• Westerngeco, L.L.C. v. PGS Geophysical AsSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 8, 2016 · IPR2015-00310 · APJ Justin Busch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 23, 24, and 30 are unpatentable as anticipated by de Kok; claims 23, 24, 28, and 29 are unpatentable as obvious over Beasley and Edington.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the “indexed” limitation requires more than merely “selecting” times. Petitioner offers no explanation how Dr. Ikelle’s testimony that “indexed” should be construed broadly to mean “selected,” Ex. 2002, 184:8–11, would be consistent with the rest of the limitation that requires enabling separate identification of events originating from different sources. Patent Owner’s proposed construction, however, is unduly narrow to the extent it requires recording. As explained in the passage cited by Patent Owner, recording the signal and indexing are two separate aspects of the process involved in the ’981 patent. Ex. 1001, 5:62–67 (“A recording is made of the signal . . . that is indexed to a known time reference with respect to time of firing of the first source) (emphases added). The ’981 patent demonstrates that the term “indexed” is used in the “indexed” limitation according to one of its ordinary meanings that one thing is arranged in reference to another. Id.; see also id. at 6:66–7:1 (“[A] time of firing of each source with respect to a time index” is shown in Figure 4.), 8:33–40 (“[W]hen time is indexed with respect to the firing time of source A,” source B events are not coherent between firing sequences.).” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Owner’s distinctions between what de Kok discloses and what claim 23 recites are inapposite. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments, which Patent Owner does not contest, that de Kok’s firing times for each source are indexed (as we have construed the “indexed” limitation) to the reference time in a way that allows the shot records to be separated into source records. Because de Kok discloses both indexing and enabling separate identification of seismic events originating from each source, de Kok discloses the “indexed” limitation as we have construed it.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “unpersuaded. Petitioner’s challenge relies on Edington for its teaching that time-delays can be used to encode and decode signals. Based on the arguments and evidence presented during trial, we are persuaded by Petitioner that a person having ordinary skill would have used time-aligning signals, as taught by Edington, as a type of decoding without needing to take multiple shots from the same source. Accordingly, a person having ordinary skill would have been able to decode a signal for a given encoding scheme, and we find Patent Owner’s assertion that an ordinarily skilled artisan would “lack[] an effective decoding scheme” unpersuasive.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “Beasley clearly states that “no time shift” results in “no spatial reflection-point smearing.” Ex. 1004, 7:61–62. Both parties agree that some amount of spatial reflection point smearing would result from using Edington’s time delay encoding with Beasley’s seismic surveying system. See Tr. 28:3–8, 38:14–15 (counsel for Patent Owner stating that “frankly, any time you have a time delay at all, there is spatial reflection point smearing”). However, neither party pointed us to evidence explaining the relationship between the amount of delay and the amount of smearing, or how much smearing would be tolerated in marine seismic surveying. One consequence of the lack of evidence on this point is that it is unclear whether Beasley is stating that simultaneous activation versus sequential activation avoids smearing or if simultaneous activation versus near-simultaneous activation avoids smearing. Beasley’s disclosure regarding the benefit of eliminating smearing immediately follows the discussion that distinguishes between sequential and concurrent source activation. Based on the record before us, we find Beasley indicates that simultaneous (or near-simultaneous) activation of sources avoids the smearing that otherwise results when activating the sources sequentially. Ex. 1004, 7:52–63. Furthermore, Patent Owner has not argued, and we do not find, that claim 23 should be construed to exclude any amount of spatial reflection point smearing.10 The parties have pointed to no evidence or argument explaining sufficiently why the level of smearing resulting from Petitioner’s proposed combination of Beasley and Edington would be unacceptable, but the level of smearing resulting from the time delay encoding recited in the ’981 patent would be acceptable. Therefore, to the extent that incorporating Edington’s time delay encoding into Beasley’s system generates reflection point smearing, the evidence does not support a finding that claim 23 excludes any amount of smearing. Based on the record before us, we are not 10 When asked whether the subject matter of the ’981 patent suffered from spatial reflection point smearing because of its use of time delays, counsel for Patent Owner stated “I do think it suffers it to some degree.” Tr. 41:14– 15. persuaded the smearing allegedly introduced by combining Edington’s time delay encoding with Beasley’s system would have led an ordinarily skilled artisan away from that combination.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 6,906,981 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,906,981
• Westerngeco, L.L.C. v. PGS Geophysical AsSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 8, 2016 · IPR2015-00309 · APJ Justin Busch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, 11, 16, 17, 21, and 22 are unpatentable; claims 3–5 are not shown unpatentable, and challenges to claims 18–20 are dismissed.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenMixed

