- PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00085 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–11, 13, and 15 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we have authority to institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Preliminary Reply, the Preliminary Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims of the ’659 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the Challenged Claims on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“We disagree with Patent Owner. Our analysis under Fintiv is guided by the USPTO Director’s Memorandum issued on June 21, 2022, titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation.”8 The Director’s Memorandum explains that, when a petitioner makes a Sotera-type stipulation, “it mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB” and “[w]ith such a stipulation, if an IPR or PGR is instituted, the grounds the PTAB resolves will differ from those present in 8 https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretio nary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf (“Director’s Memorandum”). the parallel district court litigation.” Director’s Memorandum 7 (citing Sotera, IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19). Pursuant to the Director’s Memorandum, we “will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR or PGR in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Id. Because Petitioner provides a Sotera-type stipulation, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution under Fintiv.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Upon review of the prior art of record and the parties’ arguments, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision as it appears consistent with the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). Petitioner’s proposed definition appears overly restrictive, as it requires a graduate degree in a narrow field of engineering or equivalent experience. We find that a bachelor’s degree with the accompanying experience proposed by Patent Owner more closely aligns with the prior art of record and the ’659 patent. We note, however, there is some overlap in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art because Patent Owner’s proposal includes “at least” a bachelor’s degree, which would encompass Petitioner’s master’s degree as well. Prelim. Resp. 19. Nonetheless, our determination herein would be the same under either party’s definition.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s claim construction. By using the word “or,” the plain and ordinary meaning of “prone, kneeling, or standing” is that only one must be satisfied to meet the claim. See, e.g., SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The disjunctive ‘or’ plainly designates that a series describes alternatives.”). Furthermore, and although claims are read in light of the specification, limitations in a specification are not read into a claim. In re van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Even if the Specification describes embodiments in which the user can begin in a prone position and then transition to a kneeling or standing position, as Patent Owner points out (see Prelim. Resp. 20), the claim does not recite the term “transitioning,” and we do not read the terms “each of” or “substantially flat surface” into this claim limitation. For example, the claim does not recite a “substantially flat” top surface and Patent Owner’s attempt to infer this structure into the claim is not supported under the law. See id. at 29–30. For purposes of this Decision, we agree with Petitioner and construe “prone, kneeling, or standing” in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning as alternatives, and the prior art need only show one to satisfy this aspect of the claim.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,586,659 - PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00086 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 5-8, 10-15, 17, 18, 20, and 21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of success and declining Fintiv denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in an inter partes review). slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“1. “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position” With respect to the claim term “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position,” Patent Owner points to passages of the Specification, arguing that all three positions are possible. Prelim. Resp. 19–21 (citing Ex. 1001, Abstr., 4:13–17, 4:33–40; Ex. 2006 ¶ 18). We do not agree with Patent’s Owner proposed construction because even if the Specification discloses that all three positions are possible, that is not what the plain language of the claim requires. Claim 1 recites “or,” which means that a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in any one of the three positions. See, e.g., SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The disjunctive ‘or’ plainly designates that a series describes alternatives.”). Patent Owner does not identify any definition or disclaimer that would modify this plain meaning. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, we agree with Petitioner and apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position,” to construe “prone, kneeling, or standing” as alternatives, and the prior art need only show one to satisfy this aspect of the claim.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Neither party explains how or why its particular proposal impacts the issues before us in this proceeding. We find that a bachelor’s degree with the accompanying experience proposed by Patent Owner more closely aligns with the prior art of record and the ’044 patent. We note, however, there is some overlap in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art because Patent Owner’s proposal includes “at least” a bachelor’s degree, which would encompass Petitioner’s master’s degree as well. Prelim. Resp. 10. Nonetheless, our determination herein would be the same under either party’s definition.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted
“As the Board has held in a precedential decision, “at the institution stage, the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,359,044 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Advanced Coding Technologies, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00062 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that the prior art disclosed or taught the construed “emphasis level” limitation in any challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“which the amplitude of the high frequency components of the video signal is increased,” as required by the construction of “emphasis level.”7 See Prelim. Resp. 9 (“the Petition’s analysis of the claim limitations containing these terms against the cited references does not indicate that those references disclose these limitations under Petitioner’s proposed constructions in the District Court Action”). Thus, without Petitioner mapping the constructions to the prior art in a clear and identifiable way, we determine the Petition itself does not satisfy Petitioner’s burden. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.104(b)(3)– (4).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“the terms “emphasis processing” and “emphasis level.” In the Petition, Petitioner states that no constructions are necessary (Pet. 2), but after filing 2 US 5,491,514; issued Feb. 13, 1996. Ex. 1005. 3 US 5,241,387; issued Aug. 31, 1993. Ex. 1006. 4 US 6,801,665 B1; published Sept. 30, 1999. Ex. 1007. the Petition, Petitioner proposed constructions of those terms in the parties’ district-court litigation, stating that: (i) the claim term “emphasis processing” means “increasing the amplitude of the high frequency components of a video signal;” and (ii) the claim term “emphasis level” means “a value that represents the amount by which the amplitude of the high frequency components of the video signal is increased.” Ex. 2003, 10– 11. After Patent Owner relied on those constructions in its Preliminary Response (see, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 8–10),5 Petitioner requested (Ex. 3001), and the Board authorized (Paper 8), additional briefing to address how the analysis in the Petition applies under those constructions.6 Because we determine Petitioner’s showings with respect to those constructions are inadequate to carry Petitioner’s burden, our discussion below focuses primarily on those aspects of the parties’ briefing.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialNot reached
“Discretionary Denial Because we determine Petitioner has not carried its burden on the merits, we do not reach the parties’ arguments relating to discretionary denial. See Pet. 98–99; Prelim. Resp. 26–32.” slip op. at 11
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,845,128 - Mediatek Inc. v. Parkervision, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · May 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00150 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–5 on all four asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the Gibson and Schiltz combination.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“As set forth in the Director’s Memorandum, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (dated June 21, 2022), at 7, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretion ary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf, the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR . . . in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition. Petitioner’s stipulation (Ex. 1025) satisfies the language from the Director’s Memorandum quoted above. Therefore, we need not analyze each Fintiv factor to reach the determination that we will not exercise our discretion to deny institution in view of the parallel Western District of Texas Litigation.” slip op. at 14
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“We disagree. The Petition is clear that it presents alternative challenges where Goldberg, Thacker, ITU-T J.83, and/or AAPA are added to the combination of Gibson and Schiltz or are added to Crols, if the term “cable modem,” recited in the preamble of claim 1, is determined to be limiting. Pet. 6–7. In the context presented here, “and/or” clearly means one or more of the four additional references. And Petitioner’s reliance on one or more of the additional references is clear in the context of the issues before us based on Petitioner’s analysis of the preamble of claim 1, where Petitioner clearly states, “[a]nd to the extent that the preamble is limiting and requires a ‘cable modem,’ it would have been obvious to use the modem of Gibson (as modified by Schiltz, discussed below) as a cable modem, in view of Thacker, Goldberg, ITU-T J.83, and/or AAPA.” Pet. 42 (Ground 1); see id. at 66–67 (similarly asserting, in the context of Ground 2, that, “[t]o the extent that the preamble is limiting and requires a ‘cable modem,’ it would have been obvious to use the modem of Crols as a cable modem, in view of Thacker, Goldberg, ITU-T J.83, and/or AAPA”). Petitioner also includes a discussion as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to “use the modems of Gibson modified with Schiltz (Ground 1), and Crols (Ground 2), as ‘cable modems,’ in view of the DOCSIS References (Thacker and Goldberg), ITU-T J.83, and AAPA,” and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in so doing. Id. at 37–40. Thus, we do not agree with Patent Owner that the Petition lacks particularity and we find that the Petition clearly sets forth the alternative combinations discussed above such that Patent Owner has a fair opportunity to respond.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“l. Summary as to Claim 1 For the reasons discussed above, on the present record we find that Petitioner has established that the combination of Gibson and Schiltz teaches each of the elements of claim 1 and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of these two references as proposed by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success in so doing.” slip op. at 40
