- Dr. Michael Farmwald / RPX Corporation v. Parkervision, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Oct 29, 2015 · IPR2014-00947 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s motion for adverse judgment and cancelled claims 1, 23, 25, 161, 193, and 202.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). “Judgment” is defined as “a final written decision by the Board, or a termination of a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.2. Although Patent Owner uses the term “termination” in its Motion, it did not submit the Motion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 and did not explain why termination is appropriate in this circumstance. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 (noting that the Board may terminate a trial without rendering a final written decision “where appropriate,” such as when the trial is consolidated with another proceeding or pursuant to a settlement under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a)). Under the circumstances presented here, we see no reason not to grant Patent Owner’s Motion. Additionally, for the reasons discussed above, this Decision is a Final Written Decision, not a termination of the proceeding.1” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 6,061,551 - Dr. Michael Farmwald / RPX Corporation v. Parkervision, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Oct 29, 2015 · IPR2014-00946 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s motion for adverse judgment and cancelled claims 1, 82, 90, and 91.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). “Judgment” is defined as “a final written decision by the Board, or a termination of a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.2. Although Patent Owner uses the term “termination” in its Motion, it did not submit the Motion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 and did not explain why termination is appropriate in this circumstance. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 (noting that the Board may terminate a trial without rendering a final written decision “where appropriate,” such as when the trial is consolidated with another proceeding or pursuant to a settlement under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a)). Under the circumstances presented here, we see no reason not to grant Patent Owner’s Motion. Additionally, for the reasons discussed above, this Decision is a Final Written Decision, not a termination of the proceeding.1” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“(collectively, “Petitioner”) filed a Petition for inter partes review of U.S. Patent No. 6,266,518 B1 (“the ’518 patent”). Paper 1. ParkerVision, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response on September 24, 2014. Paper 7. On December 18, 2014, we instituted this inter partes review of claims 1, 82, 90, and 91 of the ’518 patent. Paper 8.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,266,518 - PTAB · Jul 20, 2015 · IPR2015-00517 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because neither petition showed a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 9, 10, 12, 30, 32, 42, or 45 were unpatentable over Kitamura or Mehrotra.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We review the Petitions under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Based on our review of the record, we conclude that neither Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail in demonstrating that at least one of the challenged claims is not patentable, based on the Petitions filed. See 35 U.S.C. § 314. B.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Kitamura is largely silent as to the specific functioning of the D/A conversion circuit 10. Kitamura discloses that D/A conversion circuit 10 and A/D conversion circuit 13 “preferably share a voltage dividing element and a reference voltage supply (for the purpose of making their characteristics uniform),” and level differences to maximize the operating margin (Ex. 1010 ¶ 11), but does not disclose a “selection” between reference voltages or signals. Although Petitioners emphasize the obviousness of certain elements of the challenged claims (Pet. 25– 26), the obviousness of selecting a reference voltage versus outputting a voltage from a D/A conversion is not discussed. Indeed, Dr. Baker’s discussion is clear (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 74–79) as to how the output voltages could be set, but it remains unclear how Kitamura itself suggests the examples proffered. The normal function of a D/A converter is not to select between reference voltages, but to render the digital input into analog form. We are not persuaded that Kitamura teaches or suggests the selection of one of a plurality of reference voltages in accordance with the input information, per the challenged claims. In addition, the Petitions fail to provide any rationale for why Kitamura’s disclosure of D/A conversion renders the selection of a reference voltage or signal obvious. For these reasons, Patent Owner’s contentions that Kitamura does not teach or suggest “reference voltage selecting means,” or equivalent elements, or “reference voltages,” per the challenged claims, are persuasive. C.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed petitioner construction§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“Reference Voltage Selection Claim 1 recites “reference voltage selecting means for selecting one of a plurality of reference voltages,” with claims 9, 12, and 30 reciting “selecting device which selects one of a plurality of reference signals,” and claims 42 and 45 reciting “selecting one of a plurality of predetermined reference signals.” Petitioners acknowledge that the means-plus-function element in claim 1 is “governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6,” and that the construction of the claim term in claim 1 “is applicable to claim terms” recited in claims 9, 12, 30, 42, and 45, discussed above. Pet. 5, 8. Petitioners assert that “the verify reference voltage select circuit 222 selects and provides such a reference voltage to the comparator,” and is the corresponding structure described in the specification. Id. at 56 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 4552). For purposes of this Decision, we construe the referenced claim terms according to that structure and apply the same to the analysis below. B.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Reference Voltages” “Reference Signals” All of the independent claims of the challenged claims recite either “reference signals” or “reference voltages.” Petitioners emphasize that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have interpreted these features to be broad enough to include and be met by either a digital reference voltage/ signal or an analog reference voltage/signal.” Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 53–58). For purposes of this Decision, we construe the reference voltages and signals terms as being met by either digital or analog reference voltages/signals, and apply that construction to the analysis below. slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 5,764,571 - PTAB · Jul 20, 2015 · IPR2015-00504 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution in both proceedings because neither petition showed a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim obvious over Kitamura or Mehrotra.