    “Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, 11, 16, 17, 21, and 22 are unpatentable, but has failed to do so for claims 3–5 and 12–15. We dismiss the Petition with respect to the challenges asserted against claims 18–20.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “more than merely “selecting” times. Petitioner offers no explanation how Dr. Ikelle’s testimony that “indexed” should be construed broadly to mean “selected,” Ex. 2002, 184:8–11, would be consistent with the rest of the limitation that requires enabling separate identification of events originating from different sources. Patent Owner’s proposed construction, however, is unduly narrow to the extent it requires recording. As explained in the passage cited by Patent Owner, recording the signal and indexing are two separate aspects of the process involved in the ’981 patent. Ex. 1001, 5:62–67 (“A recording is made of the signal . . . that is indexed to a known time reference with respect to time of firing of the first source) (emphases added). The ’981 patent demonstrates that the term “indexed” is used in the “indexed” limitation according to one of its ordinary meanings that one thing is arranged in reference to another. Id.; see also id. at 6:66–7:1 (“[A] time of firing of each source with respect to a time index” is shown in Figure 4.), 8:33–40 (“[W]hen time is indexed with respect to the firing time of source A,” source B events are not coherent between firing sequences.).” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Although a prior art reference may anticipate when the claim limitations not expressly found in that reference are inherent in it, inherency requires that “the prior art necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the claimed limitations, it anticipates.” In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Here, Petitioner’s arguments and evidence fail to persuade us that de Kok disclosure of suppressing random noise inherently includes determining trace to trace coherence. Merely demonstrating a step may be done is not sufficient to show that step is inherently anticipated. Accordingly, based on the arguments and evidence submitted, we find Petitioner has failed to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that de Kok anticipates claims 12 and 17. Similarly, because claims 13–15 ultimately depend from claim 12, we find Petitioner has failed to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that de Kok anticipates claims 13–15.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “The relevant passages cited by both parties demonstrate that Beasley distinguishes between alternating and concurrent firings. See, e.g., Ex. 1004, 7:52–63. Although Herkenhoff states that the concurrent disclosure in Beasley means “exactly concurrently,” Patent Owner has not pointed to any clear disclosure in Beasley itself indicating “concurrently” should be understood as excluding any amount of time delay. Petitioner, however, has pointed to multiple references where Beasley explains that sources may be fired “simultaneously or nearly simultaneously.” Pet. Reply 15 (citing Ex. 1004, 8:46–47); Pet. 47 (quoting Ex. 1004, 1:19–25 (“The present invention, in certain aspects, is directed to seismic survey systems and methods in which two or more seismic sources are fired simultaneously, or significantly close together temporally . . . .”)); see also Ex. 1004, 1:47–51, 8:44–47, 9:5–10, 12:26–29. Moreover, claim 1 of the ’655 patent, which Patent Owner asserts claims the “first embodiment” of the ’981 patent, recites a method including the step of “substantially simultaneously launching a first acoustic wavefield,” from the leading source, “the first wavefield being characterized by a first unique code and launching a second acoustic wavefield” from the trailing source, “the second acoustic wavefield being characterized by a second unique code.” Ex. 2009, 6:46–53. Accordingly, Beasley does not exclude time delay encoding from its disclosed “concurrent” activation embodiments.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 6,906,981 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,906,981
• Westerngeco, L.L.C. v. PGS Geophysical AsSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 8, 2016 · IPR2015-00311 · APJ Justin Busch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 31, 32, and 35–37 are unpatentable as obvious over Beasley and Edington; the Board did not find claims 31–34 and 36–38 anticipated by de Kok or claims 33–34 obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner initially argued for a specific construction of “wavelet time” as “the duration of the source signature.” Pet. 14–15. For purposes of the Decision on Institution, we preliminarily construed wavelet time consistent with Petitioner’s proposed construction. Dec. on Inst. 14–15. Now, with the full record before us, we determine an explicit construction of “wavelet time” is not necessary to resolve this controversy. Petitioner does not clearly set forth a proposed construction for any other term in its Petition. Patent Owner argues for specific constructions of “quasi-randomly” and “randomly.” PO Resp. 15–19. The constructions of “quasi-randomly” and “randomly” are not in dispute, and an explicit construction is not necessary to resolve the controversy; accordingly, we do not provide an explicit construction of “quasi-randomly” or “randomly.” Therefore, we determine there is no need to construe explicitly any term for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 6

