- Alere Inc. v. Rembrandt Diagnostics, LPSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 9, 2018 · IPR2016-01502 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 2 is unpatentable as anticipated by MacKay; claims 3–5 were not shown unpatentable over MacKay and Cipkowski.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner
“structure or steps, or if it is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the claim.” Catalina Mkt’g Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For example, a preamble may be limiting when the disputed preamble phrase provides antecedent basis for a claim term in the body of a claim, the specification underscores that the additional structure recited in the preamble is important, or when the patentee clearly relied upon the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. Id. at 808–09. “Conversely, a preamble is not limiting ‘where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention,’” id. at 808, or where the patentee uses the preamble to give “a descriptive name to the set of limitations in the body of the claim,” IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The phrase ‘control apparatus’ in the preamble merely gives a descriptive name to the set of limitations in the body of the claim that completely set forth the invention.”). The term “device” is not recited in the body of any claim of the ’019 patent,4 the body of claim 1 recites a structurally complete invention, and the preamble phrase “device for collecting and assaying a sample of biological fluid” specifies the intended use of the invention. Thus, we find the claims of the ’019 patent do not support construing “device” as a limitation. See Catalina Mkt’g, 289 F.3d at 808–09.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“device” set forth above requires a single, unitary structure rather than a collection of separate structures that could be used during the test. See id. at 18 (concluding without analysis that the dictionary definition requires a “single, unitary structure”). Indeed, despite the ubiquitous use of the term “device” in patents generally, we are directed to no case in which the term “device,” by itself, was found to require a single, unitary structure. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, Section 2106, I (identifying “devices” as one of the four categories of statutory subject matter); Saffran v. Johnson & Johnson, 712 F.3d 549, 565 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (O’Malley concurring in part) (confirming that, in general, the term “device” is generic). Thus, we are not persuaded that the ordinary meaning of the term “device” requires a “single, unitary structure.” See Ex. 1023 ¶ 66 (Dr. Bohannon testifying that the word device, like the words “apparatus” or “system,” is merely a generic term that does not have a specialized meaning in the art and does not require a single, unitary structure). slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We do not find this argument persuasive. As noted above, we do not construe claim 1 to contain a method step of adding fluid to the container. We construe the first wherein clause of claim 1(c), instead, to require a structure that is capable of allowing liquid to enter the container when the flow control channel is properly disposed therein and is capable of directing this liquid to the sample loading zone of the assay test strip without the liquid having to migrate through an intermediate structure, such as a wicking material. We are persuaded—and Patent Owner does not dispute—that the apparatus of MacKay, as disclosed in Figures 8A–C, has a structure that is capable of achieving both functions. See, e.g., Tr. 26:10–30:20. First, given the open nature of the container, it is evident that liquid may be added to the container when the flow control channel is disposed within the container, and Patent Owner does not assert otherwise. See, e.g., id. Second, even if the fluid present in Figures 8A–C is considered, there is no intermediate structure in the container of MacKay that would prevent additional assay sample fluid from entering the container and being immediately directed to the sample loading zone of the assay test strips.6 Based on the foregoing, we find that MacKay discloses every limitation of claims 1 and 2 of the ’019 patent. Accordingly, Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 2 is anticipated by MacKay.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“discloses the subject matter of claims 3–5 of the ’019 patent. Pet. 26–30. Petitioner also asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to insert the test trip and flow control channel of MacKay in the holder of Cipkowski, in order to prevent “flooding of the test strip as taught in MacKay.” Id. at 29.” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 6,548,019 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,548,019 - Neste Oil Oyj v. Reg Synthetic Fuels, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 26, 2017 · IPR2013-00578 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Remand
Claims 1, 3, 4, and 8 are unpatentable as anticipated by Craig; claims 2 and 5 are not proven unpatentable because Dindi is not prior art.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandDecided for patent owner
“To remove Dindi as a prior art reference, the record must establish either: (1) a conception and reduction to practice before the filing date of Dindi; or (2) a conception before the filing date of the Dindi patent combined with diligence and reduction to practice after that date. See Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 726 F.3d 1306, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The Federal Circuit held that the record before us establishes, with sufficient corroboration, that Mr. Abhari conceived of the invention of claims 2 and 5 of the ’804 patent on April 29, 2008. REG Synthetic Fuels, 841 F.3d at 963. It is undisputed that Dindi was filed on June 13, 2008, and that Mr. Abhari filed on December 4, 2008 the application that issued as the ’804 patent. Dindi is not prior art—and, therefore, Neste’s ground of unpatentability fails—if either: (1) Mr. Abhari actually reduced to practice the invention of claims 2 and 5 between April 29 and June 13, 2008, or (2) Mr. Abhari exercised reasonably continuous diligence between June 13 and December 4, 2008, when the invention was constructively reduced to practice by filing of a patent application. Because, as set forth below, we find sufficient evidence of actual reduction to practice, we do not address Mr. Abhari’s alleged diligence.” slip op. at 5
