- PTAB · Dec 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00756 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 5–8, 11, and 12 on three §103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability over the asserted combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“III. CONCLUSION Because we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable, we institute inter partes review as to all challenged claims and grounds presented in the Petition. At this stage of the proceeding, we have not made a final determination as to the patentability of any of these challenged claims. ORDER For the reasons given, it is ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review is instituted as to claims 1, 2, 5–8, 11, and 12 of the ’803 patent to determine whether: 1) claims 1, 5–7, 11, and 12 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over TS 36.300, TS 36.321, and TS 36.331; 2) claims 1, 2, 5–8, 11, and 12 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Ericsson and TS 25.331; and 3) claims 5, 6, 11, and 12 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Ericsson, TS 25.331, and Sebire; and” slip op. at 27
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“ordinary meaning, “primary” and “non-primary” cells are all cells that the WTRU is connected to (PO Resp. 16), the plain language in claim 1, and similarly in claim 7, does not require a “primary” node or “non-primary” cell to have a connection to the WTRU. See Ex. 1001, 10:38−56; 11:11–26. We find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that the claims require that the WTRU “be connected to more than one cell,” wherein cells that are “associated with a wireless network node,” but are not connected to the WTRU “at the same time” cannot be “primary” or “non-primary” cells. PO Resp. 16. In the ’803 patent, nothing in the Specification clearly limits “primary” and “non-primary” cells as Patent Owner proposes. Prelim. Resp. 16. Patent Owner points to the Specification of the ’803 patent to show that, for softer handover, the WTRU is connected “with more than one cell [] which are controlled by the same Node-B,” and “[o]ne of the[se] cells 808 may be designated as a primary cell 808a, while other cells are designated as a non-primary cells 808b.” Id. (alterations in original) (citing Ex. 1001, 8:44–46, 9:4–6, Figs. 8A–B). However, this portion of the Specification (describing a softer handover embodiment in which a cell “may be designated” as a primary while other as non-primary) does not provide a clear definition to warrant interpreting the “primary” and “non-primary” cells as requiring “connection” to the WTRU “at the same time.” Id. That is, nothing in the Specification clearly precludes “primary” and “non-primary” cells from being “source” and “target” cell, as Patent Owner contends. PO Resp. 16. and the Specification, we determine that the terms “primary” and “non-primary” recited in claims 1 and 7 are not limited to cells connected to a WRTU at the same time. We determine no further explicit construction of this term is necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“f) Motivation to combine Ericsson and TS 25.331 Petitioner contends that a “POSITA would have been motivated to combine Ericsson and TS 25.331 because they are directed to similar technologies and a skilled artisan would have understood the benefits of combining these two references,” and “would have understood that there was a high likelihood of success in making the combination.” Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 156–157). In particular, the references “are both reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor, namely protocols for handover in a telecommunications system.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 158). According to Petitioner, the combination “involves the predictable use of interchangeable prior art elements according to their established functions” more than routine engineering.” Id. at 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 174). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not present arguments in the Preliminary Response addressing the specific merits of Petitioner’s contentions with respect to the motivation to combine Ericsson and TS 25.331. See generally Prelim. Resp. 15–18. We find availing Petitioner’s contention that Ericsson and TS25.331 are “directed to similar technologies,” and that a “skilled artisan would have understood the benefits of combining these two references.” Pet. 34. On this preliminary record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that a POSITA would have had a reason to combine the teachings of Ericsson and TS 25.331.” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Dr. Kakaes, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had a B.S. in Electrical Engineering or a related field with at least three years of experience designing, developing, and/or testing telecommunication systems,” and “would also have familiarity with the wireless standards and well-known protocols for accessing wireless networks existing at the relevant time,” wherein “[m]ore education may supplement practical experience or vice versa.” Pet. 12–13. At this stage in the proceeding, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or offer an alternative. On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the technology described in the Specification and the cited prior art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,764,803 - PTAB · Dec 8, 2025 · IPR2025-01064 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–18 on all four §103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Volkswagen would prevail on at least claim 1 over Weese.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A. Legal Standards — Petitioner’s Burden “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the 1 Amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 103 enacted by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”) took effect in March 2013. The ’353 patent issued from an application filed in September 2004. See Ex. 1001, code (22). Thus, we apply the pre-AIA version of § 103. grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). B. Legal Standards — Obviousness A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness, if made available in the record, which has not happened here. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art pertaining to the ’353 patent “would have possessed at least a four-year degree in physics, biophysics, medical physics, or a related field, and two years of experience in developing and/or applying computed tomography methods,” wherein “[a]dditional education and professional experience are interchangeable.” Pet. 1; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 54–55. “Patent Owner utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 2. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears to be consistent with the ’353 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyOther
