slip op. at 13
Patent outcomesUS 6,831,556 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,831,556
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.