- Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00818 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, and 4–23 were not shown unpatentable over Behbahani, Leete, and Tan because the combination did not teach comparing desired and interferer signal strengths.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Behbahani teaches “comparing the strength of the desired signal to the strength of the interfere signal,” as recited in limitation 1(a). See PO Resp. 68–69; Sur-reply 21–23. Although Petitioner argues that Behbahani “expressly teaches comparing the desired and interferer signal strengths,” Petitioner does not cite to sufficient evidence in support of this statement. Pet. 38. The basis of Petitioner’s argument is that Behbahani teaches the same process for determining signal strengths as shown in Figure 4 of the ’202 patent. Figure 4 of the ’202 patent is reproduced below: Figure 4 shows, among other things, signal strength indicator circuits 440 and 450 connected to input line 410 and output line 460, on either side of gain element 420 and filter 430. Ex. 1001, 6:53–57. The input signal on input line 410 is shown as desired signal 412 and interferers 464 and 466. Id. at 59–61. Figure 4 is further described as follows. The signal strength indicators 440 and 450 do not provide information as to the relative sizes of the desired and interfering signals. Rather, a cumulative signal level is provided at their outputs. For example, the first signal strength indicator 440 outputs a level corresponding to the sum of desired signal 412 and interfering signals 414 and 416, while the second signal strength indicator 450 provides a signal level corresponding to the sum of desired signal 462 and interfering signals 464 and 466. In this specific example, the gain of the gain and filter circuit combinations is shown as approximately one, while the interfering signals 414 and 416 signal levels are reduced. A comparison of the signal levels provided by the signal strength indicators 440 and 450 indicates that much of the combined received signal on line 410 has been filtered. Accordingly, it may be deduced that large interfering signals present at the input are being filtered by the filter 430. From this information, as will be shown in greater detail below, the bias, impedance, and gain of the gain stage 420 and filter 430 combination may be optimized to reduce power dissipation. Ex. 1001, 6:61–7:13 (emphasis added). In other words, Figure 4 shows a comparison of a sum of the desired and interferer signals output from the strength indicator circuits, not a comparison of the strength of the desired signal and the strength of the interferer signal, as required by the claim language. See Sur-reply 22–23. The ’202 patent describes Figure 4 as “an embodiment,” and claims are not limited to specific embodiments described in the specification. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner even admits that Figure 4 “compar[es] a cumulative signal strength at a first node to a cumulative signal strength at a second node.” Pet. 36 (emphasis added). In the Reply, Petitioner argues that Patent Owner “ignores the” slip op. at 33
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDenied
“Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), a reply “may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response.” We agree with Petitioner, for the reasons stated in the Opposition, that the arguments in the Reply and Reply declaration testimony are responsive to arguments raised in the Patent Owner Response. See Opp Mot. 7–12 (explaining the positions taken in the Petition, Patent Owner’s arguments in Response, and the arguments presented in Reply); see Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1008–1009 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Petitioner does not provide a new theory of unpatentability; rather, Petitioner responds and elaborates on the theory presented in the Petition to explain why Patent Owner’s arguments are incorrect. E.g., Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. One World Techs., Inc., 944 F.3d 919, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Parties are not barred from elaborating on their arguments on issues previously raised.”); Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1081–82 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reasoning that rebuttal evidence should be responsive such that it is offered “to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove the evidence of the adverse party”). “[T]he introduction of new evidence in the course of the trial is to be expected in [IPR] trial proceedings” and permissible “as long as the opposing party is given notice of the evidence and an opportunity to respond to it.” Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. Ltd. P’ship v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We also note that our Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (“CTPG”) states that In most cases, the Board is capable of identifying new issues or belatedly presented evidence when weighing the evidence at the close of trial, and disregarding any new issues or belatedly presented evidence that exceeds the proper scope of reply or sur-reply. As such, striking the entirety or a portion of a party's brief is an exceptional remedy that the Board expects will be granted rarely. CTPG at 80, 84 Fed. Reg. 64,280 (Nov. 21, 2019). We follow that guidance here. Further, Patent Owner argues that Dr. Abidi’s testimony as a co- author of Behbahani is “self-serving and unsupported.” Mot. 6–7. The fact that Dr. Abidi is a co-author of Behbahani, as well as Petitioner’s expert, is not, in and of itself, sufficient to discredit Dr. Abidi’s testimony. The CTPG provides that “[t]he Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony.” CTPG 35. We are capable of discerning from the testimony and the evidence presented whether Dr. Abidi’s testimony should be entitled to any weight, either as a whole or with regard to specific issues. We will weigh the testimony on an issue-by-issue basis as appropriate. Moreover, to the extent that Patent Owner has pointed out the inadequacies of Dr. Abidi’s testimony, we are also capable of noting those inadequacies and weighing that testimony accordingly. For the foregoing reasons, Patent Owner’s motion to strike is denied.