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is identical to the level of skill that we found applicable in the final written decision in the TCL IPR. See IPR2021-00985, Paper 44 at 13. We see no reason to deviate from our previous finding, which is now further supported by Dr. Larson’s testimony. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 26. Accordingly, at this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’835 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,292,835 - PTAB · Feb 9, 2024 · IPR2023-01235 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–6 on all petition grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood of success on obviousness over Szrek and did not reach the Llach–Szrek ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“We disagree. First, we agree with Patent Owner that the fact pattern presented here is not the typical situation in which the factors from General Plastic are considered. In particular, this proceeding challenges claims of a different patent than at issue in IPR2020-00084. Second, although the parties may have gained insight as to how the Board would handle challenges based on the same references asserted in the earlier proceeding, that insight (to the extent it gives an advantage) applies to both parties. Third, the first proceeding was a post-grant review that had a specific timing requirement (see 35 U.S.C. § 321(c)), in contrast to the present proceeding in which the filing of the Petition did not have the same or similar time constraint.6 In these circumstances, we find it appropriate to give less weight to factors based on the mere passage of time such as whether Petitioner knew of the prior art at the time of filing the petition in PGR2020- 00084 (clearly Petitioner did because two of the same references are asserted here) and whether Petitioner had received Patent Owner’s preliminary response from PGR2020-00084 at the time of filing the instant Petition. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached
“Even assuming Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner and assuming we may exercise our discretion to deny institution based on unclean hands (see Kavo Dental Techs, LLC v. Osseo Imaging, Inc., IPR2020-00659, Paper 10 at 19 (PTAB June 10, 2020)), Patent Owner essentially asks us to resolve multiple factual issues related to its contract dispute with Linq3 to justify denial of institution. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 1– 26. Many, if not all, of these issues appear to be involved in the contract dispute, which will be resolved by the Arizona state court. We are not in a good position to make determinations about these particular issues at this stage of the proceeding, on the limited record before us. Rather, we find that the state court is better suited to address the conduct of Linq3 of which Patent Owner complains. Accordingly, we do not dive headfirst into these matters that are better addressed by the state court. To the extent Patent Owner seeks to pursue its argument that Linq3 is a real party of interest to Petitioner, even though no time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) has been asserted, Patent Owner may raise the issue of real party in interest again in its Patent Owner Response and the parties may brief and argue the issue during trial.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 13).7 Patent Owner does not propose a level of ordinary skill in the art in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we find that Petitioner’s uncontested level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’135 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner contends that we should follow the Board’s decision in PGR2020-00084 and construe “transaction processor” and “data package” in accordance with each term’s plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 13; see id. at 13–19. Patent Owner does not take a position as to claim construction at this stage of the proceeding. See generally Prelim. Resp. In PGR2020-00084, the Board construed “transaction processor”8 in accordance with its plain meaning as “a processor . . . that processes transactions between two devices” and specifically “decline[d] to limit processors . . . to ‘third party’ processors . . . because the intrinsic record does not justify such a modification and it would create uncertainty.” Ex. 1008, 22. And, as Petitioner indicates, the Board determined that “data package” also is understood in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. at 22–24; see id. at 24 n.10. At this stage of the proceeding 8 In that proceeding, the Board also construed “transaction processor system.” Ex. 1008, 13–22. and on the present record, we need not construe any claim terms expressly because none are in dispute. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,865,135 - PTAB · Dec 12, 2023 · IPR2023-00910 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–6 over all petitioned grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing; denied joinder as moot.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In an inter partes review, the petitioner must show with particularity why each challenged claim is unpatentable. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b). The burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 9
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“Patent Owner argues the Petition should be denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) because (1) “Petitioner’s inability to commit to non-duplicative efforts between the District Court Litigation and this proceeding weighs in favor of discretionary den[ial]” (Prelim. Resp. 59), and (2) Petitioner failed to request a conference call prior to filing its Motion for Joinder (Prelim. Resp. 59–60). Petitioner asserts that no trial date has been set in the parallel district court litigation, which Patent Owner does not dispute. Pet. 55; Prelim. Resp. 59–60. Additionally, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (CTPG) states that “[a] party who files a motion for joinder should arrange a conference call . . . within five business days of filing the motion.” CTPG 76 (Nov. 2019) (emphasis added).8 In light of the termination of the earlier proceeding, Petitioner’s failure to request a conference call is harmless error. Thus, we find Patent Owner’s arguments unpersuasive and decline to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under § 314(a).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“Pet.”) requesting inter partes review of claims 1–6 of U.S. Patent No. 9,445,041 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’041 patent”). Petitioner also filed a Motion for Joinder requesting joinder with IPR2022-01548 (Paper 2), but IPR2022- 01548 has since terminated due to settlement (IPR2022-01548, Paper 18). Therefore, we deny the Motion as moot. Patent Owner Advanced Coding Technologies, LLC filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”). slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “at least a [b]achelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, with 2–3 years of experience in digital video processing, or a related field, or equivalent research or professional experience.