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“To remove Dindi as a prior art reference, the record must establish either: (1) a conception and reduction to practice before the filing date of Dindi; or (2) a conception before the filing date of the Dindi patent combined with diligence and reduction to practice after that date. See Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 726 F.3d 1306, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The Federal Circuit held that the record before us establishes, with sufficient corroboration, that Mr. Abhari conceived of the invention of claims 2 and 5 of the ’804 patent on April 29, 2008. REG Synthetic Fuels, 841 F.3d at 963. It is undisputed that Dindi was filed on June 13, 2008, and that Mr. Abhari filed on December 4, 2008 the application that issued as the ’804 patent. Dindi is not prior art—and, therefore, Neste’s ground of unpatentability fails—if either: (1) Mr. Abhari actually reduced to practice the invention of claims 2 and 5 between April 29 and June 13, 2008, or (2) Mr. Abhari exercised reasonably continuous diligence between June 13 and December 4, 2008, when the invention was constructively reduced to practice by filing of a patent application. Because, as set forth below, we find sufficient evidence of actual reduction to practice, we do not address Mr. Abhari’s alleged diligence.” slip op. at 5
- ExcludeNot reached
“As noted above, the Federal Circuit vacated our decision on Neste’s Motion to Exclude as to Exhibits 2012, 2013, 2057, and 2062, for further consideration of the hearsay objections in light of the decision on appeal, “because [they] may be relevant for diligence and reduction to practice.” REG Synthetic Fuels, 841 F.3d at 965. Upon review, however, we have determined that we need not rely on any of the exhibits in question to reach our decision in REG’s favor. For this reason, Neste’s objections to the exhibits are moot, as we would have found against Neste on the merits regardless of the outcome of the Motion.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 8,231,804 mixed§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 8,231,804 - Qualcomm Incorporated / Qualcomm Atheros, Inc. v. Parkervision, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 7, 2017 · IPR2015-01828 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 21, 281, 283–286, 288, 289, and 293 are unpatentable as obvious over Nozawa and Philips 4052; claims 25, 26, 363–366, 368, 369, and 373 were not proven unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Qualcomm contends, citing Dr. Larson’s testimony, that one of ordinary skill in the art as of October 1998 would possess, at a minimum, either (a) a master of science degree in electrical engineering and two or more years of experience in radio frequency circuit design, or (b) a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering with three or more years of experience with the design and development of RF circuits. Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–39). ParkerVision does not contest Qualcomm’s designation of the level of ordinary skill in the art as of the date of the invention. Accordingly, we adopt Qualcomm’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“During the trial, ParkerVision asserted that we should maintain our construction of “harmonic” (PO Resp. 19–23), and Qualcomm did not address the adopted construction. With respect to the remaining terms, ParkerVision argues that none of these terms are material to the remaining dispute between the parties, which is focused on the “harmonic” limitation. Id. at 24–25. On this, we agree. As the remaining terms are not material to the parties’ dispute, we decline to construe them further. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyOther
“Regarding the Maas equation, ParkerVision directs us to a portion of Dr. Larson’s deposition, in which Dr. Larson used the Maas equation to calculate the harmonics produced by a mixer, given certain assumed inputs supplied by ParkerVision’s counsel (an input signal of 100 kHz and an LO input of 1 MHz). Id. at 29–31 (citing Ex. 2001, 177–87). ParkerVision notes that Dr. Larson’s calculations produced -0.9, 3.1, and -4.9 MHz as the first three harmonics, which are not integer multiples. PO Resp. 31. Thus, ParkerVision argues, the circuit of Nozawa does not necessarily produce a plurality of harmonics, defined by the ’940 patent as being integer multiples of the fundamental frequency. Id. Qualcomm argues that the Maas equation “shows that Nozawa will necessarily produce the required ‘integer multiple’ harmonics for many input frequencies.” Pet. Reply 4 (emphasis added). According to Qualcomm, it is not required to show that Nozawa will produce integer multiple harmonics for all operating conditions; rather, it is only relevant that Nozawa could be operated to produce the harmonics. Id. Regarding Dr. Larson’s calculations during his deposition, Qualcomm contends that even using the assumed inputs provided by ParkerVision, the Maas equation shows that the 35th and 37th harmonics are 35.1 and -36.9 MHz, respectively, which are integer multiples of the fundamental frequency of 0.9 MHz. Id. at 7. Qualcomm also notes that selecting slightly different input frequencies for the Maas equation will produce much lower integer multiple harmonics, such as at the 7th and 9th harmonics. Id. at 8. The parties’ disagreements over the various inputs and permutations of the Maas equation aside, one point appears to be beyond dispute: under some conditions, but not all conditions, the Maas equation shows that Nozawa’s structure will produce a periodic signal that contains integer multiples of the fundamental frequency. In other words, the structure of Nozawa is capable of producing a signal that satisfies the limitations of the claim. Qualcomm argues that this is sufficient to show unpatentability. Pet. Reply 13 (citing Gen. Electric Co. v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1945)). On this point, we agree. Claim 21 and its dependents are apparatus claims; as such, they “cover what a device is, not what a device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In other words, the “periodic signal” limitations, which are directed to the transitory electrical signals produced by the apparatus, cannot give rise to patentability so long as the underlying apparatus has been shown to be capable of generating those signals. Here, it is undisputed that Nozawa’s circuit is capable of generating a periodic signal having a plurality of harmonics, wherein those harmonics are integer multiples of the fundamental frequency. Furthermore, we agree with Qualcomm that Nozawa’s low-pass filter is capable of isolating one or more of those harmonics, as desired.