“unpatentable as having been obvious over Weese, including supporting testimony from Dr. Peterson. See Pet. 17–22, 26–83; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 138–149, 159–257. Patent Owner opposes. See Prelim. Resp. 1–2, 6–7. We conclude Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertions, as follows.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“(iii) Analysis Based on the present record, we determine Petitioner’s contentions regarding the third step of claim 1 are supported sufficiently by the cited disclosures in Weese and Dr. Peterson’s testimony to justify institution of review. In particular, Weese describes obtaining a plurality of second images of the patient’s internal organs (i.e., PET image I0 in Fig. 1, and PET image I10 in Fig. 3) using a second imaging technique (i.e., PET). See Ex. 1005, Figs. 1, 3, and 6, ¶¶ 47–49, 58–59, 72. In particular, PET image I0 in Figure 1 may be a reconstructed “volume image[]” composed of a plurality of “quasi two-dimensional” “slice images” that, when combined, represent a three-dimensional region inside the patient. Id. ¶¶ 48, 58, 61; see also Pet. 56–57. PET image I10 in Figure 3 may be a similarly reconstructed volume image composed of a plurality of slice images.4 See 4 We do not rely here on Petitioner’s alternative theory that Weese discloses a “plurality” of second images because PET images I0 and I10 are “superposed” images encompassing “several states of motion.” Pet. 58. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 61, 83–84. Patent Owner’s sole opposition to Petitioner’s assertions in this regard are limited to whether Weese “obtain[s]” PET images I0 and I10 as recited in claim 1, which we address below. Also, it appears that PET images I0 and I10 are obtained while also obtaining second movement measurements of the patient’s internal organs using a second sensor system (i.e., motion acquisition unit 12 and motion sensor 15 / S1) which is independent from the PET imaging technique. See Ex. 1005, Figs. 1 and 6, ¶ 65 (“[T]he respiratory motion is determined during the acquisition of the PET projections P1 by means of a respiratory motion sensor provided on the patient and therefrom the frequency function f(r) or, more generally, a state of motion function F1 is derived for the construction of the motion model M2.”). Furthermore, Weese describes how frequency function f(r) is utilized to facilitate image comparison between CT and PET images at common motion states. See id. ¶¶ 31, 49–51, 70–71, 75–77, 79–80, 83; see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 214–216 (Dr. Peterson’s supporting testimony). Patent Owner’s sole opposition to Petitioner’s assertions in this regard are limited to whether Weese “obtain[s]” PET images I0 and I10 as recited in claim 1, which we address below. Patent Owner’s two opposing arguments are unavailing, based on the present preliminary record. First, Petitioner relies on reconstructed PET images I0 and I10 as satisfying the “plurality of second images” recited in claim 1, not PET projections P1 from which PET images I0 and I10 are derived. See, e.g., Pet. 56, 58 (“I0 and I10 disclose and render obvious a ‘plurality of second images’ in two ways” — “I0 and I10 may be ‘volume images’ formed using ‘known’ techniques,” and “I0 and I10 are ‘superposed’ PET images encompassing ‘several states of motion,’ which” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,265,353 - Vizio, Inc. / LG Electronics, Inc. et al. v. Multimedia Technologies Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00300 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–12 are unpatentable as obvious over either of two combinations: Kim, TechnoBuffalo, MissingRemote, Hunt, and Hunleth; or Kim, Ma, Hunt, and Hunleth.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“An expert witness must be qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to testify in the form of an opinion. Fed. R. Evid. 702. We deem Dr. Houh to have the requisite qualifications to provide opinion testimony, including obtaining “a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from MIT, where his research focused on building high-speed networks and developing applications for remote video capture, processing, and display—technologies central to the ’384 Patent.” Pet. Reply 29 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 7, 10–13). The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony. Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Dr. Houh’s industry experience establishes that he at least possesses ordinary skill in the art, and we do not disqualify his testimony. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 7, 10–13. We consider the factors raised by the parties in weighing his testimony with other evidence provided, including the facts and data on which it is based, in reaching our determinations here.” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) in August of 2012 would have been knowledgeable and familiar with [user interfaces] in consumer products that are pertinent to the ’384 Patent. A POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in Electrical, Software, or Computer Engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of television and/or digital video systems, human-computer interaction, or related technologies. Lack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 21). Patent Owner agreed with and adopted this definition. PO Resp. 18; Ex. 2002 ¶ 40. The definition proposed by Petitioner is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’384 patent and prior art of record and is supported by expert testimony. We adopt this definition.