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“We also disagree with Petitioner that “Dr. Abidi provided well- reasoned analysis that Behbahani teaches determining and comparing desired and interferer signal strengths.” Reply 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 179– 181). We have reviewed the Dr. Abidi’s testimony cited in the Petition and Reply for limitation 1(a) (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 95, 96, 113–120, 179–181; Ex. 1042 ¶¶ 12–16), and we disagree that Dr. Abidi provided well-reasoned analysis that Behbahani teaches comparing desired signal strengths with interferer signal strengths. Rather, Dr. Abidi’s testimony focuses on determining or measuring desired and interferer signal strengths, generally simply repeats what is in the Petition, and only provides a conclusory assertion that Behbahani expressly teaches comparing the strengths of the desired and interferer signals without providing any explanation. See TQ Delta, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 942 F.3d 1352, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Conclusory expert testimony does not qualify as substantial evidence.”). Accordingly, Dr. Abidi’s supporting testimony is also deficient. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). As Patent Owner points out, the only comparison mentioned by Petitioner in Behbahani is to derive the strength of the interferer signal. Sur-reply 22 (citing Pet. 38–39); Ex. 1004, 1207 (“[B]y comparing the signal level at the input and the output of the digital filter (DI and DO), the relative strength of the out-of-channel signal that passes through the analog filter is calculated”). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons we determine that Petitioner has not shown that Behbahani teaches limitation 1(a).” slip op. at 36
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner thus proposes a Master’s degree with two years of experience, while Patent Owner proposes a Bachelor’s degree with five years of experience. At the institution stage, we did not see a material difference in the proposals given that both parties also indicate that more education could substitute for less experience and vice versa, and thus adopted Patent Owner’s proposal. Inst. Dec. 11. We requested that the parties address during trial if either believed that the choice of one proposal over the other would make a difference in the patentability analysis. Id. Neither party has done so. Accordingly, because nothing in the record persuades us that our preliminary finding in the Institution Decision was incorrect, and because neither party has challenged our finding, we maintain our adoption of Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 10,524,202 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,524,202 - Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00820 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5–6, and 8–11 are unpatentable as obvious over Behbahani and Tan; Patent Owner’s motion to strike is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), a reply “may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response.” We agree with Petitioner, for the reasons stated in the Opposition, that the arguments and declaration testimony are responsive to arguments raised in the Patent Owner Response. See Opp Mot. 7–10 (explaining the positions taken in the Petition, Patent Owner’s arguments in Response, and the arguments presented in Reply); Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1008– 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Petitioner does not provide a new theory of unpatentability; instead, Petitioner appropriately responds and elaborates on the theory presented in the Petition to explain why Patent Owner’s arguments are incorrect. See, e.g., Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. One World Techs., Inc., 944 F.3d 919, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Parties are not barred from elaborating on their arguments on issues previously raised.”); Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1081–82 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reasoning that rebuttal evidence should be responsive such that it is offered “to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove the evidence of the adverse party”). “[T]he introduction of new evidence in the course of the trial is to be expected in [IPR] trial proceedings” and is permissible “as long as the opposing party is given notice of the evidence and an opportunity to respond to it.” Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. Ltd. P’ship v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner thus proposes a Master’s degree with two years of experience, while Patent Owner proposes a Bachelor’s degree with five years of experience. At the institution stage, we did not see a material difference in the proposals given that both parties also indicate that more education could substitute for less experience and vice versa, and we thus adopted Patent Owner’s proposal. See Inst. Dec. 14. We requested that the parties address during trial if either believed that the choice of one proposal over the other would make a difference in the patentability analysis. Id. Neither party has done so. Accordingly, because nothing in the record persuades us that our preliminary finding in the Institution Decision was incorrect, and because neither party has challenged our finding, we maintain our adoption of Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Revvo Techs., Inc. v. Cerebrum Sensor Techs., Inc., IPR2025-00632, Paper 20 at 3–5 (Director Nov. 3, 2025) (precedential), addressing situations where a petitioner takes different claim construction positions before the Board and a district court. In Revvo, the petitioner advanced its own proposed claim construction in a related district court litigation but adopted in the IPR a different proposed construction, which was advanced by the patent owner in the district court litigation. Revvo at 2. The Director acknowledged that “a petitioner is not necessarily precluded from arguing different claim construction positions before a district court and the Board,” but that if the petitioner does so, it “should explain sufficiently why the different positions are warranted.” Id. at 5. “For example,” the Director explained, “if a party advances a narrow construction in the district court and the district court declines to adopt the narrow construction, the party would have sufficient reason for advancing the broader, court-adopted construction in a proceeding before the Board.” Id. Here, as in the Director’s example, Petitioner advanced a narrower construction of “signal path” before the district court, which the district court declined to adopt. See Pet. 9; Ex. 2015. Instead, the district court adopted a “plain-and-ordinary meaning” construction, which Patent Owner proposed. See PO Resp. 38, 41; Ex. 2015; Ex. 2025, 5–14. In the Petition, Petitioner proposed applying the plain and ordinary meaning constructions that had already been preliminarily adopted by the district court. Compare Pet. (filed May 1, 2024) with Ex. 2015 (preliminarily adopting plain and ordinary meaning construction on March 25, 2024). Applying Revvo, we find that Petitioner had a sufficient reason for advancing the broader, courtadopted construction in this IPR. Thus, the parties do not dispute the meanings of “signal path,” and we adopt the district court’s construction of plain and ordinary meaning, as agreed by the parties. The “signal path” dispute concerns the application of this and the surrounding claim language (i.e., “in the receiver signal path”) to the disclosures in Behbahani. See PO Resp. 41–43. Therefore, we will provide further discussion in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding Behbahani below. However, we agree with Patent Owner that “plain language [of the claims] requires adjusting the impedance (or bias) of a circuit or component in the signal path.” PO Resp. 49. The parties also address the meaning of the terms “dynamically increasing/decreasing,” which Petitioner refers to as the “dynamic limitation.” See Pet. 9; PO Resp. 37–41. Petitioner proposes that the Board accept Patent Owner’s proposed construction, which was adopted by the district court in the related litigation, both preliminarily and following the Markman hearing. See Pet. 9–10; Ex. 2015, 2–3; Ex. 2025, 40. At Institution, we adopted the district court’s construction, that the term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning which is “varying during operation based, at least in part, on information gained during operation,”4 because there was no dispute between the parties. See Inst. Dec. 16. We continue to do so for purposes of this Decision, for the same reasons as set forth above. That is, applying Revvo, we find that Petitioner had a sufficient reason for advancing the broader, court-adopted construction in this IPR.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner further argues that Tan “provides an example of circuitry used to detect signals at various points in the low-pass filter signal path as a means of implementing a prefilter automatic gain control.” Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1006, 481); Ex. 1003 ¶ 85. The example in Tan is a peak detector circuit. See Pet. 29–30; Ex. 1003 ¶ 85; Ex. 1006, Fig. 8. Dr. Abidi testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use Tan’s signal strength measurement circuitry to measure nodes AI and AO, as well as to use comparable circuity to measure nodes DI and DO. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85–90. In response to Patent Owner’s argument that it is not possible to measure signal strength with Tan’s peak detectors (see PO Resp. 65–68), Dr. Abidi provides testimony explaining how Tan’s peak detector circuit provides a measure of the signal strength, which we find persuasive, and which is unrebutted by Patent Owner. See Ex. 1042 ¶ 15.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 11,638,210 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,638,210 - DISH Network LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00373 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Remand
Claims 1, 4–8, and 10–16 are unpatentable under § 103; claims 2, 3, 9, and 17 were not shown unpatentable on any asserted ground.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“The Director then issued an Order, Paper 47 (“Director’s Order” or “Dir. Ord.”) granting Director Review, vacating-in-part the Final Written Decision, and remanding the case to this Board panel for proceedings consistent with the Order. The Director vacated-in-part the Final Written Decision because it did not sufficiently address Patent Owner’s arguments with respect to claim 17 (and similar claims 2 and 9). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision on Remand from Director Review is entered pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). Having reviewed the complete trial record, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged claims are unpatentable except for claims 2, 3, 9, and 17.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“2. Analogous Art – DSL-Book A reference is analogous art to the claimed invention if: (1) the” slip op. at 75