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Qualcomm contends that “Nozawa and Philips 4052 both provide architectures and methods for upconversion that can be used for a transmitter.” Pet. 21. Indeed, as Qualcomm observes, the 74HC4052 chip described in Philips 4052 is used in Nozawa. Id. at 28–29. We agree with Qualcomm that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to look to the disclosure of Philips 4052 to learn more about the operation of the 74HC4052 chip disclosed in Nozawa. ParkerVision does not challenge that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Nozawa with Philips 4052.” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 6,091,940 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,091,940 - Atlas Copco Airpower N.V. v. Kaeser Kompressoren SESome claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 23, 2016 · IPR2015-01421 · APJ Erica A Franklin · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–12, and 14–20 are unpatentable; claim 13 was not shown unpatentable, because White did not teach the claimed input-compressor control.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Based upon our review of Dunne and the supporting testimony of Dr. Knaebel, whose opinion, in this regard, we afford persuasive weight, we agree with Petitioner that Dunne discloses each element of claim 1, including inherently disclosing two alternative embodiments wherein a pressure increasing device is provided within the connecting line to increase pressure of the gas flowing from the second discharging line to the second feeding line. In particular, we are persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that Dunne teaches that the compression required by paragraph 26 may optionally be provided in either stream 7 or 9, shown in Dunne’s Figure 1. Each of those streams may be seen as “going to the adsorption zone” and providing an opportunity for compression “prior to contacting the adsorbent wheel,” as required by Dunne. Ex. 1002 ¶ 26. Further, compression in any of those streams is consistent with the teaching in paragraph 27 of Dunne that compression may occur “prior to or after the condenser on the regeneration or cooling effluent,” i.e., Figure 1 shows that compression occurs in stream 7 prior to reaching the condenser and in stream 9 after the condenser, wherein each of those streams may be considered a regeneration effluent as they flow from the regeneration sector.” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not provide a statement describing a person of ordinary skill in the art. Nor does Patent Owner provide the testimony of a declarant purported to be such a person. Based upon our review of the record as a whole, we find that Petitioner’s statement regarding the qualifications of a person of ordinary skill in the art is sound and supported by the evidence. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s description. Moreover, we recognize Dr. Knaebel as a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“The Specification explains that the pressure increasing device is provided to “increase the pressure of the gas flowing from the second discharging line to the second feeding line.” Ex. 1001, 3:46–48. The Specification also explains that the pressure increasing device “may be a mechanical compressor, in particular a compressor and/or a fan and/or a pump and/or a side-channel compressor and/or a turbo compressor, e.g., a radial compressor.” Ex. 1001, 5:46–49. Independent claim 1 describes the connecting line by reciting, in part, “the second discharging line being in communication with the second feeding line and thus forming a connecting line.” Based upon our consideration of those descriptions and the Specification as a whole, we construe the phrase “a pressure increasing device provided within the connecting line” broadly to mean a device, such as a mechanical compressor, in particular a compressor, fan, pump, side-channel compressor, and/or a turbo compressor, e.g., a radial compressor, provided within the line formed between the second discharging line and the second feeding line, wherein the device increases pressure of gas flowing from the second discharging line to the second feeding line.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Based upon our review of Dunne and the supporting testimony of Dr. Knaebel, whose opinion, in this regard, we afford persuasive weight, we agree with Petitioner that Dunne discloses each element of claim 1, including inherently disclosing two alternative embodiments wherein a pressure increasing device is provided within the connecting line to increase pressure of the gas flowing from the second discharging line to the second feeding line. In particular, we are persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that Dunne teaches that the compression required by paragraph 26 may optionally be provided in either stream 7 or 9, shown in Dunne’s Figure 1. Each of those streams may be seen as “going to the adsorption zone” and providing an opportunity for compression “prior to contacting the adsorbent wheel,” as required by Dunne. Ex. 1002 ¶ 26. Further, compression in any of those streams is consistent with the teaching in paragraph 27 of Dunne that compression may occur “prior to or after the condenser on the regeneration or cooling effluent,” i.e., Figure 1 shows that compression occurs in stream 7 prior to reaching the condenser and in stream 9 after the condenser, wherein each of those streams may be considered a regeneration effluent as they flow from the regeneration sector. Further, Petitioner has shown persuasively, and Patent Owner has not argued otherwise, that streams 7 and 9 depicted in Dunne’s Figure 1 make up a “connecting line in which a condenser 8 is provided” as required by claim 1. Pet. 28–30. Thus, we determine that Dunne’s inherent disclosure of providing a pressure increasing device in either of streams 7 or 9, results in two embodiments of the invention which necessarily meet all of the limitations in claim 1, including providing a pressure increasing device within the connecting line to increase the gas flowing from the second discharging line to the second feeding line.” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 8,349,054 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,349,054 - Honeywell International Inc. v. Allure Energy, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 6, 2016 · IPR2015-01248 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 5, 20, 22–25, and 30 are unpatentable as obvious over Yamashita and Shamoon; claims 2–4, 6–8, and 19 were not proven unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner is attempting to improperly limit the construction. As we explained in our Decision on Institution, we declined to limit “comparison” to a particular type of evaluation, and by our construction, we did not find that the “focus” of the “comparison” is to identify “any dissimilarity” as Patent Owner contends. See Inst. Dec. 9. Indeed, as evidenced by the dictionary definitions cited by Patent Owner and that we relied upon, determining dissimilarities is not the “focus” of the plain and ordinary meaning of “comparison” that we adopted. See Inst. Dec. 9 (citing Ex. 2003 (defining “comparison” as “the act of looking at things to see how they are similar or different” and “the act of suggesting that two or more things are similar or in the same category”)); see also Ex. 2011 (defining “comparison” as “the representing of one thing or person as similar to or like another” and “an examination of two or more items to establish similarities and dissimilarities”).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Here, we agree with Petitioner that the plain language of the claim is sufficient and no construction is necessary for this term. The claim language already establishes that there are two user profiles, each is associated with a particular and different mobile device, and the profiles include “information to alter an operating condition of the network device according to a preference of a [first/second] user.” The claim already addresses what attributes the user profile must have. We see no support in the claim language or specification for Patent Owner’s additional requirements that the profiles be “individual” and “include information unique to each user.”” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“v. Summary as to Claims 1, 20, 22–25, and 30 Patent Owner raises no evidence of secondary considerations of nonobviousness in this case. Thus, weighing the evidence of obviousness that is before us, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 20, 22–25, and 30 would have been obvious over the combination of Yamashita and Shamoon.” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not find Patent Owner’s arguments persuasive. Teaching away requires that “a person of ordinary skill upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994).4 Patent Owner cites nothing in Yamashita that says that adding the features from Shamoon in addition to the automatic functionality of Yamashita would be unlikely to work; Yamashita alleges only that manual control alone has certain disadvantages. 4 We understand Patent Owner to be arguing both that the references teach away from the combination generally and teach away because, in particular, the combination would change the principle of operation of the system. PO Resp. 33–36. See In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding no teaching away where nothing in the prior art device suggested that the claimed invention was unlikely to work). The lack of teaching away is confirmed by Yamashita’s disclosure of an embodiment requiring manual interaction. See Reply 20 (citing Ex. 1006, 22:31–51). Indeed, although Patent Owner contends that automatic functionality is “not the focus or main purpose of Shamoon,” PO Resp. 35, Shamoon’s system demonstrates that automatic functionality can be combined with manual functionality to result in a working system. See Ex. 1007, 8:36–45. As for Patent Owner’s contentions that Yamashita “abandoned bi- directional communication” (PO Resp. 35), we find no support in the cited portions of Yamashita for these contentions. Although Yamashita does tout the benefits of its automatic control system, the cited portions of Yamashita are silent about the advantages or disadvantages of “bi-directional communication.” As for Patent Owner’s arguments about substantial reconstruction and redesign (PO Resp. 36 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 91)), we do not find the testimony or argument persuasive. Yamashita’s control terminal and mobile terminals already has built in communication abilities (Ex. 1006, 11:31–38), and we find Dr. Selker’s testimony persuasive that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to add the ability to communicate the thermostat reading to verify that Yamashita’s automatic control worked. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 205–207. As for Patent Owner’s allegation that the combination with Shamoon would change Yamashita’s principle of operation, we disagree. Yamashita would continue to work as before; the messages, rules, and control information would continue operate in the same manner. Shamoon would only add additional functionality to allow for an improved user interface and two-way communication. Where the device would operate on the same principles as before, the combination does not change the principle of operation. See Mouttet, 686 F.3d at 1332 (noting Ratti inapplicable where the modified apparatus will operate “on the same principles as before”). As Petitioner explains, Shamoon demonstrates that its known techniques have been used to improve similar devices in similar ways. We find that Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinnings to support the combination. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 205–207, 213. Thus, we conclude that a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine the teachings of Yamashita and Shamoon.