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“As neither the claim language nor the specification provides the necessary support for a construction requiring exclusion of specific information from either view, we decline to adopt such a construction. Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (claim constructions that exclude a particular element must find support either in the words of the claim or through “express disclaimer or independent lexicography in the written description that would justify adding that negative limitation.”). As reviewed above, the claim language and specification, while describing different things that would be present in elements could not be common to both views. To the extent Patent Owner’s proposed construction specifies elements to be excluded, we find no support for these exclusions, and in fact, find opposite language in the specification of the ’384 patent: while Patent Owner proposes that a detail view must not include “information that is associated with a series,” the specification describes a detail view as provided in the case where “a series with only a single episode” has been selected. Ex. 1001, 44:64–65. This is consistent with the possibility in the claims that a detail view may relate to “a single show.” Ex. 1001, 56:66, 57:36, 58:51. As discussed, the claims recite that a detail view is provided “if [a] selection . . . is for one of a movie or single show” and that the detail view “presents information about a selected item of the VOD content” and a that a digest view is provided “if the selection in the collection view is for a series” and that digest view “provides a listing of two or more episodes associated with a series.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 57:23–27, 57:31–37. Thus, by the language of the claims themselves, the provision of “either a detail view or a digest view” relates to the received third selection and is based on what that selection was. The “either . . . or” in the claim thus relates directly to the third selection and not to the resulting views. This is consistent with Dr. Surati’s testimony. See Ex. 2002 ¶ 67 (The claims “present[] the third selection as a binary choice: either the third selection is a series (in which case the digest view is presented), or the third selection is a movie or single show (in which case the detail view is presented).” While Patent Owner insists that the language and logic of the claim “excludes providing a view that can be both a detail view and a digest view,” (PO Resp. 21) we determine that this proposed negative limitation finds no support through the Therefore, we decline to adopt the proposed claim construction that further limits the plain language of the claims. Having rejected the proposed limitations on the plain language of the claims, we find that no further construction of the claim language is required in order to address the dispute before us. See Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017.” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assertions regarding the combination of Kim, TechnoBuffalo, MissingRemote, Hunt, and Hunleth, including Petitioner’s assertion that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this combination and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. We determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined and used the details regarding a content provider user interface provided in TechnoBuffalo, MissingRemote, Hunt, to provide details relating to the user interfaces provided by a CP provider on an intelligent television, such as that of Kim. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104–106, 109–110, 112. We additionally determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this combination, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. See id. ¶¶ 113– 119.” slip op. at 38
Patent outcomesUS 9,578,384 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Markman · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,578,384 - Vizio, Inc. v. Multimedia Technologies Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00723 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–12 are unpatentable as obvious under §103 over either Kim, TechnoBuffalo, MissingRemote, Hunt, and Hunleth, or Kim, Ma, Hunt, and Hunleth.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“As neither the claim language nor the specification provides the necessary support for a construction requiring exclusion of specific information from either view, we decline to adopt such a construction. Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (claim constructions that exclude a particular element must find support either in the words of the claim or through “express disclaimer or independent lexicography in the written description that would justify adding that negative limitation.”). As reviewed above, the claim language and specification, while describing different things that would be present in elements could not be common to both views. To the extent Patent Owner’s proposed construction specifies elements to be excluded, we find no support for these exclusions, and in fact, find opposite language in the specification of the ’384 patent: while Patent Owner proposes that a detail view must not include “information that is associated with a series,” the specification describes a detail view as provided in the case where “a series with only a single episode” has been selected. Ex. 1001, 44:64–65. This is consistent with the possibility in the claims that a detail view may relate to “a single show.” Ex. 1001, 56:66, 57:36, 58:51. As discussed, the claims recite that a detail view is provided “if [a] selection . . . is for one of a movie or single show” and that the detail view “presents information about a selected item of the VOD content” and a that a digest view is provided “if the selection in the collection view is for a series” and that digest view “provides a listing of two or more episodes associated with a series.