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We review the Petitions under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Based on our review of the record, we conclude that neither Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail in demonstrating that at least one of the challenged claims is not patentable, based on the Petitions filed. See 35 U.S.C. § 314. B.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Kitamura is largely silent as to the specific functioning of the D/A conversion circuit 10. Kitamura discloses that D/A conversion circuit 10 and A/D conversion circuit 13 “preferably share a voltage dividing element and a reference voltage supply (for the purpose of making their characteristics uniform),” and level differences to maximize the operating margin (Ex. 1010 ¶ 11), but does not disclose a “selection” between reference voltages or signals. Although Petitioners emphasize the obviousness of certain elements of the challenged claims (Pet. 25– 26), the obviousness of selecting a reference voltage versus outputting a voltage from a D/A conversion is not discussed. Indeed, Dr. Baker’s discussion is clear (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 74–79) as to how the output voltages could be set, but it remains unclear how Kitamura itself suggests the examples proffered. The normal function of a D/A converter is not to select between reference voltages, but to render the digital input into analog form. We are not persuaded that Kitamura teaches or suggests the selection of one of a plurality of reference voltages in accordance with the input information, per the challenged claims. In addition, the Petitions fail to provide any rationale for why Kitamura’s disclosure of D/A conversion renders the selection of a reference voltage or signal obvious. For these reasons, Patent Owner’s contentions that Kitamura does not teach or suggest “reference voltage selecting means,” or equivalent elements, or “reference voltages,” per the challenged claims, are persuasive. C.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“The standard for granting a motion to seal is “good cause,” reflecting the strong public policy for making all information in inter partes review proceedings open to the public. 37 C.F.R. § 42.54. The moving party bears the burden of showing that the relief requested should be granted. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). This includes showing that the information is truly confidential, and that such confidentiality outweighs the strong public interest in having an open record. See Garmin Int’l v. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, Case IPR2012-00001, slip op. at 3 (PTAB Mar. 14, 2013) (Paper 36). Petitioner Micron has made a sufficient showing. Accordingly, the Motion to Seal Exhibit 1011 is granted.” slip op. at 15
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 5,764,571 - Reg Synthetic Fuels LLC v. Neste Oil OyjAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 5, 2015 · IPR2014-00192 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–24 are unpatentable under § 103; proposed substitute claims 25–28 are patentable and entered because the prior art did not motivate the claimed 5,000–8,000 w-ppm sulfur range.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“Based on the record before us, we conclude that Neste has carried its burden of demonstrating that claim 25 is patentable over the prior art of record. We concluded above, in discussing the original claims, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine Jakkula and Monnier I to add sulfur to the feedstock of an HDO process that is followed by an HI step, because the prior art suggests that concentrations of 2000 or 4431 w-ppm have beneficial effects on catalyst activation and decarboxylation selectivity. A person of ordinary skill would, therefore, weigh the possible deleterious effects of sulfur on the HI catalyst, against the 28 possible benefits. The question of whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to add an even higher concentration of sulfur—in the range of 5000–8000 w-ppm—is an altogether different one. The record before us does not establish persuasively that there was any art-recognized benefit to using a concentration of sulfur over 4431 w-ppm. Absent any indication of a benefit to be obtained from adding even greater amounts of sulfur, the skilled artisan would have no reason to make the modifications to Jakkula necessary to result in the claimed invention. Such modifications would involve catalyst replacement costs, additional processing steps such as stripping, or catalyst substitutions18 that—although not prohibitive if the prior art suggested a benefit might be obtained—would not be undertaken if the person of ordinary skill saw no benefit to making them. For these reasons, we conclude that Neste has established sufficiently that there was no reason to modify the prior art to arrive at the process of claim 25.” slip op. at 28
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“We are not convinced by REG’s rate constant argument. First, REG does not direct us to any evidence in the record, other than the testimony of Dr. Sughrue, that establishes that increasing the rate constant of the conversion reaction was recognized in the art to be beneficial. This is in stark contrast to decarboxylation selectivity, which is described by several 17 Furthermore, as discussed above with respect to Laurent I, we do not find such a significant increase in sulfur concentration—from 2000 to 5000–8000 w-ppm—to be “routine.” 26 references as decreasing hydrogen consumption and, therefore, processing cost. We are, therefore, left with only Dr. Sughrue’s statement that an “increase in rate constant is important because a higher activity allows for less catalyst to be used to deoxygenate the feedstock.” Ex. 1043 ¶ 125. Dr. Sughrue cites no support for such an assertion, and we accord it little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Second, we note that Table 4 of Laurent II reports, along with kDES, the rate constants k4MA and kGUA, pertaining to the HDO conversion of 4- methylacetophenone and guaiacol, respectively. Ex. 1011, 107. While kDES is shown to increase with sulfur concentration, k4MA decreases and kGUA is unaffected by sulfur concentration. Id. REG provides no evidence or argument establishing why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered only the kDES rate constant in determining the benefit of increased sulfur concentration.” slip op. at 26
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“evidence that the prior art teaches all elements of challenged claims 1–24, and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the disclosures. Furthermore, we conclude that such a combination would have been within the level of ordinary skill in the art, as evidenced by 17 the prior art of record. We, therefore, conclude that claims 1–24 would have been obvious at the time of the invention, and thus are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