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 8,626,344 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,626,344 - Honeywell International Inc. v. Allure Energy, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 6, 2016 · IPR2015-01251 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 9–14, 16, and 26–29 are unpatentable as obvious over Yamashita and Shamoon; claims 15, 17, and 18 were not proven unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s further narrowing of our construction is improperly limiting. As we explained in our Decision on Institution, we declined to limit “comparing” to a particular type of evaluation, and by our construction, we did not find that the “focus” of the comparison is to identify “any dissimilarity” as Patent Owner contends. See Inst. Dec. 10. Indeed, as evidenced by the dictionary definitions cited by Patent Owner and that we relied upon, determining dissimilarities is not the “focus” of the plain and ordinary meaning of “comparing” that we adopted; rather, each of them emphasizes determining similarities as well. See Inst. Dec. 9 (citing Ex. 2002 (defining “comparison” as “the act of looking at things to see how they are similar or different” and “the act of suggesting that two or more things are similar or in the same category”)); see also Ex. 2006 (defining “comparison” as “the representing of one thing or person as similar to or like another” and “an examination of two or more items to establish similarities and dissimilarities”). The specification does not compel a different understanding. The” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“that the parties’ actual dispute is twofold. First, the parties dispute whether the mobile device must be able to transmit location information to the site regardless of whether the proximity setting is enabled or disabled. See Reply 8–9; PO Resp. 14–15. Second, Patent Owner argues that the entire process of proximity detection must be automatic. PO Resp. 14. As we explain below, we agree with Petitioner that this term does not require that the mobile device continue to send location reports if the proximity setting is not enabled, whereas we disagree with Petitioner that the proximity setting is limited to enabling or disabling the ability to send location reports. Instead, we find the specification supports a broader construction. In particular, we find that the specification states that “[f]or example, a user may enable proximity detection using proximity detection selector 1036 and energy use at a site may be altered based on a user[’]s distance to the site.” Ex. 1001, 46:45–48. It further explains that “[i]n some forms, proximity detection selector 1036 can be hidden, displayed, selectable, or any combination thereof in response to a user having a mobile device capable of being detected when a user is at or away from a site.” Id. at 46:50–54. Thus, we consider the broadest reasonable construction of “proximity setting” consistent with the specification to be “a setting that can enable or disable proximity detection, where energy use at a site may be altered based on the user’s location.” Both parties acknowledge that this is a reasonable meaning of the term. Reply 8; PO Resp. 12.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“In sum, Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the control terminal in Yamashita receives messages from the wireless terminals that represent the relative location of the mobile terminal (e.g., within 300 m of the site or moving away from the site) and that the control terminal includes a number of rules to compare the messages to determine what control information to send to the controlled appliances, and that as a result of the comparison sends control information to alter the condition of the controlled appliances. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 214–216. Thus, we are persuaded that Yamashita accounts for the “comparing limitations” of claim 9.” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We find that Petitioner has shown adequately that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Yamashita with Shamoon. In particular, we do not agree with Patent Owner that Yamashita teaches away from the combination or that the combination would change the principle of operation of Yamashita.3 Patent Owner is correct that Yamashita distinguishes manual control, and notes the disadvantages of “burdensome operations” and the possibility the user may forget to perform the required operations. Ex. 1005, 1:35–40. Patent Owner is also correct that Yamashita states that one objective of the invention is a system that can automatically control an appliance based on position without requiring any operation by the user. Id. at 1:44–47. Yet, Yamashita also discloses an embodiment where the user is prompted before a message is sent, which does require an operation by the user. Id. at 23:31–51. Thus, we do not agree that Yamashita disparages all manual interaction as Patent Owner contends. Moreover, teaching away requires that “a person of ordinary skill upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Patent Owner cites nothing in Yamashita that says that adding the communication features from Shamoon to transmit the thermostat readings to the mobile terminal to the automatic functionality of Yamashita would be unlikely to work; Yamashita alleges only that manual control alone has certain disadvantages, not that communicating information from the site to” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 8,626,344 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,626,344 - LG Chem, Ltd. v. Celgard, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 5, 2015 · IPR2014-00692 · APJ Donna M Praiss · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–11 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 7–10 over Tojo and claims 1–6 and 11 over Tobishima and Tojo; the other instituted grounds were not proven.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Our reviewing court, however, has “cautioned against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Patent Owner does not direct us to any specific disclosure in the Specification of the ’586 patent clearly limiting or defining dendrite blocking as impeding dendrite growth for the entire intended life of a rechargeable battery. Accordingly, because the ’586 patent does not clearly disclaim the scope of dendrite blocking in the manner Patent Owner advances, we are not persuaded that we should limit the claims to the asserted primary goal, or preferred result, of the ’586 patent. We, therefore, decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proffered claim construction.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureNot shown unpatentableInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable
“and Dr. Abraham, as well as the Handbook’s disclosure that separator pores as small as 0.1 µm are effectively barn doors, which cannot prevent electronic shorts caused by dendrite growth, Patent Owner persuades us that Tojo’s porous ceramic composite layer is not capable of hindering, interrupting, or delaying the passage, progress, or course of dendrite growth, with any degree of effectiveness that prevents electronic shorting. That is, Patent Owner persuades us that Tojo’s separators do not include a ceramic composite layer that is adapted to at least block dendrite growth and to prevent electronic shorting, as recited in claim 1 of the ’586 patent.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“As discussed above, Petitioner does not persuade us that it has established that Tojo’s separator includes that feature, because of the pores in Tojo’s ceramic composite layer. Because Petitioner relies on this limitation being inherently present in Tojo as argued with respect to claim 1 (Pet. 19, 23), Petitioner does not provide any evidence to support the obviousness of this limitation. In the context of an obviousness analysis, inherency “‘may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.’” In re Oelrich, 666 F.3d 578, 581 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (quoting Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 102 F.2d 212, 214 (CCPA 1939)). An inherent disclosure is one that is “sufficient to show that the natural result flowing from the operation as taught would result in the performance of the questioned function.” Id.; Par Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he concept of inherency must be limited when applied to obviousness, and is present only when the limitation at issue is the ‘natural result’ of the combination of prior art elements.”) (quoting In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d at 581). As discussed above, the preponderance of the evidence leads us to conclude that Tojo’s disclosure would not necessarily produce pores with a tortuosity sufficient to block dendrite growth. Thus, even if an ordinary artisan were to find it obvious to try one of the specific matrix materials recited in dependent claim 4 (id. at 19), the resulting ceramic composite layer required by both claim 4 and claim 12 would, nonetheless, have the pores that Tojo teaches should be present in that layer. Therefore, a preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that it would have been obvious that the separator disclosed by Tojo would result in a separator having the dendrite-blocking feature required by claims 4 and 12. Accordingly, because Petitioner has not shown that Tojo teaches or suggests all of the features required by claims 4 and 12, we conclude that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 4 and 12 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Tojo.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“Even disregarding the procedural infirmities in Patent Owner’s Response, however, Petitioner persuades us that the evidence of secondary considerations is not entitled to substantial weight, because Patent Owner has not established a sufficient nexus between the merits of the claimed subject matter and that evidence. Petitioner persuades us also that the evidence of secondary considerations is not reasonably commensurate in scope with the claimed subject matter.” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 6,432,586 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,432,586 - SK Innovation Co., Ltd. v. Celgard, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 25, 2015 · IPR2014-00679 · APJ Francisco C Prats · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7–9 are unpatentable as obvious over Tojo and Lundquist, and claim 10 as obvious over Tojo and Kejha; claims 1–6, 11, and 12 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed board ownDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“Our reviewing court, however, has “cautioned against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Patent Owner does not direct us to any specific disclosure in the Specification of the ’586 patent clearly limiting or defining dendrite blocking as impeding dendrite growth for the entire intended life of a rechargeable battery. Accordingly, because the ’586 patent does not clearly disclaim the scope of dendrite blocking in the manner Patent Owner advances, we are not persuaded that we should limit the claims to the asserted primary goal, or preferred result, of the ’586 patent. We, therefore, decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proffered claim construction.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureNot shown unpatentableInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable
“It is well settled that the “very essence of inherency is that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that a reference unavoidably teaches the property in question.” Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc., 567 F.3d 1366, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (emphasis added); see also In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (CCPA 1981) (“Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.”). Given the evidence discussed above that the pores in Tojo’s ceramic composite layer would allow dendrite growth, Petitioner does not persuade us that, because Tojo’s ceramic composite layer contains the inorganic particles and matrix material required by claim 1, Tojo unavoidably teaches that its ceramic composite layer is adapted to block dendrite growth enough to prevent electronic shorting. See Reply 4–6. Moreover, even assuming for argument’s sake that larger dendrites would be blocked by Tojo’s pores (see id. at 8), Petitioner concedes that dendrites may grow at an atomic scale (id. at 7), and the evidence discussed above supports a finding that Tojo’s pores would not block dendrites of that size from producing an electronic short.