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that de Kok’s polarity encoding and decoding process does not disclose the “time aligning” step. As Patent Owner argues, de Kok describes a polarity encoding and decoding system that does not align the “recorded signals with respect to a firing time of the second source in each firing sequence.” Specifically, de Kok explains that it uses activation sequences and polarity to generate signals, from which “source records may be derived” “using a combination of shot record summations, inversions and filtering.” Ex. 1003, 2:51–53; see also id. at 4:55–5:4, 5:55–65. To the extent de Kok discusses time delay encoding, any arguable time alignment applies to the firing of the sources, not the recorded signals. Id. at 5:66–6:2, 6:41–52. Accordingly, Petitioner has not pointed to persuasive evidence that de Kok’s polarity encoding and decoding discloses the “time-aligning” step.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “The relevant passages cited by both parties demonstrate that Beasley distinguishes between alternating and concurrent firings. See, e.g., Ex. 1004, 7:52–63. Although Herkenhoff states that the concurrent disclosure in Beasley means “exactly concurrently,” Patent Owner has not pointed to any clear disclosure in Beasley itself indicating “concurrently” should be understood as excluding any amount of time delay. Petitioner, however, has pointed to multiple references where Beasley explains that sources may be fired “simultaneously or nearly simultaneously.” Pet. Reply 12 (citing Ex. 1004, 8:46–47); Pet. 38 (quoting Ex. 1004, 1:19–25 (“The present invention, in certain aspects, is directed to seismic survey systems and methods in which two or more seismic sources are fired simultaneously, or significantly close together temporally . . . .”)); see also Ex. 1004, 1:47–51, 8:44–47, 9:5–10, 12:26–29. Moreover, claim 1 of the ’655 patent, which Patent Owner asserts claims the “first embodiment” of the ’981 patent, recites a method including the step of “substantially simultaneously launching a first acoustic wavefield,” from the leading source, “the first wavefield being characterized by a first unique code and launching a second acoustic wavefield” from the trailing source, “the second acoustic wavefield being characterized by a second unique code.” Ex. 2009, 6:46–53. Accordingly, Beasley does not exclude time delay encoding from its disclosed “concurrent” activation embodiments. Patent Owner’s argument that time delay encoding results in a plain wavefield rather than an encoded wavefield and, therefore, using time delay encoding would not fall within Beasley’s “any type of coding,” is similarly unpersuasive. Patent Owner fails to address that Beasley distinguishes between “a signal with no encoded feature, individual identifier, tag, discriminating feature, or separate signature” and “signals that can be discriminated from each other due to some identifying characteristic, parameter, signature or feature.” Ex. 1004, 9:67–10:8 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the evidence supports Petitioner’s contention that time delay encoding generates signals with an identifying parameter or characteristic (the timing) that would allow the signals to “be discriminated from each other.” Pet. Reply 11–12. Furthermore, Dr. Lynn acknowledged that “Edington’s time delay source coding is ‘a type of source signature encoding.’” Id. (quoting Ex. 1022, 148:18–23).” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “nonobviousness. PO Resp. 55–60. The factual inquiries for obviousness include secondary considerations based on evaluation and crediting of objective evidence. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). However, to accord substantial weight to objective evidence requires the finding of a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995). “Nexus” is a legally and factually sufficient connection between the objective evidence and the claimed invention, such that the objective evidence should be considered in determining nonobviousness. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The burden of showing that a nexus exists lies with the patent owner. Id.; see In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Patent Owner points to various prior attempts (including Edington, Beasley, and de Kok) to conduct simultaneous shootings in a marine environment and the failings of each of them. Id. at 43–44. Patent Owner also points to various published papers allegedly “investigat[ing] data processing techniques for use with data sets modeled on [the ’981 patent]’s varied time delays” and field trials and studies allegedly using the ’981 patent’s “time-delay acquisition and indexing methods.” Id. at 44–48. Petitioner argues Patent Owner has shown no nexus between Patent Owner’s proffered secondary considerations and the invention of the ’981 patent. Pet. Reply 20–22. Petitioner contends Patent Owner’s focus on the varied time delays of claim 31 is insufficient because time delayed encoding “existed long before the ’981 patent.” Id. We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner has not demonstrated sufficiently a nexus between the secondary considerations and the alleged novelty of claim 31. First, as Petitioner points out, and as borne out by the evidence in this case, time delay encoding for seismic surveying existed prior to the ’981 patent. E.g., Exs. 1006, 1021. Second, the majority of the evidence cited by Patent Owner focuses on the randomness of the time delays, not just the use of time delays generally. Consequently, Patent Owner has not presented persuasive evidence or analysis linking the claims at issue with the alleged “long-felt but unmet need, industry praise, and copying.” See PO Resp. 55.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 6,906,981 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,906,981
• Westerngeco LLC v. PGS Geophysical AsSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 3, 2016 · IPR2015-00313 · APJ Beverly M Bunting · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4, 10, and 11 are unpatentable: claims 1, 4, and 10 as anticipated by Gallagher, and claim 11 as obvious over Gallagher and Frasier; claims 2, 3, and 5 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Id. at 3:59–65. Additionally, the specification describes how, in this embodiment, “a plurality of the coordinate-designated set of traces have the same coordinates . . . the acquisition geometry resulted in two traces populating each common-inline/common-crossline bin.” Id. at 3:66–4:3. In an alternative embodiment, “there will be a unique set of coordinates per trace (i.e. a single trace per coordinate bin).” Id. at 4:5–7. Thus, based on the specification of the ’059 patent, we credit the testimony of Dr. Lynn that one of skill in the art would understand the “set of bins having a regularized number of traces” into which the coordinate-designated set of traces is organized are “common-offset bins.”4 Ex. 2037 ¶¶ 57–65, 111–113.