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“4. Motivation to Combine Amit and Jacobsen Petitioner contends that a POSITA would have modified “Amit’s” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 7,594,249 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,594,249 - PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00820 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–11 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Tadros, Porter, Kalili, and Texin 990R.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. We institute an inter partes review of claims 1–11 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 13–15). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s explanation of the level of skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’090 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Both parties indicate that no claim terms need to be expressly construed. Pet. 29–30; Prelim. Resp. 5. Consistent with that, we determine that we need not construe any claim terms expressly in order to resolve the parties’ dispute regarding whether Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Weighing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we find Petitioner’s arguments and evidence sufficient at this stage to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing. Pet. 8–17, 30–49. For example, regarding whether of Porter’s disclosure to the problem faced by inventor of the ’090 patent. Pet. 8; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 144–164. The ’090 patent illustrates that its inventor faced the problem of selecting desirable materials for an aligner, including selecting a desirable material for an aligner’s hard layer. Ex. 1001, 5:44–59. Petitioner and Dr. Osswald provide significant evidence and reasoning tending to show that Porter’s discussion of Tritan logically would have commended itself to the attention of an inventor facing the problem of selecting an aligner hard layer. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 144–164). For example, Dr. Osswald explains that “because Tritan copolyesters are BPA-free, Rafih specifically discloses Tritan EX401 as an exemplary material” for its oral appliance. Id. ¶ 99 (citing Ex. 1104, 5:4–64, claims 2, 9, 10). In view of this, Dr. Osswald testifies that “Rafih would inform a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that Porter’s guidance regarding replacing polycarbonate with Tritan applies to dental appliances.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 146. At this stage, weighing Petitioner’s evidence against Patent Owner’s contrary attorney argument that Porter focuses on dishware, we determine Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Porter is analogous art. Pet. 8; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 144–164; Prelim. Resp. 1, 9–10, 18–21.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,648,090 - PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00821 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–23, 25, and 26 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Tadros, Porter, Kalili, and Texin 990R.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. We institute an inter partes review of claims 1–23, 25, and 26 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 13–15). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s explanation of the level of skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’090 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Neither party indicates that we need to construe expressly any claim terms. Pet. 27–28; Prelim. Resp. 5. Consistent with that, we determine that we need not construe any claim terms expressly in order to resolve the parties’ dispute regarding whether Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“arguments and evidence sufficient at this stage to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing. Pet. 8–17, 53–71. For example, regarding whether Porter is analogous art, Petitioner sufficiently shows reasonable pertinence of Porter’s disclosure to the problem faced by inventor of the ’091 patent. Pet. 8; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 146–165. The ’091 patent illustrates that its inventor faced the problem of selecting desirable materials for an aligner, including selecting a desirable material for an aligner’s hard layer. Ex. 1001, 5:44–59. Petitioner and Dr. Osswald provide significant evidence and reasoning tending to show that Porter’s discussion of Tritan logically would have commended itself to the attention of an inventor facing the problem of selecting an aligner hard layer. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1007 “because Tritan copolyesters are BPA-free, Rafih specifically discloses Tritan EX401 as an exemplary material” for its oral appliance. Id. ¶ 99 (citing Ex. 1104, 5:4–64, claims 2, 9, 10). In view of this, Dr. Osswald testifies that “Rafih would inform a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that Porter’s guidance regarding replacing polycarbonate with Tritan applies to dental appliances.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 147. At this stage, weighing Petitioner’s evidence against Patent Owner’s countervailing attorney argument that Porter focuses on dishware, we determine Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Porter is analogous art. Pet. 8; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 146–165; Prelim. Resp. 1–2, 9–10, 34–36.