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 26). Patent Owner states that it applies Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for the purposes of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 29. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill, with the exclusion of “at least” in defining the education 6 US 2011/0097059 A1, published Apr. 28, 2011. Ex. 1008. Petitioner refers to “Sekiguchi” as “Seikiguchi.” See, e.g., Pet. 3. level, which would render the definition open-ended and inclusive of persons of expert-level skill.” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,445,041 - Amphenol Corp. v. PPC Broadband, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 23, 2023 · IPR2022-00719 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 8–15, and 18 are unpatentable as obvious over Youtsey, Lionetto, and Horak; the Board did not reach the alternative Tarrant and Bell ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“in that neither party proposes constructions for any specific claim terms. See generally PO Resp.; Pet. Reply; PO Sur-reply. Accordingly, based on our review of the complete record, we maintain and reaffirm that no explicit construction of any claim term is needed to resolve the issues presented by the parties and resolved in this Decision. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelOther
“G. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, supported by Dr. Dickens’ testimony, proposes that a” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“(f) Analysis and Conclusion as to Motivation to Modify Youtsey Having considered and balanced the prior art for all that it teaches,” slip op. at 89
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“For these reasons, Patent Owner’s first objective indicia argument is unavailing. Petitioner’s Patent Application Patent Owner argues that Petitioner, in its own U.S. Patent Application No. 13/530,831 (see Ex. 2013, “the ’831 Application”) filed several years after the ’983 patent’s priority date, took positions contrary to and belying Petitioner’s positions in this proceeding. See PO Resp. 2, 71–73. In particular, according to Patent Owner, the ’831 Application “included claims directed to the same coupler-body grounding member/path limitations at issue here,” demonstrating that “five of Petitioner’s own inventors (i.e., [persons of ordinary skill in the art]) understood that a coupler-body grounding member/path was patentable.” Id. (citing Ex. 2013, code (57), Figs. 4, 5, ¶¶ 3, 5, 14, 18, claim 1; Ex. 2014, 4:6–14; Ex. 2015, 3– 6; Ex. 2016, 2); PO Sur-reply 3; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 190–199. Patent Owner cites Andersen Corp. v. Pella Corp., 300 F. App’x 893, 899–900 (Fed. Cir. 2008), as “finding statements made in the accused infringer’s own patent applications provided objective evidence that the challenged claims were not obvious.” PO Resp. 73. Petitioner in reply points out that the original claims of the ’831 Application were rejected by the Examiner, and the claims were not allowed until they were amended “to require the grounding member to be ‘exposed outside of the connector body,’ supporting that other features attribute to the non-obviousness of [Petitioner’s] claimed invention.” Pet. Reply 19–20; see Ex. 2014, 3:35–4:15 (issued claim 1 from the ’831 Application). Petitioner distinguishes the Andersen decision cited by Patent Owner as involving “long-felt need, the failure of others, unexpected results, copying, and praise by others,” none of which are present here. Pet. Reply 20. Patent Owner replies that the Examiner’s rejection in the ’831 Application “fails to change the fact that Petitioner’s own inventors thought that the original claims were nonobvious.” PO Sur-reply 3. Patent Owner additionally notes that the “rejection was based on a parent patent to the ’983 [p]atent,” which Patent Owner argues “confirm[s] that Petitioner’s inventors were trying to patent the same claimed invention believing it to be patentable.” Id. (citing Ex. 2015, 4–5).” slip op. at 94
Patent outcomesUS 10,446,983 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,446,983 - PTAB · Jul 19, 2023 · IPR2023-00385 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–7 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Oracle would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon considering the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has satisfied this threshold requirement, and therefore we institute inter partes review of claims 1–7 of the ’421 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“at least a Bachelor’s Degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related subject, and two years of experience working with augmented reality, portable electronic devices, mobile computing, databases, computer networks, or related technologies. A more advanced degree can substitute for work experience. This POSITA would be aware of and generally knowledgeable about the structure and operation of augmented reality devices as well as different databases and computer networks. Paradiso Decl., ¶¶ 40–43.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner “submit[s] that the terms of the 421 Patent’s claims do not require further construction and can be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 14–15 (citing Paradiso Decl. ¶ 78). Petitioner submits that the Petition’s “sections comparing the claims to the prior art include further” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“have displayed Ivey’s parking-space-payment information on a real-time camera view, as taught by Matsumoto, to “more efficiently streamline parking enforcement.” Pet. 47–48. Regarding the modified Ivey with Tillotson, Petitioner asserts: A POSITA would have recognized that adapting Ivey in view of Tillotson’s teachings would have been advantageous to both Ivey and Matsumoto and would make the parking management system more efficient and easier to use—a result that would have been highly desirable to a POSITA during the relevant time period, particularly in settings with high usage or limited resources. Id. at 48. Petitioner supports these contentions with Dr. Paradiso’s testimony. Id. at 47–48 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 279–282). At this stage of the proceeding, and based on the current record, Petitioner’s articulated reasons to combine Ivey, Matsumoto, and Tillotson are supported by rational underpinning.