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “As discussed supra, we determined that the correct interpretation of the claim term “set of bins” is “a set of common offset bins within a common reference point bin.” Patent Owner’s arguments directed to “posthoc bins” are not persuasive because the claims do not limit the bins to “pre” or “post” hoc bins. Thus, in view of the correct construction of the claim term “set of bins,” we are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that Gallagher discloses a “set of bins.” Specifically, Petitioner explains how the section shells group the sources based on their azimuth and offset from the CMP (Reply 10–11), and that the sub-squares represent common offset bins (Id. at 11–12). Additionally, Petitioner argues persuasively that the single-trace bin satisfies the claim limitation “a set of bins” as we have construed this term, because “[e]ach trace within the sub-bins or sections of Gallagher is necessarily common [to itself] with respect to offset and even azimuth.” Reply 13. In considering the record in its entirety, Petitioner has presented persuasive evidence to support a finding that Gallagher describes the “organizing” step recited in independent claim 1.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the disclosure in Gallagher teaches away from the recited method. Patent Owner has not shown, nor can we find, that Gallagher criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages the use of a common reflection point instead of a common reference point. A reference teaches away from a claimed invention if it “criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages” modifying the reference to arrive at the claimed invention. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We will not, however, “read into a reference a teaching away from a process where no such language exists.” DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006).” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “The Supreme Court has held that an obviousness evaluation “cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 419. Instead, the relevant inquiry here is whether Petitioner has set forth “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cited with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Patent Owner does not proffer persuasive arguments or evidence that Petitioner’s proposed modification of the system of Gallagher using the teachings of Frasier regarding common reflection point would not have been obvious to one of skill in the art. We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments; however, we are persuaded that Petitioner has provided an articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 6,026,059 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,026,059
• NHK Seating Of America, Inc. v. Lear CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 2, 2016 · IPR2014-01202 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, and 28–31 are unpatentable as anticipated by JP ’468; the remaining challenged claims are not held unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “The Specification describes two embodiments in which structures are “joined or fastened” to the seatback frame, namely, a first embodiment in which plate 10 having clamped ends 14 with clips 16, and springs 18 are joined to the frame 2, id. at 1:54–64, and a second embodiment in which spring 18, clips 32, and cam guides 46 are joined to frame 2, id. at 2:15–24. Headrest cushion 6 never touches frame 2 in either embodiment, but instead is connected to posts 8 (first embodiment) or 30 (second embodiment). “[T]he presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Dependent claims 6 and 59 recognize that the posts are structures different than the headrest by reciting that the headrest “is separated from the seatback frame by a post.” Ex. 1001, C1 1:52–54 (claim 6), C1 4:31–32 (claim 59). The principle of claim differentiation instructs us to interpret “headrest” in claims 2 and 57 to refer to the headrest without the posts. Even if we were to interpret “headrest” to encompass the posts, however, posts 8 (first embodiment) and posts 30 (second embodiment) also never touch the seatback frame. Instead, the posts along with other structures functionally link the headrest to the frame.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “NHK persuades us by a preponderance of evidence that JP ’468 describes a headrest that is pivotally attached with the seatback frame. For the reasons expressed in part II.A above, we interpret “headrest pivotally attached with the seatback frame” more broadly than proposed by Lear. We interpret “pivotally attached with” to encompass a relationship between the headrest and seatback frame that involves the headrest being functionally linked via intervening structures to the seatback frame so that the headrest rotates forward in response to a rearward force applied to an impact target. Under our interpretation, JP ’468 describes “a headrest pivotally attached with the seatback frame.” We find that intervening structures physically join headrest 15 of JP ’468 to its frame member 8. Frame member 8, with its supporting arm 9 (the alleged seatback frame), is pivotally joined at axis 10 to bracket 5 of seat cushion support member 4 (the alleged bun frame), which is joined to floor 1 and thus also floor member 1′. Ex. 1008, 3–5, Figure 1. Headrest 15 is connected to arm 16, which is pivotally joined via pin 17 to bracket 18 “at the top part of floor member 1′.” Id. at 5. Headrest 15 is attached to frame 8 via the intervening structures described above and pivots about the recited axis. Accordingly, we find that a preponderance of evidence demonstrates that headrest 15 is “pivotally attached with the seatback frame” as recited in claims 2 and 57.