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,648,091 - PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00819 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims based on both obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Tadros, Kalili, and Texin 990R to meet the limitations of the claims challenged under this ground.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had at least a four-year undergraduate degree in materials science, mechanical engineering, chemical engineering, or a related field and at least two years of experience in the field of polymer science, combined with at least two years of experience in the field of design, manufacture, and processing of thermoformable polymer sheets for use in various applications, such as in orthodontic and dental appliances. Additional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa. Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 13–15). At this stage, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal or offer an alternative proposal. See generally Prelim. Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Only claim terms in controversy need be construed. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”). For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term requires express construction.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Tadros, Kalili, and Texin 990R to meet the limitations of the claims challenged under this ground. We disagree that Petitioner fails to meet its burden as to the motivation to combine arguments. Petitioner persuasively maps the limitations of the challenged claims to portions of the references relied upon. Pet. 28–38 (claim 1), 38–51. Petitioner also, on this record, provides adequate statements of motivation to combine with a reasonable expectation of success. See, e.g., id. at 34–36 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 31, 39–42, 147–151, 174–176). The Petition’s reliance on supporting testimony and related corroborating evidence to support the combination does not amount to impermissible hindsight, as that testimony takes into account “knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure.” In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). Without further clarification or support from Patent Owner, and in the absence of testimony to support the assertion that a POSITA would not have combined the cited references in the manner proposed with a reasonable expectation of success, we are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments in this regard.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 11,154,384 - PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00818 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims 1–22 based on all three asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the briefing and cited evidence of record, we institute inter partes review because we find that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art (sometimes referred to herein as a “POSITA”) would have had at least a four-year undergraduate degree in materials science, mechanical engineering, chemical engineering, or a related field and at least two years of experience in the field of polymer science, combined with at least two years of experience in the field of design, manufacture, and processing of thermoformable polymer sheets for use in various applications, such as in orthodontic and dental appliances. Additional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa. Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 13–15). At this stage, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal or offer an alternative proposal. See generally Prelim. Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that no terms require construction, but that “Petitioner applies the prior art consistent with Patent Owner’s assertions in its Infringement Contentions (EX1014, 6-20.).” Pet. 26. Patent Owner does not propose any express claim constructions. Prelim. Resp. 5. Nor does Patent Owner allege that any of Petitioner’s claim interpretations contradict Petitioner’s position in the related district court litigation. Id. Only claim terms in controversy need be construed. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”). For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term requires express construction.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Tadros, Kalili, and Texin 990R to meet the limitations of the claims challenged under this ground. We disagree that Petitioner fails to meet its burden as to the motivation to combine arguments. Petitioner persuasively maps the limitations of the challenged claims to portions of the references relied upon. Pet. 27–36 (claim 1), 36–46. Petitioner also, on this record, provides adequate statements of motivation to combine with a reasonable expectation of success. See, e.g., id. at 32–35 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 31, 39–41, 57–87, 146–150, 171–172). The Petition’s reliance on supporting testimony and related corroborating evidence to support the combination does not amount to impermissible hindsight, as that testimony takes into account “knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure.” In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). Without further clarification or support from Patent Owner, and in the absence of testimony to support the assertion that a POSITA would not have combined the cited references in the manner proposed with a reasonable expectation of success, we are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments in this regard. We also disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments about “adhesive lamination” using “tie layers” at this point in the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 15–18. On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has adequately supported its arguments