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 57:23–27, 57:31–37. Thus, by the language of the claims themselves, the provision of “either a detail view or a digest view” relates to the received third selection and is based on what that selection was. The “either . . . or” in the claim thus relates directly to the third selection and not to the resulting views. This is consistent with Dr. Surati’s testimony. See Ex. 2002 ¶ 67 (The claims “present[] the third selection as a binary choice: either the third selection is a series (in which case the digest view is presented), or the third selection is a movie or single show (in which case the detail view is presented).” While Patent Owner insists that the language and logic of the claim “excludes providing a view that can be both a detail view and a digest view,” (PO Resp. 21) we determine that this proposed negative limitation finds no support through the Therefore, we decline to adopt the proposed claim construction that further limits the plain language of the claims. Having rejected the proposed limitations on the plain language of the claims, we find that no further construction of the claim language is required in order to address the dispute before us. See Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017.” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assertions regarding the combination of Kim, TechnoBuffalo, MissingRemote, Hunt, and Hunleth, including Petitioner’s assertion that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this combination and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. We determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined and used the details regarding a content provider user interface provided in TechnoBuffalo, MissingRemote, Hunt, to provide details relating to the user interfaces provided by a CP provider on an intelligent television, such as that of Kim. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104–106, 109–110, 112. We additionally determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this combination, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. See id. ¶¶ 113– 119.” slip op. at 38
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“Our rules provide that a petitioner must include “[a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence including material facts, and the governing laws, rules, and precedent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a). Our rules also state that “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response.” Id. § 42.23(b). “‘Respond,’ in the context of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), does not mean proceed in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the positions taken in a prior filing.” PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019)15 (“CTPG”), 74. A petitioner “may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g., to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Id. at 73. “Examples of indications that a new issue has been raised in a reply include new evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case for the patentability or unpatentability of an original or proposed” slip op. at 49
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We find that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that each of the TechnoBuffalo 1:09 view and the MissingRemote 1:54 view teaches or suggests the presentation of “information about a set of the VOD content that are associated with a series,” as recited. Petitioner sufficiently shows the TechnoBuffalo 1:09 view is a digest view as it presents the “year, rating, number of episodes . . . , [and] episode lengths” for the displayed series. See Pet. 42 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 165). Similarly, Petitioner sufficiently shows that MissingRemote 1:54 view presents episode titles about episodes in the displayed season. See id. at 44 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 171). Petitioner argues alternatively that each of these would have been presented upon selection of a series in its proposed combination. Pet. 42–43, 44. We determine, in both cases, that presenting information regarding multiple individual episodes to be a sufficient showing that each presents “information about a set of the 13 We note that, applying Patent Owner’s requested claim construction for “providing either a detail view . . . or a digest view . . .” in full would lead to the same result with respect to, for example, the TechnoBuffalo 1:09 view and the Missing Remote 1:54 view. Each of these teach “a view of information about a set of the VOD content that are associated with a series without information only about a single episode” (as they contain information regarding multiple episodes, see supra footnote 10 and PO Surreply 6) but not “a view of information about a single episode without information that is associated with a series.” Additionally, Petitioner persuasively argues that the prior art demonstrates that “a POSITA would have avoided using UI designs for a TV series to display a single movie, and vice versa. Pet. 49–50 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 183–184) digest view. Additionally, Petitioner sufficiently shows the presentation of a screen including information about a movie if a movie has been selected from a collection view, and information about a set of content associated with a series if a series was selected, as per the recitations of limitations 1.6 and 1.7 of claim 1. TechnoBuffalo and MissingRemote teach digest view screens relating to a series selection, Hunt and Hunleth teach information screens responsive to a movie or single show selection, and the combination and cited testimony support the provision of the appropriate screen in response to the user’s selection from a collection view, as detailed above with respect to Petitioner’s allegations.” slip op. at 44