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Similarly, we are not persuaded by NHK’s argument that using Ferrara’s spring would decrease the risk of whiplash injury. To the extent that Ferrara improves a headrest, it does so by providing the compliance that Dr. Viano recognized to reduce the risk of impact-based head injury in highspeed collisions. Ferrara never describes its spring, which softens a blow to the occupant’s head, as reducing the risk of whiplash injury, and the testimony from Dr. Viano that NHK cites does not support such a conclusion. Rather, Dr. Viano merely testifies that it is “possible” for “some blows to the head” to cause whiplash, Ex. 1018, 51:1–52:2, and whether such a blow causes whiplash “depends on so many factors,” id. at 52:4–53:1. Dr. Viano never testifies that Ferrara’s spring reduces the risk of whiplash injury, and NHK cites no evidence to support such a conclusion. Because NHK fails to establish that using Ferrara’s spring in Mertens’s headrest would “mitigate whiplash risk,” NHK’s proffered rationale for using Ferrara’s spring in Mertens’s headrest and, thus, NHK’s obviousness challenge is unpersuasive. “[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). A challenge “on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Id. (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (C.A.Fed.2006)). The argument and evidence proffered by NHK does not establish any credible reason to combine Ferrara’s spring with Mertens’s headrest. Nor does NHK proffer any evidence to establish whether a skilled artisan would have considered Ferrara’s spring 48 to have been an obvious substitute for Mertens’s torsion member 85 to permit rearward rotation of the headrest in severe collisions. NHK bears the burden of proving obviousness of the challenged claims by a preponderance of evidence, and we conclude that it has failed to do so in this case. Accordingly, we conclude that NHK has failed to establish that the combination of Mertens and Ferrara renders claims 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 13–20, 31, 43–49, 55–60, 62–68, 70, 81, 84–90, 93, and 94 unpatentable as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103.” slip op. at 28

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “IV. LEAR’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE We have reviewed Lear’s Motion to Exclude, NHK’s Opposition to the Motion, and Lear’s Reply in support of the Motion. Based on our review, we deny the Motion in all respects for one or both of the following reasons: (1) the Motion is moot because it seeks to exclude evidence not considered or relied upon in rendering this Decision or (2) the Motion addresses issues more appropriate to determining the weight ascribed to the evidence rather than the admissibility of evidence. In rendering this Decision, we determine and ascribe the appropriate weight to all proffered evidence and, when appropriate, comment upon the weight ascribed.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 5,378,043 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 5,378,043
• NHK Seating Of America, Inc. v. Lear CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 12, 2016 · IPR2014-01079 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 6–9, 12–16, 20, and 21 are unpatentable; claims 2, 4, 10, 11, 17, and 25 are not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “As will be described in greater detail below, headrest 22 moves variably upon vehicle impact. In the embodiment shown, such variable movement occurs in first and second manners wherein the first and second manners relate to first and second forward velocities respectively, those being the velocities of the headrest 22 forward toward the occupant or the front of the vehicle, and first and second trajectories respectively, those being the trajectories or paths of headrest 22. Such variable movement could be along any suitable combination of trajectories and velocities. As long as at least one of the first forward velocity and first trajectory is different than one of a second forward velocity and second trajectory, movement in first and second manners, variable movement, has been achieved. Ex. 1001, 5:12–26 (emphasis added). This passage is consistent with interpreting “first manner and second manner” as meaning “any two different ways.” As described in this quoted passage, if either the forward velocity or the trajectory of the headrest, or both changes, then movement in a first and second manner has occurred. For example, if the headrest were to move forward at one velocity and then merely slow down (or speed up) on the same trajectory, then movement would occur in a first and second manner.” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “headrest that moves in a first manner and a second manner because Dr. Kent’s original modeling of Nakano’s headrest failed to account for the constraint imposed by brackets 35. Resp. 20–23. Lear further contends that its expert, Dr. Viano, “correctly model Nakano” and determined that brackets 35 were “essential” to predicting the motion of Nakano’s headrest. Id. at 23. Lear also argues that movement of Nakano’s headrest may be defined mathematically by a single equation, which allegedly demonstrates that Nakano’s headrest moves along “a single trajectory.” Id. at 23–24 (citing Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 112–15). Lear contends that Dr. Kent “admits” that a path of motion that can be expressed by a single equation establishes movement in only one manner. Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 2012, 17:3–14). Our review of the cited testimony, reveals that it does not support Lear’s contention. We also do not understand Dr. Viano’s testimony to support a conclusion that a “single equation” defines the movement of Nakano’s headrest. Dr. Viano refers to Exhibit 2018 as reflecting his derivation of the mathematical relationships that define movement of Nakano’s headrest. Ex. 2010 ¶ 112 (citing Ex. 2018). Exhibit 2014 demonstrates that one equation defines the movement of Nakano’s headrest in the x-direction and another equation defines it in the y-direction. Ex. 2018, 1. Dr. Viano never provides an exemplary output of these two equations to illustrate how Nakano’s headrest would actually move. More importantly, however, Lear does not explain how Nakano’s express description that the coordinated operation of links 61, 62, and 63 lifts its headrest (as shown in Figure 5b) and subsequently lifts the headrest obliquely forward (as shown in Figure 5d) fails to constitute movement in a first and second manner. NHK persuades us by a preponderance of evidence that Nakano describes a headrest that moves in a first and second manner. More specifically, Nakano expressly states that it lifts the headrest (a first manner) and then subsequently lifts the headrest obliquely forward (a second manner). We need not determine whether Dr. Kent’s first or second kinematic model or Dr. Viano’s kinematic or geometric model accurately depicts the movement of Nakano’s headrest because Nakano expressly describes movement in first and second manners.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNon analogous artDecided for patent owner