that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use adhesive lamination to achieve the proposed combination. See, e.g., Pet. 33–35; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 39–42, 120, 45, 51, 116, 120. Petitioner relies on Kalili as disclosing a hard layer suitable for combination with Tadros’s soft layers (Pet. 32), and more particularly, doing so in the context of a laminated multilayer aligner (Reply 4). To create the laminated multilayer aligner proposed, Petitioner’s suggested use of a particular type of well-known lamination, i.e. adhesive lamination, is sufficiently developed and supported in the Petition. Pet. 32–35. Here, Patent Owner recognizes that Kalili teaches lamination, but suggests that it does not specifically teach using adhesive lamination. Prelim. Sur-reply 5. We note, however, that the parties have identified limited types of known lamination for aligners: coextrusion, extrusion lamination, and adhesive lamination. Prelim Sur-reply 4; Pet. 14–15 n.3, 33. In KSR, the Supreme Court explained that when “there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. “If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.” Id. Having reviewed Petitioner’s proffered arguments as to Tadros, Kalili, and Texin 990R, including motivation to combine the references asserted in this ground, with a reasonable expectation of success, we are persuaded on this record that Petitioner has met its burden for institution with respect to Ground 1.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,973,613 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00714 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable: Goldenberg anticipates or renders claims 1–6, 8–13, and 15–19 obvious, and Goldenberg with Cruz-Hernandez renders claims 7, 14, and 20 obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar, supported by testimonial evidence, and consistent with the asserted prior art and the types of problems and solutions in the ’907 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:14–62. Because we discern no dispositive difference between the parties’ proposals, and neither party has argued that the choice between the two would affect the outcome,6 we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill for this decision. We note, however, that our decision would be the same under Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“to,” as recited in each of claims 1, 8, and 15, to “require[] a cause-and-effect relationship between a secondary event (e.g., a haptic effect) that occurs in reaction to a first event (e.g., entry of the user input element to one or more positions within the boundary range of positions).” PO Resp. 26–27 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 44). Patent Owner argues that “in response to” refers to more than just a coincidence and involves at least some degree of causality. Id. at 27 (citing American Calcar, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ex. 2007, 12–14 (dictionary definition); Ex. 2008, 7 (dictionary definition); Ex. 2006, 30:13–31:2, 32:8–11, 32:17– 21 (testimony by Mr. Ward)); PO Sur-reply 8–9 (citing Ex. 2009, 34:8–19, 36:5–21 (testimony by Mr. Ward)).” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“to,” as recited in each of claims 1, 8, and 15, to “require[] a cause-and-effect relationship between a secondary event (e.g., a haptic effect) that occurs in reaction to a first event (e.g., entry of the user input element to one or more positions within the boundary range of positions).” PO Resp. 26–27 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 44). Patent Owner argues that “in response to” refers to more than just a coincidence and involves at least some degree of causality. Id. at 27 (citing American Calcar, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ex. 2007, 12–14 (dictionary definition); Ex. 2008, 7 (dictionary definition); Ex. 2006, 30:13–31:2, 32:8–11, 32:17– 21 (testimony by Mr. Ward)); PO Sur-reply 8–9 (citing Ex. 2009, 34:8–19, 36:5–21 (testimony by Mr. Ward)).” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“To show anticipation under § 102, a petitioner must locate every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, in a single prior art reference. See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The limitations may be present in the reference “either explicitly or inherently.” In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In making this determination, we consider the reference “together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)).” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 10,627,907 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,627,907 - PTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00762 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5 and 8–12 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Koskinen.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review on all of the challenged claims based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and at least two years of practical experience with design or development of telecommunication and/or wireless communications systems, or the equivalent.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21). Petitioner further argues that “[a]dditional education” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms.6 See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Additionally, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have known and been familiar with information elements (IEs) that specified an RLC reordering timer value based on (1) general knowledge that IEs carried information in RRC messages and (2) that 3GPP TSs describe an IE carrying recording timer duration information for the RLC layer. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 151; Ex. 1014, 219–20. Accordingly, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art “that the PDCP timer information, which used similar variables as its RLC counterpart (Koskinen, ¶¶37-38), would also be carried in a PDCP configuration IE.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 151.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,863,573 - AT&T Mobility LLC / AT&T Services Inc. et al. v. Daingean Technologies Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00310 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 4–6 and 8 are unpatentable as obvious over Lee1 and Lee2; the Board found the Lee1–Lee2 combination teaches the limitations and has sufficient motivation to combine.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”), on or around the earliest possible priority date of the ’207 patent, would have had “a B.S. in Electrical Engineering or a related field with at least three years of experience designing, developing, and/or testing telecommunication systems” and “familiarity with the wireless standards and well-known protocols for accessing wireless networks,” and that “[m]ore education may supplement practical experience or vice versa.” Pet. 3, 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 36). In its Preliminary Response, “Patent Owner generally concurs with [Petitioner’s] description, though would propose that a POSITA only needs two years of experience . . . . [but] does not believe any difference between Patent’s Owner’s view and Petitioners’ view affects the unpatentability analysis.” Prelim. Resp. 24. We agree with Patent Owner that the difference between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s formulations would not affect our analysis of patentability. We adopt Petitioner’s formulation, which is supported by expert testimony and is generally consistent with the level of skill reflected in the Specification and the prior art. See, e.g., Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Looking first at the claim language itself, Patent Owner’s construction is unduly narrow. The “for” recitations derive antecedent basis from limitation 4a. Ex. 1001, 36:44–45. Limitation 4a recites “a 4-step” procedure and “a 2-step” procedure. Thus, the claim includes one of each procedure type: “one” 4-step and “one” 2-step (i.e., single instances of each procedure). Patent Owner similarly reads the claim as requiring “one or more” of each procedure type. See Tr. 33:19–34:4. Because limitation 4a provides antecedent basis for a singular 4-step procedure and a singular 2-step procedure, this strongly suggests that the claim requires for the one (or for the single) 4-step procedure but not for all 4-step procedures, and for the one (or for the single) 2-step procedure but not for all 2-step procedures. At trial, Patent Owner’s interpretation was similar, stating, “that would read. . . as for the one or more 4-step . . . procedure and for the one or more 2-step . . . procedure.” See Tr. 33:25– 34:4 (emphasis added). In seeming contradiction, Patent Owner also stated, “I read that as being . . . all 4-step contention random access procedures . . . and all 2-step random access based procedures.” Id. (emphasis added). We note that Patent Owner does not, however, cite any legal precedent for interpreting “one or more” as requiring “all,” or provide reasoning for departing from the default claim construction principle that “one or more” includes “one.” For this reason and for reasons further discussed below, construing “for the 4-step” to mean “for all 4-step,” and “for the 2-step” to mean “for all 2-step,” would improperly import limitations from the Specification into the claims. See SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim.”).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 4 is rendered obvious over Lee1 and Lee2 (“Lee1–Lee2”).” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“With these teachings in mind, we are persuaded by Petitioner that incorporating Lee2’s higher power and different ramping into Lee1’s 2-step procedure would have even further reduced the latency of Lee1’s 2-step procedure, and that this would have resulted in different power settings based on procedure type. Pet. 37–38; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 88–89; Reply 12–13. Patent Owner does not meaningfully dispute this point. See generally PO Resp. 37–42; Sur-reply 12–17. Instead, Patent Owner argues that Lee1’s 4-step procedure would “equally benefit” from reducing latency, and that Petitioner has not explained why a POSITA would not use the same power settings for both procedures, i.e., use Lee2’s same higher power and different ramping in Lee1’s 4-step procedure. See PO Resp. 41–42. However, Petitioner’s burden is to provide a motivation for the proposed combination—in this case, modifying Lee1’s 2-step procedure with Lee2’s higher power and lower ramping. The obviousness analysis does not require Petitioner to explain why the references would not have been combined in an alternative way not proposed by Petitioner. To the extent Patent Owner argues that Lee1 and Lee2 cannot be combined as proposed, and therefore must be combined in this alternative manner, we disagree. For example, Patent Owner does not provide evidence of teaching away or that the proposed combination is inoperable. See generally PO Resp. 37–42; Sur-reply 12–17. Furthermore, we do not see how solving any technical issues in combining Lee1 and Lee2 as proposed would have been beyond the level of ordinary skill in the art. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Furthermore, Petitioner explains why a POSITA would have sought to” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 10,932,207 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,932,207
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.