Patent outcomesUS 9,578,384 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Markman · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,578,384 - Tesla, Inc. v. Iqar Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2024-00543 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Tesla’s rehearing request and left claims 8 and 18 not shown unpatentable under §103 over Hongo, Obradovich, Niki, and Newstrom.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner’s counsel during the hearing or any of Petitioner’s arguments and evidence. As confirmed by Petitioner’s counsel, Petitioner relies solely on Newstrom’s disclosure of loading its spatial database 20 into solid state memory via a “wireless connection to [a] server” in asserting that the database “may be hosted on a server that is remote from a vehicle.” Pet. 83 (citing Ex. 1012, 8:26–38; Ex. 1003 ¶ 197). Column 8, lines 27–29 is the only disclosure in Newstrom of a “wireless connection.” Although Petitioner argues that Newstrom’s system communicates wirelessly with the geospatial database while the vehicle is being driven (see Dec. 38 (citing Pet. 83); Tr. 19:20–22), Petitioner relies solely on the single instance of “wireless” in Newstrom’s disclosure to satisfy the recitation that the database (which Petitioner maps to Newstrom’s geospatial database 20) is “remote.” In the Decision, we explained that Petitioner’s reliance on Newstrom’s “wireless connection” and its assertion that the geospatial database may be hosted on a remote server were not persuasive to satisfy Petitioner’s burden to prove the unpatentability of claims 8 and 18 by a preponderance of the evidence, especially given Newstrom’s express disclosure that the geospatial database is located on the vehicle. Dec. 40–42. For example, we stated: Petitioner does not explain adequately why Newstrom’s disclosure that, when first initializing the database manager, the geospatial database is loaded into solid state memory by, for example, wirelessly transferring data from a server means that the geospatial database is remote from the vehicle. Similarly, Petitioner does not explain adequately why Newstrom’s disclosure that the database manager can load new portions of the data into solid state memory as the vehicle location changes means that the geospatial database is remote from the vehicle. Nor does Petitioner’s conclusory contention that “the geospatial database 20 may be hosted on a server that is remote from a vehicle” (Pet. 83 (emphasis added)) apprise us of disclosure that Newstrom’s geospatial database is remote from the vehicle. Dr. Morellas’ testimony is substantially identical to the Petition (see Ex. 1003 ¶197) and, thus, also fails to provide adequate support for Petitioner’s assertions. During the hearing, counsel for Petitioner confirmed that it relied solely on Newstrom’s disclose of the database using a “wireless connection” by which the database manager communicates with the database in arguing that Newstrom’s geospatial database 20 is remote from vehicle 12. Tr. 19:14–24; see also Ex. 1012, 8:27–29. Petitioner, however, fails to explain adequately how such wireless communication indicates that the database is not located on vehicle, especially given Newstrom’s express disclosure (discussed above) that the database is onboard the vehicle.” slip op. at 5
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Initially, Petitioner’s reliance on assertions made in its Reply, relying on Dr. Morellas’ second declaration, fail to persuade us that we overlooked or misapprehended any arguments made in the Petition. Such post-institution arguments attempting to bolster the Petition are untimely and, thus, improper. See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 73 (Nov. 2019).6 Even considering Petitioner’s Reply arguments, however, we are not” slip op. at 7
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,882,399 - PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00820 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–11 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Tadros, Porter, Kalili, and Texin 990R.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. We institute an inter partes review of claims 1–11 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 13–15). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s explanation of the level of skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’090 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Both parties indicate that no claim terms need to be expressly construed. Pet. 29–30; Prelim. Resp. 5. Consistent with that, we determine that we need not construe any claim terms expressly in order to resolve the parties’ dispute regarding whether Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Weighing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we find Petitioner’s arguments and evidence sufficient at this stage to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing. Pet. 8–17, 30–49. For example, regarding whether of Porter’s disclosure to the problem faced by inventor of the ’090 patent. Pet. 8; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 144–164. The ’090 patent illustrates that its inventor faced the problem of selecting desirable materials for an aligner, including selecting a desirable material for an aligner’s hard layer. Ex. 1001, 5:44–59. Petitioner and Dr. Osswald provide significant evidence and reasoning tending to show that Porter’s discussion of Tritan logically would have commended itself to the attention of an inventor facing the problem of selecting an aligner hard layer. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 144–164). For example, Dr. Osswald explains that “because Tritan copolyesters are BPA-free, Rafih specifically discloses Tritan EX401 as an exemplary material” for its oral appliance. Id. ¶ 99 (citing Ex. 1104, 5:4–64, claims 2, 9, 10). In view of this, Dr. Osswald testifies that “Rafih would inform a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that Porter’s guidance regarding replacing polycarbonate with Tritan applies to dental appliances.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 146. At this stage, weighing Petitioner’s evidence against Patent Owner’s contrary attorney argument that Porter focuses on dishware, we determine Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Porter is analogous art. Pet. 8; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 144–164; Prelim. Resp. 1, 9–10, 18–21.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,648,090 - PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00821 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–23, 25, and 26 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Tadros, Porter, Kalili, and Texin 990R.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. We institute an inter partes review of claims 1–23, 25, and 26 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 13–15). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s explanation of the level of skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’090 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Neither party indicates that we need to construe expressly any claim terms. Pet. 27–28; Prelim. Resp. 5. Consistent with that, we determine that we need not construe any claim terms expressly in order to resolve the parties’ dispute regarding whether Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“arguments and evidence sufficient at this stage to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing. Pet. 8–17, 53–71. For example, regarding whether Porter is analogous art, Petitioner sufficiently shows reasonable pertinence of Porter’s disclosure to the problem faced by inventor of the ’091 patent. Pet. 8; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 146–165. The ’091 patent illustrates that its inventor faced the problem of selecting desirable materials for an aligner, including selecting a desirable material for an aligner’s hard layer. Ex. 1001, 5:44–59. Petitioner and Dr. Osswald provide significant evidence and reasoning tending to show that Porter’s discussion of Tritan logically would have commended itself to the attention of an inventor facing the problem of selecting an aligner hard layer. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1007 “because Tritan copolyesters are BPA-free, Rafih specifically discloses Tritan EX401 as an exemplary material” for its oral appliance. Id. ¶ 99 (citing Ex. 1104, 5:4–64, claims 2, 9, 10). In view of this, Dr. Osswald testifies that “Rafih would inform a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that Porter’s guidance regarding replacing polycarbonate with Tritan applies to dental appliances.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 147. At this stage, weighing Petitioner’s evidence against Patent Owner’s countervailing attorney argument that Porter focuses on dishware, we determine Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Porter is analogous art. Pet. 8; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 146–165; Prelim. Resp. 1–2, 9–10, 34–36.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,648,091 - PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00819 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims based on both obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Tadros, Kalili, and Texin 990R to meet the limitations of the claims challenged under this ground.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had at least a four-year undergraduate degree in materials science, mechanical engineering, chemical engineering, or a related field and at least two years of experience in the field of polymer science, combined with at least two years of experience in the field of design, manufacture, and processing of thermoformable polymer sheets for use in various applications, such as in orthodontic and dental appliances. Additional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa. Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 13–15). At this stage, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal or offer an alternative proposal. See generally Prelim. Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Only claim terms in controversy need be construed. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”). For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term requires express construction.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Tadros, Kalili, and Texin 990R to meet the limitations of the claims challenged under this ground. We disagree that Petitioner fails to meet its burden as to the motivation to combine arguments. Petitioner persuasively maps the limitations of the challenged claims to portions of the references relied upon. Pet. 28–38 (claim 1), 38–51. Petitioner also, on this record, provides adequate statements of motivation to combine with a reasonable expectation of success. See, e.g., id. at 34–36 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 31, 39–42, 147–151, 174–176). The Petition’s reliance on supporting testimony and related corroborating evidence to support the combination does not amount to impermissible hindsight, as that testimony takes into account “knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure.” In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). Without further clarification or support from Patent Owner, and in the absence of testimony to support the assertion that a POSITA would not have combined the cited references in the manner proposed with a reasonable expectation of success, we are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments in this regard.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 11,154,384 - PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00818 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims 1–22 based on all three asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the briefing and cited evidence of record, we institute inter partes review because we find that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art (sometimes referred to herein as a “POSITA”) would have had at least a four-year undergraduate degree in materials science, mechanical engineering, chemical engineering, or a related field and at least two years of experience in the field of polymer science, combined with at least two years of experience in the field of design, manufacture, and processing of thermoformable polymer sheets for use in various applications, such as in orthodontic and dental appliances. Additional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa. Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 13–15). At this stage, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal or offer an alternative proposal. See generally Prelim. Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that no terms require construction, but that “Petitioner applies the prior art consistent with Patent Owner’s assertions in its Infringement Contentions (EX1014, 6-20.).” Pet. 26. Patent Owner does not propose any express claim constructions. Prelim. Resp. 5. Nor does Patent Owner allege that any of Petitioner’s claim interpretations contradict Petitioner’s position in the related district court litigation. Id. Only claim terms in controversy need be construed. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”). For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term requires express construction.