    “Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325. The appropriate field of endeavor is determined by referring to the specification of the patent at issue “including the embodiments, function, and structure of the claimed invention.” Id. at 1325–26. “A reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem.” Clay, 966 F.2d at 659.” slip op. at 41

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “addressed by the ’949 patent, Lear persuades us that Seitzer fails to describe the guide member and follower of claims 2 and 25. Lear persuasively argues that Wiklund and Seitzer would not motivate a skilled artisan to incorporate a “bushing having a cam profile” into Wiklund’s support 24 (the alleged guideway) because Seitzer describes only rotating cams used in reciprocating machinery, not the claimed version of the guide member, a bushing having a cam configuration. Id. at 54–56. Drs. Viano and Kent agree that Seitzer describes rotating cams, Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 212–15; Ex. 2012, 198:12–14, 200:17–21. Both experts also agree that Seitzer does not describe the types of non-rotating cams to which the ’949 patent refers. Ex. 2010 ¶ 214; Ex. 2012, 205:3–5. We determine that a preponderance of the evidence establishes that Seitzer fails to describe the types of non-rotating cam configurations discussed in the ’949 patent. Accordingly, we conclude that the combination of Wiklund and Seitzer does not render the guide member and follower of claims 2 and 25 obvious. Resp. 52–56. 4. Conclusion For the reasons expressed above, we conclude that NHK fails to persuade us by a preponderance of evidence that the combination of Wiklund and Seitzer renders claims 2 and 25 unpatentable as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103.” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 6,631,949 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,631,949
• NHK Seating Of America, Inc. v. Lear CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 30, 2015 · IPR2014-01026 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 11, 14, and 17–21 are unpatentable; claim 15 was not shown unpatentable because Wiklund does not disclose its required sequential contact portions.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Ex. 1001, 5:9–22 (emphasis added). This passage is consistent with interpreting “first manner and second manner” as meaning “any two different ways.” As described in this quoted passage, if either the forward velocity or the trajectory of the headrest, or both changes, then movement in a first and second manner has occurred. For example, if the headrest were to move forward at one velocity and then merely slow down (or speed up) on the same trajectory, then movement would occur in a first and second manner.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Id. at 8:58–9:5 (emphasis added). The emphasized portion of the quotation establishes that Kage’s headrest moves differently at the beginning and end of its path S2'. Namely, Kage’s headrest moves quickly toward the occupant’s head at the beginning of path S2' and more slowly toward the occupant’s head at the end of path S2'.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “claims 12, 17, 18, and 21 obvious and sets forth the evidence from Wiklund and Humer to support its contentions in detailed claim charts. Pet. 43–46. NHK also proffers Dr. Kent’s testimony to explain the manner in which Wiklund describes the requirements recited in these claims. Ex. 1010¶¶ 60– 69. Claims 12 and 21 depend from claims 10 and 20, respectively, and further recite a “damper connected between the headrest arrangement and the seatback.” Ex. 1001, 13:15–16 (claim 12), 14:26–27 (claim 21). NHK relies upon Humer for its disclosure of a damper as recited in these claims. Pet. 44–46. More specifically, NHK contends that Humer teaches using a damper 118 to improve “energy absorptions” of the Saab SAHR headrest. Pet. 43 (citing Ex. 1007, 7:27–8:4). NHK also contends that Wiklund is directed to the same Saab SAHR headrest. Pet. 43 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶ 60). NHK therefore concludes that an ordinary artisan would have found it obvious to improve Wiklund by adding Humer’s damper between the headrest arrangement and the seatback. Pet. 43–44. NHK contends that an ordinary artisan would have found it obvious to add a damper to Wiklund to “provide ‘some energy absorption to cause more even and controlled contact with the head during impact’ because without the damper 118 ‘the head tends to oscillate after impacting a headrest cushion.’” Id. at 44 (citing Ex. 1007, page 8:1–4; Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 60, 61, and 63).” slip op. at 34

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “IV. LEAR’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE We have reviewed Lear’s Motion to Exclude, NHK’s Opposition to the Motion, and Lear’s Reply in support of the Motion. Based on our review, we deny the Motion in all respects for one or both of the following reasons: (1) the Motion is moot because it seeks to exclude evidence not considered or relied upon in rendering this Decision or (2) the Motion addresses issues more appropriate to determining the weight ascribed to the evidence rather than the admissibility of evidence. In rendering this Decision, we determine and ascribe the appropriate weight to all proffered evidence and, when appropriate, comment upon the weight ascribed.” slip op. at 39