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayMotivation foundTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“A reference does not teach away, however, “if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not ‘criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage’ investigation into the invention claimed.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Patent Owner does not direct us to disclosures in Tojo that clearly or specifically criticize or discredit the use of fluoropolymers as the matrix material in its ceramic composite layer. Moreover, as noted above, and as Petitioner points out (Reply 13–14), Tojo’s teaching regarding its matrix material is rather expansive. See 1007 ¶ 22 (“The binders are not particularly limited, as long as they are conventionally in use, and examples include various polyesters, polyolefins, rubbers, acrylic resins, or the like . . . .”) (emphases added). Given this expansive disclosure, we agree with Petitioner that an ordinary artisan would not have viewed Tojo’s failure to include fluoropolymers in its list of binder materials as a teaching away, even in light of the earlier mention of fluoropolymers as known separator materials.” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Because Tojo teaches that essentially any conventional polymeric material used in batteries can be used as its inorganic particle binder material, and because Lundquist, in turn, teaches that PTFE copolymers are useful as a binder material for inorganic particles in a battery separator containing the same two layers contained in Tojo’s separator, we find that that an ordinary artisan would have been prompted to use Lundquist’s PTFE copolymers as the binder material in Tojo’s separator. Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence do not persuade us to the contrary.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 6,432,586 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,432,586 - Facebook, Inc. / Linkedin Corp. et al. v. Software Rights Archive, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 30, 2015 · IPR2013-00480 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 14 was held unpatentable as anticipated by Fox Thesis; claims 1, 5, 15, and 16 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“determine whether “cluster links” means relationships between two nodes, which are represented in data stored in a computer. Claim 1 recites a method of analyzing data in a database with indirect relationships using links and nodes. Claim 14 similarly recites a method for representing the relationship between nodes, using stored direct links, paths, and candidate cluster links. As explained in the ’494 Patent specification, data in the database may be represented as a node. Ex. 1001, 12:29–33. Exemplary nodes include an object or a portion of an object, a document or section of a document, and a World Wide Web page. Id. at 12:35–38. The ’494 Patent specification states that a link is a “relationship between two nodes.” Id. at 12:65–66. The ’494 Patent specification continues, “[a] link [] can be represented by a vector or an entry on a table and contain information for example, a from-node identification [] (ID), a to-node ID [], a link type [], and a weight.” Id. at 13:3–6. As described in the ’494 Patent specification, a link is represented in data stored in a computer. We, therefore, determine that “cluster links” means relationships, which are represented in data stored in a computer and are used for grouping interrelated nodes.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As described in Fox SMART, the concentration tests that are cited by Petitioner are performed as part of forming the cluster tree. Id. Petitioner does not identify disclosure in Fox SMART of deleting clusters other than those that simply overlap, or duplicate, other clusters. Overlapping clusters are deleted following a routine that identifies plausible clustering with “no limit on overlap.” Id. Additionally, Fox SMART includes code that collects orphans. Id. at 52. Petitioner, however, has not shown that Fox SMART describes a subset which does not include these orphans. Dr. Fox’s supplemental testimony that “Fox SMART teaches that potential (i.e., candidate) clusters are rejected (‘deleted’) if they fail any one of these tests” (Ex. 1028 ¶ 281 (citing Ex. 1005, 51)) suggests that the terms “rejected” and “deleted” are the same. We do not agree. In view of Dr. Fox’s testimony in both of his Declarations and the testimony of Dr. Jacobs, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art reasonably would have understood Fox SMART as describing deleting overlap that had been generated by the immediately preceding software routine. Additionally, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art reasonably would have understood Fox SMART as describing that the tests referred to by Dr. Fox are processed during formation of the tree. We, therefore, determine that Dr. Fox’s testimony does not address persuasively the requirement in claim 1 of deriving a subset of the already generated candidate cluster links.” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“FURTHER ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend to cancel claims 8, 10, 11, 35, and 40 of the ’494 Patent is GRANTED;” slip op. at 24
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“arguments for the first time. Paper 44, 1. A reply may respond to arguments raised in the corresponding patent owner response. 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(a). Examples of indications that a new issue has been raised in a reply include new evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case for the unpatentability of a claim. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed.Reg. 48,756, 48,767 (Aug. 14, 2012). We determine that the evidence presented in the Reply Fox Declaration that is discussed in this Decision properly responds to arguments raised in the Patent Owner Response. Additionally, we do not rely on evidence in the Reply Fox Declaration in our determination that Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 14 is unpatentable. For the reasons given, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 5,832,494 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 5,832,494 - Facebook, Inc. / Linkedin Corp. et al. v. Software Rights Archive, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 29, 2015 · IPR2013-00481 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 12 and 22 are unpatentable over Fox Thesis, Fox SMART, and Envision under § 103; claim 21 was not shown unpatentable because the art did not teach deriving actual cluster links from generated candidate …