Patent outcomesUS 8,278,492 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,278,492 - Yamaha Corporation Of America v. Black Hills Media, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 18, 2015 · IPR2013-00597 · APJ Peter P Chen · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2, 6, and 10–12 are unpatentable: Bi anticipates claims 2, 6, and 10–12; Gladwin anticipates claims 2, 6, 11, and 12; Berman renders claims 2, 6, 11, and 12 obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“[a] playlist is a list of a user’s favorite selections.” Ex. 1001, 1:33–34. Patent Owner quotes from the specification of the ’099 Patent: Playlists also facilitate the playing of a plurality of selections in a particular order. That is, the playlist may be compiled in an order in which the playing of selections therefrom is desired. The selections may then be automatically played sequentially from the playlist. Typically, selections may also be played randomly from a playlist. PO Resp. 10; Ex. 1001, 1:45–52 (emphasis added).2 As noted by Petitioner, this passage reflects that a playlist may have a particular order of selections (see Pet. Reply 6), but also expressly discloses that selections may be played randomly from a playlist. slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“wireless handheld remote control which is associated with and separate from the media player device,” arguing that the term requires “a handheld remote control that can operate as an independent device relative to the media player that it control.” PO Resp. 14–16 (emphasis and grammatical error in original); see also Tr. 70:1–14 (“independent and separate would be synonyms.”). Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s proposal is narrow and excludes “a standard remote control for a device,” Pet. Reply 8–9. We agree, as in addition to the Petitioner’s contentions, we note the terms “operate” and “independent” do not appear in the ’099 patent. 9 We decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction over the ordinary and customary meaning of the term.” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelOther
“year of practical experience with networked multimedia.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 8. Patent Owner’s proposal is similar, requiring “a person with a bachelor’s degree in computer science or electrical engineering and one year of practical experience with networked media.” PO Resp. 7. The parties dispute Petitioner’s use of the qualifying phrase “at least” in describing the level of education and work experience. While we disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that “at least” is “improper because it is open-ended” (PO Resp. 7–8),3 we determine that an express definition of the level of ordinary skill is not required. The level of ordinary skill in the art can be reflected in the cited prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown.”) (internal quotations omitted); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Here, neither party has provided a sufficient explanation as to how their specific proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill (and in particular the importance of the inclusion or exclusion of “at least”) affects the analysis in this case. Therefore, we find the level of ordinary skill in the art to” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“B. Motion to Amend In its Motion to Amend, Patent Owner moves to cancel independent claim 1 and dependent claim 9. Paper 25. Petitioner’s Reply does not oppose the motion. Pet. Reply 1. We grant the motion to amend, and proceed to analyze the remaining five claims.” slip op. at 10
Patent outcomesUS 8,230,099 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,230,099 - Avx Corporation v. Greatbatch Ltd.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 14, 2015 · IPR2014-01461 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment, entered judgment against it on claims 1–20, and cancelled those claims.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party1 may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Although not titled as such, we interpret Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response as a request for adverse judgment under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Patent Owner’s request for judgment against itself is granted; FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is entered against Patent Owner under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) with respect to claims 1–20 of U.S. Patent No. 7,244,279; and FURTHER ORDERED that claims 1–20 of U.S. Patent No. 7,244,279 are CANCELLED.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,244,279 - Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC / Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc. v. Velocity Patent LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 6, 2015 · IPR2014-01247 · APJ Peter P Chen · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request to cancel challenged claims 31 and 32 and entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner before institution.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“of claims 31 and 32 (Paper 19). Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), cancellation of all challenged claims leaving no remaining claims for trial is construed as a request for entry of adverse judgment. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Patent Owner’s request to cancel claims 31 and 32 of U.S. Patent No. 5,954,781, is granted; and FURTHER ORDERED that adverse judgment is entered herein against Patent Owner.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 5,954,781 - PTAB · Nov 24, 2014 · PGR2014-00010 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · PGR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated PGR2014-00010 without a final decision; it also granted confidential treatment of the settlement agreement.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Patent Owner’s preliminary response is not yet due. On November 20, 2014, the parties filed a joint motion to terminate the proceeding (Paper 7) and a copy of their written settlement agreement (Ex. 2001). Along with the motion to terminate, the parties also filed a joint motion to treat the settlement agreement as business confidential information and keep it separate from the file of U.S. Patent No. 8,598,219 (“the ’219 patent”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 327(b) and 37 C.F.R § 42.74(c). Paper 8, 1.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,598,219 - PTAB · Sep 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00555 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the five inter partes reviews without issuing final written decisions.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Based on the present record, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate these inter partes reviews both as to Sealed Air and Pregis without rendering a final written decision. See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 3
None
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.