  Patent outcomesUS 6,655,733 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,655,733
• NHK Seating Of America, Inc. v. Lear CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 15, 2015 · IPR2014-00925 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, and 4 are unpatentable as obvious over DE ’017 and DE ’826; claim 2 was not shown unpatentable because the combination lacks the claimed tab.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Not all surfaces guide a path of travel. We imposed this limitation based upon our review of the Specification. The pertinent portion of Figure 5 from the ’818 patent (reproduced at right) illustrates ramp 132 having two cam surfaces 134a and 134b (highlighted in green). These two cam surfaces together comprise cam surface 134. Ex. 1001, 8:65–9:2. Although we agree with Lear that the combination of cam surfaces 134a, 134b “changes the trajectory of travel” of the ends of lower crossbar 120, Lear fails to persuade us that the Specification justifies reading such a limitation into “cam surface.” The Specification specifically counsels against reading such a limitation into the claims by stating: “Those having ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the ramp 132 can include any number of cam surfaces oriented in any manner toward the upper armature 50 without departing from the scope of the invention.” Ex. 1001, 9:9–13 (emphasis added). Accordingly, either of cam surfaces 134a or 134b is within the “scope of the invention” because either one constitutes “any number of cam surfaces oriented in any manner.” Second, we are not persuaded by Lear’s argument that, by interpreting “cam surface” as meaning “a surface that guides a path of travel,” we render “to slide the transverse bar along the cam surface” superfluous. Resp. 33– 35. We read “to slide the transverse bar along the cam surface” as specifying which “path of travel” the “cam surface” guides, namely, the path of travel of the “transverse bar.” Because we are unpersuaded by Lear’s arguments for altering our preliminary interpretation of “cam surface,” we maintain our interpretation of “cam surface” as meaning “a surface that guides a path of travel.”” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “would render it inoperable for its intended purpose. First, we determine that both references have the same intended purpose, namely to move the head rest to a supportive position in response to a rear-end collision. Ex. 1004, Abstract, ¶¶ 15, 16, 18; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 27–30. Second, we determine that DE ’017 and DE ’826 both operate according to principles that efficiently translate the forces applied by the occupant to the seat back during a collision into movement of the head rest. Ex. 1004, Abstract, ¶ 5, claim 1; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 27–30. Third, we determine that both DE ’017 and DE ’826 do not move the head rest in response to forces encountered in normal, non-collision, conditions. Both systems respond only to forces large enough to overcome biasing forces imparted by springs that hold the head rest in the non-actuated position during normal conditions. Ex. 1004 ¶ 17; Ex. 1006 ¶ 25; Ex. 1012, 25:11–23; Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 27–29. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that NHK’s proposed modification of DE ’017 would render DE ’017 inoperable for its intended purpose.” slip op. at 18

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedOther

    “annotated figure is not a “tab” but instead an eyebolt. Because DE ’017 never directly describes or discusses this uppermost “tab” structure, Lear supports its argument with testimony from Dr. Viano. Surreply 3 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 19–22). The only portion of DE ’017 relating to this uppermost structure is a passage stating “At the end of the pivot lever 2d, opposite the pivotal axis 4, the coupling element 6b of the connection device 6 is suspended in an articulate fashion.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 17. Dr. Viano testifies that, because of the way that this uppermost structure is illustrated in Figure 2b and the functional description of the connection between coupling element 6b and lever 2d, a skilled artisan would conclude that this uppermost structure is akin to an eyebolt. Ex. 2019 ¶ 22. Dr. Kent testifies that concluding that the uppermost structure is “drawn as a tab” is a “reasonable inference . . . based on the way it is characterized in the drawing and the mechanical function it performs.” Ex. 2020, 19:6–17. Dr. Kent offers no further explanation for his inference that the uppermost structure is a “tab.” We accept Dr. Viano’s tesimony on how a skilled artisan would view the uppermost structure that NHK identifies in the annotated version of Figure 2b of DE ’017 as being more credible, thorough, and reasoned than Dr. Kent’s. On the record before us, we are persuaded by Lear’s argument and evidence that the uppermost structure does not constitute the claimed “tab.”” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “surface” because slot 17 guides a path of travel for pin 18, which is operatively connected to impact plate 10 of DE ’826. Pet. 25, 31–32. On the record before us, and under our interpretation of “cam surface,” we are persuaded by NHK’s argument. Accordingly, we conclude that NHK has established by a preponderance of evidence that DE ’826 describes the “cam surface” recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 8,434,818 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,434,818
• Microsoft Corporation v. Proxyconn, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 19, 2014 · IPR2013-00109 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 9–12, 14, 22, and 23 were canceled as anticipated; claim 24 was not shown unpatentable, and the motion to amend was denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenOther