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenMixed
“The claim chart persuasively reads all elements of each of claims 12 and 22 onto the teachings of Fox Thesis, Fox SMART, and Envision, taken together. Despite the counter-arguments in Patent Owner’s Response, and the evidence cited therein, which we have also considered, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 12 and 22 of the ’571 Patent are unpatentable, under 35 U.S.C. § 103, as they would have been obvious over the combination of Fox Thesis, Fox SMART, and Envision. Petitioner, however, has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 21 of the ’571 Patent is unpatentable, under 35 U.S.C. § 103, as obvious over the combination of Fox Thesis, Fox SMART, and Envision. 1.” slip op. at 15
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“As taught in Fox SMART, the concentration tests that are cited by Petitioner are performed as part of forming the cluster tree. Id. Petitioner does not identify a teaching in Fox SMART of deleting clusters other than those that simply overlap, or duplicate, other clusters. Overlapping clusters are deleted following a routine that identifies plausible clustering with “no limit on overlap.” Id. Additionally, Fox SMART includes code that collects orphans. Id. at 52. Petitioner, however, has not shown that Fox SMART teaches a subset, which does not include these orphans. Dr. Fox’s supplemental testimony that “Fox SMART teaches that potential (i.e., candidate) clusters are rejected (‘deleted’) if they fail any one of these tests” (Ex. 1032 ¶ 281 (citing Ex. 1005, 51)) suggests that the terms “rejected” and “deleted” are the same. We do not agree. In view of Dr. Fox’s testimony in both of his Declarations and the testimony of Dr. Jacobs, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art reasonably would have understood Fox SMART as teaching deleting overlap that had been generated by the immediately preceding software routine. Additionally, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art reasonably would have understood Fox SMART as teaching that the tests referred to by Dr. Fox are processed during formation of the tree. We, therefore, determine that Dr. Fox’s testimony does not address persuasively the requirement in claim 21 of deriving a subset of the already generated candidate cluster links. In light of the Declaration by Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Jacobs, we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the combination of Fox Thesis, Fox SMART, and Envision teaches deriving actual cluster links. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not established that claim 21 of the ’571 Patent is unpatentable, under 35 U.S.C. § 103, as obvious over the combination of Fox Thesis, Fox SMART, and Envision.” slip op. at 27
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Owner contends that the Reply Fox Declaration should be excluded in accordance with Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 702. Paper 44, 1. In particular, Patent Owner contends that the Reply Fox Declaration should be excluded because FRE 702 precludes admission of expert testimony unless “the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Id. With regard to this objection, we note that under 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a), “[e]xpert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” Consequently, this objection properly goes to the weight to be given to Dr. Fox’s testimony, and not to its admissibility. It is within our discretion to assign the appropriate weight to the testimony offered by Dr. Fox. See, e.g., Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding the Board has discretion to give more weight to one item of evidence over another “unless no reasonable trier of fact could have done so”); In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”). When weighing evidence, we are capable of determining whether the prior art references render obvious the challenged claims without being confused, misled or prejudiced by Dr. Fox’s testimony.” slip op. at 32
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Claim 21 recites a method of displaying information about a network, which includes a determination regarding hyperjump data. As explained in the ’571 Patent specification, exemplary hyperjump data includes hyperjump links, which connect web pages, web sites, and documents on the web. Ex. 1001, 48:37–39. The specification of the ’571 Patent states that a link is a “relationship between two nodes.” Id. at 13:5–6. The ’571 Patent specification continues, “[a] link [] can be represented by a vector or an entry on a table and contain information for example, a from-node identification [] (ID), a to-node ID [], a link type [], and a weight.” Id. at 13:9–12. As described in the ’571 Patent specification, a link is represented in data stored in a computer. We, therefore, construe “cluster links” in light of the specification of the ’571 Patent to mean relationships, which are represented in data stored in a computer and are used for grouping interrelated nodes. 4. “indirect relationships” and “indirect reference” The term “indirect relationships” is recited in claim 12 and the term “indirect reference” is recited in claim 22. As discussed above, the terms “link” and “relationship” are used interchangeably in the ’571 Patent specification. For the reasons discussed above, therefore, we construe “indirect relationships” to mean indirect relationships that are represented in data stored in a computer. For these same reasons, we construct “indirect reference” to mean an indirect reference that is represented in data stored in a computer.” slip op. at 9
Patent outcomesUS 6,233,571 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 6,233,571
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.