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Tadros, Kalili, and Texin 990R to meet the limitations of the claims challenged under this ground. We disagree that Petitioner fails to meet its burden as to the motivation to combine arguments. Petitioner persuasively maps the limitations of the challenged claims to portions of the references relied upon. Pet. 27–36 (claim 1), 36–46. Petitioner also, on this record, provides adequate statements of motivation to combine with a reasonable expectation of success. See, e.g., id. at 32–35 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 31, 39–41, 57–87, 146–150, 171–172). The Petition’s reliance on supporting testimony and related corroborating evidence to support the combination does not amount to impermissible hindsight, as that testimony takes into account “knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure.” In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). Without further clarification or support from Patent Owner, and in the absence of testimony to support the assertion that a POSITA would not have combined the cited references in the manner proposed with a reasonable expectation of success, we are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments in this regard. We also disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments about “adhesive lamination” using “tie layers” at this point in the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 15–18. On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has adequately supported its arguments that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use adhesive lamination to achieve the proposed combination. See, e.g., Pet. 33–35; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 39–42, 120, 45, 51, 116, 120. Petitioner relies on Kalili as disclosing a hard layer suitable for combination with Tadros’s soft layers (Pet. 32), and more particularly, doing so in the context of a laminated multilayer aligner (Reply 4). To create the laminated multilayer aligner proposed, Petitioner’s suggested use of a particular type of well-known lamination, i.e. adhesive lamination, is sufficiently developed and supported in the Petition. Pet. 32–35. Here, Patent Owner recognizes that Kalili teaches lamination, but suggests that it does not specifically teach using adhesive lamination. Prelim. Sur-reply 5. We note, however, that the parties have identified limited types of known lamination for aligners: coextrusion, extrusion lamination, and adhesive lamination. Prelim Sur-reply 4; Pet. 14–15 n.3, 33. In KSR, the Supreme Court explained that when “there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. “If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.” Id. Having reviewed Petitioner’s proffered arguments as to Tadros, Kalili, and Texin 990R, including motivation to combine the references asserted in this ground, with a reasonable expectation of success, we are persuaded on this record that Petitioner has met its burden for institution with respect to Ground 1.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,973,613 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00714 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable: Goldenberg anticipates or renders claims 1–6, 8–13, and 15–19 obvious, and Goldenberg with Cruz-Hernandez renders claims 7, 14, and 20 obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar, supported by testimonial evidence, and consistent with the asserted prior art and the types of problems and solutions in the ’907 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:14–62. Because we discern no dispositive difference between the parties’ proposals, and neither party has argued that the choice between the two would affect the outcome,6 we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill for this decision. We note, however, that our decision would be the same under Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“to,” as recited in each of claims 1, 8, and 15, to “require[] a cause-and-effect relationship between a secondary event (e.g., a haptic effect) that occurs in reaction to a first event (e.g., entry of the user input element to one or more positions within the boundary range of positions).” PO Resp. 26–27 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 44). Patent Owner argues that “in response to” refers to more than just a coincidence and involves at least some degree of causality. Id. at 27 (citing American Calcar, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ex. 2007, 12–14 (dictionary definition); Ex. 2008, 7 (dictionary definition); Ex. 2006, 30:13–31:2, 32:8–11, 32:17– 21 (testimony by Mr. Ward)); PO Sur-reply 8–9 (citing Ex. 2009, 34:8–19, 36:5–21 (testimony by Mr. Ward)).” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“to,” as recited in each of claims 1, 8, and 15, to “require[] a cause-and-effect relationship between a secondary event (e.g., a haptic effect) that occurs in reaction to a first event (e.g., entry of the user input element to one or more positions within the boundary range of positions).” PO Resp. 26–27 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 44). Patent Owner argues that “in response to” refers to more than just a coincidence and involves at least some degree of causality. Id. at 27 (citing American Calcar, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ex. 2007, 12–14 (dictionary definition); Ex. 2008, 7 (dictionary definition); Ex. 2006, 30:13–31:2, 32:8–11, 32:17– 21 (testimony by Mr. Ward)); PO Sur-reply 8–9 (citing Ex. 2009, 34:8–19, 36:5–21 (testimony by Mr. Ward)).” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“To show anticipation under § 102, a petitioner must locate every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, in a single prior art reference. See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The limitations may be present in the reference “either explicitly or inherently.” In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In making this determination, we consider the reference “together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)).” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 10,627,907 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,627,907
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.