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,438,421 - PTAB · Apr 13, 2023 · IPR2022-01547 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–7 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least claims 1, 2, and 4–7 over Loomis and Hodge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, on this record, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the Challenged Claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“G. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, supported by Dr. Lett’s testimony, proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have been a person with a working knowledge of cache memory technologies.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 427). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in an academic discipline emphasizing the design of electrical, computer, or software technologies, in combination with experience with memory management technologies such as caching. Superior education or experience would compensate for deficiencies in either.” Id. at 10–11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 42). Patent Owner states that “[f]or the purposes of this Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 13. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we find that Petitioner’s uncontested level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’244 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner and Patent Owner agree that no claim terms require an express construction at this stage of the proceeding.8 Pet. 11; Prelim. 8 During a conference call and as documented in a joint email thereafter, (1) Petitioner acknowledged an error in the Petition, where it states that four claim elements should be construed instead of stating that no terms require construction and (2) Patent Owner agreed that Petitioner’s clarification mooted an argument raised on page 13 of the Preliminary Response regarding the error in the Petition. See Ex. 3001 (Email from D. Smith dated Feb. 17, 2023). Resp. 13. Accordingly, we need not construe any claim terms expressly because none are in dispute. See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Whether an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to modify the teachings of a reference is a question of fact.” WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). “[W]here a party argues a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine references, it must show the artisan ‘would have had a reasonable expectation of success from doing so.’” Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Prods. Inc., 876 F.3d 1350, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1154, 1068–69 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,313,244 - PTAB · Apr 13, 2023 · IPR2022-01548 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–6 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that TikTok would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any response thereto shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and the evidence of record, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in establishing unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’041 patent. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “at least a [b]achelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, with 2–3 years of experience in digital video processing, or a related field, or equivalent research or professional experience.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 26). Patent Owner states that it applies Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for the purposes of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 7.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Resp. 34–35. First, Mr. Lett’s Declaration constitutes evidence cited to and relied on in the Petition. Thus, to the extent there is repetition, it is more reasonable to infer that the Petition repeats Mr. Lett’s testimony (not the other way around). Second, that a petition repeats the analysis of an expert declarant is not a reason, in and of itself, to give that expert’s opinion little to no weight. Rather, the critical inquiries are whether the declaration testimony “is conclusory and unsupported” and whether it “disclose[s] the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based.” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a)). Additionally, a similar important inquiry is whether the declaration testimony supports the arguments made in the Petition. If these conditions are satisfied, we do not give little to no weight to declaration testimony simply because it is repeated in a petition, just as we do not give little to no weight to teachings of the prior art that are repeated in a petition. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s level of” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“At this stage, we determine it is unnecessary to determine whether the challenged claims are limited as argued by Patent Owner because, as explained below, we determine Petitioner has shown that both Morikawa and Suzuki teach or reasonably suggest each limitation of the challenged independent claims even under Patent Owner’s proposed requirement of a variable output frame rate. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). To any extent that the parties disagree regarding this issue or the scope of the challenged claims, including whether prosecution history disclaimer applies and/or whether the claims are otherwise limited to variable output frame rates, the parties are encouraged to address such issues more directly in future briefing. We note for a statement made during prosecution to qualify as a disavowal of claim scope, the statement “must be ‘so clear as to show reasonable clarity and deliberateness,’ and ‘so unmistakable as to be unambiguous evidence of disclaimer.’” Genuine Enabling Tech. LLC v. Nintendo Co., 29 F.4th 1365, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). “The party seeking to invoke prosecution history disclaimer bears the burden of proving the existence of a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that would have been evident to one skilled in the art.” Id. (quoting Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Shire Pharms., Inc., 839 F.3d 1111, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,445,041
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.