    “petitioner must establish facts supporting its challenges by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). 1. Anticipation The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit summarized the analytical framework for determining whether prior art anticipates a claim as follows: If the claimed invention was “described in a printed publication” either before the date of invention, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), or more than one year before the U.S. patent application was filed, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), then that prior art anticipates the patent. Although § 102 refers to “the invention” generally, the anticipation inquiry proceeds on a claim-by-claim basis. See Hakim v. Cannon Avent Group, PLC, 479 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2007). To anticipate a claim, a single prior art reference must expressly or inherently disclose each claim limitation. Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998). But disclosure of each element is not quite enough—this court has long held that “[a]nticipation requires the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all elements of a claimed invention arranged as in the claim.” Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Soundscriber Corp. v. United States, 175 Ct.Cl. 644, 360 F.2d 954, 960 (1966) (emphasis added)). Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2008). We must analyze prior art references as a skilled artisan would. See Scripps Clinic & Res. Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (to anticipate, “[t]here must be no difference between the claimed invention and the reference disclosure, as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention”).” slip op. at 32

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Both parties’ interpretations of “data access” are too narrow. Neither the challenged claims nor the Specification expressly limits “data access” to require a “request from the client” as proposed by Proxyconn. The claims merely recite “data access.” Even though the Specification describes examples in which the client requests data from a server, the Specification does not require that the client request data in all described embodiments of the claimed systems and methods. For example, the Specification expressly describes an embodiment in which “a sender/computer required to send data to a receiver/computer . . . initially sends a digital digest of the data.” Ex. 1002, col. 2, ll. 26–28. “[L]imitations are not to be read into the claims from the specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321(Fed. Cir. 1989)). We decline to do so here. Microsoft’s position is similarly unsupported by the claims themselves or the Specification. None of the challenged independent claims affirmatively recites that the receiver/computer acquires data from the sender/computer. Microsoft cites no portion of the Specification, and we find no support for the proposition that the Specification equates “data access” with “data acquisition.” We determine that the plain meaning of “data access” is clear. Independent challenged claims 1, 6, 10, 11, and 22 recite “access” as a noun modified by “data.” Ex. 1002, col. 10, l. 31 (claims 1, 3), col. 10, l. 64 (claims 6, 7, and 9), col. 11, l. 20 (claim 10), col. 11, l. 35 (claims 11, 12, and 14), col. 12, l. 30 (claims 22–24). “Access” plainly means the “freedom or ability to obtain or make use of.” MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 6 (10th ed. 1999). We conclude, therefore, that the claimed systems and methods recite “data access” to refer to the freedom or ability to obtain or use data. Although obtaining or acquiring data requires access to that data, access to the data need not involve acquisition of that data.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Resolution of the parties’ arguments relating to whether Yohe anticipates claims 1, 3, and 10 requires that we interpret “digital digests” as recited in the comparison means. We interpret “digital digests” by reading claim 1 in its entirety. Claim 1 recites that both the sender and receiver include “means for creating digital digests on data.” We conclude that the “digital digests” recited in the means for comparison refers to the “digital digests on data” that are recited earlier in claim 1 in the “means for creating.” b. Claim 10 Claim 10, like claim 1, recites that the receiver includes “means for comparison between digital digests.” Also like claim 1, claim 10 recites that the sender includes a “means for creating digital digests on data.” By contrast to claim 1, claim 10 does not recite a “means for creating” in the receiver. Ex. 1002, col. 11, ll. 20–33. Instead, the receiver includes a “means for storing a digital digest received from said network.” Id. at col. 11, ll. 31–32 (emphasis added). The reference to “a digital digest” rather than “the digital digest on data” in the storing means implies that the receiver can store any type of digital digest received from the network. Therefore, the “digests” that are compared in the “means for comparison” recited in claim 10 need not be the two digests on data created by the sender and receiver. Instead, the “means for comparison between digital digests” recited in claim 10 refers to structure that can compare any digital digest received from the network with any other digital digest.” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “A finding of anticipation by inherency requires more than probabilities or possibilities. Motorola Mobility LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 737 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Based on the evidence discussed above, it is possible to infer that Perlman describes such permanent storage memory. However, Microsoft has not presented evidence that the computers or routers described by Perlman necessarily use permanent storage memory as recited in claims 1 and 3. Therefore, Microsoft has failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence that Perlman describes a receiver/computer or sender/computer necessarily having “permanent storage memory.” Without such evidence, we cannot conclude that Perlman anticipates claims 1 and 3.” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 6,757,717 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,757,717

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.